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This  study of the  instruments of monetary policy in  the Member  States of 
the European  Economic Community is the  outcome  of a  joint undertaking by  the 
national  monetary  authorities  and ·the  Directorate  General  for  monetary  and 
financial  problems  in  the  Commission  of the  European  Economic  Community. 
It was  originally required by  the  Monetary  Committee  and the  Commission 
for  their own  purposes.  The  Committee  has  used it during  the  past year as a 
basic document in  detailed discussions of the  nature,  use and effectiveness of 
tns truments  ol  monetary  policy.  In  the  course of these  discussions it was sug-
gested that the  studies should be  published and made  availabl~ to  wider circles 
I 
interested in  problems of Common  Market monetary policy.  · 
Our  thanks  are  due  to  the  Commission  of the  Econom~c Community  for 
taking  up  the  Monetary  Committee's  suggestion  and  making;  this  publication 
possible. 
JONKHEER MR  .. E. VAN LENNEP 
Chairman of the Mf?netary  Committee 
of the  European  Ef:onomic  Community MAIN  CONTENTS 
Part one 
THE  INSTRUMENTS OF MONETARY  POLICY IN  THE COUNTRIES 
OF  THE  EUROPEAN  ECONOMIC  COMMUNITY  7 
Part two 
THE  INSTRUMENTS  OF  MONETARY  POLICY  IN  THE  FEDERAL 
REPUBUC OF  GERMANY  53 
Part three 
THE  INSTRUMENTS  OF  MONETARY POLICY IN  FRANCE  103 
Part four 
THE  INSTRUMENTS  OF MONETARY  POUCY IN  ITALY  153 
Part five 
THE  INSTRUMENTS  OF  MONETARY  POLICY  IN  BELGIUM  181 
Part six 
THE  INSTRUMENTS  OF  MONETARY  POLICY  IN  THE  NETHER-
. LANDS  215 
Part seven 
THE  INSTRUMENTS  OF  MONETARY  POLICY  IN LUXEMBOURG  251 Part one 
THE  INSTRUMENTS 
OF  MONETARY  POLICY  IN  THE  COUNTRIES 
OF  THE  EUROPEAN  ECONOMIC  COMMUNITY CONTENTS 
Introductory remarks 
I.  Basic facts of monetary policy 
Chapter 1: The institutional framework of monetary policy 
Chapter 2 : The structural conditions of monetary policy 




Chapter 3: Refinancing policy  29 
Chapter 4: Ope~-market  operations  36 
Chapter 5: Minimum reserve policy  41 
III. The financing of the public sector and its influence on  the liquidity 
of the economy and of the banks  48 
TABLE 
1 - Liquidity of the economy in member countries in 1960  23 
9 INTRODUCTORY  REMARKS 
1.  From the outset the Monetary Committee's  regular  studies of the monetary 
and  financial  situation in  the  Member  States  have  shown  how  necessary it is 
to have a  careful analysis made  of the means of action available to the Central 
Banks  and  the  other  monetary  authorities :  discount  policy,  ininimum  reserve 
requirements, open··market operations and also the possibility of influencing the 
liquidity of the economy and the banks as a  result of the financing of the public 
sector. The significance of these weapons in the Member States was not always 
very clear, and in any case the circumstances in which they were used were not 
sufficiently  known. 
2.  A  full  understanding  of  monetary  policy  in  the  member  countries pre-
supposes  a  precise  knowledge  of  these  monetary instruments  - often differing 
in conception - of their use in an institutional and structural framework varying 
from  country to country and, finally, of their efficacy. It is particularly important 
for  the Monetary Committee to possess such knowledge, when it has to discharge 
the duty, entrusted to it by the Treaty, of advising the Council or the Commission 
of  the  European  Economic  Community  on  these  matters.  In  general  the  views 
expressed  by  the  Committee  already  contain  the  main  features  of  eventual 
recommendations of the  two Community institutions  to the  Member States;  such 
recommendations  have  a  proportionately  greater  practical  value  the  more  they 
can  take  into  account the  special situation and  the  monetary policy powers of 
the respective Member State. 
3.  In the course of its work the Monetary Committee has become increasingly 
conscious of the need for a  systematic description of the instruments of monetary 
policy in the  Member  States, of the  way in which  they are applied and of their 
efficacy.  The  responsible  monetary  authorities  in  the  Member  States  and  the 
services  of the  Commission have  closely co-operated in making  studies  of the 
instruments  of monetary policy in  the  Member States,  which  were  completed by 
a  comparative  survey.  Each of them was  thoroughly discussed by  the Monetary 
Committee. 
The  extensive  knowledge gained in this  way  will make it easier to align 
the  instruments  and  methods  of monetary policy in  the  various  countries.  The 
discussions of the Committee give its members a  chance to acquaint themselves 
with the experience of their partners in respect to certain instruments of monetary 
policy and  put  forward  suggestions  for  the  improvement  of their  own  monetary 
policy.  Thus,  the  introduction  of  a  system  of  minimum  reserve  requirements 
in  Belgium,  at the  beginning  of 1962,  and the  improvement of this instrument in  11 12 
France,  may,  in this  respect,  be  considered as  progress  in the achievement of 
which the work of the Committee had some part. 
4.  Instruments of monetary policy appear on the whole to be  mote comparable 
now than in the  early days of the Common  Market. It is true that the conditions 
under  which they are  applied are  quite  different:  the  behaviour of individuals, 
groups  and  institutions  which  participate  in  monetary  transactions  is  not  the 
same;  the  banking  systems  are not entirely comparable  and  finally the general 
dissimilarity in  the  structure  of the  economies  also  has  some  importance.  The 
differences  are  reflected,  for  instance,  in  greater  or  lesser  interdependence 
between  the  various  member  countries  and  the  rest  of  the  world.  In  view of 
these  structural  differences  one  cannot  expect - even considering  the process 
already  begun  of  improving  comparability  of  .their  monetary  instruments  - a 
complete harmonization of policies in this field.  Nor does the. stipulation in the 
Treaty of Rome  - that monetary policies must be co-ordinated to the full extent 
necessary  for  the  functioning  of the  Commoo  Market  - imply such  a  degree of 
harmonization.  Nevertheless,  the  instruments  of  policy  must  be  perfected and 
the  arrangements  by which  they  are  applied must be  worked out in such a  way 
as to attain the common aim of a  co-ordinated monetary policy, i.e. an economic 
expansion  which  does  not  jeopardize  the 'internal  and· external stability of the 
currencies. I.  BASIC  FACTS  OF  MONETARY  POLICY 
CHAPTER  1 
THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF MONETARY POLICY 
5.  In this  study the term "monetary policy" will be  understood to denote the 
means  available  to  the  monetary  authorities  to  influence  the  liquidity  I  of the 
economy, in particular by acting on bank liquidity. 
The responsibility for  monetary policy in  the  Member  States  of the  EEC 
with  the  exception of  Luxembourg,  which has  no  C~ntral Bank of its  own and 
is a  special case by reason of its membership of the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic 
Union, is vested by virtue of the respective laws in the Central Bank, in varying 
degree  from  state  to  state.  In  some  member  countries  the State,  however, has 
also  assigned certain  powers  in  the  field  of monetary  policy to  other official 
institutions or to the government itself or has even taken the final responsibility 
for  monetary policy,  but has at least provided for  its own participation in deci-
sions on monetary policy. 
Besides  this,  there is  a  factual  limitation  on  the  powers  of the Central 
Banks:  governments,  that is  to  say,  exert an influence  on  monetary  trends  by 
their debt-management policy and  by the  placing of their liquid funds.  In  fact, 
this  policy is  generally  the  reflection  of  a  co-ordination  - varying,  however, 
in  degree  from  State  to State  - between  the  competent  public  bodies  and the 
Central Bank. 
6.  It  is  perhaps  not  always  precisely  possible  to  determine  the  scope  of 
government intervention in monetary policy or, conversely, the degree of autonomy 
of  the  Central  Banks.  The  existing  legislation  governing  relations  between 
government and Central  Bank give  only an imperfect picture of these relations, 
\Which  are  often  very  complex.  In  practice  the  government,  where  it has  very 
strong powers to  p~rticipate or even to intervene in this field,  might not always 
avail itself of its  authority.  Conversely,  where  these  legal provisions  give  to 
the Central Bank a  very far-reaching autonomy,  the _government may still insist 
on its views  being  taken into account.  These legal provisions,  therefore,  come 
into  play only in the  event  of sharp conflict, whilst  the  day-to-day conduct of 
monetary  policy  and  of  collaboration  between  Government  and  Central  Bank 
tends to depend on  the  personalities engaged.  13 The  following  is a  brief description of relations between Government and 
Central Bank in so far as they are laid down by laws and regulations. 
7.  In  the  Federal  Republic of Germany  the  Deutsche  Bundesbank is empow-
ered by the  Act of 1957  to  fix  interest and discount rates as well as minimum 
reserve ratios within pre'scribed limits, and to determine the principles governing 
its  credit  and  open-market  operations.  In  the  exercice  of  these  powers  the 
Bundesbank  is  independent  of  instructions  of  the  Federal  Government.  It is, 
however, required to  support the general economic policy of the Federal Govern-
ment at least as far as this obligation is consonant with its special task, which 
is briefly defined in the Act as the "safeguarding of the currency" (die Wahrung 
zu sichern). 
The  1957  Act  also  goes  into  some  detail  on  co-operation  between  the 
Government and the Central Bank. 
a) The  Bundesbank has to advise the  Federal Government of matters of primary 
importance  in  the  field  of monetary policy and upon request furnish information 
to the Federal Government. 
b) The  members  of  the  Federal  Government  are  entitled  to  take  part  in  the 
deliberations of the Central Bank Council. They have no vote,  but may propose 
motions.  At their request the  taking of  a  decision is deferred,  but for  not more 
than two weeks. 
c) The  Federal  Government  invites  the  President of  the  Deutsche  Bundesbank 
to participate in its deliberations on  matters of importance in the field of  monetary 
policy. 
The 1957 Act contains no other provisions concerning the relation between 
Government  and  Central  Bank.  In  particular, it provides  for  no appeal  or arbi-
tration authority in the event of disagreement. 
The  wide  institutiona'l autonomy of the  Bundesbank is supplemented  by 
the personal)nd.ependence of the members of the Central Bank Council (Zentral-
bankrat),  the  highest  body of  the  Bundesbank.  This  Council  consists  of  the 
President and Vice-President of the  Deutsche  Bundesbank,  the  other members 
(at  present seven in  nutT1ber)  of the  Board of Managers  of the  Bundesbank and 
of  the  eleven  Presidents  of  the Lander  Central  Banks  (Landeszentralbanken). 
These· are  the  Main  Offices  (Hauptstellen)  of  the  Bundesbank  in  the Lander, 
the  Hanseatic  cities  and West  Berlin. The members  of the  Board (Direktorium) 
are  proposed by  the  Federal Government;  the  Presidents of the Lander Central 
Banks by the Bundesrat (the Upper House of Parliament, consisting of represent-
atives  of  the  Lander  Governments)  on  nominations  from  the  competent Lander 
authorities.  All  are- appointed  for  a  period  of  eight  years  by  the  President of 
the  Federal  Republic.  The  President  of  the  Deutsche  Bundesbank,  who  is 
chairman  of  the  Board  of  Management,  also  presides  over  the  Central  Bank 
14  Council, which as a  general rule meets fortnightly. 8.  In  France  the  institutional  framework  of monetary  policy  is  determined 
by  the  Act of 2  December 1945  on  the nationalization of the Banque de France 
and  the  major  banks  (grandes  banques)  and  on  the  organization  of  the  credit 
system.  This  Act  was  superimposed  on  the  laws,  decrees  and  conventions 
which  formerly defined the status of the Banque de France. It set up a  "Conseil 
national  du  credit"  (National  Credit  Council)  whose  task  is  to  decide  on  the 
general lines of credit policy and to study ways of adapting it to the economic 
development  of  the  country.  The  Government,  the  National  Credit  Council and 
the Banque de France thus share responsibility in monetary matters. 
The  Governor  of  the  Banque  de  France  is  appointed  for  an  indefinite 
period by a  decree of the  Council of Ministers  meeting under  the chairmanship 
of  the  President  of  the  Republic.  The  Governor  is  assisted  by  two  deputy 
governors, appointed in the same way, and he presides over the General Council 
of the Bank which includes the following: 
i)  seven members are appointed by the Minister of Finance to represent general 
interests (labour,  industry, agriculture, etc.); 
ii)  four  members  who  are  ex officio members in their capacity as General Man-
agers of the leading specialized credit institutions in the public sector; 
iii) one member is elected by the  personnel of the  Bank.  Two auditors, who are 
senior officials  in the Ministry of Finance, attend the  ~eetings of the General 
Council in an advisory capacity. 
The  Banque de  France fixes  among  other things  the  rates and conditions 
applying  to  rediscounting  and  open-market  operations.  Since  the  beginning  of 
1961  it has  also  been  responsible  for  fixing,  within limits  authorized  by  the 
Conseil national du  credit, the minimum  reserve ratio (coefficient de tresorerie). 
The Conseil national du credit is pr_esided over by the Minister of Finance 
and  Economic  Affairs,  the  Governor  of the  Banque  de  France  being ex officio 
Vice-President.  The 43  members of this Council include  eleven representatives 
of the borrowers, eight of workers' organizations, eight of the Ministries respon-
sible for economic matters, eight of finance and banking institutions and, finally, 
eight members  exercising or having exercised managerial functions  in public or 
semi-public credit institutions. Secretarial services for  the Council are provided 
by a  special department of the Banque de France, it is the Governor of the Bank 
who  almost  invariably  takes  the  chair  at  meetings.  The  Conseil  national du 
credit  n1akes  proposals,  renders  opinions  or  formulates  recommendations  for 
transmission  to  the  responsible  Ministers.  But  its  main  functions  are  to  take 
"decisions of a  general nature" (decisions de caractere general) concerning the 
regulation  of banking  activities  (minimum  reserve  ratios),  scale of  bank rates 
and charges, regulations on hire purchase credits, etc.). 
The control of the banking and allied professions is the responsibility of 
the  Commission  de  controle  des  banques,  which  is  also  presided over  by  the  15 Governor of the Ban  que de France. If we further take into consideration that the 
latter is also chairman of the  Comite des  Bourses  de  valeur's  (Stock Exchange 
Committee),  which has authority over the  capital market, we  see the importance 
of his role and the action which he can take in widely differing fields,  in close 
liaison  with  the  Minister  of  Finance,  who  is himself represented at all levels 
in the machinery just described. 
9.  In  Italy  powers  in  the  matter  of monetary  poli-cy  have been  vested  to a 
large extent in the Comi tato Interministeriale per i1  credito e  i1  risparmio (Inter-
ministerial Committee for  Credit and Savings).  The powers of the Central Bank 
in this field must be considered as deri~ed or delegated functions. 
The Comitato lnterministeriale - established in 1947 - is under the chair-
manship  of the  Minister of the  Treasury,  and  includes  the  Ministers  of Public 
Works,  Agriculture,  Industry  and  Trade,  External  Trade  and  the  Budget.  The 
Governor of the Banca d'ltalia takes part in the Committee's meetings. 
This  Committee  determines  monetary  policy  and  has  wide  powers  of 
supervision over the banks. Its decisions are carried out by the Ministry of the 
Treasury and  by the  Banca d'Italia which is under  the  control of that Ministry. 
The Minister has power to change Bank rate and this he does in practice on the 
proposal of the Governor of the Central Bank. 
\ 
The  Banca d'Italia is directed by a  Consiglio superiore  (Council) whose 
role is similar to that of a  Board of Directors and which consists of the Governor 
and of twelve members appointed by  the general meeting of shareholders. These 
are  principally the savings banks (holders of 59% of the Bank's capital), other 
credit  institutions  and  pension  funds  and  insurance  companies.  The  Council 
appoints  the  Governor,  the  General  Manager  (representing  the  Governor)  and 
the Deputy General Manager, who make up the managing board of the Bank. These 
appointments must be confirmed by decree of the President of the Republic. The 
Consiglio superiore is not competent in the field of monetary policy, which is, 
as  mentioned  above,  the  -responsibility  of  the  Comitato  Interministeriale  to 
which  the  Governor  of the  Banca d'Italia  belongs.  The  administration  of the 
Bank is kept quite separate from the exercise of monetary powers. 
10.  In the Netherlands,  the Nederlandsche Bank (a joint-stock company wholly 
owned by the State) has the  task, under the Act of 1948, "to regulate the value 
of the Netherlands monetary unit in such a  way as is deemed most conducive to 
the welfare of the country and to keep its value as stable as possible". 
Powers  in  monetary matters  are  vested in  the  Board of Managers  of the 
Bank,  which  consists of the President and the Secretary together with at least 
three and at most five Managers. Members of the  Board of Managers are appoint-
ed for  seven years by the Crown, on nomination by a  joint meeting of the Board 
of Managers  and the  Board of Directors  (Raad van  commissarissen).  They  are 
16  also  suspended or dismissed by the Crown (see also the last paragraph of this section). The Bankraad (Bank Council) is another body responsible for monetary 
policy.  It has  17  members  and  is  presided  over  by  a  Royal Commissioner who 
exercises  Government supervision over the  Bank and who  may participate in an 
advisory  capacity at meetings  of the  Board of Directors  and at joint meetings. 
Four members of the  Bank Council are appointed by the  Board of Directors from 
among  its  own  members  and  twelve  are  appointed  for  four  years  by the Crown 
on  nomination  by  the  busines~ and  labour  organizations  in  such  a  way  that 
trade  (including  transport),  industry  and  agriculture  are  represented  by  two 
members each and  labour, financial  and banking circles  by three members each. 
Meetings  of the Bank Council which take place at least six times annually 
are attended in an advisory capacity by the Board of  Managers of the  Bank, the 
Treasurer-General  and  representatives  of  the  Ministries  of  Economics,  Agri-
culture and Social Affairs.  At the meetings the President of the  Bank reports on 
economic  and  financial  developments and  on  the  Bank's  policy.  The  Bank 
Council is entitled to give its advice to the Minister of Finance in matters which 
are  of importance  for  guiding  the  Bank's  policy,  and  the  Minister  of Finance 
may request its opinion, after consulting the Board of Managers. 
When  he  considers  it  necessary  for  the  co-ordination  of  monetary  and 
financial  policy,  the  Finance  Minister  may  give  instructions  to  the  Board of 
Managers after consulting the Bank Council. Nevertheless, the Board of Managers 
may within three  days submit its objections to the  Crown, which then examines 
the  ministerial  directives.  If  these  are  confirmed,  the  Board's  objections  and 
the  decisions  of the  Crown  are  published in the  "Nederlandse Staatscourant" 
provided such publication is not contrary to the  interests of the State. Members 
of  the  Board  of  Managers  failing  to  apply  directives  of  the  Finance Minister 
which  have  not  given  rise  to  any  objec.tions  or  have  been  confirmed  by  the 
Crown  may be  removed from  office  after consultation with  the Council of State. 
11.  In  Belgium  powers  in  the  field  of  monetary  policy  are  to  some  extent 
decentralized. The Banque nationale de Belgique, which is a  joint stock company 
with  half  of  its  capital  held  by  the  State,  is  chiefly  competent  for  discount 
policy,  fixing  the  rediscount  conditions  and the  minimum  reserve  ratio (coeffi-
cient  de  reserve  monetaire).  This  ratio  is  fixed  by  the  Commission  bancaire 
(Banking Commission), but on the proposal of the Banque nationale de Belgique. 
Open-market operations are the responsibility of a  sp~cial body, the  "Fonds  des 
rentes" (Government Stock Equalization Account). 
The  Banque nationale is directed by  a  Governor and  administered by the 
Managing  Board  which  is presided over by the Governor; it is assisted by the 
Conseil de regence (Council of Regents). The Governor is appointed by the King 
for  five  years;  the  Managers  - at least three  and not more  than six - are like-
wise appointed by the King for a  period of six years, on a  proposal of the Conseil 
de regence.  17 The  Managing  Boar.d  conducts  all business  which is not  the preserve of 
the  Conseil de  regence. In case of urgency the Managing Board may change the 
rates  for discount and advances  on  securities but must refer the  matter to the 
Conseil de  regence at its next meeting. 
The  Conseil  de  regence  meets at least once  weekly.  It consists  of the 
Governor, the managers and ten regents. The regents are  elec~ed by the general 
meeting of shareholders for  three  years. Two of them  are  chosen on  a  proposal 
of  the  most  representative  labour organizations  and three  are  proposed by the 
most representative organizations of industry, trade and agriculture. Two regents 
are  selected from the  management of public finance  institutions.  The remaining 
three are nominated by the Minister of Finance.  The Conseil de regence discusses 
general questions concerning the Bank, the monetary situation and the economic 
development  of  the  country.  It fixes  the  rates  and  conditions  for  discount, 
advances  on  securities  and  loans.  However,  the  Governor  of  the  Bank  may 
suspend  execution of the  decisions  of the  Conseil de  regen ce;  in  such cases 
he has to submit the decisions to the Conseil general (General Council), which 
for  that purpose is called together at short notice. The Conseil general consists 
of the  members  of the  Conseil de regence  and  the eight  to ten  members  of the 
college de censeurs (Auditing Board) and is presided over by the Governor. 
Finally~  the  Finance  Minister  exercises  control  over  all  the  Bank's 
operations  through  the  intermediary  of  a  Government  commissioner,  appointed 
by  the  King,  who  has  a  right  of  suspensive  veto  in  respect  of  any measure 
contrary to law or to the "interests of the State" and who may attend the meetings 
of the various bodies of the Bank in a  consultative capacity. 
Beside  the  Banque  nationale  de  Belgique  there are  further  institutions 
with powers  in respect to monetary policy. The  Fonds  des rentes  has  already 
been mentioned. Next to it the Institut de reescompte et de garan:tie (Rediscount 
and  Guarantee  Institute)  influences  the  money  market.  Finally,  there  is  the 
Commission  bancaire  (Banking  Commission)  which; in  addition  to  its  functions 
in  supervising  the  banks  and issues  of securities  on the capital market, admin-
isters  the  system  of  the  so-called  bank  cover  ratios  (coefficients  bancaires). 
But  beginning  in  1962  this  regulation  has  been  replaced  by  a  conventional 
system of minimum reserve requirements. 
The  decentralization  of responsibilities  in respect to  monetary policy is 
modified  by  the  fact  that  the  Banque  nationale  de  Belgique, as  the  principal 
authority  responsible  for  monetary  policy,  is  represented and  can  express  its 
opinion  in  all these  institutions.  Thus,  the  Fonds des  rente  s  is  jointly admin-
istered by  the Treasury and the Bank. The Institut de reescompte et de garantie 
is directed  by  a  Comite  de  direction  (Board of directors) with responsibilities 
for  daily  transactions  consisting  of  a  Chairman  and  seven  members  who  are 
appointed by the King and may be dismissed by him.  Four of these members are· 
chosen  from  a  list  which  includes  three  candidates  nominated  by  the  general 
18  meeting  of shareholders  (banks  and  financial  institutions) for  each  seat to be filled.  It is  customary  that  the  chairman  and  two  mem hers  of  the  Comi te de 
direction  are  from  the  Banque  nationale.  The  operations  of  the  Institute are 
supervised  by  a  Government Commissioner who has a  right of veto at all meet-
ings of the  Comite de direction. 
The  most important decisions  of the Commission bancaire - in particular 
those  relating  to  the  former  regulations  on  the  bank  cover ratio  - are subject 
to ministerial approval.  Under the  new system ·of minimum  reserve requirements 
this approval is only required when the rate of these reserves is raised by more 
than three points in the course of any 30-day period. 
12.  Luxembourg has  no  Central Bank.  Under agreements  between Luxembourg 
and Belgium the circulation of Luxembourg notes and coins is limited to a  sym-
bolical  amount of  300  million  francs.  Belgian  notes  and  coin  are  also  legal 
tender in the Grand Duchy. 
Luxembourg's  sovereignty in monetary matters  extends  only to  fixing  the 
parity of its currency. A public institution, the Caisse d'epargne de l'Etat (State 
Savings  Bank),  exerts  a  considerable  influence  on  the  movement  of  credit in 
Luxembourg.  It acts  as  bank  of  the  State  and  accepts  deposits  expressed in 
Luxembourg francs; as far as possible it grants credits only to borrowers residing 
in  the  Grand  Duchy;  its  liquidity surpluses  are  invested preferably in readily 
negotiable  money  market  paper  in  Belgium.  The  business  of  the  Bank  is as 
large as that of all the other banks in the Grand Duchy put together. 
Deposits with the Caisse d'epargne de l'Etat are guaranteed by the State, 
which  supervises  the  Bank's  activities.  The  Caisse  d'epargne  de  l'Etat is 
controlled by a  commissioner, appointed by ministerial decree,  who  can attend 
meetings  both  of the  Board of Directors  and of the  Managing  Board. It is also 
supervised by the commissariat for  the control of banks. 
The Caisse d'epargne de l'Etat has a  Board of Directors consisting of the 
Director,  the  Deputy-Director,  both  appointed  by  Grand-Ducal  Decree,  and  a 
maximum of five other directors appointed by ministerial decree.  These include 
the  Honorary Director of the establishment,  a  representative of the Chamber of 
Commerce,  one  of the  Chamber of Handicrafts  and one  of the  National  Labour 
Office.  The  Board  of  Directors  fixes  the  interest  rate  and  credit conditions, 
assumes  responsibility  for  the  investment  policy  of the  Bank  and  supervises 
the work of the management. 
It is  to  be  noted  that decisions  of the  Board of Directors  submitted for 
ministerial  approval  become  effective  despite  any objection  by  the  Ministry if 
the  Board,  after deliberating,  confirms  its previous  attitude.  Nevertheless,  the 
Government has the right to dissolve the  Board of Directors. 
The  Managing  Board  which  at  present  is  composed  of  three  members 
appointed by  ministerial decree, in addition to the Director and Deputy Director,  19 decides  as  to  the  acceptance or rejection of individual  applications  for  credits 
or  loans  and  is  responsible  for  all  the  business  of  management  which  is not 
especially reserved to the Board of Directors. 
To sum up: 
i)  the  powers  of  the  Caisse  d'epargne  de  l'Etat  in  the  sphere  of monetary 
policy apply only to deposit money; 
ii)  the  monetary  policy  followed  by  this  autonomous  public  establishment is 
laid down by the Government subject to the above reservations; 
iii) the operations of the Caisse d'epargne de  l'Etat are under the direct control 
of the Government represented by a  supervising Commissioner. 
13.  Apart  from  their  powers  in  the  sphere  of  monetary  policy  in  the  strict 
sense of the term,  the central banks of all the Member States have wide powers 
in the field of  ba1tking policy,  supervision and control.  From the monetary  point 
of  view  the  scope  of  these  responsibilities  goes  beyond  the  mere  supervision 
of liquidity and solvency, particularly in those countries where monetary policy 
makes  use  of  selective  methods  and  where  the  bank's  supervisory authorities 
also have to fix interest rates for  debtors and creditors. 
These powers are particularly extensive in the case of the  Banca d'Italia 
and  the  Banque  de  France.  In Italy  the  Central  Bank is  alone  responsible  for 
the  execution of decisions  taken  by the  authorities  controlling  banks,  i.e.  the 
Comitato interministeriale per il credito e il risparmio {Interministerial Committee 
for  Credit  and  Savings)  and  the  Minister  of  the  Treasury;  to  this  end  it has 
available extensive machinery and in fact exercises very wide responsibilities. 
In  the same way the  Banque de France  gives executory force  to the deci-
sions  taken  by  the  Conseil national du  credit whether these be  of a  general or 
individual nature, and helps to implement these decisions and those of the Com-
mission  de  controle  des  banques  (Banking  Control  Commission)  which,  as 
pointed out above,  is presided over  by the  Governor of the  Banque de France. 
In  Italy  the  powers  of  the  authorities  dealing  with  monetary  policy  and  the 
supervision of banking also extend to long-term credit establishments. In France 
the  specialized  establishments  are  under  the  direct  supervision  of  the State. 
But it goes without saying that despite this difference in structure  these  estab-
lishments  must be able  to adapt their operations  to the requirements of general 
economic policy. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany,  the Law on the Credit System (Gesetz 
iiber das Kreditwesen) which came into force at the beginning of 1962 expressly 
provides  for  co-operation between the  Federal Supervisory Office  on  the Credit 
Syste~ (Bundesaufsichtsamt fiir  das Kreditwesen) and the Deutsche Bundesbank, 
which· has  powers  of its own in certain fields  of banking control,  in particular 
20  as regards  the granting of large credits.  Before submitting its proposals for the appointment  of  the  Chairman  of  this  Office  to  the  President  of  the  Federal 
Republic  the  Federal  Government must  consult the  Central Bank.  The  Federal 
Supervisory  Office  issues  regulations  concerning  solvency  and  liquidity only 
by  agreement  with  the  bank  of issue.  When  the  Federal Ministry of  Economics 
or  the  Federal  Supervisory  Office  on  the  Credit  System  prescribes  terms  for 
granting  credits  or  accepting deposits,  these  regulations  may  not be  promul-
gated without  consultation with  the  Bundesbank.  The  terms  must be  such as to 
reinforce the credit policy measures taken by the Bank. 
In  Belgium,  the  Banque  nationale  de  Belgique  has  a  representative on 
the Commission bancaire which is the body exercising powers of superintendence 
and control over the banks. It also places its technical resources at the disposal 
of this Commission,  in this way acting as does  the  Banque de  France vis-a-vis 
the Conseil national du credit or the Banca d'Italia vis-a-vis the Comitato inter-
ministeriale.  At  the  request  of  the  Commission  bancaire  the  Bank  carries  out 
enquiries and gives its opinion,  for  instance to the Commission when  this  body 
is fixing maximum interest r~tes for certain classes of credit which it is competent 
to determine. 
In  the  Netherlands,  powers  of  supervtston and control over the  banks are 
exercised by the Central Bank itself. 
The 1956 law on the credit system confers on the Bank fairly wide powers 
which it may use to discharge the functions  assigned to it in its statutes. These 
powers  include  the  right  to  consult  the  bankers'  association  and  conclude 
agreements  with  them  when  it considers  that  the  situation is  shaping  in such 
a  way as  to impair the accomplishment of its task.  It was  thus that  the  Neder-
landsche  Bank  put into operation its system of minimum  reserves,  which is not 
provided for in the law on the Central Bank. 
21 CHAPTER  2 
THE  STRUCTURAL  CONDITIONS  OF  MONETARY  POLICY 
14.  The  methods  and  efficacy  of  monetary policy are  determined  in  varying 
degrees in the Member States by the structure of the national economy in general 
and of the banking system in particular.  Here  we  indicate only the main struc-
tural data. 
15.  The volume of payments transactions with foreign  countries is an important 
factor  in monetary policy. If we take as a  rough· frame  of reference the relation 
between exports and services supplied, on  the one hand, and the gross national 
product. on the other, we  obtain for the different States of the European Economic 
Community  in  1960  the  following  figures  (as  percentages of the gross  national 
product): 
Luxembourgl  80 
Netherlands  50 
Belgium  34 
Germany FR2  25 
Italy  16 
France  15 
Such considerable differences cannot fail to influence the extent to which 
the national economies are dependent on the world economic situation. With  the 
almost complete liberalization of trade and services, the return to convertibility 
and  the  sweeping  relaxation  of  restrictions  on  capital  movements,  relations 
with foreign countries have tended to develop more widely in all the Community 
States, particularly Italy and France, i.e. the two  countries which were formerly 
the  most  sheltered  against  fluctuations . of  the  economic  situation  in  other 
countries. 
Doubtless,  the  foreign  trade  and  payments  transactions  of  France  and 
Italy are still small (in relation to the national product) compared with those of 
the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, and their responsible authorities can 
influence  economic  trends  by monetary measures  with  less  heed to  their rapid 
repercussions on external trade.  Furthermore, certain restrictions still imposed, 
particularly  on  short-term  capital  movements,  make  Italy  and  France  less 
1  In  1959 
22  2  Excluding Berlin and Saar. sens1t1ve to international capital movements  of this sort than Federal Germany, 
the  Netherlands,  Belgium  and  Luxembourg.  The  policy  on  interest  rates  in 
France and Italy allows more  latitude,' and they are largely allowed to find their 
own  level.  It would seem, however,  that in recent times  this relative autonomy 
vis-a-vis  the  trend  of interest rates  abroad  has  tended  to disappear,  the more 
so as the banks in all Member States except France are allowed to hold balances 
in  foreign  currency and invest on  foreign  money markets,  and they do so on a 
considerable scale. 
16.  The  habits  of the  investing  public,  particularly as  regards liquidity,form 
another  structural  factor  which  monetary  policy  must  take  into  account.  Here 
again we  have  only a  rough basis of comparison.  We  may get some  idea of the 
diverse  structure  by  comparing  the  relationship in  the  different  Member  States 
between  the  liquid  assets  of  households,  non-banking  undertakings  and public 
authorities,  on  the  one hand, and the gros.s  national product,  on the other. The 
breakdown  of  these  liquid assets  varies  from  country  to  country  and  it is in 
itself an  important  structural  factor in monetary policy. 
Table  1 
LIQUIDITY  OF  THE  ECONOMY  IN  MEMBER  COUNTRIES 
IN  1960 
Currency 
Country  Primary liquidity  in circulation  Secondary liquidity 
as% of GNP  as % of primary  as% of GNP 
liquidity 
Germany FR  18  41  25 
Belgium  36  56  25 
France  34  42  21 
Italy  37  36  30 
Luxembourg  43 1  411  41 
Netherlands  27  45  38 
1 Including Belgian notes and coin circulating on Luxembourg territory (estimated). 
If we  consider the  most liquid portion of this  " liquidity of the economy ", 
i.e. currency in circulation and sight deposits (primary liquidity) the situation is 
as follows in the different countries. 
In  the  Federal Republic of Germany,  the  ratio of primary liquidity to the 
gross national product is very low (18 %)  and has remained remarkably stable on 
the  whole  since  1950.  In  the  Netherlands  it reached  27% in 1960  after wide  23 fluctuations,  with  a  predominantly  downward  trend,  since  1950.  In  France, 
Belgium,  Italy and  Luxembourg  the  ratio  in  1960  was  respectively  34%,  36%, 
37% and 43%; it had risen from  1950 onwards  in France, Italy and Luxembourg 
- with  more  marked  variations  in  the first  of  these  three  countries  - and had 
fallen off in Belgium since the same date. 
The  share  of  currency  in  circulation  in  "primary liquidity"  (which  is  a 
pointer  to  the  growing  requirements  of  the  banks  for  liquidity  to  finance  the 
increase  in the  note  and  coin circulation in an  expanding economy) also varies 
greatly from  country to counuy;  the  Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, 
France  and the Netherlands with  41 %,  41 %,  42%  and  45% respectively in 1960 
show roughly equal rates but the percentage is definitely lower in Italy (36 %) and 
appreciably higher in  Belgium, where it reached 56%. 
The volume and composition of "secondary liquidity" - sometimes called 
"liquid  savings"  in  France  - also  show  very  wide  differences  in  the  various 
Member  States.  In  France,  the  Netherlands  and  to  a  lesser extent  in Italy and 
Luxembourg,  households  and enterprises hold  short-term securities of the State 
and  other  public  authorities,  which  in  the  case  of  France  represent  a  third of 
the  volume  of  secondary  liquidity,  in  addition  to  their  savings  deposits  and 
fixed  deposits.  In  Federal  Germany  and  Belgium  personal  savings  and  cash 
surpluses  of firms  are  not to any  great extent invested in  this  liquid  form.  For 
this  reason  secondary  liquidity in  these  countries  consists  almost exclusively 
of time deposits and savings deposits with banks and savings banks. 
For reasons  of a  statistical and  terminological  nature  any  comparison  of 
the  ratio  between  secondary  liquidity  and  the  gross  national  product  in  the 
Member  States  can  only  be  made  with  reservations,  since  secondary liquidity 
is not everywhere defined in the same way.  Thus, in the Netherlands the statis-
tics of secondary liquidity, for reasons pertaining to the nature of the institutions, 
omit  deposits  administered  by  the  savings  banks.  If these deposits  are  added 
to  facilitate  comparison and to take into account the  fact that savings deposits 
- despite  their  capital  character  - are essentially  liquid  investment  for  their 
holders, the situation in the  Community countries may be summed up as follows:. 
In  1960,  the  countries  with  the  lowest  ratio  of  secondary  liquidity,  of 
varying  composition,  to  gross  national  product  were  France  (21 %),  Federal 
Germany  (25 %)  and  Belgium  (25 %).  In  Italy,  the  ratio was  30%,  in  the  Nether-
lands  38%  and  in  Luxembourg 41 %.  In  recent  years  it has  steadily increased 
in all the  Member  States, with  the  Federal Republic  of Germany in  the  van; in 
that  country  the  1948  currency  reform  radically  curtailed  monetary  assets  and 
new  resources ·were  in  the  first instance  kept in  the  most liquid form  possible. 
It is not intended to analyse  the  ~auses of the  structural differences  noted and 
the trend in the various Member States, but it will be noted that these differences 
24  and their causes are important factors in the shaping of monetary policy. 17.  The structure of the banking system is another material factor in monetary 
policy. It also differs greatly in the various Member States. 
In  the  Federal  Republic of Germany  most  banks  undertake  all  types  of 
banking  operation.  In  addition  to  sight,  time  and  savings  deposits,  they  can 
accept  long-term  deposits  and  conversely  grant  medium  and  long-term  as well 
as  short-term loans.  Even  the  savings  banks,  which  in  the  past generally con-
fined  themselves  to  savings  and  long-term  credit  operations,  are  transacting 
an  increasing  amount of  short-term deposit and  credit business.  Although their 
main  task is to provide  finance  for  relatively small businesses,  the  largest of 
them,  and  in  particular their  central  giro institutions,  which  are  at the  hub of 
their  networks,  take  an  important  part in  the  large  scale financing of industry 
and in underwriting  syndicates.  Another  large  category of banks  includes mort-
gage  loan  institutions  and  building  societies;  these  finance  their  long-term 
operations almost exclusively by bond issues and direct borrowing. 
In  Luxembourg,  the  banks  accept  sight,  time  and  savings  deposits and, 
conversely,  grant medium  and  long-term as  well  as  short-term  loans.  Even the 
Caisse  d'epargne  de  l'E'tat  (State  Savings  Bank)  which,  before  the  last world 
war,  used to  confine  itself to savings  and long-term credit operations now does 
a  considerable amount of short-term deposit and credit business. 
Dutch  commercial banks  traditionally accept short-term deposits and make 
shoh-term advances. However, these  banks have in recent years  been attracting 
savings  on an increasing scale, and this has led to some  growth in longer term 
loan  operations.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Dutch  savings  banks  accept  almost 
exclusively deposits on  savings account, as they are obliged to do by the 1956 
law on the  banking system: they make  chiefly medium  and long-term loans. The 
agricultural credit co-operatives have the  same powers  as the  commercial banks 
and savings banks. The major part of. their deposits  comes from  savings; short-
term  lending,  particularly to agriculture, is on a  smaller scale than medium and 
long-term. A special credit establishment,  the Bank voor Nederlandsche Gemeen-
ten, makes long-term loans to local authorities. 
In  Belgium  the deposit  banks  accept sight and time  deposits  as  well as 
deposits  on  savings  account.  Although  they  are  not  forbidden  to  make  long-
term  loans,  these banks  offer  mainly short and  medium-term  advances, perhaps 
because  a  large  part of their as  sets is  immobilized in the  form  of State funds 
which  they  are  obliged  to  hold  in  pursuance  of  the  minimum  reserve rules. 
Private savings banks can accept deposits of all kinds, but they chiefly confine 
themselves  to  savings  book  accounts  and most of the  advances  they make are 
on  a  long-term  basis,  with  short-term  loans  playing only a  small part. But the 
main  collector  of savings  in  Belgium  is  the  Caisse  generale  d' epargne  et de 
retraite (General Savings and Pensions  Bank). This semi-official establishment, 
which  accepts  only savings-book deposits, is the chief provider of medium  and 
long-term  loans.  It invests  chiefly  in  public  funds,  building  loans  and,  to  a 
lesser extent, in loans to industry and agriculture ; it also finances exports.  The  25 Caisse generale is also very active in the money market, particularly in day-to-
day loans,  taking up short-term Treasury certificates and the  purchase of bank 
acceptances.  Specialized establishments  grant  medium  and  long-term  credits to 
industry  and  local  authorities,  finding  the  money  chiefly by issuing their own 
bonds. 
18.  The  banking  systems  in  France  and  Italy are  very  different  from  those 
of  the  countries  mentioned  above.  In  both  countries  the  law  draws  an almost 
clear distinction between  short-term  credit establishments  and those  concerned 
with medium and long-term credits. 
In  France,  the  first  category  includes  the  deposit  banks  (banques  de 
depots), which alone hold nearly 90% of the deposits  held  by the banking estab-
lishments  proper.  The  banques  de  depots  may  not  accept  deposits  from  the 
public for  a  term longer than two years. Since March 1957 they have also had the 
right  to  accept  savings  deposits  under  the  name  of  "special  accounts",  to 
which strict rules  apply.  Their !endings and investments,. and more  particularly, 
the acquisition of participations, are subject to certain restrictions. 
The  banques  d'affaires  (investment  banks)  are  empowered  to  carry  out 
all  the  usual  credit  operations  of  deposit  banks  but  are  exempted  from  the 
restrictions  applied  to  the  latter  in  the  matter  of  share  holdings.  They  are 
authorized  to  accept deposits  for  periods  or  at  notice  of  more  than  two  years. 
They may also receive deposits for  periods of less than two  years  from traders 
and private individuals with whom  they have financial relations. 
The  people's  hanks  and  the  agricultural  credit  co-operatives,  which are 
not under the supervision of the Conseil national du credit but conduct business 
in their own sectors on the same lines as the banks, also make short and medium 
term loans. 
The distribution of long-term credit is mainly effected by a  certain number 
of  specialist establishments  which  attract  savings.  They  have  close  financial 
relations  with  the  Treasury  and  their  activities  are  supervised  by  the  State. 
The  "long  and  medium-term  credit banks",  which  come  under  the  Conseil na-
tional du credit, play only a  limited part here. 
Special  mention  should  be  made  of  the  savings  banks  proper,  which in 
France  are  not  a  part  of  the  banking  system.  Under  their statutes  they place 
the  funds  which  they  collect  with  the  "Caisse des· depots  et consignations", 
a  public  establishment  which  uses  these  funds  to  finance  medium  and  long-
term  loans  on  a  large  scale,  p~rticularly for  local authorities  and for  housing. 
Since the thirties a distinction has been made in the Italian banking system 
!>etween  short-term  and  long  and  medium-term  credit  establishments.  But  this 
distinction  is  not  very  strict  and  there  is  overlapping.  Within  certain  limits, 
26  which  moreover are  narrower  for  banks  than  for  savings  banks,  these  " aziende di credito"  can also carry out medium-term operations.  They may accept sight, 
till!e  and  savings  deposits  without  upper  limit  and  there  is  a  close relation 
between  them  and  the  special  credit institutions,  a  part of whose  capital they 
hold. 
These  special institutions  (for industrial and agricultural  long-term loans 
and  the  financing  of  public  works)  obtain  about  60%  of their resources  by is-
suing cash certificates and placing· bonds on the capital market, 25% by recourse 
to  the  banks  and  15%  from  the  Treasury.  They  are  concerned  almost entirely 
with long-term loans. 
19.  The structure of the  capital market and the policy followed on that market 
by  the  responsible  bodies  have  an  important  bearing  on  monetary  policy.  The 
key  factor  here  is  the  greater  or lesser  volume  of  bank  holdings  of long-term 
securities which  to some extent determines relations between the  money market 
and  the  capital  market  and  the  degree  in  which  interest rates  on  the  capital 
market  are  dependent  on  the  monetary  policy  of  the  Central  Bank.  Finally, .it 
is  important  to  know  how  much  control is  exercised ,over issues  by  the  State  .. 
In  the  Federal  Republic  of Germany  the  credit  institutions  (commercial 
banks  and  central  giro  institutions  of  the  savings  banks)  form  syndicates  for 
the  issue  of  bonds  and  shares.  They have  set up  a  committee,  the  "Capital 
Market Committee",  which endeavours  to  regulate  access to  the  capital market 
and ensure a  certain consistency in the  terms  of issue. Representatives  of the 
Deutsche  Bundesbank  may express  their opinion  on  the  situation of the  capital 
market.  From  the  point of view of monetary policy it is not irrelevant to observe 
that,  in  relation  to  the  very  marked increase in  the  volume of their operations, 
the  banks  and  the  savings  banks  hold  a  growing  volume  of  transferable  secu-
rities  - in  particular  bonds  issued  by  local  authorities- and  that  their  sub-
scriptions have  sometimes accounted for  almost half the total of certain issues. 
The  liquidity  policy  measures  adopted  by  the  Deutsche  Bundesbank  therefore 
generally have  direct and appreciable repercussions  on  the  capital  market and 
consequently  also  influence  investments  financed  by capital  from  that source. 
As  regards  the  banks  the  situation in  the  Netherlands  is  similar  to that 
in  the  Federal Republic.  The  Dutch  commercial banks  can buy and sell stocks 
and  shares  without  limit  but  their  holdings  in  the  past  have  generally been 
smaller  and more  stable than  those  of  the  German  banks.  Changes  in monetary 
policy and  the  tightening of bank liquidities  following  the  measures  introduced 
by  the  Central  Bank  have  not set  off any  increase  in  sales  or  purchases of 
stocks  (~nd  shares.  This  is  explained  by  the  traditions  of  the  Dutch banks. 
Changes in the policy of the Central Bank therefore do  not have the same rapid 
effects  on  the  financial  market  as  in  the  Federal Republic.  This  is also due 
to  the  fact  that,  although  they  are  authorized  to  use  their  funds  to  invest in 
real estate and grant loans on mortgage, the establishments which attract savings, 
including the private savings banks and the Post Office savings banks, purchase 
large  quantities  of  securities  on  local  stock  .exchanges.  In  addition  the  27 28 
Nederlandsche  Bank  has  a  certain  influence  on  the  volume  of capital  market 
issues  and  authorizes  issues  by  foreign  companies  according  to  the  capacity 
of the Netherlands capital market to absorb them. 
In  Italy  the  banks  (aziende  di  credito)  can  buy  fixed  interest-bearing 
securities,  particularly  those  issued  or  guaranteed  by  the  State,  and  bonds 
issued  by  the  specialized  credit  institutions.  Their  holdings  are  relatively 
large; at the end of 1960 they represented about 20% of the  commercial credits 
of these banks. But the banks do not sell these securities on the stock exchange; 
they pledge them with the Central Bank when they need liquid funds. 
20.  In  Belgium  and France  the deposit banks' holdings  of long-term securities 
are  negligible,  either  because  of  the  regulations  or  because  of  tradition.  The 
Belgian banks may only hold securities issued or guaranteed by the State which 
complete their " cover" as required by the regulations on banking ratios. However, 
since  the  introduction  of a  system of minimum  reserves, under  which,  in prin-
ciple, the banks have reserves only with the Centrai Bank, this "cover" require-
ment refers  only to the average deposits in  the period from  January to October 
1961. As to the French deposit banks, their holdings of securities are insignificant 
in relation to their other investments. II.  THE  PRINCIPAL  INSTRUMENTS  OF  MONETARY  POLICY 
CHAPTER  3 
REFINANCING  POLICY 
21.  Rediscount policy  concerns  the  different forms  of direct aid which under 
its  statutes  the  Central  Bank  can  grant  the  banksl  either  by purchasing from 
them government or private bills ("Rediscount" in the strict sense) or by granting 
them  advances ("advances on securities").  In this  wider sense of the  concept 
of  rediscount  policy  the  expression  " refinancing  policy"  is  sometimes  used. 
By influencing its cost,  changes  in  Bank rate  can modify  the  demand for 
credit from  the economy.  But since  the  war particularly central banks have also 
made  use  of  quantitative  limitation  of  credits  to  the  banks  as  part  of their 
discount policy. 
But  whether it is  exercised by  manipulating interest rates  or by quanti-
tative  limits  discount  policy  differs  in  importance  and  efficacy  within  the 
Community according to the traditions of the banking systems and the practices 
of the respective central banks. 
22.  In  all  Common  Market  countries  the  Central  Bank  imposes  certain  con-
ditions  and certain limitations  on  the help it grants the banks  by rediscounting 
bills and making advances on securities. 
In  this  field  the  acttvlty  of  the  Central  Bank  is  more  likely  to  oe  an 
essential  weapon  in  the  arsenal  of monetary  policy in a country like  France, 
where  four-fifths  of  bank  credit  to  commerce  and  industry  takes  the  form  of 
discounting  of  trade  bills,  than  in  the  Netherlands,  where  the  banks  mainly 
help firms and individuals by overdraft facilities. In this respect Federal Germany, 
Belgium  and  Italy  are  in  an  intermediate  position,  since  in these  countries 
bank  credits  made  available  by  discounting  commercial  bills  represented,  at 
the end of 1960, 42 %,  40% and 33% respectively of all short-term credit granted 
to the economy by  the banks. 
1 In  the  Netherlands  this  aid  from  the  Central  Bank is made  available  through  exchange brokers 
(wisselmakelaars).  29 The  relative  volume  of  bank  credit  granted  by  discounting  depends  to 
some  extent on  the  policy followed  by  the Central Bank itself to encourage or 
restrain certain forms  of credit and also on the practices of the banks, in partic-
ular  their  greater  or  lesser tendency  to  borrow  from  the  Central  Bank.  In the 
Netherlands  intervention by  the  Central  Bank is considered simply as  a  means 
of helping the banks to overcome transient difficulties, and it must not have the 
effect of  putting the  banks  permanently in debt to the  Central Bank.  In France 
and Belgium, on the contrary,  the high volume of such indebtedness has been a 
regular  feature  of the  banking  system,  at any  rate  until  recent  years.  A  large 
part of the  assets of the Banque de  France (40% at the end of 1960) consists of 
rediscopnted bills. 
The  volume  of the  direct help  of  the  Central  Bank naturally depends on 
the  abundance  or  insufficiency  of  the  liquid  funds  which  the  banks  receive 
from  other  sources,  but  also  to  some  extent  on  the  distribution  of  the  liquid 
assets of the  economy between the  institutions managing them  (banks, special-
ized credit institutions, Treasury). Thus in the Netherlands again the comfortable 
cash  position  of  the  banks  generally makes  it unnecessary for  them  to  call on 
the  Nederlandsche  Bank  for  help  in  substantial  amounts  or  for  long  periods, 
whereas in France shortage of liquidity obliged the banks in the post-war years 
up to 1958 to have recourse to the Banque de France almost constantly. 
The  importance  of  direct  aid  - rediscounting  of bills  and  advances  on 
securities - from  the Central Bank to  the banks not only differs from  one country 
to  another according· to  the  structure of the  banking  system and customs in the 
matter  of credit,  but also  varies  according  to  how  much use  is  made  of other 
instruments  of monetary  policy introduced or  developed since  the  war,  such as 
the open-market policy and the minimum reserve policy. 
23.  Although in  France,  Belgium  and Federal Germany the banks usually call 
upon  the  assistance  of  the  Central  Bank  in  the  form  of  rediscounting,  in the 
Netherlands  and even more  in Italy they tend  to  prefer advances on securities. 
Despite the relatively large volume of bank credit made available to the economy 
in Italy by discounting commercial bills, the liquidity requirements of the banks 
are  only covered to a  very secondary extent by rediscounting, if we  except the 
refinancing  of bills  relating  to  stocks of agricultural  products.  The  reason  for 
which  Italian  banks  prefer  advances  on  securities  is that  this  method  is less 
costly  than  rediscounting,  although  the  ~ominal  rate  has  been  identical  for 
years, because the interest on discounting is paid in advance. In Federal Germany, 
Belgium  and  France  ~dvances on  se~urities are  rather the  exception; moreover 
the rate for  them is usually higher than Bank rate. 
24.  The  degree  of  interdependence  between  Bank  rate  and  the  lending  and 
borrowing  rates  fixed  by the  banks  for their customers  varies  from  one  country 
to  another.  The  rates  charged to  borrowers,  which  can influence the  demand of 
commerce and industry for  credit,  are in particularly close relation to Bank rate 
30  in  Federal  Germany,  France  and  Italy.  In  the  Federal  Republic  and  Italy the relationship is based on an agreement between the  banks which is approved by 
the State, and in France on decisions of the  Conseil national du credit. In the 
Federal Republic of Germany  the rates  for  borrowing linked with Bank ~rate are 
maximum  rates and the banks  may  operate below them.  In France and Italy, on 
the  contrary,  it is  the  minimum  rates  which  are  modified  and  the  banks may 
apply higher rates.  The effective rates  charged to borrowers· do not necessarily 
follow  the  fluctuations  of Bank rate,  but they nevertheless  tend to do  so more 
or less closely, according to  the liquidity position of the banks. In  France the 
connection between Bank rate  and  the rates  charged by  the banks  to borrowers 
was  recently relaxed.  Bank rate and  the basic rate which serves as a  standard 
for  the  minimum  terms  applicable  to  credit  customers  are  only identical when 
the  former  is  between  3~ and  4~  %.  Variations  of Bank rate  below or  above 
these limits only affect the basic rate to the extent of one half of the divergence 
to 3~% and 4~  %.  In Belgium and the Netherlands  the banks are in the habit of 
following  Bank  rate  although  there is  no  regulation obliging them  to do  so. In 
Luxembourg they fall in line with the interest rate fixed by the Caisse d'epargne 
de  l'Etat. 
25.  The  rates of interest paid on  deposits  by  the  banks are as a  general rule 
less  directly linked  to  Bank  rate  than are  the  rates  for  advances.  In Germany 
the  Federal  Office  for  the  credit  system  (Bundesaufsichtsamt  fiir  das  Kredit-
wesen), set up in January 1962, decides by agreement with the Deutsche Bundes-
bank  whether  and  how  far  deposit rates  shall  follow  changes  in  Bank  rate.  In 
France  there  is  no direct link  between  the  rates  of the  Banque  de  France and 
the  rates  of  interest which  the  Conseil national  du  credit  fixes  for  sight and 
time  deposits  with  banks.  However,  the  Conseil national  du  credit settles the 
interest  rates  for  time  deposits  with  banks  slightly  below  the  rates  paid for 
government  bills  of  comparable  maturity  date.  Interest  rates  for  savings bank 
deposits follow the  same rules. 
Since the beginning of 1962 in Belgium interest rates on time deposits in 
Belgian francs  have  been fixed by agreement between  the  Banque nationale de 
Belgique and the Association beige des banques in the light of the money market 
situation, the balance of payments and the economic trend.  Previously maximum 
rates of interest on deposits were linked with Bank rate by an  inter-bank  agree  .. 
ment approved by the Ministry of Finance. In Italy, the maximum rates of interest 
on deposits are fixed by an agreement between the banks and are not tied to the 
official Bank rate. When  the latter is changed the deposit rates are nevertheless 
reviewed  by  the  Comitato  interministeriale  per  il  credito  e  il  risparm.i.o,  and 
amended  where  necessary.  In  the  Netherlands,  on  the  other hand,  there  is no 
agreement between  the  banks  and  the  State does not intervene in the  matter of 
deposit  rates.  These  are  established  in  the  light  of  market  conditions  and 
interest rates  for  time  deposits  generally follow  the  market rates  for  Treasury 
bonds. 
26.  The  manipulation  of  Bank  rate  as  an  instrument of monetary policy has 
varied  in importance in the  Member States over recent years.  Between the end 
of the  war  and  the  end of 1961  the  rate  was  changed  24  times  in the Federal  31 Republic  of Germany,  22  in  Belgium,  17  in  France, 16 in  the  Netherlands  and 
only 4 times in Italy. 
In general, changes in  Bank rate are  considered as a  means  of influencing 
the  demand  of  industry  and  commerce  for  credit;  since  Bank  rate  in varying 
degree  affects  the interest rates which the banks charge to borrowers, it largely 
determines  the  cost  of money.  To  the  extent  that  changes  in  Bank  rate  also 
affect  the  rates  paid on bank deposits,  such changes  may directly or indirectly 
influence the trend of rates on the capital market. 
However,  the  degree  to  which  changes  in  Bank  rate  affect  the  economy 
depends  partly  on  the  business  trend.  When  overall demand  is  very  strong and 
firms  have 'reason to expect this  trend to  continue  for  some  considerable time, 
the mere  raising of Bank rate may have little effect on their decisions.  In  such 
an  economic  situation  the  use  of  this  instrument  alone  will  not  appreciably 
abate  the  demand  for  credit~ But if there is any feeling  -prompted perhaps by 
credit  policy  measures  of the  Central  Bank  - that  demand  will  weaken,  any 
increase  in  the  cost of borrowing  following  a  rise  in  Bank  rate  may  seriously 
influence  business  calculations  and consequently decisions.  This will still be 
the  case when  on  the  contrary,  in  order to maintain a  certain level of economic 
activity or to stimulate activity in a  period of recession, Bank rate is lowered and 
the  cost  of borrowing  consequently reduced.  Here  again any additional demand 
for  credit  seems  to  depend  rather  on  the  business outlook  for  firms  - though 
they may still be  influenced by the  lower  Bank  rate  - than  on  the  reduction in 
the cost of borrowing. 
Generally  speaking,  the  Central  Banks  of  the  member  countries  do  not 
consider  that  changes  in  Bank  rate  greatly  influence  the  demand  for  credit by 
affecting its cost; they  feel  that the  banks  and  their commercial and industrial 
customers interpret such changes as an indication of the general lines of monetary 
policy  in  the  near  future.  Changes  in  Bank  rate  are  significant  as  a  pointer, 
and it is this aspect which influences the decisions of firms, particularly where 
investment and stock-building are  concerned. 
27.  Since  the  return  to  convertibility  and  the  extensive  liberalization  of 
international  payments  and capital  movements,  the  external  aspect of discount 
policy, which was neglected for  many years, has assumed a  growing importance. 
The central banks are now required more than in the past to conduct their monetary 
policy,  and  in  particular,  their  policy  on  interest  rates,  with  an  eye  to  the 
trend  in  other  countries.  This. also demands  the  closest possible  co-ordination 
of economic policy in a  wider sense. Conversely, as the recent trend has  shown 
on several occasions, central banks may be  faced with a  dilemma:  should they, 
or  should  they  not,  pursue  for  reasons  of external economic  policy a  policy on· 
interest rates which is not justified by the internal economic situation? 
28.  A  change  in  Bank rate necessarily has a  blanket effect on  all sectors of 
32  the  economy.  For  this  reason some  member  countries  apply  a  selective  credit policy by means of differential rates. Such a  policy, however, is less prominent 
today  than  in  the  past: at present only the  Banque nationale de  Belgique and 
the Ban  que de France apply a  certain differentiation in rates. 
The Banque nationale de  Belgique applies different rates according to the 
guarantees  offered  by  the  bills  presented  to  it  for  discounting (acceptances, 
domiciliation,  etc.)  and  according  to  whether  the  bank  acceptances  offered 
concern imports  or  exports.  The  Banque de  France,  which  in 1947 temporarily 
adopted  a  system  of  differing  rates  for  commercial  and  for  financial  paper, 
has  since  1957  been  applying  a  preferential  rate  to  the  discounting  of bills 
representing export credits. 
In  fact,  in all  countries  where  it is  followed,  selective  credit policy is 
applied less by differentiation in rates than by direct control of the distribution 
of credit either through directives and recommendations of the monetary authorities 
or  by  authorizations  granted  or  rediscount  assurances  given  by  the  Central 
Bank.  Thus,  in  France  the  limitation  of  total medium-term  credits outstanding 
at any time is ensured thanks to the control exercised by the monetary authorities 
and particularly the  Banque de  France at the  time  when bank credit is granted. 
The distribution of this form  of credit is controlled at the source. Once approved, 
these  credits  can  be  refinanced automatically by  the  banks  (having due  regard 
to  their  cash  ratio) at  the  Banque  de  France  through  specialized bodies.  The 
Banque nationale de  Belgique also influences the distribution  of bank credit by 
certifying  bank  acceptances  and  thus  automatically  providing  a  rediscount 
assurance. 
29.  As  the  manipulation  of  Bank rate is not  sufficiently effective  ih certain 
circumstances  in  controlling  the  volume  of  bank  advances  and  particularly in 
limiting ·the  supply  of  credit  in  periods  of excess  demand  and  abundant bank 
liquidity,  the  monetary  authorities  in  some  EEC  countries  have  introduced 
rediscount ceilings for  banks. 
It is mainly in  France  and  Federal Germany  that  rediscount  ceilings  are 
used as an  instrument of monetary policy. In the  Netherlands,  where  the banks 
are  only in  debt to the  Central  Bank in exceptional  cases~ and in Luxembourg, 
this  instrument is never used.  In Belgium the  purpose  of the  rediscount quotas 
imposed on  the  banks is rather  to  keep a  check on  their management.  In Italy 
there are no rediscount ceilings in the strict sense and when the Banca d'Italia 
grants "refinancing" credits to the banks it takes into consideration the exigen-
cies of monetary policy and thus makes  this  help dependent on  the observance 
of a  certain ratio· between advances mace and deposits held by the bank. 
30.  In  France,  where  the  rules  concerning  rediscount  of  certain preferential 
credits (export, stocking of grain, medium-term bills) are laid down  and amended 
by  the  Central  Bank  as  part  of  a  selective  credit policy,  the  ceiling for the 
rediscounting  of  ordinary  bills  is  an  essential  element  in  controlling  bank 
.liquidity. Since the war the banks have perforce  become heavily indebted to the  33 Banque de France, so that they have almost always beeri very near their ceilings 
and have only a  narrow margin for calls on the Bank. They are sometimes obliged 
to make use of the  facility offered them of applying for  permission to go above 
their  ceilings temporarily, but in this case they must pay penal rates which are 
sometimes  very  high  and  which  they  cannot- pass  on  to their customers.  When 
they  have  excess  liquidity,  as  during  the  last  three  years,  the  banks  make 
first use of it to  take up  - principally for  reasons of profitability - not short-
term  but·  medium-term  bills.  This  tendency  was  accentuated  in  1961  when  a 
minimum  liquidity ratio was  imposed,  coupled with  a  lower  ptescribedminimum 
for holdings of government paper. 
In  the  Federal  Republic of Germany  the  rediscount  "quotas"  are  fixed 
for each bank as  a  multiple of the amount of its own funds,  which implies peri-
odical adjustments  of  the ceilings  in step with  the  increase in the  banks' own 
resources.  Apart  from  these  periodical  increases,  the  rediscount  quotas  have 
often  been  amended  during  recent  years  for  reasons  of monetary  policy.  They 
were  reduced  under  the  restrictive  credit  policy  of 1957  and  1959,  and then 
raised again after March  1961  when the  Bundesbank relaxed this policy.  But in 
a  general  way  the  refinancing  credits  are  well below the  ceilings themselves. 
Thus  the influence of this instrument of monetary policy is linked with changes 
in  the  margins  not made use  of,  since  the  amount  of such margins  may appre-
ciably influence  the  credit policy of the  banks. It is particularly in conjunction 
with  changes in minimum reserve ratios - which determine, among  other things, 
the  volume  of "refinancing" by the  banks  - that these quotas are an effective 
instrument,  especially  when  the  Central  Bank is  applying  a  restrictive policy. 
But,  in  Federal  Germany  as  in  France,  the  efficacy  of  the  rediscount 
ceilings as a  means  of controlling bank liquidity depends on the banks possess-
ing  a  reserve  of  liquidity, for  instance in the  form  of holdings  of open-market 
securities or foreign currencies. 
31.  Summing  up,  even in countries  where  the  direct help of the  Central Bank 
makes  an  appreciable  contribution  to  bank  liquidity,  the  " refinancing"  policy, 
that  is  to  say  changes  in  Bank  rate  and  rediscount  ceilings,  often  appears 
somewhat  ineffective  unless  it  is  supplemented  by  other  measures  ~reedy 
affecting the available resources of banks. 
This is evident from  the  monetary policy  trend noted in the  member  coun-
tries.  In  Federal  Germany,  for  instance,  the  system  of  rediscount  quotas  is 
used  particularly  to  reinforce  the  control  exercised over  bank  liquidity  by  the 
minimum reserve policy and by open-market operations of the Central Bank. 
In  France,  t~e  introduction  of  rediscount  ceilings  in  1948  necessitated 
at  the  same  time  a  system  of  freezing  that  part  of  the  assets  of  the  banks 
which  consisted of short-term" government paper  (minimum  holdings  of Treasury 
bonds),  which  became  general 'in  1960 as  part of the  minimum  reserve  require-
34  ments system. But conversely, the  manipulation of discount rates and ceilings has often 
proved a  useful adjunct to other courses  of action.  Thus  under  a  policy of re-
stricting  bank  liquidity a  reduction  of the  rediscount  ceilings  may,  as  pointed 
out above, reinforce the effectiveness of the minimum reserve policy. 
35 CHAPTER  4 
OPEN-MARKET OPERATIONS 
32.  Generally  speak;ing,  the  Central Banks  of  the  Member  States  are  empow-
ered  to  conduct  open-market  operations,  but  their  interventions  on  the market 
play  a  lesser role  in  practical monetary  policy  than  is  the  case in  the  Anglo-
Saxon  countries.  Since  the  war,  however,  open-market  operations  have  tended 
to assume more importance among the instruments of monetary policy. 
33.  Up  to  the  present,  however,  only  the Central  Banks  of  the  Netherlands 
and of Federal Germany have  systematically used the  technique  of open-market 
operations to act on the cash positions of the. banks. In the other member countries 
open-market transactions or the like are effected only occasionally or on a  very 
small scale. 
In  France  the scope  for  the  Central  Bank to engage in open-market oper-
ations  is  limited for  two  reasons.  First,  the Bank's  statutes permit such oper-
ations  only  with  short-term  bills,  but  in this  matter  the  Central  Banks  of the 
other  member  countries  abstain  in  practice  from  buying  and  selling long-term 
securities, although their statutes· do not forbid this. Secondly, the open-market 
portfolio  of the  Banque  de  France  is  not  large.  The  Bank  generally confines 
itself  to  taking  private  bills  in  pawn  and  to  purchasing  Treasury  bonds  from 
the  banks  to  help  them  meet  temporary  pressure  on  their  cash  position.  As  a 
general  rule it abstains  from  selling bills  to the  banks,  which  are  thus  led to 
use  any  excess  liquidity to increase their holdings of mobilizable medium-term 
bills  - for  reasons of yield - and to reduce  their indebtedness to  the  Banque 
de France. 
In Italy,  there is practically no organized money market  on which supply 
of and demand for short term funds  can meet. It is therefore not possible really 
to  speak of an open market.  In recent years, however,  the  Treasury, wishing to 
attain  the  objects  of an open market,  has occasionally issued relatively long-
term  securities  (Buoni  del  Tesoro  poliennali)  proceeds  from  which  have  been 
blocked in  order to withdraw liquidity from  the  economy and the  banks.  A  fund 
was recendy established which will receive annual payments from  the Treasury 
and  will purchase  government  paper quoted  below par with  a  view to providing 
the market with liquid resources if necessary. Finally, swap transactions, which 
will  be  discussed below,  can  be  likened  to  some  extent  to  open-market oper-
ations  in  their  effects.  These  operations  consist  of  sales  of  foreign  currency 
36  for  lire concluded by the Exchange Office with the banks. These sales of currency by the  Exchange Office, which is in close contact with  the Central Bank, .have 
had the effect of attracting bank liquidity towards foreign money markets. 
In  Belgium  open-market  operations  are  not  carried  out  by  the  Central 
Bank  itself but by a  special body, the  Fonds des  rentes,  controlled jointly by 
the  Banque nationale de  Belgique and the  Treasury.  Following successive new 
arrangements,  this  fund  is  in  a  position  to  buy  and  sell  short  and long-term 
securities  on  the  money  or financial  markets.  Fairly considerable  means have 
been placed at its disposal and it may also have recourse up to a  certain point 
to credit from  the  Central Bank and issue its own short-term certificates. Under 
its  statutes it has  fairly  extensive  means  of influencing by its operations  not 
only the liquidity of the banks but also that of the economy. 
34.  In  the  Netherlands  and in the  Federal  Republic of Germany.; the  only two 
countries  in  which  the  central  banks  systematically  carry  out  open-market 
operations  in  order  to  act  on  bank  liquidity,  the  Nederlandsche  Bank  and the 
Deutsche  Bundesbank have an operating fund in the  shape of short and medium-
term  bills, which enables them  to intervene on the  money market,  the only field 
in which ~he open-market policy is applied. 
The  open-market  policy  followed  in  these  two  countries  nevertheless 
shows  certain  differences. In  the  Federal  Republic  the  market  on  which the 
Central  Bank  carries  out  its  open-market  transactions  is  narrower  than  in the 
Netherlands  in  two  respects :  buying  and  selling  of open-market  securities  is 
confined  in  Federal Germany to credit institutions  (i.e.  banks)  and  to  a  small 
number of public institutions; in the Netherlands, on  the other hand, along with 
banks  and  exchange  brokers  (wisselmakelaars),  the  institutions  which  accept 
savings  deposits and private businesses also figure  both as  buyers and sellers 
of open-market securities. This does not mean that all participants .in the market 
can  be  contracting parties  with the Nederlandsche  Bank;  the latter engages in 
open-market transactions only with the banks and the exchange brokers.  On the 
other hand - and this is the second essential difference - the market is wider in 
the  Netherlands,  where  open-market  transactions  also  take  place  between  the 
various  participants.  In  the  Federal  :Republic,  on  the  contrary,  such  a  market 
between the banks as chief participants in the open market has not so far devel-
oped. Transactions  take place only between th" banks and the Deutsche Bundes-
bank.  In  the  Netherlands,  therefore,  cond;'  .:;  for  the  formation  of a  "market 
price"  for  open-market securities  are rath  ~  more favourable than in the Federal 
Republic  where  this  "price" is largely determined  by  the  Central  Bank  which, 
however, may allow itself to be guided - and this happens very often - by the 
influence of the trend of bank liquidity. 
The  differences  in  the  structure  of  the  open  market  in  Federal Germany 
and  in the  Netherlands give  rise to other differences  in  the  technique  of open-
market transactions in the  two  countries.  For lack of a  sufficiently wide market 
in  the  Federal  Republic,  the  Deutsche  Bundesbank  itself  fixes  the  rates  for 
sale and repurchase of open-market  ~ecurities.  By modifying the  level of these  37 rates, the  Bundesbank encourages the banks to buy short and medium-term open-
market  securities (Treasury bills and bonds) or to mobilize them  with it. It  thus 
-leaves the initiative to the banks while itself remaining passive. It fixes these 
sale and repurchase rates by  maintaining, with due  regard to market conditions, 
a  certain relation  between  them  and  Bank rate.  This is  explained by  the fact 
that  the  banks  can  at  any  time  have recourse to discouht  credit  and  that most 
of  them  are almost permanently in debt to the  Central Bank,  even if only to be 
able to fulfil  their minimum  reserve obligations.  Where  there is excess liquidity 
the  banks are thus able to choose between reducing their discount commitments 
and investing  in  open- market bills.  In the  contrary case the  ~hoice is between 
increasing  their  discount  activities  and  mobilizing  open-market  bills.  Conse-
quently,  rates  for  the  sale of short-term open-market securities (up to 90 days) 
are in practice  no higher than  the  Bundesbank discount rate.  We  may therefore 
say that  the  open-market  policy of the  Deutsche  Bundesbank is  ari  instrument 
both of interest rate and of liquidity policy. 
In  the  Nethei.-lands,  on the other hand,  market rates for  open-market bills 
are more loosely related to discount  r~tes because the Dutch banks have recourse  -
to  discounting  by  the  <;::entral  Bank  only  exceptionally.  The  gap  between  the 
market  rates  for  open-tJarket  bills  and  Bank  rate  is  therefore  generally wider 
than  that between rates  for sale and  Bank rate in. the  German  system. Whereas 
the  Deutsche  Bundesbank itself fixes  the rates for  sale and repurchase  - with 
due regard to the trend of rates on the money market - the Nederlandsche Bank 
as  a  general  rule  only  buys  or  sells open-market  bills at  the  market  rate and 
according  to  market requirements.  To ease very short-term  strains it  als~ buys 
open-market securities for  a  short period fixed in advance under the "repurchase 
agreements ". 
As  an  accompaniment  to  the  Nederlandsche  Bank's  open-market policy, 
the Netherlands Treasury, like the Italian Treasury,  has  on occasion withdrawn 
liquidity  from  the  banks  and  the  economy  by  making  long-term  loan  issues 
which  were  hardly required by  the  budget situation and sterilizing the proceeds 
by, for instance, advance repayment of external debts. 
35.  If  we  take  into  consideration  the  total  liquidity  of  the  banking system, 
open-market transactions as practised in the Netherlands and the Federal Republic 
of  Germany  are  of  qual~tative  rather  than  quantitative  significance.  This  is 
tantamount  to saying that in general these transactions in  no  way influence the 
total volume of liquidity at the disposal of the banking system (cash and potential 
liquidity)  but  merely its composition.  The  advantage  of these  transactions lies 
chiefly  in  the  fact  that  they  constitute  a  flexible  instrument  convenient for 
balancing out temporary fluctuations in the cash position of the banking system. 
Except in the  Netherlands and the  Federal Republic, there are limitations which 
put a  brake  on  the  use  of this  instrument in  the  various  countries. As  a useful 
complemen~ to  the  armoury of monetary policy, it would  be desirable  to create 
conditions  for  the  commensurate  development  of  open-market  transactions  as 
38  described  above  in  the  countries  where  they  are  non-existent  or  inadequate. This presupposes, inter alia, the existence  or  the extension of a  money market 
on  which  the  monetary  policy  authorities  can  buy  and  sell open-market bills. 
36.  Furthermore,  monetary  policy  could  perhaps  profit  by  making  wider use 
of the open-market method. If non-banking circles were able to share in dealings 
in open-market bills - as they already do in the Netherlands, sometimes by direct 
transactions  with  the  Nederlandsche  Bank  - open-r;narket  operations  would no 
longer  influence  only  the  composition  of  bank  liquidity  but  also  its  volume. 
To  the  extent  that  open-market  bills  are  negotiated  outside  the  banks  with 
the  participation  of  commerce  and  industry,  the  Central  Bank  will  be  able  to 
reduce  or  expand  the  liquidity  of banks  whether  or  not  they  so desire,  and at 
the  same  time  to exert a  certain influence  on the  composition of the liquidity 
of the  economy.  Doubtless, if it were desired to restrict or expand not only the 
liquidity  of  the  economy  but  also  bank  liquidity,  as  would  be  appropriate  in 
certain phases of the cyclical trend, this aim could only be attained by extending 
open-market  transactions  to  long-term  securities.  It would,  nevertheless,  seem 
that  close  collaboration between the Treasury  and the  Central  Bank in making 
systematic use  of open-market operations,  perhaps  through  special institutions, 
should  offer  possibilities  for  a  development  of  the  instruments  of 'monetary 
policy.  As  we  have  seen,  this  is  already  practised up  to  a  point in Belgium, 
where  the Fonds des rentes can also buy and sell long-term securities and block 
the  proceeds  of such sales by depositing them in its account with the Central 
Bank,  financing  its  purchases from  the  balance  of this  account.  In  the Nether-
lands and Italy the  Treasury has on  several occasions restrained the liquidity 
of  the  economy  and  of  the  banks  by  issuing  long-term  loans  which  were n.ot 
called for  by the budget situation and by freezing the proceeds of these issues. 
37.  By  means  of  forward  exchange  operations  with  the  banks  the  Deutsche 
Bundesbank  in  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  and,  in  Italy,  the  Exchange 
Office (Ufficio italiano dei  cambi, an institution closely linked with  the  Banca 
d'ltalia),  have  exerted influences  on  bank  liquidity comparable  to those of the 
open  market.  Thanks  to  the  progressive  dismantling  of  exchange restrictions, 
th~  banks  in  Member  States  (except France)  have  enjoyed  increasing opportu-
nities  for  placing  their  liquid assets abroad.  Such  investments  depend  on  the 
relationship between the interest rates ruling on the internal and external markets · 
as well as on the cost of the forward covering operation. By carrying out forward 
covering  or  swap  transactions  with  the  banks,  the  Central  Bank  can .  to  some 
extent  affect  the  movement  of  bank  liquidity  to  foreign  countries,  particularly 
when  the  comparison  between interest rates  on the  internal market and abroad, 
after  allowing  for  the  cost  of  covering  the  exchange  risk,  offers  no encour-
agement  to invest abroad. 
It  is  particularly  the  Deutsche  Bundesbank  which,  since  the  beginning 
of  1959,  has  made  systematic use of swap transactions,  sometimes  applying a 
lower  discount  than  the  market ·and  sometimes  waiving  it  altogether  or even 
applying a  premium.  Similarly the Italian  Exchange  0 lfice has  carried out swap 
transactions  with  the  Italian  banks  under  which  the  latter have  bought foreign  39 40 
currency  spot  and  sold it back  to  the  Office  forward  in  order  to  grant foreign 
currency  credits  to  residents  or  non-residents  or  to  increase  their investments 
on money markets abroad. Although  the  main purpose of these swap transactions 
is  to  reduce  the  considerable  net indebtedness of  the  Italian  banks  to  foreign 
customers,  they have nevertheless contributed to reducing the internal liquidity 
of the banks and transferring it abroad. 
The  N ederlandsche  Bank has  only once  - in  1957  - carried out forward 
exchange  operations  with  the  banks.  This  was  done  for  various  reasons,  in 
particular  to  avoid  any  contraction  of the  money  market  due  to  currency spec-
ulation  by operators  outside  the  banks.  In recent years  the interest rate policy 
followeq  by  the  Nederlandsche  Bank  has  aimed  at  stimulating  the  investment 
of bank liquidity abroad and there has therefore  been no reason to offer special 
incentives,  such  as  swap  deals,  to  encourage  the  export  of money  by banks. 
Forward  exchange  operations  such  as  are  carried  out  by  the  Deutsche 
Bundesbank,  and  up  to  a  point  by  the  Italian  monetary  authorities,  may  be 
considered as  the  complement of or substitute for  an internal open-market policy 
where  the  Central  Banks  use  them  to restrict or  enlarge  the  internal liquidity 
of the  banks without having to carry out ope.n-market operations. This being so, 
such  operations  could  be  important if the  strategical  reserves  of  the  Central 
Bank for open-market purposes proved insufficient. Forward exchange transactions 
also enable  the  Central Bank to allow money market rates to move  up and down 
independendy  of  rates  abroad,  although  within  very  narrow  limits.  The  inter-
dependence of the national money markets through the medium of the international 
exchange market has in fact become  so close now  that the  banks in the Member 
States  - particularly in  Federal Germany and  Benelux'- are  no  longer subject 
to  restrictions in placing their liquid assets abroad,  that it calls for  co-ordina-
tion of the interest rates policies of the Central Banks. CHAPTER  5 
MINIMUM  RESERVE POLICY 
38.  A  further  weapon has  been added to  the monetary policy armoury of most 
Member  States  since  the  war:  the  policy  of  minimum  reserves.  The  minimum 
reserves  system  enables  the  monetary  authorities  to  act directly on  bank liq-
uidity., and thus <;>n  their ability to provide credit. The policy of minimum reserves 
is  thus  a  useful  addition  to  discount  and  open-market  policies,  which  tend 
merely to modify the composition of the aggregate liquidity of  the banks. 
39.  Two systems of minimuni  reserves may be distinguished in the EEC member 
countries :  the  first,  which in its  pure form  exists only in Federal Germany and 
the  Netherlands,  obliges  the  banks  to  keep  minimum  balances  at  the  Central 
Bank;  the second, which until recently operated in its pure form  in France and 
Belgium,  makes it incumbent on them  to hold a  minimum  portfolio of government 
paper. 
In Belgium since the reform early in 1962, this system has largely tended 
towards the traditional system of minimum  reserves  under which the banks must 
in  principle  keep deposits at the  Central  Bank.  However,  the  monetary author-
ities applying the new regulations can fix the  proportion of their reserves which 
the  banks  may or must hold in  the  form  of deposits  with the  Fonds  des rentes 
or of government bills of a  special type deposited with the Central Bank. Under 
transitional  arrangements  the  banks  are  further  required  to  continue  to  hold 
the  minimum  portfolio of government paper laid down  by the old cover ratio, but 
only  on  the  basis  of  the  average  amount  of their customers'  deposits  during a 
reference  period,  so that this  minimum  holding will  no  longer follow  variations 
in the  volume  of deposits. 
In  France  the  regulations on  the so-called  " plancher" (minimum holdings 
of government  paper) introduced in 1948 were supplemented in 1960 by  the mini-
mum  reserve  system  (systeme  du  coefficient. de  tresorerie),  under  which the 
minimum reserves include, along with Treasury bonds, cash holdings and private 
bills  which  the banks  may  mobilize  without reference  to  their discount ceiling 
(these  are  principally  bills  representing  mobilizable  medium-term  credits,  and 
bills intended for the financing of exports and grain stocks). 
Italy  is  in  an  intermediate  position:  the  banks  may  constitute mlntmum 
reserve:S  with  the  Central  Bank  either  on  current  account  or  in  government 
paper.  41 In  the  Federal Republic  and the Netherlands,  the mimmum  reserves have 
from  the  beginning  been  a  flexible  instrument  of  monetary  policy.  In  France, 
Belgium  and  Italy  they  were  introduced  immediately  after  the  war  because of 
the need to prevent the banks from  liquidating their large holdings of government 
paper. If these  had  not been blocked, the  Bank  rate measures would have  been 
practically without  effect,  because  of the  possible mobilization  of these secu-
rities or failure to renew them on maturity. 
In  France  and  Belgium  the  recent  reforms  referred  to  above  allow  of a 
more  flexible  and  efficient  use  of the  minimum  reserve  ratio  as  an instrument 
of monetary policy.  In Italy the  present system also makes  it possible, if this 
should be necessary, to handle this  instrument of  monetary policy in a  flexible 
way. However, the monetary authorities have done so only recently (January 1962). 
Until then they had found other methods sufficiently effective. 
40.  As  a  general rule  the  minimum  reserve  obligations  of  the  banks are cal-
culated  on  the  basis  of specific  commitments.  In  the  Netherlands  it has  been 
possible for  some  time now  to  oblige  the  banks also to  hold additional minimum 
reserves,  the  amount  of  which  is  calculated  in  relation  to  the  trend  of their 
advances.  In  some  member  countries  the  different  classes  of  commitments  are 
not subject to  the  minimum  reserve  obligation in the  same  way:  the obligation, 
moreover, differs in scope from  country to country. 
All credit establishments in the  Federal Republic of Germany  are subject 
to  the  minimum  reserve  obligation  with  few  exceptions,  on  the  basis  of the 
sight,  time  and  savings  deposits  of  inland  customers  other  than  banks  and 
also of loans  taken up on  the internal market, for  periods  up to four  years, from 
sources  other than  banks.  The· arrangements  for  reserves also apply to  commit-
ments  of  the  same  nature  towards  non-residents,  including  foreign  banks.  But 
for  some  time  now  the  banks  have  been  authorized,  when  calculating  their 
minimum reserve obligations on  liabilities to non-residents, to deduct from  these 
liabilities the amount of their balances with foreign banks and their investments 
on money markets abroad. 
In the Netherlands,  where  the regulations  on  minimum  reserves are based 
on  a  gentlemen's  agreement  between  the  Central  Bank  and  the  most important 
credit  institutions,  the  minimum  reserve  obligation  applies  to  39  credit insti-
tutions  adhering to this agreement (including  the  two central agricultural credit 
funds)  and  the  postal  cheque  service.  The  liabilities  subject  to  the  reserve 
obligation are in the main sight and time deposits in guilders of the non-banking 
sector  (including  non-residents),  of banks  which  are  not  parties  to  the agree-
ment  with  the  Nederlandsche  Bank,  and  finally  of the  foreign  banks.  Savings 
deposits are thus not taken into account in calculating minimum reserves. 
In  France  the  minimum  reserve  regulations  (reglementation du coefficient 
de  tresorerie)  apply  only  to  deposit  banks,  people's  banks  and  agricultural 
42  credit co-operatives.  For  these  establishments  all  deposits  received  from  the public  are  subject  to  the  regulation,  whether  they  are  sight  or  time  deposits, 
cash certificates ("boos de caisse ") or special accounts. 
In  Italy  the  minimum  reserve  obligation  applies  to  all  credit  institu-
tions  with  the  exception,  however,  of  a  few  specialized  credit institutions. 
All sight, time  and savings deposits  from  the  non-banking sector are subject to 
these. arrangements. 
In  Belgium  the  banking  ratio  system  applies  only  to  the  banks,  i.e.  to 
institutions !iCcepting deposits for  not more  than two years. In the  new minimum 
reserve  regulat-ions  effective from  1962,  the  following  types  of bank  liabilities 
are made subject to the holding of reserves, as under the former system of cover 
ratio: 
a) sight deposits and deposits for a  fixed period not exceeding one month; 
b) deposits for fixed periods of from  one month to two years; 
c) deposit book accounts. 
41.  Until  1961  the  mtmmum  reserve  ratios  had  long  remained  unchanged in 
Belgium  and  Italy,  although legally they  could have  been  altered.  In  Italy the 
ratio of about 25 %,  applied without distinction to sight, time and savings depos-
its,  had  remained  in  force  since  1947 ;  it  was  altered  for  the  first  time,  to 
22.5 %,  at the end of January 1962. 
In  Belgium  the  banking  cover  ratio  was  also  set at  the  same  level for 
sight  and  time  deposits,  but  at different  levels  for the various kinds of banks 
(50  to  65 %).  After  the  reform,  the  transitional  arrangements  provide  that the 
minimum  portfolio of govern'lnent  paper should be calculated, at the same rates, 
on the average amount of deposits between January and October 1961.  According 
to  the  new  regulations  the  monetary  authorities  can  fix  the  minimum  reserve 
ratio (coefficient de  reserve monetaire) and vary it from  nil to 20%  for sight and 
one-month  deposits  and  from  nil  to  7%  for  one-month  to  two-year  deposits. 
These  rate·s  cannot  be  increased  by  more  than  three  points  within  any period 
of  30 days  without  the  approval  of the  Ministers  of Finance  and of Economic 
Affairs. 
In  France,  where the  m1n1mum  holding of government paper had only been 
altered  once  since  1948,  greater flexibility  was  introduced at the  end  of 1960 
under  the  minimum  reserve  system  (systeme  du  coefficient de  tresorerie).  The 
establishment of this  system in fact enabled the  Minister of· Finance to reduce 
within a  few months  the required proportion of government paper in· the minimum 
reserves  from  25%  to  20%,  and later to 15%,  without  producing an increase of 
bank  liquidity.  This  may itself  be  expanded  or  contracted  by  the  Banque  de 
:France  which can alter the minimum  reserve ratio within the limits· fixed by the 
Conseil national du credit (the ceiling is at present 35 %).  43 In  the  Netherlands,  where  the  ratio of minimum  reserves  is  also applied 
indiscriminately to all liabilities in respect of which reserves are required,  the 
maximum ratio is 15%; the  Nederlandsche  Bank has undertaken, however, in an 
agreement  with  the  banks  that  it  will  not  exceed  10%  except  under  certain 
conditions and after previous consultation with them. 
In  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  the  minimum 
reserve  ratio  varies  according  to  the  kind  of  liability.  The  law  governing the 
Deutsche  Bundesbank  sets  a  maximum  ratio  of  30%  for  sight  liabilities,  20% 
for  time  deposits  and  10%  for  savings deposits.  By means  of the  flexible  pro-
visions  of  this  law  the  Deutsche  Bundesbank  has  also  prescribed  different 
ratios  depending  on  the  size  of  the  credit  institution,  on  whether  it is  in a 
centre  where  the  Bundesbank  has  an  office,  and  finally  on  the  origin  of the 
deposits  (resident  or  non-resident);  it has,  moreover,  occasionally  required in 
respect of new deposits for the account of non-residents a  higher ratio than that 
set for other liabilities. 
42.  While  in  Germany and in  the  Netherlands  m1mmum reserves  are unproduc-
tive  (deposits  at  the  Central  Bank  bear  no  interest),  in  France  and  Belgium 
the banks do receive interest on their blocked papers. In Italy, minimum  reserves 
consisting of deposits with the Central Bank earn for  the banks a  rate of interest 
almost equal to that of Treasury bills which they can likewise deposit with  the 
Banca d'Italia as part of their minimum reserves. 
43.  In  Germany  and in  the  Netherlands,  the  amount  of the  minimum  reserves 
required of the  banks is based on a  monthly average. This enables them  to make 
use of their reserves in the intervening period to meet temporary needs for cash, 
provided  they  restore  the  average  by adding to their reserves on  other days of 
the  month.  But if they do not reach the prescribed monthly average, in Germany, 
although not in the Netherlands, the banks have to pay interest on the deficiency 
at a  penal rate of three points above that for  advances on  security. The French, 
Italian and Belgian banks, on the other hand, have to comply with their obligations 
from  day to day. 
44.  To make the system of minimum reserves an effective instrument of mone-
tary policy, it must be possible to adjust the minimum ratio whenever the cyclical 
trend and the  bank liquidity situation call for such a  step. 
In Germany and the Netherlands the minimum reserve ratio has been changed 
over twenty times since it was introduced. Minimum  reserves have not been used 
in  such  a  flexible  way  in  the  other  member  countries,  but  since  the  French 
monetary  authorities  adopted  the  minimum  reserve  system  (systeme  du  coeffi-
cient de tresorerie) at the end of 1960 they have had a  more  flexible instrument, 
which they have already used to adjust, within the overall reserves, the respective 
percentages  of the different assets accepted as reserves  and  to  raise  the ratio 
in February 1962 from  30 to 32%.  The  recent reform in Belgium also enables the 
44  ratio  of minimum  reserves  to  be  varied.  Finally,  by  changing  for  the  first time ~ 
in January 1962 the reserve ratio which had been in force since 1947,  the Italian 
monetary  authorities  have  shown  that  they  also  intend  to  make  use  of  this 
instrument  of  monetary  policy.  But  the  system  of  minimum  reserves  has  more 
or less a  blanket effect upon all credit institutions, irrespective of their liquidity 
position  or business  policy.  That is why  the Nederlandsche  Bank, which since 
1954  has  often altered the reserve ratio, has  only done so on each occasion by 
a  few  points  and,  if in  an  upward  direction,  generally  by  not  more  than one 
point.  In  Germany  the  Central  Bank  has  varied  the  reserve  rati.o  much  more 
widely  but  on  a  differential  basis·  according  to  certain  criteria,  as  we have 
·seen above. 
45.  Qn account of its overall effects,  mtmmum reserves are generally used as 
an instrument of policy in Federal Germany  and the Netherlands at times when it 
seems indispensable to exert an influence on persistent trends in bank liquidity. 
The  Central  Banks  iron  out  temporary  fluctuations  in  bank  liquidity  by  appro-
priate  open-market  transactions  and  by  rediscount  credit  or  making  advances 
against  security. 
In the  German  system, in which, owing to the use of rediscount credit,  the 
banks  are  generally  in  debt  to  the  Deutsche  Bundesbank,  adjustments  to  the 
minimum reserve,ratio are usually reflected in a rise or fall of this indebtedness. 
Thus,  in the  same  way as the  rediscount  ceilings,  which  can also be adjusted 
for reasons of credit policy, the minimum reserves constitute, in Federal Germany, 
a  particularly  effective  method  of  controlling  the  extent  to  which  the  banks 
may  draw  upon  the Central Bank.  The banks  can also of course use their other 
liquid  assets,  such  as  open-market  papers  or  investments  on  foreign  money 
markets,  to  meet  their  minimum  reserve  commitments.  Considerable  use  was 
made  of  this  facility  in  Germany  during  the  period  of  credit  restraint in 1959 
and 1960,  when refinancing was contracted by a  reduction in rediscount quotas. 
Later  on,  however,  the  Bundesbank exerted an  influence  in  the  other direction 
on  the  banks'  investments  in  foreign  money  markets  by  allowing  the  banks  to 
deduct them  from  their liabilities  to  non-residents  when  calculating the amount 
of  their  minimum  reserve  obligation,  In  that  way it encouraged  the  export of 
bank funds which was at that time desirable. 
The  Netherlands  policy  with  regard  to  m1n1mum  re·serves  is  more  limited 
in its objects.  In adjusting the reserve ratio the  Nederlandsche  Bank is guided 
to some extent by the rise or fall in the gold and foreign exchange reserves and 
the  banks  are  made  to  contribute  in  this  way  to  the  financing  of the gold and 
foreign exchange reserves. Thus hitherto, if there was a  loss of foreign currency, 
the Nederlandsche Bank lowered the minimum reserve ratio, although in such cir-
cumstances it would have been quite normal  to reduce the banks' lending poten-
tial  by raising  the ratio.  However,  the  position  of the  Netherlands  is different 
because, as it is  economically  so heavily dependent on other countries, foreign 
exchange  surpluses  or  deficits  can  have  a  more  marked effect  and  exert a 
stronger  influence  on  the  liquidity  of  the  money  market.  Consequendy  there 
are  times  when  it  may  seem  desirable  to  palliate  the  tightening  of liquidity  45 caused by large withdrawals of foreign  currency by lowering the minimum reserve 
ratio,  particularly  when  these  withdrawals  of foreign  currency  are  the  result, 
not  of  an  exce-ssive  expansion  of  bank  advances,  but  of  the  conversion of 
customers'  deposits  into  foreign  currencies. 
In  addition  to  the  existing  regulations  governing  compulsory  reserves, 
which  date  from  1954,  the  Nederlandsche  Bank  copcluded  in  May  1960  (see 
section  40 above)-with  the  credit institutions  which  are  parties  to  the  original 
agreement  a  new  " gentlemen  ts  agreement"  on  minimum  reserve-s  in  order  to 
prevent  an  excessive  expansion  of  bank  advances.  Under  this  agreement the 
Central  Bank can require  certain credit institutions  to make  additional deposits 
with it if their  shor~·term advances to the  private sector should go above a  pre-
determined  ceiling.  This  agreement  was  first  put  into  operation  in  June  1961. 
For  the  year  1961  the  permissible  increase  in  short"'term  advances  was  fixed 
at 15 % for the whole of the banking system ; this ceiling, which was not exceeded 
during  the year, was fixed after taking· account of the volume  of short-term bank 
advances considered necessary to finance increased production in 1961. 
46.  The -efficacy of a  minimum  reserve  system  depends  upon  the  nature  of 
the  assets  which  make  up  the  reserves  - compulsory deposits with the Central 
Bank or minimum portfolios of securitie-s. 
The  system  of  minimum  reserves  composed  of  balance-s  deposited with 
the  Central Bank is obviously the one which,  by ensuring that the banks' liquid 
holdings  are  blocked,  is  the  more  reliable  instrument  of  credit  policy.  The 
results  obtained  by  the  system  of  minimum  portfolios  of  securities  are  more 
open to question. 
Compulsory  reserves  in  the  form  of  public  securities  may,  however,  in 
certain circumstances exert an influence ·similar to that of the traditional reserves 
on  the  liquidity  and  therefore  the  lending  potential  of the  banks.  Actually the 
freezing  of  the-se  securities,  immediately  after  the  war,  in  Italy,  Franc~ and 
Belgium  helped to  restrict the  banks'  scope for  credit creation at a  time  when 
they  might  have  peen  tempted  to  liquidate  the  large  holdings  of  government 
paper which  they had amassed during  the  preceding years.  The  essence of the 
" coefficient"  system in Belgium or the " plancher "  in France is that each bank 
can only use part of the liquid assets arising from  new deposits tomake advances 
to  the  economy.  It has  the  same  effect on  the  banks  as if each of them had  to 
"-devote  the  same  proportion  of its resources  to  increasing its  balances  at the 
Central Bank. 
But  the  effect  that  compulsory  reserves  of  public  securities  may  have 
on  the  liquidity  of  the  banking  system as  a  whole  is  less  certain.  Inasmuch 
as  the  Treasury  freezes  the  resources  which  flow  in  through  this  system  of 
compulsory  reserves,  either  by  using  them  to  reduce  its  indebtedness  to  the 
Central  Bank  or  by  converting  them  to  meet  commitments  in  foreign currency, 
46  it absorbs bank liquidity in the same way as the conventional system of reserves. That  was,  for  instance, the  case  in  France  over  the  last three  years.  On the 
other  hand  when  the  Treasury's  position  is  difficult,  for  instance  as  a  result 
of a  growing budget deficit, the system of a  minimum portfolio of Treasury paper 
works out in practice as follows: the Treasury, which usually regards this form of 
minimum  reserve  as a  good opportunity for  financing budget deficits, withdraws 
liquidity  from  the  banks,  which  finds  its way  back  to  them  when  the  Treasury 
makes  the  corresponding  payments.  But  as  this  in  any  case has  the  effect of 
transferring liquidity from  the public sector to the banks, the  problem is largely 
one  of  choosing  between  the  various  ways  of  financing  Treasury expenditure 
- borrowing from  th€ banks, from  the public, or from  the Central Bank. 
In  short,  the  system  based  on  a  minimum  portfolio  of public securities 
does  not seem  to  have  as  certain  an  effect on  the  volume  of credit as  that of 
the  conventional  ~eserves.  Moreover,  the  requirement of  a  portfolio  of public 
securities proportionate to bank deposits appears to be a less flexible instrument 
of  credit  control  than  the  mechanism  of  compulsory  balances  at  the  Central 
Bank. It gives rise to  the  question whether  the  reserve  ratio should always be 
adjusted solely according to  the exigencies of credit policy; in such a  system 
considerations of credit control cut across those of Government financial policy, 
if only because  a  change )n the  reserve  ratio  has  direct  repercussions,  which 
may  be  very  pronounced  if  the  adjustment is  considerable,  on  the Treasury's 
situation. 
47.  The Member States which used the system of minimum portfolios of govern-
ment paper (" plancher"  in France and  banking  ratio in  Belgium) have recently 
made  changes as noted above,  with the  result that they will  be able  to make a 
more  flexible  use  of  this  instrument  according  to  the  exigencies  of monetary 
policy. 
In  France  the  system  of  m1n1mum  reserve  ratios  introduced  in  1960 has 
incorporated  the  old  system  of the  • planchers •  and  should give  the  monetary 
authorities more freedom of action. The banks can now keep part of their minimum 
reserves in securities other than Treasury bills, in particular, bills representing 
medium-term  advances.  The  easing  of  the  Treasury's  situation  enabled  the 
• plancher" of Treasury bills, originally fixed at 25%,  to be reduced to 15% (in 
March  1962)  within  the  reserve  ratio  (fixed at 30%  from  31  January  1961  and 
raised to 32% from  28  February 1962, with a  maximum of 35 %).  But this reduction 
forced  the  ·banks  themselves  to  hold  a  certain  amount  of  medium-term  bills 
instead  of  negotiating  them  through  the  Banque  de  France.  Thus  the  French 
monetary  authorities  now  have  at  their  disposal  a  means  of  influencing  the 
, amount of these bills. 
In  Belgium,  the  reform  of the  "cover ,ratio"  system in  1957  loosened the 
hitherto  close  connection  with  the  financing  of budget deficits.  Since  then the 
banks  have been allowed to complete their cover with certificates of the Fonds 
des  rentes  (Government Stock Equalization Account) instead of Treasury bills; 
the  Fonds  des  rentes  can  now  make  better use  of the  proceeds  of the sale of 
its  certificates  for purposes  of liquidity  policy.  The  introduction  in  1962  of a 
variable minimum reserve system gives the Belgian monetary authorities a  means 
of  acting directly on bank liquidity.  47 Ill. THE  FINANCING OF  THE  PUBLIC  SECTOR 
AND  ITS  INFLUENCE ON  THE  LIQUIDITY 
OF THE  ECONOMY AND  OF  THE  BANKS 
48.  Since  the last war,  the  transactions  of the  public  authorities,  especially 
the  central  government,  have  been  of  the  highest  importance  in  controlling 
bank  liquidity  and  that  of  the  economy  as  a  whole.  Consequently,  the  ties 
between the financial policy of the State and the monetary poiicy of the Central 
Bank,  has  steadily become  closer,  thus  calling  for  more  intimate  co-operation 
between  the  authorities  and the  Central  Bank.  To appraise  the  efficacy of the 
instruments of monetary policy used by the Central Banks, it is obviously essen-
tial to consider the financial policy of governments. 
49.  To do this,  we  must first  examine  the  way in which the State handles its 
cash  holdings,  since the effect on bank liquidity can vary considerably accord-
ing  to  the  Treasury's  methods,  i.e.  whether  it  keeps  all  its  balances  at the 
Central Bank or deposits some of them with the ordinary banks. 
In all the countries of the Community there is some degree of concentration 
of  public  funds,  or  at least government  funds,  at the  Central  Bank.  In  Federal 
Germany,  for  example,  the  Federal and Lander Governments are obliged to keep 
their  cash  holdings  at  the  Deutsche  Bundesbank,  which,  within  the  framework 
of  its  liquidity policy,  can  nevertheless  allow  the  authorities  to keep deposits 
at  the  banks.  In practice, however,  it has  proved extremely difficult to use this 
power of the  Central  Bank as  a  flexible  instrument of monetary policy, although 
the  Bundesbank  has  occasionally authorized  large deposits  in  the  banks.  The 
influence  that can be exerted on bank liquidity  by  the  accumulation  of Treasury 
reserves  at the  Central  Bank  was  strikingly  shown  in  Federal Germany during 
the years  1955  and 1956,  when substantial budget surpluses (the "Juliusturm ") 
were frozen at the· Central Bank. 
In  France,  the  concentration  of  public  funds  is  almost  complete  since 
all  local  authorities  and  public  or  semi-public  bodies  are  obliged  to  deposit 
their  balances  wlth  the  Treasury,  which  can  give  them  advances  or  loans.  In 
this  way  the  Treasury acts  as  a  bank  for  the  public  sector.  Further,  it also 
acts  as a  deposit bank  by  collecting deposits  from  the  public  through the  post 
office(" Comptes cheques postaux ")and its own  receiving offices(" Fonds parti-
48  culiers ").The Treasury deposits all its liquid funds  with the Central Bank. 50.  The  financing  of public  expenditure  exerts  an  influence  on  the liquidity 
of  the  banks  and of the  economy  which  varies  according  to  the  extent  of the 
authorities'  indebtedness  to  the  Central  Bank,  to  the  banks,  or  to  the  public 
through the issue of short or long-term paper. 
All the Member States have  pre~ise regulations governing advances by the 
Central  Bank to  the  public authorities,  but they vary considerably in scope from 
country to country. 
Except  in Italy  and  in  the  Netherlands,  the  total  amount of the  Central 
Bank's advances  to the State is subject to a  fixed ceiling. In Federal Germany 
the  limit is  DM  3 000  million  for  the  Federal Government  and  DM  850 million 
for the special funds, and an amount equal to a  fixed number of DM  per inhabitant 
in  the  case  of  the  Lander  Governments  (at  present  about  DM  1 000  million). 
The  Banque nationale  de  Belgique may only make  advances  up to Bfrs.  10 000 
million to the  B~lgian State, and Bfrs.  333  million to the State of Luxembourg. 
In France, the Central Bank'-s advances to the State are kept by law to a  ceiling 
at present fixed at NF 4 800 million. 
In Italy, the Central Bank's advances are  limited to 15% of current budg-
etary  expenditure.  In  the  Netherlands  the  interest-free  advances  of the  Neder-
landsche  Bank  to  the  Treasury are  subject  to a  limit fixed  at fl.  150 million, 
but the Central Bank is free to make other advances to the Treasury. 
In Germany, the extent to which the authorities may borrow from  the Central 
Bank  is  fixed  by  the law governing  the  Deutsche  Bundesbank ; an alteration in 
the  ceiling  would  therefore  t'equire  an  amendment  to  the  law.  The  ceiling for 
the  Banque  de  France  is  fixed  by  agreements  made  between  the  Governor of 
the  bank and the Minister of Finance and ratified by Parliament.  In  Belgium the 
ceiling is also fixed by agreement between the Governor of the Banque nationale 
de  Belgique and the Minister of Finance  on the  proposal of the  Bank' s Conseil 
de  regence,  but it requires  only  the  approval  of  the  Council  of Ministers.  In 
Italy the ceiling is fixed simply by decree. 
51.  In all the Member States, the Treasury also  tums to  the  banks  for advances 
to meet its needs, especially by placing with them short or medium-term govern-
ment paper, and occasionally long-tertn securities. 
As  already pointed out in discussing the  policy of m1n1mum  reserves, in 
some  of the  Member States the Treasury's needs are, or at least were,  to some 
extent met automatically. The requirement that the banks should hold government 
paper  representing  a  certain  percentage  of customers'  deposits,  in  accordance 
with  the  system  of  banking  ratio  or  the 
11  plancher •,  automatically channelled 
part of their liquid assets to the Treasury. This method of financing government 
expenditure  through  the banks existed in Belgium and in France since the early 
post-war  years; it has recently been brought to  an end in Belgium and modified 
in France by  reductions in the  proportion of Treasury bills in the " planchers ".  49 In Italy the Treasury is also free to place government paper with the banks 
in  accordance  with the  system of minimum  reserves:  it is, however,  left to the 
banks  themselves to decide  whether they will meet their minimum  resen:e obli-
gations  by  holding  balances  or  by  depositing  Treasury  bills  with  the  Central 
Bank. 
In the  other member  countries,  the  Treasury or other authorities  offer the 
banks  short and  medium-term  securities  in which  to  invest their liquid assets, 
either  directly,  as  in  the  Netherlands,  through  their  own agents  in  the money 
market,  or  indirectly through the Central Bank as is the case in Germany. The·se 
securities  can  often  be  rediscounted  at  the  Central  Bank  or  can  be  used as 
collateral  for  advances.  In  general  they  may  therefore  be  considered  a  fairly 
liquid  form  of investment  and  can  be  put  to  some  use  for  purposes  of open-
market policy. 
52.  In  the  Netherlands,  France,  Italy  and  Luxembourg,  the  Treasury  also 
offers  commercial concerns  and  non-banking  institutions  short and medium-term 
securities  for  the  investment  of  their liquid assets  and  savings,  although  to a 
considerably lesser extent than  before  the war.  In the  Netherlands  the  interest 
on  these  securities is  ~losely dependent  on  the  state of the  money market; in 
France and Italy, on  the other hand, the rates of interest on tap issues of Treas-
ury paper are comparatively stable. 
In  France  Treasury  bills  are  an  investment  much  sought  after  by  the 
private  sector and  are  therefore a  permanent and  substantial means  of covering 
the Treasury's needs. Although they are short-term paper and their rate of  interest 
is  only  changed  at  rare  intervals,  the  extent  of  this  indebtedness  actually 
remains  stable.  Experience  has  shown  that even  in times  of crisis the  amount 
of Treasury bills in the hands  of the  public does  not show any marked decline. 
The Treasury nevertheless  endeavoured to prolong the average term of this debt 
by issuing for  the first time in June 1961 three to five-year bills. 
In  Italy,  however,  it  seems  that  investment  in  Treasury  bills  bearing 
a  comparatively stable rate of interest has  in the past shown fairly substantial 
fluctuations.  Further,  the  comparatively  large  volume  of current  sales  of these 
bills  has  enabled  the  Treasury to reduce  considerably  its  indebtedness  to the 
Banca  d' ltalia  thanks  to  the  continuously  increasing  liquidity  of the  economy 
and of the banks due to the expansion of foreign trade. 
Purchases  of  Treasury  bills  by  the  public  do  not  of  themselves  reduce 
liquidity  in  the  non-banking  sector;  on  the  other  hand,  when  they  are  taken 
up  by  commercial  concerns  and  private  individuals  they  do  decrease  bank  liq-
uidity in so far as the Treasury,as  in  Italy  and  for  some  years  now  in France, 
freezes  the  money  invested.  In  some  Member  States  the  Treasury  has  also 
floated  long-term  loans  with  a  view  to  reducing  bank  liquidity.  That was  done 
on  a  considerable scale  in  Italy  in  1959  when  the  Treasury issued bonds  with 
50  maturities  of seven to nine  years for  the specific purpose of absorbing liquidity due  to surpluses of foreign currency.  In the  Netherlands also the Treasury took 
similar  steps  by floating  long-term  loans,  although  the  budgetary  situation did 
not  call for  such action. It is also in that country more  than in the others that 
regular use  has  been  made  of funding  issues to consolidate liquid investments 
of  the  banks  (for  instance,  through  the  gentlemen's  agreement  on  compulsory 
reserves) and of the non-banking sector. 
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1.  The  ultimate  aim  of all Central  Bank  policy is  to  influence  the demand 
for  money.  Apart,  however,  from  certain  open-market  operations  and  direct 
discount  transactions  with  business  concerns  or  private  persons,  the  Central 
Bank  cannot  as  a  rule  exert any direct  influence  on  the  demand  for  money or 
on the volume of money - at any rate not under the German Central Bank system. 
Its  influence  is  rather in most cases  an indirect one; it must either attempt to 
influence  the  liquidity of the  banking system,  and  thereby  the  volume  of credit 
granted  by  the  commercial  banks,  or  - by  changing  the  Bank  rate  and related 
interest  rates  - it must  bring  its  influence  to  bear  on  the  banks'  demand  for 
refinancing and the demand (){the business community for  credit, and also on the 
formation  of monetary capital within the  banks. 
2.  The  policy of a  Central  Bank  turns  largely on  the  question  of liquidity. 
In  dealing with monetary policy,  a  distinction must  be  made  between  two forms 
of  "liquidity". There is on the one hand the·" liquidity of the  economy ",that is 
to  say,  the  total  volume  of money  in  circulation in the  economy, however that 
may  be  defined in detail; on  the  other hand,  we  may speak of the  liquidity  of 
the  banking  system,  that is  to  say,  the  amount  of  Central  Bank  money  at the 
disposal  of the  banking  system as  a  whole,  together  with such liquid reserves 
as are at any time  convertible into Central  Bank money.  When  reference is made 
to  the  "liquidity policy"  of the  Central  Bank  in  the  strict sense of the  term, 
what  is  understood  in  the  Federal  Republic  is  always  the  influencing of the 
liquidity of the  banks by  appropriate measures. 
a)  The liquidity of the  economy as a whole ("money") 
3.  The  expression  "liquidity  of  the  economy"  is  very  little  used  in  the 
Federal  Republic.  The  concept  generally  used  is  "volume  of  money"  (Geld-
volumen) or sometimes "supply of money" (Geldversorgung); these terms may be 
used in a  narrow or a  wider sense. 
The "volume of money" in the narrower sense is made up of: 
i)  the  note and coin circulation (excluding cash balances held by credit insti-
tutions); 
ii)  sight  deposits  of  home  non-bank  customers,  including  sight  deposits  of 
public authorities with banks other than the Central Bank.  57 The definition in its wider application also includes : 
iii) sight deposits of public authorities at the Deutsche Bundesbank; 
iv)  and,  possibly,  also  time  deposits  of  home  customers  for  a  fixed  period or 
at  notice  of less  than  six months  (or  even longer  periods  - depending  on  the 
point of view adopted). 
4.  As  there is  no  clear definition of the  concept  " volume  of money"  which 
is applicable for  all purposes, this  expression is not employed in the Deutsche 
Bundesbank statistics;  the  relevant  table  in the  monthly report  of the  Bundes-
bank,  which  is  reproduced on  page  59  as Table  1, is  simply headed "note and 
coin  circulation  and  bank  deposits ",  leaving  it  to  the  reader  to  select for 
himself from  the  very detailed subdivisions whatever items  he requires to make 
up his  figure.  Where  the  expression  "volume  of money"  or "supply of money" 
is  used in  the  text of  the  Bundesbank's monthly report, it is as a  rule accom-
panied by explanatory notes. 
The table includes all the factors comprised in the term "primary liquidity" 
as  commonly  used  in  the  Netherlands,  and  also  time  deposits  and  savings 
deposits, which form  a  part of the bank balances comprised in the term "secondary 
liquidity".  On  the  other hand it does  not include  non-bank  customers' holdings 
of short-term Government paper (Treasury bills, Treasury bonds,  tax certificates 
etc), which are regarded in the Netherlands as also forming a  part of " secondary 
liquidity"  - and  hence  of  "total  liquidity".  In  the  Federal  Republic  such 
holdings  do  not  play  such  an  important  part (see para.42),  because  hitherto it 
was  only occasionally  that  any  substantial  amount  of Treasury bills  was  held 
outside the banking system (and then only by certain public authorities). 
5.  The most important sources of money supply available to the economy are 
the  external  payments  surpluses  and  the  net  amount  of  credit granted  by the 
banking system as a  whole; that is to say, the credit granted to inland customers 
other  than  banks,  after deducting the amount  of  monetary capital  formed  at the 
same  time  at  the  credit  institutions  (increase  in  savings  and  time  deposits, 
proceeds  from  sale  of  bank  bonds,  long-term  borrowing  and  loans  from  non-
banks and additions  to banks' own  capital and reserves) (see Table  2, page 60). 
In  many  instances,  when  changes  in  the  volume  of  money in  Germany 
are being studied, it is better not to include the sight deposits of public author-
ities at the Bundesbank in ascertaining the  volume of money;  this is especially 
the case for certain periods in the past when sight deposits of public authorities 
at the Bundesbank were subject to special influences. If this narrower definition 
of the volume  of money is employed, any changes in the sight deposits of public 
authorities  at the  Bundesbank  have  to  be  taken  into  account as  an  additional 
factor  in  determining  variations  in  the  volume  of  money  as  so  defined. (Any 
increase  in these  accounts  arising out of  cash transactions  in the home  market 
reduces, other things being equal, the " active volume of money" ;  any reduction 
58  increases it). Table  1 
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114  16 370  7 220  9150  31268  2716 
71  16425  6637  9788  32570  2673 
43  16989  7022  9967  34006  2748 
47  16511  6716  9795  36065  2779 
- 16 630  6 499  10131  38 289  2 651 
- 16662  6127  10 535  39941  3166 
- 17 303  6 531  10772  41607  3 025 
- 18189  6 845  11344  44 170  3 537 
- 18 423  6 911  11 512  44 940  3 537 
- 19159  7406  11753  45720  3262 
- 19 581  7 436  12 145  46 516  3 225 
- 19051  7175  11876  47058  3506 
- 19201  7144  12057  47562  3821 
- 19 495  7 181  12 314  48 062  3 836 
- 18863  6617  12246  484f9  3 578 
- 19 205  6 935  12 270  48 875  3 451 
- 19 570  7 046  12 524  49 447  3 225 
- 19215  6758  12457  49879  3414 
- 19 525  7 003  12 522  50 583  3 221 
- 19656  7182  12474  50939  3181 
- 19463  7157  12306  52863  3691 
1076  1703 
1613  1924 
1613  1924 
1895  1796 
1978  2 044 
756  1159 
829  1 256 
891  1796 
915  1 580 
941  1775 
1 014  1659 
1049  1699 
1076  1703 
1380  1271 
1568  1598 
1493  1532 
1613  1924 
1613  1924 
1551  1711 
1 580  1645 
1624  1882 
1739  2 082 
1701  2135 
1680  1898 
1694  1757 
1656  1569 
1678  1736 
1715  1 506 
1710  1471 
1895  1796 
- 19907  7426  12481  53963  3296  1747  1549 
- 20716  7 731  12 985  54816  3 206  1695  1 511 
- 20457  7125  13332  55281  3 577  1749  1828 
- 21 035  7 326  13 709  55 484  3 693  1812  1881 
- 21687  7 609  14 078  55 996  3 789  1807  1 982 
- 21150  6815  14335  56423  3912  1931  1981 
- 21241  7 014  14 227  56 804  3 929  1847  2 082 
- 21608  7 372  14 236  57 213  3 625  1801  1824 
- 21018  7155  13 863  57 381  3 552  1837  1715 
- 21202  7 581  13 621  58 330  3 518  1793  1725 
- 21040  7 516  13 524  58 387  3 542  1795  1747 
- 21204  7 521  13 683  60 073  4 022  1978  2 044  . 
1 From  July  1959  onwards  including ·oM  notes  and  coins  circulating  in  the Saarland as  well  as  deposits  of  Saarland  non-banks 
with Bundesbank; from  January 1960 onwards including deposits of non-banks maintained with Saarland credit institutions. 
2 !'\eluding DM  notes and coins held abroad. 
Source: Monthly Reports of the  Deutsche Bundesbank.  59 Table  2 
TRENDS  IN  THE  MONEY  SUPPLY 
Increase (+) or Decrease (-) 
1957  1958  1959 
Bank  credits  to  non·  banks  in 
Germany  +  9983  +  12 542  +  18096 
Formation  of monetary  capital 
at  credit institutions  from  do· 
mestic sources 1  +  13 557  +  11 59R  +  15187 
I.  Surplus  of  credit-granting 
within  Germany  ( +) or of 
formation  of money capital 
from  domestic  sources(-)  - 3 574  +  944  +  2909 
II.  Changes  in  Central  Bank 
balances  of German public 
authorities (increase -)  +  2606  +  671  +  2686 
III.  Changes  due  to  other do· 
mestic causes  - 180  - 1062  - 649 
IV.  Total  from  domestic  sour· 
ces (I + II + III)  - 1148  +  553  +  4946 
v.  Changes  in net claims  on 
foreign  countries (Bundes· 
bank and other banks)  +  5066  +  4218  - 261 
VI.  Changes  in  money  supply 
(note  and coin circulation 
and  sight deposits  of  do· 
mestic  non-banks  but  ex· 
eluding  Central  Bank  bal· 
ances  of  German  public 
authorities)  +  3918  +  4771  +  4658 
For information: 
Time  deposits of domestic 
customers  for  fixed period 
or  as  notice  of  les.s  than 
6 months 2  +  1605  - 481  +  129 
1 Includes all time deposits by domestic customers. 
(in million OM) 
1960  1961 
+  17 307  + 23966 
+  16170  +  18 457 
+  1137  +  5509 
- 2304  - 1293 
- 1694  +  2836 
- 2861  +  7 052 
-----::L  6 269  +  427 
+  3408  +  7 479 
+  246  +  326 
2 Included in  the  line  "Formation  of monetary capital" above; these short-term deposits are some· 
times treated as a  part of the volume of money. 
60  Source: Monthly Reports of the Peutsche Bundesbank. t; 
b)  The liquidity of the  banking system 
6.  The  concept  of  the  " liquidity  of  the  banking  system "  in  the  narrower 
sense  comprises the  total  amount  of Central  Bank money  (bank notes  and bal-
ances at the Central Bank) held in the banking system. When  the term is used in 
its wider sense, it also includes other bank assets which can be used to increase 
the  supply  of  Central  Bank  money.  Such  assets  include  trade  bills  eligible 
for  discounting  at  the  Central  Bank,  foreign  exchange,  short  or  medium-term 
securities  issued  by  the  Government  or  other  public  authorities  and  also,  in 
certain circumstances, other securities. The justification for  taking such assets 
into account in considering the liquidity position is that the Central Bank itself 
is  ready  - and,  indeed,  in  some  cases  obliged  - to  take them  over  and,  in 
exchange, to make Central Bank money available.  It is therefore appropriate  to 
speak  of  "potential  liquidity •  or  "easily-mobilized  liquidity  reserves"  and 
to  describe  the  amount  of  Central  Bank  money  actually  held  by  the  banks as 
"actual" or "cash liquidity". 
7.  The  ••  cash  liquidity •  of  the  banks  is  very  closely  linked  with  their 
obligation  to  keep  certain  minimum  reserves  at the  Bundesbank,  as  under  the 
German  system  there  are  no  surplus  reserves  worth  mentioning  (see  para.32, 
below); on the other hand these minimum  reserve balances act at the same time 
as  "working balances"  for  payments  purposes  (see  para.22).  The "potential" 
liquidity or the real liquidity reserves of the banks consist mainly of: 
a) domestic  open-market  paper  (including  all  short-term  securities  issued  by 
public authorities); 
b) balances  at  foreign  banks  and  funds  employed  in  foreign  money  markets ; 
c) commercial  bills  eligible  for  discounting  at  the  Central  Bank,  but  only up 
to the limit of the individual rediscount quotas of the commercial banks. 
8.  The  definitions  used here  relate  to  the  banking  system  as  a  whole.  On 
the  other  hand,  in  dealing  with  the  liquidity of individual  banks  or  of sectors 
of the  banking system, we  may also include such assets as a  single institution 
(though  not  the  banking  system as  a  whole)  can  use  to increase its liquidity. 
These  include  credit  balances  with  other  credit institutions,  securities  which 
are  saleable in the capital market,  bills not eligible for  discount at the Central 
Bank  provided that  they can be  placed with  other credit institutions  etc. How-
ever important these  liquid assets may be  for  individual  banks  or single groups 
of  banks,  when  we  are  considering  the  liquidity  policy  of  the  Central  Bank 
they  are  of no  great significance.  From  the  standpoint of liquidity policy they 
are  a  means  of evening  out liquidity  between  individual  sectors  of a  banking 
system,  although  they have no effect on the liquidity of the  banking  system as 
a  whole. 
9.  The  cash liquidity of the  banking  system is  a  resultant of the  credit and 
debit  transactions  of  the  Central  Bank  and  the  trend  of  the  note  and  coin  61 62 
circulation outside the  banks.  It is determined mainly by the following  factors : 
i)  net foreign currency transactions of the  banks with the Bundesbank; 
ii)  net transactions of the Bundesbank with the public sector; 
iii) changes in the note and coin circuktion (and also "other factors"). 
Under the German system the amount of the net transac'tions of the Bundes-
bank  with  the  economy outside  the  banks and public authorities is of only very 
small  importance  compared  with  the  foregoing  factors  (see  paras.42  and  61 
below). 
The  weight  of  the  main  factors  for  the  years  1957  to  1960  is  shown in 
Table 3  on page 63 and in the diagram 1 on page 64. 
10.  Credit policy affects liquidity of the banks by: 
a) changes in the minimum  reserve obligation; 
b) open-market  operations  (changes  in  the  terms  of sale  and  purchase  of open-
market  paper);  including  certain  transactions  for  the  regulation  of  the  money 
market and supplemented by forward dealings in foreign exchange; 
c) influence  on  the  holdings  of  public  balances,  in  particular  their allocation 
between the  Central  Bank and the  commercial  banks, and also influence  on  the 
manner of financing cash deficits of public authorities; 
d) conditions  for  access  to  rediscount  credit  at  the  Central  Bank (qualitative 
requirements  with  regard  to  rediscountable  paper,  quantitative  limitations  by 
way of rediscount quotas). 
Changes  in the  bank  rate have  an indirect effect on  bank  liquidity, since 
they  make access  to  rediscount credit more  difficult or  easier as  the  case may 
be. Furthermore, under the German banking system, this is the only way in which 
the  demand of industry and commerce  for  advances  from  domes tic banks  can be 
directly influenced. Table  3 
TRENDS  OF  BANK  LIQUIDITY 
(calculated on  the basis of the average of the four weekly bank return dates 
in  the last month of each financial year) 
(in million DM) 
1957  1958  1959  1960  1961 
I.  Changes  in  bank  liquidity 
(increase +) owing to : 
1. Change  in note and  coin 
circulation  - 1531  - 1482  - 937  - 1684  - 2524 
2.  Domestic  cash  transac-
tions of  public authorities  - 232  - 2139  - 3185  - 5 550  -6748 
3. Foreign  currency  trans-
actions  of  the  Bundes-
bank 1  + 8062  + 5503  +  3388  +  10748  +  5575 
4.  Other factors  - 307  +  481  +  348  +  1025  +  1286 
Net effect on  bank liquidity of 
factors 1- 4  + 5992  + 2363  - 386  +  4539  - 2411 
II.  Changes  in  balances  of 
credit  institutions  at  the 
Bundesbank  (increase -)  2  - 1694  - 927  - 1344  - 4001  + 2936 
(for comparison:  change  in 
monthly  ..  reserve  m1n1mum 
requirements)  (- 1757)  (- 964)  (- 1 089)  (- 4364)  (+ 3 361) 
III.  1. Repayment  ( +)  or  avail-
ment  (-)  of refinancing 
credits  from the Bundes-
bank  +  1179  +  627  - 293  - 797  +  480 
2.  Acquisition ( +) or dispo· 
sal  (-)  of  home  money 
market paper 3  +  3119  +  809  - 1437  +  1335  +  45 
IV. (For information)  Change~  in 
amount of short-term claims 
of  banks  other  than  the 
Bundesbank  on  foreign 
debtors 4  +  396  +  265  +  1503  - 1228  +  1463 
1 So far as these affect bank liquidity. 
2 Represents  for  the  most part the  changes in minimum reserve requirements. Divergencies are ex-
plained by the fact that in this table changes in credit balances are shown on the basis of an average 
of the dates of the Bank's four weekly returns, whereas the  minimum 1reserve  requirement  needs  to 
be satisfied only on  the  basis of  the  average  of the daily balances for the month; furthennore oc-
casionally surplus reserves appear for purely technical reasons. 
3 As part of the Bundesbank's open-market policy. 
4 Credit balances  and money  market  funds  employed  abroad.  Unlike  the  other items,  this item is 
arrived at on the basis of end-of-year figures, 
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7)Catcu/ated from a~rages  of  the four weekly bank -return dates in the month.-2)Aiso when resulting from the formation or repa-
triatt"on of  banks 't'nvestments abfT10d, -3)Net total of  changes in credit balances and cash advances, plus the Federol Government's 
foreign payments.-4)Account has been taken of  the liquidity contraction due to the development aid loan and to the issue of Volks-
wagen shares.-S)Calculated on the basis of  the four weekly bank -return dates from the 23rd day of  the preceding month to the 
15th day of  the current month.-6)Credit balances with foreign banks (gross) and money -morket investments abroad, disregardtng 
investments by R.L.C. out oft  he development aid loan. -*}Break  due to inCDrporotton of  the Saarland.  BBk 
64  Source: Annual Report 1961 of the Deutsche Bundesbank. CHAPTER  1 
REFINANCING  POLICY 
a) Discount Policy 
11.  According to sec. 15  of the Bundesbank Act, dated 26  July 1957, the Bank 
is authorized, "in order to influence the amount of money in circulation and the 
volume  of  credit  granted",  to  fix  "such rates  of interest  and  discount  as  are 
appropriate to  the business undertaken".  Thus the Bundesbank can in principle 
apply different rates of discount for various classes of business, but so far it has 
made  no  use of this  power (cf.  Table 4,  page  66). Sec.  19  gives  the  Deutsche 
Bundesbank the right to buy and sell at its fixed discount rate bills dated up to 
three months, ir:tcluding Treasury bills issued by the Federal Government, the Lan-
der  and  the  Federal  Government~s Special  Funds  (Federal  Railways,  Federal 
Postal  Administration,  Equalization  of  Burdens  Fund,  E.R.P.  Special  Fund), 
providing that these satisfy the conditions prescribed in the Act. 
Further,  under  sec.  19,  the  Bundesbank  can grant interest-bearing loans 
against the  pledge of securities  with  various  terms  (bills, non-interest-bearing 
Treasury bonds,  debentures listed by  the Deutsche Bundesbank as eligible for 
this  purpose),  so-called  "Lombard  credit",  granted  for  not  more  than  three 
months  and limited  to  a  certain  percentage of the  face  value  of the  securities 
pledged,  the  percentage varying  according  to  the  class of security offered.  In 
these  transactions  the  Bundesbank  applies  the  so-called "Lombard  rate"  of 
interest,  normally  1%  above  Bank  rate.  In  principle  the  Bundesbank  grants 
Lombard  credit only  when  it is  required_ as  a  stop-gap  to  meet liquidity diffi-
culties,  and when it has no objection to the purposes for which  the advance is 
to be applied. 
12.  The  Bundesbank  discount  rate  is  also  normally  applied  in  advances  to 
public authorities up to the statutory ceiling (see chapter 5). 
13.  The  Bundesbank  discount rate  is  also of importance  in  connection  with 
the interest rates which banks charge to their customers. In accordance with the 
so-called  "Sollzinsabkommen"  (agreement  on  interest  rates  charged  to  bor-
rowers)  - which  is still being  applied even  since  the  new  Law on  the  Credit 
System came into force on  1  January 1962 - the interest rates which  the banks 
are allowed to charge their customers on bill credits  and overdrafts are to be no 
higher than a  specified amount above the  Bank's  discount  rate or Lombard rate, 
as the case may be. Any change in Bank rate therefore automatically leads to a 
corresponding alteration in  the  maximum  rates  for  the above-mentioned credits.  .65 Table  4 
INTEREST RATES OF  THE  DEUTSCHE  BUNDESBANKl 
Rates for  Discounts and  Advances, 
and  Special  Rate of Interest charged  for failure to meet the Minimum  Reserve Requirement 
Special rate of interest 
Rate for  charged to credit 
Applicable from :  Discount rate 2  advances on  institutions for failure 
securities  to meet minimum reserve 
requirement 
% p. a.  % p. a.  % p.a. over advance rate 
1948  July  1  5  6  1 
December  1  ·3 
1949 \1ay  27  4Ya  5Ya 
July  14  4  5 
1950 October  27  6 3/4  7 
November  1  1 
1951  January  1  3 
1952  May  29  55  6 
August  21  4Ya  5Ya 
1953 January  8  4  5 
June  11  3Ya  4Ya 
1954 May  20  3  4 
1955  August  4  3Ya  4Ya 
1956 March  8  4Ya  5Ya 
May  19  5  Ya  6  6Ya 
September  6  5  6 
19 57  January  11  4Ya  5Ya 
September 19  4  5 
19 58  January  17  3Ya  4Ya 
June  27  3  4 
1959  January  10  2%  3% 
September  4  3  4 
October  23  4  5 
1960 June  3  5  6 
November  11  4  5 
1961  ~anuary  20  3Ya  4Ya 
ay  5  3  4 
1 Until 31  July 1957  rates of Bank deutscher Lander and of Land Central Banks. 
2  This  is  also  the  rate  for cash advances  to  public  authorities  and  to  the  Reconstruction  Loan 
Corporation;  cf.  footnotes  4  and 5.  The  discount rate  for  bills  expressed in  foreign  currency was 
uniformly  fixed  at 3%,  for  the  time  being, by  a  decision  adopted  by  the Board of Directors of the 
Bank deutscher Lander on 3  Aug.  1948.  By decision of 9/10 November 1949 the Board of Directors 
authorised the Board of Managers to fix varying rates for bills in this class, in accordance with the 
discount rates of the foreign Central Banks concerned.  The same  applied to bills in  DM  which had 
been  accepted  abroad  (Decision  of  22/23  March  1950),  and  also  to  export  drafts  (Decision  of 
15/16 November 1950 and 23/24 May  1951); see also footnote 6. 
3 Promissory notes  arising under the  export promotion  scheme of  the  Reconstruction  Loan  Corpo· 
ration were discounted at the preferential rate of 4%  even after the  raising of the discount rate on 
27  October 1950 (Decision of 29/30 November 1950).  This privilege in  regard to  the interest rate 
was cancelled by decision of 7 I 8  November 1951; and it could then  be claimed only for promissory 
notes arising from  credits which were granted or promised not later than 7  November 1951. 
4 Under a  decision  taken by the  Board of Directors of the  Bank deu tscher Lander on  20  December 
1950  the interest rate for  cash  advances  to  the  Reconstruction  Loan  Corporation  was  fixed,  with 
effect from  27  October 1950,  at 4%  in  the  case of len dings  to  agriculture,  maritime  shipping and 
house  building, and at 5 ~%  in the case of len  dings serving other purposes. 
5  From 29 May  1952 there was in effect only the special arrangement mentioned under 4  for !endings 
to  be used for  financing  agriculture,  maritime  shipping and housebuilding,  to  which  !endings until 
their redemption the rate of 4% applied. 
6  From  19  May  1956  onwards  also discount rate  for  foreign  bills,  foreign  cheques,  foreigners'  DM 
acceptances, and export drafts. 
66  Source: Monthly Reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank. In  practice,  however,  the  rates  charged  by  banks  are  often  lower  than  these 
official maximum rates. 
Deposit  interest  rates  are  also  related  to  Bank  rate,  though  less  di-
rectly. Up to the date when  the new Law on  the Credit System came into force, 
on  each  occas'ion  when  Bank  rate  was  changed  the  Central  Credit Committee, 
on which all groups of banks are represented, submitted recommendations to the 
Special Committee for Bank Supervision of the German Lander as to whether, and 
if so to  what extent, deposit interest rates  should follow  the  changes in  Bank 
rate.  The  Bank  Supervision  Authorities  then  decided,  with  the  concurrence of 
the  competent Federal Ministries and the  Bundesbank, what changes  should be 
made in depositinterest rates. Since the new Law on the Credit System has come 
into force, the Federal Supervisory Office for the Credit System has been granted 
powers  by  the  Federal Economics  Ministry  to  fix  banking conditions by  statu-
tory decree.  In  this  connection  the  Federal Supervisory Office  can act only by 
agreement with  the  Bundesbank. Deposit interest rates  - like rates. of interest 
charged  to  borrowers  - are  only  maxima;  the  banks  can  apply  lower  rates if 
they wish. 
14.  It  is  not  altogether  easy  to  form  an  optmon  as  to  the  efficacy  of the 
Federal Republic's  Bank rate policy. In contrast with  the Bundesbank's instru-
ments of liquidity policy (especially its minimum  reserve and open-market poli-
cies), changes in Bank rate have only an indirect influence on banking liquidity, 
depending on  how  far  the  banks  are  prepared  to  borrow  from  the  Central Bank. 
On  the other hand Bank rate policy is the only means by which the Bundesbank 
can influence  the  demand for  credit. of bank customers - and hence of the eco-
nomy in general - by means of changes in the general level of interest. A change 
in deposit interest rates, which is often connected with  a  change in Bank rate, 
may also have direct repercussions on interest rates in the stock market, because 
of  the  competition  between  securities  and  savings  or  time  deposits  as  alter-
native  forms  of  investment.  Finally  a  change  in  Bank  rate  - in  the  Federal 
Republic as elsewhere - is taken as a  pointer to the general credit policy of the 
Central Bank and thus also influences the policy of the banks and of business 
in general. 
With  the  removal of restrictions on international payments and the result-
ing  interdependence  of  the  world's  financial  centres,  changes  in  Bank  rates 
(with  concomitant  changes  in  internal  interest  levels)  have  assumed  special 
importance in relation to the international flow of short-term capital. Because of 
this, a  Government's freedom to manoeuvre and its means of exerting an influence 
by its Bank rate policy may, in certain circumstances, be considerably restric-
ted,  as  experience  in  the  Federal  Republic  since  1960  has  clearly  shown. 
If the  Central Bank wishes  a  change in Bank rate  to have more  than the 
effect  of a  "pointer", it will take  further  steps  to  render  a  change in interest 
rates effective on the market by acting on bank liquidity. There is also another 
way  in  which interest rate  policy and liquidity  policy interact,  for  changes in  67 Bank rate are often made  to increase the  efficacy of liquidity policy measures; 
by  relaxing  or  tightening  the  pressure  of  these  two  forces,  as  the  situation 
demands, it can be made easier or more difficult for the banks to obtain refinance 
at the Central Bank. 
h) Rediscount  quotas 
15.  A  change  in  the  Bank  rate  is, however,  not  the  only  way in  which  the 
Bundesbank can exert an influence on the banks  recourse to refinancing. It can 
also  restrict  or  extend  this  by  laying  down  conditions  for  the  discounting of 
bills or by varying rediscount quotas. 
The  Statute of the  Bundesbank does  no more  than  lay down  minimum  re-
quirements for rediscountable bills (bills with three backers known to be solvent 
and  maturing  in  not more  than  three  months);  but  the  Bundesbank in  the ordi-
nary course of business can say which bills it will discount. It has frequently 
refused  to  discount bills  relating  to  certain  classes  of business,  for  example 
hire  purchase  transactions,  interim  finance  for  building  projects  and  bank 
acceptances except when intended only to provide short-term finance  for partic-
ular transactions. 
The  effect  to  the  Bundesbank
1 s  refusal  to  rediscount  bills  relating  to 
certain  classes  of business is of course  felt  mainly  by  the  ultimate  borrower 
because if the  banks have  no  assurance  of rediscount at the  Bundesbank they 
are inclined to reject business of this sori:. ·From  the standpoint of credit policy, 
the  refusal  to  discount certain classes of bills is  generally of only minor im-
portance ; in most cases the banks have other bills at their disposal which they 
can, if necessary, present at the Bundesbank for rediscounting. 
16.  More  important  from  the  liquidity  policy  aspect  is  that,  in addition to 
the  qualitative  test  which  the  Bundesbank  applies  to  bills  presented  by  the 
banks,  the  total  volume  of rediscount  credit at  the  disposal of each  bank is 
limited  by  so-called "rediscount quotas"·  All  bills  which  are  rediscounted at 
the Bundesbank are reckoned against this quota; exceptions are made in respect 
of  prime  acceptances  with  a  remaining  period  of  up  to  45  days  and  also for 
bills  to  finance  medium  and long-term  export business drawn within  the limits 
of a  rediscount quota granted by the Bundesbank to the  Export Credit Company 
{" B - Ceiling"). 
The level of the rediscount .quota depends mainly (though  the rule is not 
very strictly interpreted) on  the committed funds of the credit institution (being 
its capital, including disclosed reserves and global value adjustments) and the 
coefficient applicable at the time ; the coefficient may however vary for different 
groups of banks.  The credit institutions are not officially informed about these 
68  quotas but they can ascertain them on enquiry. 17.  In past years the quotas have several times been reduced. On  1 May 1957, 
they were  reduced by  15%.  Then a  deduction was  made  from  the  reduced quota 
in respect of credits taken up abroad, except in  cases where they were used as 
direct finance for import  business or to finance a  merchanting transaction. Further 
reductions  in  rediscount quotas  have  been  made  since  the  autumn  of 1959 in 
connection  with  the  credit restraint policy.  These reductions  are  needed  from 
time  to  time,  because  the  banks'  own  capital and  reserves  are  increasing; if 
the  coefficient  for  computing  the  rediscount  quota  remained  unchanged,  the 
financing limit would steadily increase in proportion. On 1 October 1959, there-
fore, when the basis of computation was being reviewed, the quotas were reduced 
in  the aggregate  by  some  19%.  With  a  further  revision of quotas  which became 
effective from  1 March  1960, there was a  further aggregate reduction of at least 
DM  2 OOQ  million. The smaller credit institutions received preferential treatment 
in that the percentage reduction made in the first DM  5 million of each individual 
bank's quota was  10%  only, the remainder being cut by 30%.  Since, at the same 
time as these rediscount quotas were reduced, the minimum reserve requirements 
were  increased,  and  the  banks,  in  order  to  satisfy  these  requirements,  were 
compelled  to  present bills  for  discounting on  a  larger scale than  hitherto,  the 
combined  effect was  an  appreciable  contraction  in  the  liquidity  of  the  credit 
institutions. With  effect from  1 July 1960, yet another reduction was made; this 
time  the  cut was increased to  15%  on  the  first DM  5  million and to 40%  on the 
remainder. In connection with a  relaxation of credit restriction·, these reductions 
in quotas,  which  had  been made  during  1959  and  1960,  were  partly withdrawn 
with effect from  1 March  1961 and entirely reversed from  1 November 1961. 
69 CHAPTER  2 
MINIMUM  RESERVE  POLICY 
18.  Compulsory  minimum  reserves  were  first  introduced in  Germany in  1948, 
when  the  Bank Deutscher Lander was  founded.  It is  true  that the  1934 Act on 
the  Credit System  contained  a  general  provision  to  the  effect  that  the  banks 
should keep balances at the Central Bank sufficient to cover a  certain percentage 
(not  specified)  of  their  customers~ deposits,  but the  purpose  of this  provision 
was  to  ensure  the  liquidity  of  customers~  deposits  rather  than  to  further  any 
particular credit policy; moreover it was never implemented.  . 
a) The  legal ;asis of the  present minimum reserve regulation 
19.  When the former  Act on the .Bank Deutscher Lander was superseded by the 
Deutsche Bundesbank Act of 26 July 1957, the minimum reserve provisions of the 
1948 Act were adopted in a  modified form.  Sec.  16  (1) of the Deutsche Bundes-
bank  Act provides: 
"In order  to  regulate  the  volume  of money in  circulation and of credit granted, 
the  Deutsche  Bundesbank  may  require  that  credit  institutions  shall  maintain 
with  it  balances  on  current  account  (minimum  reserve)  representing  a  fixed 
percentage  of  their  liabilities  in  respect of sight deposits,  time  deposits  and 
savings deposits and also short and medium-term borrowings with the exception 
of liabilities  to  other credit institutions  which  are  subject to  minimum  reserve 
regulations.  The percentage rates  fixed  by  the  Bank  shall not exceed 30%  for 
sight deposits,  20%  for  time deposits and  10%  for  savings deposits. Subject to 
these  limits,  the  Bank  may  vary  the  percentage  rates  according  to  general 
considerations,  fix  differential  ratios  for  certain  categories of institutions and 
exclude certain commitments from  the basis of calculation " 
On  16  April  1959  the Bundesbank issued an instruction on  the operation 
of sec.  16  of  the  Bundesbank Act.  Bulletins are  published by  the  Bundesbank 
notifying credit institutions of the minimum reserve ratios. 
b) Credit institutions subject to minimum reserve regulations 
20.  With  few  exceptions,  all credit institutions  in  the  Federal Republic  are 
70  subject to  the minimum  reserve regulations. This is because almost all German credit institutions accept sight, time or savings deposits to which the minimum 
reserve obligation applies. The institutions concerned are as follows: 
Commercial banlcs: 
- Large banks, 
- State and regional banks, 
- Private bankers, 
-Specialized banks (mainly banks affiliated to large enterprises or serving the 
needs of particular trades or industries) ; 
Central giro institutions, 
Savings banks, 
Central institutions of industrial and agricultural credit co-operatives, 
Industrial and agricultural credit co-operatives, 
Private mortgage banks, 
Shipping mortgage banks, 
Public mortgage banks 
Credit instit\ltions with special functions (e.g. Kreditanstalt fiir Wiederaufbau- Re-
construction Loan Corporation) 
Hire purchase finance houses 
Postal cheque and Postal Savings Bank Offices 
In  the  Bundesbank  instruction,  the  institutions  which  are  not  liable  to 
minimum reserve regulations are expressly specified, they are: 
House-building  undertakings  in  the  public  interest  which  are  not  primarily 
concerned  with  banking  or  savings  bank  busines.s, 
Pawnbroking businesses, 
Building societies (Bausparkassen), 
Investment companies, 
Kassenvereine (institutions for clearing transactions in securities), 
Credit institutions in liquidation. 
c) Computation of minimu'f!l reserves 
21.  The basis of computation for the balances which have to be maintained at 
the  Bundesbank  (minimum  reserve  requirement)  is  the  total  of  the  so-called 
"liabilities  subject  to  the  reserve  regulations",  that  is,  all  liabilities  to: 
Non-banks, 
"Credit institutions which are not subject to minimum reserve regulations, 
Foreign banks, 
in respect of deposits and borrowed money; in the latter case, when the money 
is borrowed for a  fixed period or at notice of less than four years. 
The following liabilities are excluded : those  to the Bundesbank in re~pect 
of money earmarked for some specific purpose and certain deposits referred to in 
the Deutsche Bundesbank instruction on minimum reserves.  71 Among  the  liabilities  which  are  subject  to  the  reserve  requirements,  a 
distinction is made between: 
Sight liabilities (with a  term or period of notice of up to 30 days), 
Time  liabilities  (for  a  fixed  period  or  at  notice  of one  month  or  more)  and 
savings  deposits. 
In determining the mtmmum reserve requirement (Mindestreserve-Soll), the 
average  amount  of  the  liabilities  subject  to  the  regulation  over a  period  of a 
month is ascertained. The banks have the alternative of computing this average 
either on the  basis of the  figures at the end of each day, including non-working 
days, from  the  16th of the previous month to the 15th of the current month, or on 
the position at the 23rd and last day of the previous month and the 7th and 15th 
of the current month. 
The actual reserve (1st -Reserve) is  arrived  at  by  calculating the simple 
monthly average of the daily balances held at the Bundesbank. 
22.  This manner of calculation allows the banks considerable elasticity in the 
management of their minimum reserve holdings. As  the minimum reserve require-
ment only needs to be satisfied on  the basis of a  monthly average, they can use 
their minimum  reserves  for  the  purpose  of making  payments  and,  if  necessary, 
can draw  on  them  freely so long as the reserves are correspondingly increased 
on other days  of the calculation period. Because of the latitude permitted under 
this  arrangement,  the  banks  need  not  maintain  at  the  Central  Bank  any  other 
special balances  for  the  purpose  of making current payments. The minimum  re-
serves have thus also something of the character of 
11 working balances 
11
,  although 
up  to  now  the  banks have never had to  employ  them  to their full  extent in this 
way. Consequently so-called surplus reserves - that is to say balances held at 
the Bundesbank in excess of minimum reserve requirements - are as a  rule very 
small.  They  are  in  some  cases  due  to  unavoidable  errors  in  forecasting,  and 
they generally amount to no more than  1%  to  2% of the minimum reserve require-
ment. 
d) Differentiation in  minimum reserve ratios 
23.  From. the  time  of their introduction  on  1  July  1948  to  the  end of Decem-
ber  1961,  the  minimum  reserve  ratios  of  the  Deutsche  Bundesbank have  been 
changed 29  times. Table 5  on  page  73 shows these changes and also gives  the 
present reserve ratios. 
The  table  also  shows  that  there  has  been  a  very  wide  differentiation 
between the various minimum reserve ratios. Sec. 16 (1) of the Bundesbank Act, 
which has already been referred to, gives the Bundesbank the right to differentiate 
within  the  maximum  limits  laid  down,  according  to  particular  categories  of 
72  institution. Sight liabilities 
Applicable from  Bank places 
reserve month: 
Reserve class 
1  2  3  4  5  6  1 
1948 July  10 
December  15 
1949 June  12 
September  10 
1950 October  15 
1952 May  15  14  13  12  11  10  12 
September  12  12  11  11  10  9  10 
195 3 February  11  11  10  10  9  9  9 
1955 September  12  12  11  11  10  10  10 
1957  May  13  13  12  12  11  11  11 
1959 August  13  12  11  10  - - 10 
November  14.30  13.20  12.10  11  - - 11 
1960 January  15.60  14.40  13.20  12  - - 12 
March  18.20  16.80  15.40  14  - -I  14 
June  20.15  18.60  17.05  15.50  - -I  15.50 
July  2o.15  I 18.60  I  17.05  I  15.50  I -I -I  15.50  J 
December  20.15  18.60  17.05  15.50  - - 15.50 
1961 February  19.50  18  16.50  15  - - 15 
March  18.20  16.80  15.40  14  - - 14 
April  17.55  16.20  14.85  13.50  - - 13.50 
June  16.25  15  13.75  12.50  - - 12.50 
July  15.60  14.40  13.20  12  - - 12 
August  14.95  13.80  12.65  11.50  - - 11.50 
September  14.30  13.20  12.10  11  - - 11 
October  13.65  12.60  11.55  10.50  - - 10.50 
December  13  12  11  10  - - 10 
2 
Table  5 
RESERVE  RA TJOS  AND  RESE RYE  CLASSES 
a) Reserve  Ratios 1 
(per cent of reserve-carrying liabilities) 
Non-bank places 
3  4  5  6  1  2 
Time liabilities 
Reserve class 
3  I 
4 
Reserve-carrying Liabilities to Residents 
all such liabilities 
10  5 
10  5 
9  5 
8  4 
12  8 
11  10  9  8  8  8  7.50  7  6.50 
10  9  9  8  8  7  7  6  6 
9  8  8  8  8  7  7  6  6 
10  9  9  9  9  8  8  7  7 
11  10  10  9  9  9  9  8  8 
9  -8  7  - - 9  8  7  6 
9.90  8.80  7.70  - - 9.90  8.80  7.70  6.60 
10.80  9.60  8.40  - - 10.80  9.60  8.40  7.20 
12.60  11.20  9.80  - - 12.60  11.20  9.80  8.40 
13.95  12.40  10.85  -- - 13.95  12.40  10.85  9.30 
such liabiliti~s up to the average level of the months March to May 1960 
13.95  I 12.40  I 10,85  1- I -I 13.95  I 12.40  I 10.85  I  9.30  I 
all such liabilities 
13.95  12.40  10.85  - - 13.95  12.40  10.85  9.30 
13.50  12  10.50  - - 13.50  12  10.50  9 
12.60  11.20  9.80  - - 12.60  11.20  9.80  8.40 
12.15  10.80  9.45  - - 12.15  10.80  9.45  8.10 
11.25  10  8.75  - - 11.25  10  8.75  7.50 
10.80  9.60  8.40  - - 10.80  9.60  8.40  7.20 
10.35  9.20  8.05  -
~  10.35  9.20  8.05  6.90 
9.90  8.80  7.70  - - 9.90  8.80  7.70  6.60 
9.45  8.40  7.35  - - 9.45  8.40  7.35  630 
9  8  7  - - 9  8  7  6 
Savings deposits 
Non- Bank  bank 
5  6 






6  5.50  4 
5  5  4 
5  5  4 
6  6  5 
7  7  6 
- - 6  5 
- - 6.60  5.50 
- - 7.20  6 
- - 8.40  7 
- - 9  7.50 
- I  - I  9  I  7.50 
- - 9  7.50 
- - 8.70  7.25 
- - 8.10  6.75 
- - 7.80  6.50 
- - 7.20.  6 
- - 6.90  5.75 
- - 6.60  5.50 
- - 6.30  5.25 
- - 6  5 
- - 6  5 
1 Prior to May  1954, partly different regulations applied to the Berlin credit institutions. The Saarland credit institutions have been subject to the minimum reserve requirement since August 1959. 
Reserve ratios for 
addition to liabilities 
Sight  Time 
liabili·  liabili- Savings 
ties  ties  d,eposits 
no special ratios 
Addition to the 
average level of the 
months March to May 1960 
I  30  I  20  I  10 
no special ratios 
73 Table  5  {continued) 
Sight liabilities 
Time liabilities  Saving deposits  Reserve ratios for 
addition to liabilities 
Applicable from  Bank places  Non.;.bank places 
reserve month:  ! 
Reserve cJass  Reserve class  Non- Sight  Time  I  Savings  Bank  bank  liabili- liabili- I 
l 5 I 6  I 
places  deposits 
1  2  3  4  5  6  1  2  3  j  4  1  2  3  4  5  6  places  ties  ties 
Reserve-carrying Liabilities to Non-residents 
/' 
all such liabilities 
(Until April 19S7  ratios were the same as for liabilities to residents) 
19S7 May  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  10  10  10  10  10  10  10 
September  30  30  30  30  30  30  30  30  30  30  30  30  20  20  20  20  20  20  10 
19S9 April  13  13  12  12  11  11  11  11  10  10  9  9  9  9  8  8  7  7  6  no special ratios 
August  13  12  11  10  - - 10  9  8  7  - - 9  8  7  6  - - 6  I 
s 
November  14.30  . 13.20  12.10  11  - - 11  9.90  8.80  7.70  - - 9.90  8.80  7.70  6.60  - - 6.60  s.so. 
Addition to the level 
such liabilities up to the level as of 30 November 10S9  as of 30 November 1959 1 
1960 January  1S.60  14.40  13.20  12  - - 12  10.80  9.60  8.40  - - 10.80  9.60  8.40  7.20  - - 7.20  6  30  20  10 
March  18.20  16.80  1S.40  14  - - 14  12.60  11.20  9.80  - - 12.60  11.20  9.80  8.40  - - 8.40  7  30  20  10 
June  20.1S  18.60  17.0S  1S.SO  - - ·1S.SO  13.9S  12.40  10.8S  - - 13.9S  12.40  10.8S  . 9.30  - - 9  7.SO  30  20  10 
all such liabilities 
1961 May  30  130  1  30  1  30  I  -I -l 
30  I 
30  1  30  1  30  I  -1-1
2?  '1'20  120  120  I  - I  - I 
10  r 10  l 
no special ratios 
I 
1 From July 1960 onwards these ratios apply also to the addition, as  compared wi.th the level on 31  May  1960, to credits availed of by customers with third parties abroad. Up to  the level as at 31  May 1960 these liabili~ies remain exempt from 
the reserve requirement. 
b)  Reserve Classes 2 
From May 1952 to July 1959  From August 1959 onwards 
Reserve class  Credit instia.ttions with reserve-carrying liabilities (not including savings deposits)  Reserve class  Cred~t instia.ttions with reserve-carrying liabilities  (including savings  deposits) 
1  of D'~ 100 million and over  1  of DM  300 million and over 
2  of DM  SO  to under 100 million  2  of DM  30 to under 300 million 
3  ofDM  10 to under  SO  million  3  of DM  3 to under  30 million 
4  of DM  S to under  10 million  4  under DM  3 million 
s  of DM  1 to under  S million 
6  under DM  1 million 
2 The reserve class into which any credit instia.ttion is to be placed is determined by the amount of its reserve-carrying liabilities in the preceding month. 
74  Source: Monthly Reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 24.  Sometimes the ratios for  sight liabilities and savings deposits are differ-
entiated according  to  "Bundesbank centres" (BankpHitze)  and  "others''  (Bank-
nebenpHitze).  A  Bundesbank  centre  for  the  purposes  of  the  minimum  reserve 
regulations  is  a  place  in  which  the  Deutsche  Bundesbank has a  branch estab-
lishment. Where there is no such branch,  the reserve ratios for  sight liabilities 
and savings deposits are lower than those for banks in Bundesbank centres. The 
reason for  this is that in places where there is no Bundesbank branch the banks 
are in any case obliged to keep more  till money,  in particular for their savings 
account business, since a  considerable  proportion  of the  savings deposits can 
be withdrawn without notice. 
25.  In  determining  the  minimum  reserve  ratios  applicable  to  sight and  time 
deposit  liabilities,  the  credit  institutions  are  divided  into  various  classes, 
according  to  the  amount  of  their  liabilities  liable  to  the  reserve regulations 
(including savings deposits). The differentiation between centres with a  Bundes-
bank branch and those without on the one hand, and according to reserve classes 
on the other, favours the smaller institutions. 
26.  In the course of the tightening of credit restrictions in which the Bundes-
bank  was  engaged  at that  time,  with  effect  from  July  1960 a  special minimum 
reserve was introduced in respect of the increase in domestic liabilities subject 
to  the minimum  reserve  regulations.  The basis of computation for  the increase 
in liabilities was the average amount of these, as arrived at for  the purpose of 
ascertaining  the amount of the reserve  requirement on the  relevant bank return 
dates  in  the  months of  March to  May  1960. The  increase  since  this  reference 
period  was  made  subject  to  the  maximum  ratio  permitted  by  law.  With  effect 
from  December 1960, this regulation was withdrawn; since that date, all domestic 
liabilities are  subject to the  same ratio. 
27.  Finally,  for  the  period from  May  1957  to  April  1959, liabilities of banks 
towards non-residents were for  the first time  subject to higher minimum reserve 
ratios  than  were  applicable to liabilities towards  residents;  the  object of this 
differentiation  was  to stem the flow  of foreign  money into German banks.  From 
January 1960 onwards,  the maximum ratios  were imposed on  the  increase since 
30  November  1959  in liabilities  towards  non-residents  subject  to  minimum 
reserve  regulations  whereas  up  to  the  amount  of  the  liabilities  that already 
existed  before  30  November  1959  the  rating ratios  for  non-resident deposits 
continued to apply.  From May  1961  to the end of January 1962, in  order  to  put 
an even more effective brake on the influx of foreign  funds,  the maximum ratios 
were  applied  to  all liabilities  towards  non-resident"s  subject  to  the  minimum 
reserve regulations with the exception of customers' drawings on credits opened 
at foreign institutions as at the end of May 1960. Since 1 May 1961, in computing 
the  minimum  reserve  the  amount  of balances  (whether  sight or  time  deposits) 
and money market funds held abroad on the selected day is allowed as deduction 
from  liabilities towards non-residents;  this offers an inducement for  the export 
of capital.  75 e) Interest 
28.  It  is  not  the  practice  of  the  Bundesbank  to  pay  interest  on  mtmmum 
reserve  balances.  This  entails  a  considerable loss  of  earning  power  for  the 
credit institutions  concerned;  and  the  burden is  particularly heavy if minimum 
reserve ratios  are  substantially increased  for  general reasons of credit policy. 
Minimum  reserve policy is  therefore  not  merely  a  factor  of purely quantitative 
significance for the liquidity of the banking system; it also has its repercussions 
on interest rates.  When  minimum reserve percentages are increased,  the banks' 
profitability is affected and they feel obliged to increase  their charges  to  bor-
rowers. It  is  true  that  under  the  "Sollzinsabkommen"  (see  page  65) . interest 
charged to borrowers is linked with Bank rate; but this agreement only lays  down 
maximum  interest  rates,  and  in  individual  cases  the  rates  charged  may  be  -
and often are  - below  the  maximum.  An  increase in  the  minimum  reserve ratio 
therefore  gives  rise  to  a  tendency  to  withdraw  special  concessions  for  bor-
rowers - which, in times of restrictive credit policy, is a  desirable end. 
f)  Penal rates 
29.  If  the  balance  held  by  any  bank  at  the  Bundesbank  falls  short  of  the 
amount  required under  the  minimum  reserve  regulations,  interest is  charged on 
the amount of the deficiency at a penal rate of 3%  above the Bundesbank advance 
rate  at the  time.  As  a  rule,  this  means  a  charge  of 4%  above  Bank rate (see 
Table 4, page 66). 
g) Efficacy of minimum reserve policy 
30.  As  an  instrument of policy minimum  reserve regulations  are  used by the 
Bundesbank  principally  when  some  persistent trend  in  banking  liquidity calls 
for  a  corrective, or when it is desired to influence banking liquidity in a  certain 
way  as  a  matter  of  long-term  policy.  The  Bundesbank  generally  deals  with 
short-term·  fluctuations  in  banking  liquidity  by  money  market  operations,  as  a 
part of its open·  market policy. The difference in the extent to which these two 
methods have  been applied is shown by the  fact that since 1948, as mentioned 
earlier,  there have been 29  changes in minimum  reserve ratios  (on a  few occa-
sions changes were made on grounds other than those of credit policy), whereas 
the Bundesbank's selling rates  for  open market paper were changed 26  times in 
the three years 1958 to 1960 alone, during which period there were 7  changes in 
the  Bank  rate  and  6  changes  in  minimum  reserve  ratios  on grounds of credit 
policy. The restraint displayed in using the minimum  reserve ratio is explained 
by the fact that, in spite of all differentiation, it is still a  somewhat rough and 
ready  method; it has  a  blanket effect on  the  various  institutions,  even  though 
76  their liquidity position and their business policies may be different. 31.  With  the  steep  increase, almost  continuous  since  1948,  in  liabilities 
subject  to  minimum  reserve  regulations,  the  volume  of bank  liquidity immobi-
lized would have been substantial even if the ratio had remained unchanged. The 
real importance of the minimum reserve weapon, however, lies in the possibility 
of varying  the percentages from  time to time. At the  end of December 1961  the 
total  liabilities  subject  to  minimum  reserve  regulations  amounted  to  nearly 
DM 112 000 million, so that an average increase of only 1%  in the minimum reserve 
ratio  means  a  reduction  in  liquidity  of  some  DM  1 000  million.  The  ratios  in 
force  at that time meant that the liquid funds  of the 'banks  kept at the Central 
Bank amounted to about DM  9 000 million. 
32.  In  assessing  the  qualitative  effects  of  minimum  reserve  policy,  in  the 
first place it must be borne in mind that, by reason of its structure,. the German 
banking system is more dependent on refinancing at the  Central Bank than are 
banks in Anglo-Saxon countries.  Ev~n when in past years liquidity increased to 
an  extraordinary degree,  the  banks  as  a  whole  continued to have  recourse  to 
the Central Bank. It is true that on several occasions the amount of their recourse 
fell to a  very low level and that large sections of the banking system were for a 
time no longer dependent on the Bundesbank for refinance. Whether this develop-
ment in past years rna y be taken as indicating a  structural change in this respect, 
it is still too  early to  say. In the  past, however,  this  structural feature  of the 
German  banking  system  - to the  maintenance  of  which, it may be remarked in 
passing,  minimum  reserve  obligations have  made  a  substantial contribution  -
has been of very special importance for  the efficacy of minimum reserve policy. 
Any increase of funds accruing to the banks, which they do not require to meet 
their minimum  reserve obligations, is used mainly by them  to reduce their refi-
nancing  liabilities  at  the  Bundesbank.  Even  when  there has  been a  great ex-
pansion  in  liquidity,  this  has  never  led  to  the  formation of so-called  surplus 
reserves  to any significant amount. Neither was  this  the case when the indebt-
edness of the  banks  to the Bundesbank reached a  very low level, because they 
always had opportunities of investing any liquid funds in home or foreign money 
market paper. 
33.  In general the banks can meet an increase in minimum reserve obligations 
only  by  converting  their  "potential"  liquidity  (in  the  form  of  rediscountable 
trade  bills,  money  market  paper  and  foreign  exchange)  into  balances at .the 
Central  Bank,  where  they  are immobilized.  On  the  other  hand,  when  minimum 
reserve ratios are reduced, certain balances are set free and the banks reconvert 
them into potential liquidity. In either case the liquidity of the banking system 
~s a  whole is affected.  Whether the banks acquire the additional Central Bank 
balances by drawin.g on their foreign money market investments, by realizing home 
money market paper or by presenting bills at the Central Bank for discounting, 
will  depend  on  circumstances  (e.g.  relative  rates  of interest).  The  important 
point is that the financing of increased minimum reserves lays a  burden on the 
liquidity  reserves  (potential liquidity) of  the  banks,  with  the  result  that  they 
are obliged to exercise greater restraint in granting credit.  77 78 
34.  The  efficacy of  the  mmtmum  reserve  system in  the  Federal Republic is 
enhanced  by  the  fact  that  the  banks'  scope  for  resort  to  the  Bundesbank is 
limited  by  the  so-called  rediscount  quotas.  In  conjunction  with  the  minimum 
reserve  policy,  the  importance of these quotas lies in the fact that they set a 
limit to  the  banks'  recourse  to Central Bank funds,  even where  they still have 
bills  in  their  portfolios  (or  could  obtain  these  in  the  ordinary  course of their 
credit business) which would satisfy the Bundesbank requirements as to quality. CHAPTER  3 
. OPEN  -MARKET  POLICY  AND  REGULATION 
OF  THE  MONEY  MARKET 
35.  The  Deutsche  Bundesbank carries  out  open-market  operations  in  short 
and medium-term paper in order to influence the money market. The Bundesbank 
Act indeed also permits of open-market business in long-term securities, so that 
operations  on  the  market in fixed-interest securities  would  be possible; up to 
the  present,  however, the Bundesbank - which  incidentally does  not hold  any 
appreciable  amount  of long-term  interchangeable  securities  of this  sort  - has 
not engaged in business of this type. 
a) Legal basis 
36.  The legal basis for the Bundesbank's open-market business is sec. 21  of 
the Deutsche Bundesbank Act of 1957. According to this section, the Deutsche 
..Bundesbank "in order to regulate the money market, may buy and sell at market 
prices in the open market" : 
a) Bills  which  satisfy  the  requirements  laid down  in  sec.  19  of  the  Act  (di~­
countable bills); 
b) Treasury bills and Treasury bonds issued by the Federal Government, one of 
its Special ·Funds or a  Land ; 
c) Debt certificates and Debt Register claims issued by the Federal Government, 
one of its Special Funds or a  Land; 
d) Other bonds officially quoted on the Stock Exchange. 
According  to  the  wording  of  the  Act, .  open-market  business  is  only  in-
tended "to regulate the money market"  but not to regulate or  support the capital 
market  - though  that  of  course  seldom  remains  unaffected  by  money  market 
policy. 
37.  In  the  early  years  of  its  existence  the  Bundesbank's  predecessor,  the 
Bank Deutscher Lander, was able to engage in open-market operations only to a 
very limited extent. In fact, it had at its disposal hardly any paper which would 
have been suitable for  such business. It is true  that the Bank Deutscher Lander  79 and the Land Central Banks (which, until the Bundesbank was  founded  in  1957, 
together constituted the Central Bank System) had some DM  8 000 million worth 
of claims on  public authorities. These claims, however, which had arisen in the 
course of the  currency reform in the shape of balance sheet adjustments  in the 
accounts  of  the  Bank  Deutscher  Lander  and  the  Land  Central  Banks,  bear 
interest only at 3%; moreover they may only be sold at their nominal  value,  so 
that in practice they are not marketable. As bank liquidity increased, it became 
more and more necessary to absorb the surplus liquidity, and the Baak Deutscher 
Lander agreed  with  the  Federal Government that a  part of these "Equalization 
Claims"  should be converted into negotiable money market securities (Treasury 
bills and non-interest-bearing Treasury bonds). This arrangement was at a  later 
date embodied in sec. 42 of the Bundesbank Act and the Bundesbanlc now has an 
operating fund of some DM  8 000 million worth of so-called "mobilization paper". 
The Bundesbank is under an obligation to the Federal Government to meet 
all liabilities arising out of the mobilization paper which has been issued. The 
Federal  Government,  however,  still  pays  only  3%  interest  to  the  Deutsche 
Bundesbank  in  respect of  the  Equalization Claims  which  have  been converted 
into mobilization  paper. If the Bundesbank sells mobilization  paper at a  yield 
in excess  of this figure, it has  to find the difference in interest out of its other 
earnings. 
b) Other money-market business 
38.  In  addition  to  the  money-market  paper  ongtnating  from  the  agreed  con-
version  of  Equalization  Claims  (mobilization  paper),  the  Bundesbank  also 
arranges  for  the  placing  of  Treasury  bills  and  non-interest-bearing  Treasury 
bonds issued by the  Federal Government, the Lander and certain of the Federal 
Government's Special Funds (see Table 6,  page  81).  As  a  general rule  the  sale 
of  this  money-market  paper  does  not  draw  off  liquidity,  because  the  issuers 
normally spend the proceeds of the sale, so that the money  finds  its  way  back 
to  the  banks,  though  sometimes  after a  certain lapse of time.  The Bundesbank 
also  regulates  the  market  in  the  so-called  Storage  Agency  Bills ;  these  are 
issued  by  the  Import  and  Storage  Agencies  within  the  ceiling  of  the  credits 
granted  to  them  by  the  banking  syndicate,  and  up  to  a  limit  agreed  with  the 
Bundesbank,  in  the  form  of  Government-guaranteed  promissory  notes,  for  the 
purpose of financing stocks of certain basic foodstuffs (cereals,fats, meat, etc.). 
The  Bundesbank  takes  up  these  bills  as  they  are  offered  on  the  market,  on 
conditions  appropriate  to  the  state of the  market at the  time,  and disposes of 
them again when a  demand arises. The way in which this  form  of money market 
regulation operates differs  somewhat from  open-market operations  proper; more 
80  especially, the object is not the same. Table  6 
CIRCULATION OF  TREASURY  BILLS,  NON-INTEREST-BEARING  TREASURY  ~ONDS AND  OTHER  MONEY-MARKET  PAPER 
1 
Federal Government  Lander 
Position  Treasury bonds  Tax 
at end of  Total  Treasury  Money- Ear- Total  Treasury  Treasury  credit 
month  bills  market  marked  bills  bonds  certifi-
paper  paper2  cates 3 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
1950  498.7  498.7  - - 313.0  260.2  2.8  50.0 
1951  1306.0  608.2  697.8  - 346.3  137.8  44.9  163.6 
1952  861.6  110.6  751.0  - 330.7  66.3  102.4  162,0 
1953  753.6  78.7  529.9  145.0  300.2  24.3  128.3  147.6 
1954  607.0  65.0  400.0  142.0  299.5  16.8  89.2  193.5 
1955  138.0  - - 138.0  321.2  30.6  149.5  141.1 
1956  94.0  - - 94.0  547.7  - 409.7  138.0 
1957  - - - - 897.8.  - 661.3  236.5 
1958  - - - - 545.6  - 311.1  234.5 
1959  295.8  65.2  230.6  - 419.7  - 163.7  256.0 
1960  880.8  - 880.8  - 269.7  - 105.5  164.2 
1961  407.6  - 407.6  - 133.6  - 33.7  99.9 
1960 March  778.2  22.1  756.1  - 419.9  - 158.2  261;7 
June  834.8  20,0  814.8  - 337.3  - 122.9  214.4 
September  820.3  - 820.3  - 298.0  - 116.1  181.9 
December  880.8  - 880.8  - 269.7  - 105.5  164.2 
1961  March  740.9  - 740.9  - 265.8  - 105.2  160.6 
June  683.7  - 683.7  - 230.1  - 75.2  154.9 
September  513.7  - 513.7  - 156.7  - 46.7  110.0 
December  407.6  - 407.6  - 133.6  - 33.7  99.9 
1 Except money-market paper deriving from  the conversion of equalization claims, and except Storage Agency bills. 
2 Issued for the purpose of a  special financial adjustment between Federal Government and Lander. 
3 Land of Bavaria: moreover, up to 31  March 1955, also Berlin debt certificates. 
4 To provide security for investment credits. 
5 Including non-interest-bearing Treasury bonds special series "S" (resulting from  the temporary conversion of bonds). 
Source: Monthly Reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
00  ...... 
in millions of DM 
Federal  among 
Federal Railways  Postal Ad- which: 
ministration  money-
Treasury bonds  market 
Treasury  Money- Ear- Treasury  Total  paper 
Total  bills  market  marked  bonds  (col.14 less 
paper  paper 4  4 less 12) 
9  10  11  12  13  14  15 
718.6  571.5  127.6  19.5  - 1530.3  1 510.8 
846.0  642.1  149.2 5  54.7  - 2498.3  2 443.6 
1128.8  528.3  549.1 5  51.4  150.0  2 471.1  2 419.7 
1159.6  519.6  553:2 5  86.8  295.9  2 509.2  2 277.4 
1071.2  551.8  394.7  124.7  381.1  2 358.8  2 092.1 
824.2  472.1  216.5  135.6  . 405.3  1688.7  1415.1 
718.0  432.9  102.1  183.0  500.0  1859.7  1582.7 
1111.6  320.8  538.9  251.9  439.8  2449.2  2197.3 
1371.0  398.6  590.0  382.4  300.0  2 216.6  1834.2 
1171.1  296.8  445.0  429.3  269.9  2156.5  1727.2 
1085.9  199.4  445.0  441.5  192.2  2428.6  1987.1 
1293.1  182.4  590.0  520.7  264.3  2 098.6  1577;9 
1090.4  180.9  475.0  434.5  266.0  2 554.5  2120.0 
1259.9  285.0  530.0  444.9  220.3  2652.3  2 207.4 
1034.0  98.8  480.4  454.8  275.6  2427.9  1 973.1 
1085.9  199.4  445.0  44L5  192.2  2428.6  1987.1 
955.6  133.9  411.9  409.8  150.4  2112.7  1702.9 
985.4  204.6  355.9  424.9  195.7  2 094.9  1670.0 
1130.9  100.0  583.4  447.5  300.4  210L7  1654.2 
1293.1  182.4  590.0  520.7  264.3  2 098.6  1577.9 With  regard  to  the  purchase  and sale  of so-called prime  acceptances by 
the Bundesbank, see sec. 50 et seq. 
c) Quality, term and buying and selling rates of money-market paper 
39.  The  reason  why  money-market  paper  -:  apart  from  those  securities  with 
a  relatively short remaining life  - is suitable as  a  form  of investment for  the 
banks'  liquid funds  is that it  can, if required, be returned  to the Central Bank 
and  in  this  way  exchanged  for  Centtal  Bank  money.  Treasury  bills  and  non-
interest-bearing  Treasury  bonds  can  also  be  discounted at the  Bundesbank at 
its own currently fixed to repurchase price. In the  case of Treasury bills there is 
a  formal promise to discount. There is no such promise attached to non-interest-
bearing  'f.reasury bonds,  but  the  Bundesbank has  always  taken  up  such bonds 
when offered, at its currently fixed price. 
40.  Mobilization  paper  takes  the  form  of  2- and  3-month  Treasury  bills and 
also non-interest-bearing Treasury bonds with 6, 12, 18 or 24 months to run. The 
Bundesbank  is  however  not  always  prepared  to  sell  paper  with  the  currency 
period desired by the banks. In a  period  of rapidly rising liquidity and falling 
interest  rates,  as  for  example  in  1958,  there  is  a  pressing  demand  from  the 
banks for paper with a  longer currency and correspondingly higher rate of interest. 
As on that occasion the Bundesbank had no desire to withdraw too much liqui-
dity, from  the middle of 1958 until the beginning of 1959 it entirely discontinued 
the  sale of non-interest-bearing Treasury bonds,  so that  the only recourse left 
to  the  banks  was  to  invest  in  Treasury  bills,  which  carried  a  lower  rate  of 
interest and,  moreover, a  rate which was constantly falling.  From the beginning 
of  1959  the  Bundesbank  only  gradually  resumed  the  sale  of  the  longer-term 
Treasury bonds. Conversely) in April 1960, that is to say in a  period of restraint 
the  Bundesbank  sold no Treasury bills  from  its mobilization portfolio but only 
Treasury bonds  bearing a  higher rate of interest; it hoped in this  way to exert 
a  somewhat  stronger restraining influence  on bank liquidity. In  February 1961, 
in  accordance  with  a  policy  of  lower  interest  rates  pursued  for  balance-of-
payment reasons,  the  Bundesbank began  selling only  short-term  paper,  that is 
Treasury  bills  and non-interest-bearing Treasury  bonds  with  a  currency of not 
more  than a  year, and the sale of higher interest-bearing paper with a  currency 
of more than a  year was discontinued. 
41.  In  practice,  the  open-market  policy  works  through  the  actions  of  the 
Bundesbank in varying  its  selling and repurchase rates  for  different  forms  of 
money-market  paper according  to  the  current trend  of the  money market  and in 
accordance  with  the  intentions  of its  liquidity  policy.  These  changes  in  the 
selling and repurchase rates of money-market securities are the real hub of the 
Bundesbank's  open-market  policy.  Changes  in  selling  rates  are  publicly  an-
82  nounced in the following form : Example: Press announcement of the Deutsche Bundesbank dated  ~January 1962 
With  effect  from  4  January  1962  the  selling rates  for  the  money-market 
securities listed below are reduced as follows: 
1. Federal Government and Federa f  Railways 
Treasury  bills 
with a  currency of 60 - 90 days 
with a  currency of 30 - 59 days 
2. Non-interest-bearing  Treasury  bonds 
issued  by  the  Federal  Government,  the 
Federal  Railways  and  the  Federal  Postal 
Administration 
with a  currency of  ~ year 
with a  currency of  1  year 
3.  Storage  Agency  Bills 
with a  currency of 60 - 90 days 
with a  currency of 30 - 59 days 
Since  From 
2 0 October 1961  4  January 1962 
%  % 
2 
1 7/8 










The selling rates for Treasury bonds with a  currency of  1~ to 2  years remain unchanged 
(2  5/8% and 2 3/4% respectively) 
The rates at which money-market securities are repurchased before maturity 
are  not  published.  They  are  fixed  at  a  certain  margin  above  the  published 
selling  rates.  These  margins  may  vary  according  to  the  state  of  the money 
market,  the  way  in which  the  Bundesbank  wishes  to  influence  the  market and 
the type of security concerned ; yet these margins between selling and repurchase 
rates  in  practice  often  remain  unchanged  for  fa~rly  long  periods  so  that  the 
rate  at  which  the  Bu.ndesbank  will  repurchase  ,varies  in  accordance  with  its 
selling prices - though on a  higher level. Table 7  on page 84 traces the changes 
in  selling  rates  for  the  various  classes  of money-market  securities  since the 
beginning  of  1958. 
d) The  "Market" for  money-market securities 
42.  It is a  special feature of open-market operations in the Federal Republic 
that dealings in money-market securities take place only between the Bundesbank  83 Applicable 
from: 
1958 
January  2 
January  6 
January  17 
April  15 
May  30 
June  27 
July  11 
August  11 
October  28 
1959 
January  10 
April  9 
April  15 
September  4 
September 23 
September 30 
October  16 
October  23 
October  28 
December  21 
1960 
February  29 
March  3 
June  3 
November  2 
November  3 
November  11 
December  20 
1961 
January  20 
February  9 
February  14 
March  3. 
March  8 
March  17 
tJarch  23 
April  26 
May  5 
October  4 
October  20 
Table  7 
RATES  OF  THE  DEUTSCHE  BUNDESBANK 
Applying to  Sales  of Money  .. Market Paper in  the  Open  Market 
(%  per annum) 
Treasury Bills of  Non-interest-bearing Treasury Bonds of 
Federal Government  Federal Government, Federal Railways  Storage Agency 
and Federal  and Federal Postal Administration  Bills 
Railways 
running for  running for  running for 
30 to 59  60 to 90  6  12  18  24  30 to 59  60 to 90 
days  days  months  months  months  months  days  days 
3 3/8  3 1/2'  3 3/4  4  4 1/4  4 1/2  3 1/2  3 5/8 
3 1/4  3 3/8  3 5/8  3 7/8  4 1/8  4 3/8  3 3/8  3 1/2 
3 1/8  3 1/4  3 1/2  3 3/4  4 1/8  4 3/8  3 1/4  3 3/8 
3 1/8  3 1/4  3 1/2  3 5/8  3 7/8  4 1/8  3 1/4  3 3/8 
3 1/8  3 1/4  3 1/2  3 5/8  3 3/4  4  3 1/4  3 3/8 
2 5/8  2 3/4  3  3 1/8  3 1/4  3 1/2  2 3/4  2 7/8 
2 1/2  2 5/8  2 7/8  3  3 1/8  3 3/8  2 5/8  2 3/4 
2 3/8  2 1/2  2 3/4  3  3 1/8  3 3/8  2 1/2  2 5/8 
2 1/4  2 3/8  2 5/8  2 7/8  3  3 1/4  2 3/8  2 1/2 
2 1/8  2 1/4  2 1/2  2 5/8  2 7/8  3 1/8  2 1/4  2 3/8 
2  2 1/8  2 3/8  2 1/2  2 3/4  3  2 1/8  2 1/4 
17/8  2  2 1/4  2 3/8  2 5/8  2 7/8  2  2 1/8 
2 3/8  2 1/2  2 3/4  3  3 1/4  3 1/2  2 1/2  2 5/8 
2 1/2  2 5/8  2 7/8  3  3 1/4  3 1/2  2 5/8  2 3/4 
2 5/8  2 3/4  3  3 1/8  3.3/8  3 5/8  2 3/4  2 7/8 
2 1/2  2 5/8  2 7/8  3 1/8  3 3/8  3 5/8  2 5/8  2 3/4 
3 1/2  3 5/8  3 7/8  4 1/8  4 1/4  4 1/2  3 5/8  3 3/4 
3 1/2  3 5/8  3 7/8  4 1/8  4 1/4  4 3/8  3 5/8  3 3/4 
3 5/8  3 3/4  4  4 1/4  4 3/8  4 1/2  3 3/4  3 7/8 
3 3/4  3 7/8  4 1/8  4 3/8  4 1/2  4 5/8  3 7/8  4 
3 7/8  4  4 1/4  4 1/2  4 5/8  4 3/4  4  4 1/8 
4 3/4  4 7/8  5 1/8  5 1/4  5 3/8  5 1/2  4 7/8  5 
4 5/8  4 3/4  5  5 1/8  5 1/4  5 3/8  4 3/4  4 7/8 
4 3/8  4 1/2  4 3/4  4 7/8  5  5 1/8  4 1/2  4 5/8 
3 7/8  4  4 1/4  4 3/8  4 1/2  4 5/8  4  4 1/8 
3 5/8  3 3/4  4  4 1/8  4 1/4  4 3/8  3 3/4  3 7/8 
3 1/8  3 1/4  3 1/2  3 5/8  3 3/4  3 7/8  3 1/4  3 3/8 
3  3 1/8  3 3/8  3 1/2  3 5/8  3 3/4  3 1/8  3 1/4 
2 7/8  3  3 1/4  3 3/8  3 1/2  3 5/8  3  3 1/8 
2 3/4  2 7/8  3 1/8  3 1/4  3 3/8  3 1/2  2 7/8  3 
2 5/8  2 3/4  3  3 1/8  3 1/4  3 3/8  2 3/4  2 7/8 
2 1/2  2 5/8  2 7/8  3  3 1/8  3 1/4  2 5/8  2 3/4 
2 3/8  2 1/2  2 3/4  2 7/8  3  3.1/8  2 1/2  2 5/8 
2 1/4  2 3/8  2 5/8  2 3/4  2 7/8  3  2 3/8  2 1/2 
2 1/8  2 1/4  2 1/2  2 5/8  2 3/4  2 7/8  2 1/4  2 3/8 
2  2 1/8  2 3/8  2 1/2  2 5/8  2 3/4  2 1/8  2 1/4 
17/8  2  2 3/8  2 1/2  2 5/8  2 3/4  2  2 1/8 
84  Source: Monthly Reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank. on  the  one  hand  and  credit  institutions  and  certain  public  authorities  (e.g. 
Federal  Postal  Administration,  Social Insurance  Institutions)  on  the  other.  It 
is  in  practice  impossible  for  business  undertakings  or  private  individuals  to 
acquire Treasury bills, Treasury bonds or other money-market securities at the 
selling prices fixed by the Bundesbank. The Bundesbank sells them only to the 
above-mentioned groups,  while the  banks  can sell them  to  non-bank customers 
only  within  the  limits  laid  down  in  the  "Habenzinsabkommen"  (Agreement on 
deposit interest rates); moreover the banks have very little interest in business 
of this sort because it would lead to withdrawals from  deposits. The agreement 
referred  to  lays  down  that Treasury- bills;  non-interest-bearing Treasury bonds 
and  other  specified securities  must  not  be  sold  to  non-bank  customers  when 
within less than 30 days of maturity. Although the agreement in principle permits 
the  sale  of tyaper  with  more  than 30 days  to run, it stipulates that the  current 
rates .of the discount market or money market must be scaled down, which makes 
it hardly worth while for non-bank customers  to invest in this  form  of security. 
The placing of mobilization tyaper  outside the banks in the hands  of the public 
authorities  referred  to is  normally  not  of much  importance  from  the  standpoint 
of  open-market  policy.  It  is  true  that  it  immobilizes  certain  non-bank  funds, 
which  would  otherwi~e pass  to certain banks  and increase  their liquidity,  but 
its effect on the banking system is not so extensive as that which open-market 
operations  would have if large sections of the  public  or  business undertakings 
were to participate. 
43.  In  contrast to New  York  or  London,  there is no market  for  money-market 
paper on  which business can be  done  between the  credit institutions  (and any 
other  interested  parties)  at  discount  rates  varying  according  to  ·supply  and 
demand.  Money  market  paper  provides  the  credit  institutions  and  the  public 
authorities with an outlet for  investment of their liquid funds.  Apart from  cases 
where  they are held to maturity, these securities can always  be  converted into 
Central  Bank  money  by  selling  them  back  to  the  Bundesbank  at  the  current 
repurchase  rate. 
e) The efficacy of open-market policy 
44.  The fact that the  private non-bank sector is in practice entirely excluded 
from  participation in money-market transactions and that there is no real market 
for  open-market paper outside the Central Bank has an important bearing on the 
character  and  efficacy  of  open-market  policy  as  carried  out  in  Germany.  In 
certain other countries, in which there is a  real market for  open-market securi-
ties, both short and long-term, and in which the business community participates 
as  well  as  the  banks,  the  Central  Bank,  by  intervening  on  this  market,  can 
arbitrarily reduce or increase the liquidity of the banks. In the Federal Republic, 
on  the other hand, all that happens  is that the Central  Bank makes  known the 
terms  on  which  it is  prepared  to do  open-market business with  the banks. To 
a  large  extent,  the  Central  Bank  - except  where  it discontinues  the  sale  of 
certain ty.pes of security for the reasons mentioned above - leaves the initiative  85 for  sales  or purchases  of open-market secunues to the  market,  that is, to the 
banks. The banks' decisions as to how  far they will buy from  the Central Bank 
or sell back to it on  its own terms, are governed by their own liquidity position 
and  the  opportunities  for  alternative  investment  of  their  funds  (investment on 
foreign  money  markets,  repayment  of  rediscount  credits  to  the  Central  Bank, 
et~.). Of course  the  Bundesbank exerts an appreciable influence on  the  volume 
of operations  through the level of,  and changes  in,  the  rates' at wliich it sells 
and repurchases money-market paper. If the banks react in a  way which, in the 
opinion  of  the  Bundesbank,  is  incompatible  with  the  line  of  liquidity  policy 
which  it  is  following,  it alters  its  selling  and  repurchase  rates  accordingly. 
45.  Thus  the  German  system  of  open-market  operations  is  just as  much an 
instrument of interest policy as of liquidity policy; indeed it must sometimes be 
regarded as  being  concerned  more  with  interest rates  than  with  liquidity.  Just 
as  Bank rate influences (or, at any rate, is intended to influence) the extent to 
which  the  banks  acquire  Central  Bank  money  by  rediscounting  trade  bills  or 
transfer funds  back to the Central Bank - in which case the initiative lies with 
the  banks  - so the changes  in  the  Bundesbank's selling and repurchase rates 
are factors which determine to what extent the banks buy money-market securities 
from  the  Central Bank  or return  them  to it.  Yet on  the  other hand  there are in 
the  German system considerable differences  between discount and open-market 
policies ;  by  reason  of their influence  on  the  debtor and creditor interest rates 
applied  by  the  credit  institutions,  changes  in Bank rate have a  much more far-
reaching influence on the interest rate structure as a  whole than changes in the 
Ceo tral Bank's  dealing rates  for  open-market securities ;  this  latter instrument 
is  admittedly  employed  much  more  frequently  and,  in  particular, as  it is more 
flexible,  it  can  quickly  be  adapted  to  market  fluctuations  even  in  the  short 
term  (see Diagram  2  ou  page  87).  Furthermore  the  banks'  powers  of obtaining 
liquid  funds  by  discounting  bills  at  the  Central  Bank,  involve  quite  different 
institutional arrangements  from  those  required  for  obtaining funds  by  returning 
money-market securities to the Bundesbank. 
46.  On  the  other  hand  it must  not  be  overlooked  that  the  sale  of "medium-
term"  Treasury  bonds  in  particular  (that  is,  those  with  a  currency  of  1  to  2 
years)  does  represent  a  corresponding  immobilization  of  liquid  funds  of  the 
purchasing  banks  - and  one  which  could  not  have  been achieved  merely  by 
means  of  Bank  rate  policy.  Experience  shows  that  this  longer-term  money-
market securities are seldom discounted a  considerable time before maturity, in 
many cases, to do this would mean  a  loss  of earnings for the banks concerned. 
47.  In contrast to other countries, in which  money-market rates deviate quite 
substantially from  Bank rate, under the German system this has seldom been the 
case for  a  long period, at least so far  as  the  open-market for  Treasury bills is 
concerned.  It is  true  that  in  times  of  extreme  liquidity  the  rate  for  Treasury 
bills  may  fall considerably below  Bank rate  (see Diagram 2);  yet in this case 
the  banks will prefer to apply their available funds  to reducing as far as possi-
86  ble  their indebtedness  to the  Central Bank,  because  this  carries  a  higher rate Diagram  2 
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of interest. For various  reasons  such a  loss  of rediscounting business may  be 
unwelcome  to  the  Bundesbank,  so that the  question may  then arise whether it 
should deal with the situation by a  downward adjustment of Bank rate or arrange 
that the rate for  Treasury bills does not fall too much below Bank rate. On the 
other  hand,  the  Treasury  bill  rate  will  not  remain  above  Bank  rate  for  long 
without  causing  a  tendency for  the  banks  to  procure  Central Bank money  on a 
larger scale by  discounting bills, and using the  proceeds for  direct or indirect 
investment  in  higher-yielding  money-market  securities.  The  close  connection 
between  Bank  rate  policy  and  the  fixing  of  open-market dealing rates  is also 
shown  by  the  fact  that,  when  there  are  changes  in  Bank rate,  normally  there 
are,  corresponding adjustments to open-market rates, and these create that state 
of liquidity on  the money  market which is  necessary before  the new Bank rate 
can  become  fully  effective.  Occasionally  these  alterations  in  open-market 
rates  precede  a  change  in  Bank rate ;  sometimes they  are  made  at  the  same 
time. 
48.  The  relationship  between  Bank  rate  and  open-market  discount  rates  for 
short-term money-market investments  thus  determines  to a  great extent how far 
the  banks  procure  Central  Bank  money  by  rediscounting  trade  bills  or  on  the  87 money market (by inter-bank loans) or by  the return of money-market paper to the 
Central  Bank.  The  Bundesbank's  selling and  buying  prices  are  also normally 
the  most  important  standard  of  comparison,  by  reference  to  which  the  banks 
decide  whether  to  employ  their  available  funds  in  domestic  or  foreign  money-
market  investments.  Of  course,  in  making  such  a  comparison  of  the  yields 
obtainable  at home  and  abroad,  the  cost of the  forward  exchange cover has al-
so to  be  taken  into account (see on  this  point chapter 3).  It may,  however,  be 
affirmed  though  with  reservations  that .  the  decision  whether  an  inflow  of  li-
quidity is used for  investment in the home money market, for investment abroad 
or  for  reducing  indebtedness  to  the  Central Bank,  depends  on  the  relationship 
existing at the  particular time  between the Central Bank's open-market dealing 
rates,  foreign  open-market  rates  (including  the  cost of covering  the  exchange 
risk) and Bank rate. 
49.  In  conclusion  we  may  mention  the  orders  of magnitude  within  which the 
Bundesbank's  open-market operations  (exclusively transactions  in mobilization 
paper)  have  fluctuated  during  various  periods  in  recent  years  (see Diagram  3 
on  page  89). 
In  the  first  period of open-market opet:ations,  lasting from  1956  to 1958, 
in which  the  liquidity of the  credit institutions showed a  marked expansion as 
a  result  of  the  inflow  of  foreign  exchange,  the  banks  employed  their  surplus 
funds  partly  to reduce  their indebtedness  to the  Bundesbank and  partly to buy 
open-market  paper  from  the  Bundesbank.  Because  of  this, the  circulation  of 
mobilization  paper  rose  from  some  DM  1400  million  at  the  end  of  1956  to 
DM  4 200 million at the  end of 1957, until in August 1958 it reached a  peak of 
nearly  DM  7 200  million  ..  This  increase  took  place,  despite  the  fact  that as 
early  as  1957,  and  even more  in 1958, the  selling rates  for  open-market paper 
were  continually  reduced,  until  in August  1958  the  rate  for  3-month Treasury 
bills had fallen as low as  2~%. 
The. second period in the development  of the  money  market  extends  from 
the ·middle of 1958 to the autumn of 1959. During this period the inflow of liquid 
funds  at the banks was  no longer so marked and the banks' holdings  of mobili-
zation  paper,  after  various  fluctuations,  fell  to  a  lowet:  level.  As,  under  the 
pressure  of  the  funds  which  had  already  reached the  banks  (supported  by  re-
ductions  in Bank rate and  open-market rates) short-term interest rates continued 
to fall on  the  market up  to  the  spring of 1959, the result was that there was a 
marked  difference  between  interest  rates  in  the  Federal  Republic  and  those 
abroad  (particularly  in  New  York),  so that in  the  first nine  month  of 1959 the 
banks  were  able  to  improve· their  net  short-term  position  abroad to the extent 
of some  DM  2 000 million.  The ·hanks  obtained part of the  Central Bank money 
required for  this purpose by reducing their holdings of Bundesbank mobilization 
paper. 
The third period in the  development of the money market commenced with 



























Diagram  3 
DATA  ON  OPEN-MARKET  POLICY 
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1JTwo-year "mobilisation •roo-interest-bearing Treasury bonds; issued under agreement with Federal loan syndicate.-2J/ncluding the fXJP9f' 
tr:IHen over l:1j the Bllldeslx1flk.-3)WithcxJt "mobilisotion fXJper•.  BBk 
Source: Annual Report 1960 of the Deutsche Bundesbank. November  1960.  The  Bundesbank's  open-market  rates  were  raised  from  their 
lowest point in the summer of 1959 (when the rate for sales of 3-month Treasury 
bills  was  down  to  2%)  in about  the  same  proportion as  Bank rate,  that is, by 
2 5/8%  to 2 7/8% (according  to their currency  period);  from  June  to November 
1960  the  rate  for  sales  of  3-month  Treasury  bills  was  4 7/8%.  During  this 
period  there  were  very  great fluctuations  in  the  volume  of mobilization  paper 
in  circulation  which  varied  according  to  the  changing  state  of  liquidity.  The 
increases  in  minimum  reserve  ratios  which  took  effect  during  this  period,  in 
conjunction with the increase in liabilities subject to the regulation, resulted in 
an increase of some OM  5 500 million in the aggregate minimum reserve require-
ments.  The  funds  required  by  the banks  for  this  purpose were  found  mostly by 
the  repatriation of their foreign  liquidity reserves;  the  banks  were also helped 
by funds  accruing from  the balance-of-payments surplus and to some extent they 
resorted to increased refinancing at the Bundesbank. 
In  a  fourth  period,  which dates  from  November 1960, the  large surplus of 
foreign  currency  which  resulted  from  the  inflow  of  foreign  funds  caused  the 
Bundesbank, in spite of the persistent strain on the internal economy, to change 
the  direction  of its credit policy with the  object of narrowing the gap between 
German and foreign interest rates. Thus  from  November 1960 onwards, the rates 
for  the  sale  of money-market  paper  were  reduced step by  step with  the result 
that by  the  beginning of January 1962, the rates for  Treasury bills and storage 
bills  had  been  reduced  by  no  less  than  3%.  The  way  was  thus  prepared  for 
stemming the ·flow of foreign money into Germany and for  a  revival of the export 
of short-term funds.  In fact  the  export of money  by banks  once  more  showed a 
marked  increase,  with  the  result  that  their  net  claims  on  foreign  countries 
improved by some  OM  3 600 million between the  end of November 1960 and the 
end of November 1961. 
f)  The prime acceptance market 
50)  Since  the  beginning of February  1959,  there  has  once  more  been a  prime 
acceptance market in the Federal Republic, but from  the point of view of liquid-
ity policy it has not been of any great significance. It is not a  special instrument 
of  liquidity  policy;  its  principal aim  is  rather  to  provide  a  cheap means  of 
financing import and me~chanting trade ("Transithandel" - trade where the goods 
pass between two countries other than the originator's country) and in this way 
to  maKe  it  unattractive  for  importers  to  open  acceptance  credits  in  foreign 
countries. The participation of the Bundesbank in the  prime acceptance market 
comes within the field  of money-market regulation ;  in special circumstances it 
may  affect liquidity,  although  this may not have  been its  main intention. The 
legal basis for  the  participation of the  Bundesbank in operations  on  the  prime 
acceptance  market is  sec.  21  of the  Bundesbank Act  (to which  reference  has 
been  made  in  paragraph  36) which deals  with  open-market  transactions. Under 
this  section, bills which  meet the  requirements  of discount business can also 
90  be  used for  open-market  operations. 51.  The  prime  a~ceptance market,  which  was  revived in  1959  with  the  help 
of the Bundesbank, is on  a  more  restricted scale than in pre-war days, because 
the  only bank acceptances which can be  negotiated life  those employed  in  the 
financing of import and merchanting trade. It is indeed only for  this type of bill 
that  the  Bundesbank has  promised  to give  its  assistance, in  pursuance  of its 
liquidity  policy.  The  credit  institutions  whose  acceptances  qualify  as  prime 
acceptances are  selected according to certain objective criteria. Certain maxi-
mum  limits  are  fixed for  the amount of discountable prime acceptances which a 
credit institution may  hold  at any  given  time.  The  Privatdiskont  A.G.,  which 
was  founded  in  Frankfurt  in  1959,  acts  both  as  broker  in  dealing  in  prime 
acceptances on the stock exchange and also buys and sells them itself; further, 
it is the only liaison office between the market and the Bundesbank. The latter, 
for  its  part,  buys  prime  acceptances  only directly  from  the  Privatdiskont A.G. 
and not from  the credit institutions which participate in such business ;  the same 
applies to sales. 
52.  In  order  to give  prime  acceptances  the status of first-class  investments, 
it  was  necessary  for  the  Bundesbank  to declare  its  readiness  to  buy  them  in 
case  the  Privatdiskont  A.G.  should  at any  time  not  be  able  to  place  all its 
holdings  on  the  market  or  to  take  them  over .itself  by  employing  day-to-day 
money or its own funds.  The buying, selling and middle prices for prime accept-
ances,  which  are  quoted  each  day  on  the  stock  exchange  for  "longs" (60-90 
days) and  "shorts"  (30-59 days), are fixed by the  Privatdiskont A.G.  by agree-
ment with the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
53.  Since  it was  formed  in the  spring  of 1959,  the  prime  acceptance  market 
has  not  assumed  any  great  importance.  The  circulation  of  prime  acceptances 
has so far not risen to more  than DM  200  million.  By  comparison with the cost 
of foreign credits to finance foreign  tr~de transactions, the cost of prime accept-
ances  is  still relatively  high  because,  although  the  rate  of discount  in  their 
case is sometimes below Bank rate, the banks' commission. on acceptances and 
stamp duty (at the appreciable figure  of 0.6%) have to be added. 
91 CHAPTER  4 
THE  BUNDESBANK'S  OPERATIQNS 
ON  THE  FOREIGN  EXCHANGE  MARKET 
54.  Since  the  beginning  of  1959  the  Bundesbank has  regularly dealt in  the 
forward  exchange  market,  by  concluding  with  German  banks  forward  covering 
operations  or  U.S.  dollar  "swaps"  (i.e.  selling  dollars  spot  and  at  the  same 
time  buying  them  back  forward)  for  up  to  3  months,  and  in  some  cases even 
6  months. In  this  class  of business  the  Bundesbank either waives  completely 
its  right  to  charge any  forward  discount or  covers  the  exchange risk on  terms 
which are more  favourable than market rates. Occasionally, it has even allowed 
the banks a  forward rate at a  premium over the spot rate. In this way, by making 
use  of  the  difference  between  home  and  foreign  interest rates,  the  banks  are 
encouraged to  transfer funds  abroad - indeed in many cases it is only because 
of this  Bundesbank  support that they  are  able  to  export funds  at all. This ar-
rangement  will only hold good  to  the  extent that,  and so long as,  the Central 
Bank considers it expedient as a  matter of policy.  At the  same  time  - at any 
rate,  so long as the forward  deals are done at little or no cost - this tends to 
bring home money-market rates more nearly into line with those  for comparable 
forms of investment abroad, in particular with those in New York. 
55.  When  the  Bundesbank  began  this  class of business  in  January  1959, it 
stated  that its intention in intervening in the  forward  foreign  exchange market 
was only to get the banks off to a  good start in building up a  sizeable holding 
of  short-term  foreign  investments and that it reserved  the right  in  due course 
to discontinue the provision of exchange rate cover or to bring its charges nearer 
to those of the market.  At the end of 1958, that is before the Bundesbank com;. 
menced its forward exchange operations, the  net extemaLposition of the German 
banks  was unfavourable  to  the  extent of DM  1600 million;  that is, their short-
term  obligations  to  foreign  countries  were  greater  by  this  amount  than  their 
short-term claims  and money-market investments abroad (see Table 8, page  93). 
Since in the  first half of 1959 money-market rates in Frankfurt were well below 
those  in  New  York  and,  it  was  possible  thanks  to  the  Bundesbank's  swap 
\.. 
transactions, to exploit this interest rate differential more than in the past, the 
German  banks  increased  their  holdings  of  short-term  foreign  investments  so 
greatly that in April 1959 their  net: short-term position abroad was balanced and 
shortly afterwards showed a  surplus. Indeed, by the spring of 1959 it had become 
apparent  that the result of  the  Bundesbank's  action in  covering  the  exchange 
risk  free of charge was that the higher interest rates obtainable abroad strongly 
92  attracted  the liquid  funds  of the  German  banks.  As  this ·threatened to conflict Table  8 
SHORT-TERM  ASSETS  AND  LIABILITIES OF  THE  BANKS 1  IN  RELATION  TO  FOREIGN  COUNTRIES 2  3 
in millions of DM 
Assets  Liabilities 
Position at  '\let  Balances at foreign banks  Non-residents' deposits, by  depositor groups 
end of year  assets or  and money-market paper 
Short-term  Non-banks  Inter-
or month  liabilities  Total 
Money- credits  Total·  Foreign  Enterprises  national  Deposits 
Time  Total  banks  Public  organi- Total  payable on  market  and indi-
deposits  authorities  sations  demand  paper  vi duals 
1955  - 1397  524  320  312  7  1  204  1921  1473  730  622  121 
1956  - 2 309  715  379  362  13  4  336  3 024  2114  1197  733  184 
1957  -2285  1320  775  307  20  448  545  3 605  2650  1580  914  156 
195R  - 1551  1919  1040  431  128  481  879  3 470  2893  1625  1075  193 
1959  - 272  3471  2 543  754  543  1246  928  3743  3410  1784  1095  216  315 
1960  -2526  2 368  1315  526  410  379  1053  4849  3641  1679  1348  308  288 
1<J61  - 2262  3926  2778  651  906  1221  1148  6 188  3985  1903  1419  311  352 
1959 \{arch  - 197  2758  2022  486  916  620  736  2 955  2499  1175  867  231  226 
June  +  145  3356  2651  542  1219  890  705  3 211  2893  1474  953  229  237 
Septem!>er  +  762  3 977  3108  680  1478  950  869  3 215  2 931  1407  955  264  305 
December  - 272  3471  2543  754  543  1246  928  3 743  3410  1784  1095  216  315 
1960 \{arch  - 392  3457  2 383  746  813  824  1074  3849  3380  1741  1085  231  323 
Tune  -2002  2 279  1192  590  260  342  1087  4281  3479  1767  1063  346  303 
September  - 2 317  2 085  1014  489  211  314  1071  4402  3324  1626  1152  285  261 
December  -2526  2 368  1315  526  410  379  1053  4894  3641  1697  1348  308  288 
1961 January  - 857  3872  2743  652  956  1135  1129  4729  3 234  1440  1216  323  255 
February 2  - 141  4317  3106  724  1150  1232  1211  4458  3149  1402  1166  333  248 
March 2  - 628  4431  3166  574  1493  1099  1265  5 059  3 501  1716  1197  327  261 
April  - 389  4996  3 774  560  2096  1118  1222  5 385  3644  1773  1250  350  271 
\fay  - 36  5 516  4320  608  2448  1264  1196  5 552  3660  1835  1262  317  246 
June  - 22  5 982  4785  625  3077  1083  1197  6 004  3836  1884  1372  322  258 
July  +  387  6 587  5 296  611  3612  1073  1291  6200  3872  1983  1282  317  290 
August  +  989  6863  5493  707  3496  1290  1370  5 874  3 574  1723  1238  295  318 
September  - 73  5760  4489  637  2597  1255  1271  5 833  3497  1600  1214  351  332 
October  +  343  5893  4674  619  2827  1228  1219  5 550  3466  1619  1230  304  313 
November  +  443  6111  4786  708  2824  1254  1325  5668  3491  1643  1249  293  306 
December  -2262  3926  2778  651  906  1221  1148  6188  3985  1903  1419  311  352 
1 Other than Bundesbank. 
2 Figures for the period following the economic incorporation of the Saarland (6 July 1959) include the assets and liabilities of the Saarland banks in relation to foreign countries. 
3 Assets and liabilities in foreign currency are valued at the parity rate prevailing at the end of the perio~ .indicated. 































2203 with  the  Bundesbank's  policy at  that  time,  the  swap rate  was  raised  step by 
step until it amounted to 7/8% in July 1959 and thus  reached the market rate. 
Shortly after this, by the end of October 1959, the Bundesbank withdrew entirely 
from  participation  in  forward  foreign  exchange  transactions.  Notwithstanding 
this} the  volqme  of  short-term  money-market  investment  abroad, conti9ued  to 
expand  during  this  period,  with certain fluctuations,  because  the difference in 
interest rates  - especially in comparison with  the United States and Canadian 
markets - was  still very marked (see Diagram 4, page  95). In explanation of its 
m~re c·a.\Itious  policy,  the  Bundesbank  pointed out  that,  whatever justification 
there had been for maintaining its old- sw.~p rate unaltered, there was  e~en less 
reason now because the liquidity of the c;edit institutions was under a relatively 
heavy  strain  and,  if the  Bank  continued  to  encourage  the  export of money by 
maintaining low  swap rates, this would probably lead to a  further  drain on the 
bank's'  other  liquid  funds,  in  particular  on  their  holdings  in  domestic  money-
market paper "unless home discount rates were gradually adjusted to the level 
of foreign  rat~s". When  in September and October 1959 there was a change•ropnd 
in  German credit' policy, there was no longer any reason to counteract the pull 
of foreign interest rates on the liquid funds of the banks; the Bundesbank there: 
fore  once more  began  to intervene in the  forward  exchange market and, after a 
short  transition  period,  it once  more  provided  facilities  for U.S. dollar swaps 
without  charging  for  covering  the  exchange  risk.  So  long  as  the  comparable 
money market rates in New York  (and in other financial centres in which short-
term investments could be made via the dollar) were higher than in the Federal 
Republic, there was still an inducement to export money or to hold on to existing 
investments  in  the  foreign  money  market.  The  short-term  claims  and  money-
market investments of the banks at the  end of January 1960 reached a  peak of 
DM  4 200  million.  The  fall  in  New  York  rates  and  the  restrictive  liquidity 
policy in  the  Federal  Republic  then caused the  German  banks  to repatriate on 
a  fairly large scale such foreign balances and investments as were not directly 
required for  business purposes.  At  the  end of October 1960,  the corresponding 
figure for claims on foreign countries amounted to no more than DM  2 000 million. 
The  policy of relaxation which the Bundesbank had followed since the autumn 
of 1960 made it possible for money once more  to be exported  o~ a  large scale; 
an additional factor which stimulated such exports was that banks  were  tempo-
rarily  allowed  to  conclude  U.S.  dollar  swaps  at  premiums  of  up  to  1Y2%  per 
annum  above  the  spot  rate.  Moreover,  from  May  1961,  as  mentioned  in  para-
graph  27,  the  banks  were  allowed  to  deduct  the  amount  of  their  short-term 
foreign investments from  the amount of liabilities subject to the minimum reserve 
regulations,  and this  gave a  special stimulus  to  the  export of money.  Later in 
1961,  short-term  interest rates  in  Germany  approximated  so  closely  to  those 
abroad that the Bundesbank could begin to sell U.S. dollars to the credit insti-
tutions either at par or even at steadily widening discounts. 
56.  The  Bundesbank's  experience  with  swap  transactions  shows  that it can 
in many ways use this instrument to supplement its internal open-market policy, 
it  forms,  as  it were,  a  means  of  "fine  adjustment".  The  assumption  by  the 
94  Central Bank of the cost of providing forward  cover has meant that movements Dl~gram 4 
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in  foreign  money  rates  (in relation  to movements  in  corresponding home  rates) 
have  a  direct effect on home liquidity; conversely, this  effect on the domestic 
money market is greatly attenuated if the cost of the forward covering operations 
forms  an obstacle to the flow  of home  funds  to foreign  countries - and if large 
amounts  are  involved these costs go up steeply. The Bundes_bank' s  swap trans-
actions also supplement its open-market policy to the extent that greater invest-
ment  in  foreign  money  markets  widens  the  bounds  which  a  restrictive  open-
market  policy  would  otherwise  come  up  against in  the  form  of  the  volume  of 
domestic money-market paper available. CHAPTER  5 
CASH  MANAGEMENT  AND  BORROWING  OF  PUBLIC  AUTHORITIES 
AND  THEIR  EFFECTS  ON  LIQUIDITY 
57.  The  deposits  of public  authorities  with banks  and  the  Central Bank are 
in  general  very  large.  The  most important  public  authorities  must keep  their 
accounts -with certain exceptions which will be referred to later-at the Deutsche 
Bundesbank.  This  obligation is  the  counterpart to  the  facility  which  they  en-
joy under  the  Bundesbank  Act for  obtaining cash credits  from  the Bundesbank 
up  to  certain statutory limits. Cash surpluses or deficits of public authorities, 
so far as they lead to increases or decreases in the balance kept at the Central 
Bank or to credits being taken up there, have a  direct effect on the liquidity of 
the  banking  system.  The  great influence  exerted  by  the  accumulation of cash 
reserves  by  the  Federal Government in  the  years  1953  to  1956  (known  as the 
"Juliusturm")  on  the  liquidity  of  the  German  banking  system  _is  a  matter of 
common  knowledge.  It  had  the  effect  of  reducing  bank  liquidity,  which  was 
useful  from  the  standpoint  of  the  policy  being  followed  at that  time;  it was 
indeed  expressly welcomed  by  the  Central  Bank as  a  support of its liquidity 
policy. The  Federal Governmentts cash surpluses were, however, not the result 
of  a  financial  policy  pursued  primarily  on  grounds  of  liquidity;  they  arose 
rath~r from  the  accidental  circumstance of  the  time-lag  which  occurred in the 
expenditure  of  the  occupation  {later  NATO)  authorities,  and  later  on  of  the 
German  Defence  Ministry.  Bank liquidity may however be  strongly influenced, 
not only by the specific level of cash surpluses or deficits of the various public 
budgets, but also by the distribution of public cash reserves between the Central 
Bank  and  the  outside  banks,  as  well as  by  the  way  in  which  any deficits in 
public budgets are covered. 
58.  As  regards  the  distribut,ion  of public  deposits  between  the  Bundesbank 
and  the  banks,  sec.  17  of  the  Bundesbank  Act  (which  is  headed  "Deposit 
Policy")  gives  the  Bundesbank  certain  means  of  exerting  an  influence.  This 
section  reads: 
"The  Federal  Government,  the  Special  Equalization  Fund,  the  E.R.P. 
Special Fund and the Lander shall deposit  their liquid  funds,  even  when cash 
balances  are  earmarked  under  the  Budget  for  some  special  purpose,  at the 
Bundesbank  on  current  account.  Funds  shall  not  be  deposited  or  invested 
elsewhere  without  the  consent  of  the  Bundesbank;  in  this  connection,  the 
Deutsche Bundesbank must take into account the interest of the Lander in main-
taining their State and Land banks".  97 59.  It is  significant  that  this  section  appears  in  the  part of  the  Act which 
deals  with  the  powers  of  the  Bundesbank  in  matters  of  monetary  policy.  In 
principle,  the  Bundesbank
1s  attitude  to  any  application  for  exceptions  to  this 
rule  should be  governed only  by  considerations of monetary and credit policy. 
Still,  there  is  one  important  qualification;  the  Bundesbank  must  "take  into 
account the interest of the- Lande-r in maintaining their State and Land banks". 
This  point  is  met  by  an  arrangement  under  which,  on  the  application  of the 
Lander, quotas are fixed for  the funds  which  the Lander may keep at specified 
institutions. Under this arrangement, in a  number of Lander considerable balances 
have accumulated in recent years  and the  fact that any funds  in excess of the 
quota  figure  must  in  any  case  be  deposited  with  the  Central  Bank  partially 
offsets any  tendency  for the  liquidity  of  the  banking system  to  be  increased. 
Decisions  on  applications  by  either  of  the  Special  Funds  mentioned  in  the 
section for  permission to deposit funds  elsewhere than at the Central Bank are 
made,  as  far  as  possible  in  the  light  of  the  liquidity  position  at  the  time. 
Considered as a  whole, however, it will be seen that the authority in respect of 
monetary  matters  which  is  granted  by  sec.  17,  is  not  necessarily  capable of 
being  developed  into  a  real,  flexible  and  convenient  instrument  of liquidity 
policy,  in  such  a  way  that  the  cash  balances  of  public  authorities  can  be 
transferred to  and from  between the Central Bank and the outside banks accord-
ing to the requirements of credit policy. 
60.  Of course, any grant or refusal of cash advances  from  the Bundesbank to 
public  authorities  to  cover  their  cash deficits  are  of particular importance  to 
liquidity policy, because any such advances grarited by  the  Central Bank must 
directly increase the liquidity of the banking system. Sec. 20 of the Bundesbank 
Act  gives  the  Bundesbank  authority  to  grant  to  the  Federal Government,  the 
Lander  and  specified  public  Special  Funds  "short-term  credits  in  the  form  of 
current  account  advances  or  advances  in  the  form  of  Treasury  bills"  up  to 
certain limits  which  are laid down in the  Act.  In the  case of the  Federal Gov-
ernment,  the ceiling is DM  3 000 million;  to  this  figure  must be  added special 
credits granted for  the  fulfilment of the Federal Government
1 s  obligations as a 
member  of  the  International  Monetary  Fund  and  other  international  financial 
organizations.  The ceilings  for  the  Lander and  the Special  Funds  are  consid-
erably lower; details may be found in the Act.  From  the standpoint of liquidity 
policy, two considerations are important: 
a) The establishment of a  ceiling does not, itself, mean that the administrations 
concerned  have  a  claim  to  Central  Bank credit up  to  this  figure;  there is no 
"automatic"  right  to borrow.  The statutory ceiling represents rather the utmost 
limit to which the Bundesbank may go at its discretion in granting credit.lt may, 
for  reasons of monetary policy,  decline to go  as far as that limit.  Furthermore, 
the ceiling may only be used for "cash advances", that is, advances for meeting 
temporary  difficulties~  but not for  covering permanent budget deficits.  In  each 
specific  case,  therefore,  agreement must  be  reached  between  the  Bundesbank 
98  and  the  public authorities  concerned as  to  the interpretation of this provision. b) Resort  to  borrowing up  to  this ceiling does not necessarily lead to  creation 
of  Central  Bank  money.  The  credit  ceiling  can  indeed  be  drawn  upon  in  the 
form  of  cash  or  Treasury  bills  advances ;  so  far  as  the  Treasury  bills  are 
accompanied by  a  Bundesbank promise  to  rediscount them,  the volume of these 
in  circulation  in  the  market  is,  under  sec.  20  of  the  Bundesbank  Act,  to  be 
regarded as utilization of the credit ceiling at the Bundesbank; this applies in 
principle to all Treasury bills of the Federal Government. In this way the Central 
Bank is able  to a  large extent to  cover the public authorities'  need  for  short-
term  credit, within the limits of the ceiling, through the money market, by seeing 
to the placing of  the bills on  the market. It should be noted that the non-interest-
bearing Treasury bonds  (6 to  24  months) which  are issued by,  the  Federal Gov-
ernment  and  other public  authorities  to  cover  their  financial  requirements  are 
not  reckoned  against  the  credit  ceiling,  because  the  Central  Bank  gives  no 
firm  promise to discount them (see Chapter 3, sec. 39). 
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CHAPTER  6 
OTHER  WAYS  IN  WHICH  THE  BUNDESBANK 
MAY  INFLUENCE  BANK  LIQUIDITY 
61.  Direct  grants  of credit by  the  Bundesbank  to  business firms  (other  than 
banks),  as  was  customary  with  the  former  Reichsbank,  are  not provided  for  in 
the  Deutsche  Bundesbank  Act.  Consequently it is  not possible  in  this  way  to 
bring any influence to bear on the liquidity of the banking system. 
62.  Although  the  so-called Directive III  cannot be  regarded as an instrument 
of liquidity policy, it can yet be looked upon ·as a  means for  the maintenance of 
a  certain structure of liquidity at the banks. In  1951 the Bank Deutscher Lander 
drew  up  "credit directives"  as  a  part of the  conditions  of business  which  the 
banks  have  to  satisfy if they wish  to have  access  to  refinancing credit at the 
Central Bank. These credit directives regulate: 
a) the ratio of short and medium-term credits to liable funds; 
b) the ratio of customers'  borrowing to liable funds  and deposits; 
c) liquidity; 
d) the ratio of acceptance credits to liable funds. 
Table 9 on page 101 shows the current credit ratios. 
63.  The  system of credit ratios  was  also incorporated in the new  Act on the 
Credit  System  which  entered  into  force  1  January  1962.  This  law  contains 
general provisions dealing with banks' own capital (sec. 10) and with guarantees 
of  adequate  liquidity  (sec.  11),  the  implementation  of  which  lies  with- the 
Federal  Supervisory  Office  for  Credit  system,  by  agreement with the Bundes-
bank and after consultation with the leading associations of the credit institutes. Table  9 
PRESENT  GUIDING  RATIOS  IN  REGARD  TO  CREDITS 
(End 1961) 
Central  Central 
Guid·  Commercial  Industrial Credit  Agricultural  Central Giro  Institutions of  Institutions of 
inc  Banks1)  Savings Banks  Cooperatives  Credit  Institutions  Industrial Credit  Agricultural 
Ratio  Cooperatives  Credit  Cooperatives  Coo11eratives 
The total of the  The total of the  The total of the  The total of the  The total of the  The total of the  The total of the 
short-term and  short-term lend·  short-term lend·  short-term lend·  short-term lend·  short-term lend·  short-term lend· 
medium-term  ings to business  ings to business  ings shall not  ings to business  ings to business  ings shall not er.· 
!endings to  and private c:us- and private cUS•  exceed 1 S times  I  and private cus•  and private c:us ..  ceed 20 times the 
business and  tomers shall not  tomers shall not  the liable funds of  tomers shall not  tomers shall not  liable funds  of 
private customers  exceed 15  times  exceed 15 times  ihe agricultural  i  exceed 15 times  exceed s thnes  the central insti· 
shall not exceed  the liable funds of  the liable funds of  credit cooperative ! the liable funds of  the liable funds  tution of agri· 
18 times the  the savings banlc.  the industrial  (plus the addition  the central giro  of the central  cultural credit 
liable funds of  credit cooperative  to these whidt is  :  institution.  institution of  cooperatives. 
the commercial  (plus the addition  permitted by law). i  industrial credit 
bank.•)  to these which is  cooperatives. 
permitt~d by law). 
II  The debtors shall  The total of the  The total of the  The total of the  The total of the  The total of the  No Guiding 
not exceed 60 per  debtors plus the  debtors plus the  debtors plus the  debtors plus the  debtors plus the  Ratio establi1hed. 
cent of the liable  bills drawn on  bills drawn on  bills drawn on  bills drawn on  bills drawn on 
funds  and  debtors shall not  debtors shall not  debtors shall not  debtors shall not  debtors shall not 
deposits.•)  exceed 60 per cent  exceed 70 per cent  exceed 70 per cent  exceed 70 per cent  exceed 80 per cent 
of the liable funds  of the liable funds  of the liable funds  of the liable funds  of the liable funds 
and deposits, the  (plus the addition  (plus the addition  and deposits, the  and deposits. 
savings deposits  to these whidt is  to these whidt is  savings deposits 
being taken at the  permitted by law)  permitted by law)  being taken at the 
rate of only  and of the  and of the  rate of only 
5'0 per cent.  deposits.  deposits.  ;o per cent. 
Ill  The liquid re·  The liquid re- The liquid re·  The liquid re·  The liquid re·  The liquid re·  No Guiding 
sources shall not  sources shall not  sources shall not  sources shall not  sources shall not  sources shall not  Ratio established. 
be less than  be less than  . be less than  be less than  be less than  be less than 
20 per cent of the  15 per cent of the  15 per cent of the  IS per cent of the  20 per cent of the  20 per cent of the 
bortl>wed funds.  borrowed funds,  borrowed funds,  borrowed funds,  borrowed funds,  borrowed funds, 
the savings de- the savings de·  the savings de- the savings de- the savings de· 
posits being taken  posits being taken  posits being taken  posits being taken  posits being taken 
at the rate of  at the rate of  at the rate of  at the rate of  at the rate of 
only SO per cent.  only 50 per cent.  only SO per cent.  only SO  per cent.  only so per cent. 
IVa  The  total  of  acceptance  credits  and bills drawn  on  debtors  shall not exceed three  times· the liable funds. 
IVb  The  acceptance  credits  and bills  drawn  on  debtors,  included  in sudt  credits  and  bills,  and  not serving  directly 
to  &nance  exports,  imports or crops,  shall  not exceed  the  liable funds. 
1)  Big  banks  with brandt  networks,  state,  regional  and  local  banks,  and  private  bankers.  - •)  If  the  position  of  a  commercial 
bank in rerard to Guiding Ratio I is  substantially better than  the  standard laid down,  then  the Deutsdte Bundesbank may  take this 
into account in the  application of Guiding Ratio II  (decision  of 20/21 June  19H). 
Remarks 
Any  credit whidt a  credit inslitution has  granted  to  expelled  persons  is  in  principle left  out of  account  in determining whether, 
and if so,  to  what extent,  the  credits  granted by the institution  are  in  accordance  with  the  Guiding  Ratios,  provided  that  the 
Lastenausgleidtsbank  (Bank  fiir  Vertriebene  und  Gesdtadigte)  - (Equalisation  of  Burdens  Bank)  - has  guaranteed  the  credit  and 
has placed the funds  at the disposal of the credit institution.  This applies  also to· that part of the  credit on whidt the credit insti-
tution itself  carries  the  commitment  (decision of 11/12  April  19H). 
Definitions 
Liable  funds:  These  are  the  liable capital  and  reserves  ("Eigenkapital") within the meaning of Article  11  paragraphs  2  and 3 of 
the  Banking  Law  (Kreditwesengesetz),  plus  the  global  adjustment of values  pumitted under the tax laws. 
Debtors:  Credits in current account, and acceptance credits. 
Liquid  resources:  Cash  holdings,  balances  at Deutsdte  Bundesbank,  postal  dteque  account  balances,  dteques  and  bills,  Treasury 
bills  and  non-interest-bearing  Treasury· bonds  of  the  Federal  Government  and  the  Under,  certain  foreign  Treasury bills  and non-
interest-bearing  foreign  Treasury  bonds. 
Bonowed  funds:  Deposits,  monies  and  loans  taken,  own  acceptances  and promissory  notes  in circulation. 
The  de&nitions  of  the  Guiding  Ratios  conform  closely  with those whidl are in current use  in the banking statistics. There are 
full  explanations  indicatinr whidt Items  in the form  for  the  statistical  return  must  be  used  in  the  calculation  for  the purpose  of 
eadt  of  the Ratios. 
Source: Annual Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank, 1961.  101 Part three 
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152 INTRODUCTORY  REMARKS 
1.  The  concept  of credit policy is  more  familiar  in  France  than  is  that of 
monetary  policy.  In  this  study,  monetary  policy  will  be  considered  from  the 
point  of view  of the  way  in which  the  monetary  authorities  manipulate  the  ar-
moury of instruments available to them to control the  volume and the )l.Se made, 
by  the  public  and  by  the  banks,  of  means  of  payment and  liquid  savings. In 
this  sense,  monetary policy will  be  examined from  the  point  of view of action 
to influence liquiditY. 
It would  be  well,  however,  to  outline  the  salient  features  of the  French 
banking  system before  going into  the  question  of  what is  to  be  understood by 
"liquidity" in France.  Two introductory sections will facilitate analysis of the 
means  of action available  to  the  monetary authorities  to influence  the  economy 
and the banks . 
107 CHAPTER  1 
STRUCTURE  OF  THE  BANKING  SYSTEM 
2.  A  study of the instruments of liquidity policy in France can only be useful 
if it is clearly understood that the organization of this country's banking system 
differs from that of other countries in at least two ways: 
a) by  the  distinction  which obtains  between institutions  which  accept deposits 
of a  monetary nature and those which collect savings (paras. 3 to 12); 
b) by  the special role played by the Treasury (paras. 13  to 17). 
3.  Traditionally the  role of  the  French  banks is to  supply short-term  credit. 
Only  exceptionally have  they  tried  to  attract  savings,  preferring  to  leave  this 
to the institutions set up for this purpose  by the State. 
The  tendency  for  French finance  or banking institutions  s·o  to  specialize 
stems  mainly from  historical factors.  It was  officially recognized  in legislation 
passed in 1941 and again in 1945. 
4.  To facilitate  the  study of monetary policy, banking establishments  can be 
divided  into  two  main  categories:  those  which  work  with  funds  of  a  monetary 
nature  and  those that deal with  savings.  A  place  apart must,  however,  be  kept 
for  institutions  specializing  in  medium-term  credit,  because  of  the  particular 
machinery used in this form  of financing. 
a)  Institutions accepting deposits of a monetary nature 
5.  This first  category includes ordinary banks  and  a  few  official institutions 
set  up  for  the  express  purpose  of supplying  credit  to  certain  sectors.  Both 
accept  deposits  from  their  customers  and  use  them  mainly  for  granting  short 
and medium-term  credit to the economy. 
Among  the  ordinary  banks  the  deposit  banks  proper  are  predominant.  A 
deposit  bank  cannot  accept  deposits  for  a  term  of  more  than  two  yea~s, nor 
may it hold  more than 10% of the capital of concerns other than banks or finan-
cial establishments. 
The  "Banques d'affaires"  are  entitled to  carry out  all  the  credit opera-
lOS  tions effected by the deposit banks; but they can accept deposits of a  term less than  two  years only if the depositors are  either traders  or-private persons with 
whom  they  have  financial  relations. 
Lastly,  certain  semi-official  institutions  are  authorized,  like  the  banks, 
to  accept deposits  from  the  public  and  to  make  short-term  advances,  but only 
in  a  given  sector  of  the  economy:  credit  for  small  and  medium-sized  firms 
(" Banques  populaires "), ·credit  for  farmers  (" Caisses  de  credit  agricole "). 
The  ordinary  banks  come  under  the  authority  of  the  Conseil national  du 
credit  (National  Credit  Council)  and  the  supervision  of  the  Commission de 
controle des  banques (Banking Control Commission),  but the  semi-official insti-
tutions  are subject to the direct supervision of the  public authorities.  Like the 
banks engaging in general activities, they are, however, subject to the influence 
the  Banque  de  France  exerts  over  all institutions  making  use  of its facilities. 
The  greater  part  of  short-term  lending  is  provided  by  the  banks  proper. 
At  the  end  of  1960,  the  total  for  short-term  advances  was  NF  46920 million, 
including NF 37 420 million for  registered banks, NF 4160 million for  the "Cais-
ses  de  credit  agricole II  and  NF  2 050  million  for  the  "Banques  populaires ". 
b)  Institutions accepting savings (" ressources d'epargne ") 
6.  This  group  includes,  first  of  all,  the  "Banques  d'affaires"  - for  that 
part of their business  financed  from  their own  funds  or from  deposits  of a  term 
of not less than two years-- and the "Banques de credit a long et moyen terme ", 
which may not accept deposits  for  terms of less than two years and which make 
advances  for  a  similar  minimum  period.  The  share  these  institutions  have  in 
banking business as a  whole is, however, very small. 
7.  But the distribution of long-term credit is largely in the hands of a  certain 
number  of  specialized  institutions,  which  collect  savings  and  maintain  close 
financial  relations  with  the  Treasury;  their  activities  are  under  Government 
control. 
These  institutions  use  their  own  funds,  but  more  particularly  savings 
deposits and the  proceeds  of their issues on the  capital market,  for  the purpose 
of making long-term advances to industry and  to private persons for  purposes of 
industrial  equipment  ("Credit  national"),  commercial  equipment  (" Caisses  de 
credit  mutuel"  and  "Caisses  de  credit  cooperatif "),  agricultural  equipment 
(" Caisses de credit agricole "), or for housing ("Credit fonder"). 
Among  them,  the  "Caisse  des  depots  et  consignations "  occupies  a 
particularly  important  position  because  of  the  size  of  the  capital resources it 
accumulates : it uses the funds deposited with it mainly by the savings banks to 
make  direct  loans  to  local  authorities  and  certain  public  undertakings  for  the 
benefit  of  various  sectors  of  business  activity,  among  which  housing  is  of 
special importance.  109 The  total  direct  loans  granted  by  the  specialized institutions  (from  re-
sources other than public funds) to industry and commerce stood at NF 13 750 mil-
lion on 31  December 1960, and was distributed among the various institutions as 
follows(in NF '000 million): 
Caisse des depots 
Credit national 












8.  Based  as  it  is  on  the  traditional  distinction  between the  short  and the 
long term, the French banking system was ill-suited to the distribution of medium-
term  credit, which raises special financing problems.  For this reason the devel-
opment  of this  form  of credit in the last twenty years has required co-operation 
between the two categories of establishments discussed above. 
9.  Broadly  speaking,  medium-term  advances,  intended  for  the  financing  of 
equipment and external trade,  are  supplied by establishments of the  first  cate-
gory,  i.e.  banks  in  the  widest  sense  (ordinary  banks,  "banques  populaires ", 
"caisses  de  credit  agricole "),  in  the  form  of  90-day  bills  renewable  up  to  a 
maximum of five years. 
10.  The  specialized  institutions  classified  above  in  the  second  category 
have two  ways of participating in the financing of medium-term lending. 
Some  grant  only a  supplementary guarantee  for  these loans.  For example, 
the  "Caisse  nationale  des  marches  de  l'Etat"  is  empowered  under  certain 
conditions  to  give  its  "aval"  (supplementary  endorsement)  to  bills  drawn  to 
finance  capital  development  expenditure  in  private  and  nationalized  industry, -
and  the  " Ban  que  franc;aise  pour  le  commerce  exterieur "  gives  its  " a val "  to 
medium-term loans intended to mobilize export claims. 
11.  The  other specialized institutions  participate in the  provision of medium-
term  credit not only by  authorizing  the granting of advances  by  the  banks,  but 
also by mobilizing bills representing medium-term loans by discounting them for 
the establishments from  which they originated: this is the case with the "Credit 
national"  (industrial  equipment),  the  "Caisse  nationale  de  credit  agricole " 
(rural and farming equipment), and the "Credit fonder" (housing). 
The  financing  of housing  has  certain special  features  when  it takes the 
110  form  of  "special  building  loans"  granted  under  the  Act  of  21  July  1950.  The loans  are  granted  by  the  "Sous-comptbir des  entrepreneurs",  the  corresponding 
bills are discounted at the  "Credit fonder de  France ", and these advances are 
themselves  mobilizable  with  the  "Caisse  des  depots",  which  also takes  part 
in,  the refinancing of certain equipment loans. 
12.  The  institutions  which  re-discount  bills  representing  medium-term  loans 
may  in  their turn mobilize  them  without  limit  at  the  Banque  de  France.  As  the 
banks  and  the  specialized institutions  have  made  great  use  of  their  scope  for 
mobilizing  medium-term  bills,  the  discount  portfolio  for  these  bills  had  until 
recently  grown  steadily in the  balance-sheet of the  Banque -de  France,  in pace 
with the issue of new bills. 
In  the  last three  years,  however,  the  portfolio  of  the  Banque  de France 
has  thinned  out  because  of  the  limitation  on  the  total  of  certain medium-term 
advances  (building,  equipment  for  nationalized undertakings),  and  also because 
the  banks  and  the  specialized institutions  - notably  the  Caisse des  depots  -
were  able  to  accommodate  a  greater  volume  of  medium-term  bills  from  their 
own resources : 
Mobilizable medium-term loans, 
at 31 .12 .1958  at 31. 12. 1959  at 31. 12 .1960  financed by: 
a) the banks  0.83  4.15  2.80 
b) specialized institutions 1  2.33  3.23  4.51 




Total (in N F  '000 million)  18.19  18.84  20.16 
1 Caisse  des  Depots  et Consignations,  Caisse  de  consolidation  et de  mobilisation  des credits  a 
moyen  terme,  Credit National,  Caisse Nationale  de  Credit  Agricole,  Credit  Fonder de  France et 
Sous-comptoir des  entrepreneurs, finance institutions. 
From  1958  to  1960,  the  Banque  de  France's  share  in  the  financing  of 
medium-term lending fell from  82% to 63 %. 
13.  The Treasury itself exerts  a  direct influence  on  the  banking  system in the 
wide sense of the  term.  Its activity is not unlike that of an ordinary bank, since 
it accepts sight deposits from,  and makes loans to, private persons and industry. 
14.  The  Treasury  collects  deposits  from  the  public  through  the  post offices 
(" Comptes cheques postaux ") and over the counters of its own agencies(" Fonds 
particuliers ").  The  post  office  facilities  provide  the  public  with  a  far  greater 
number  of points  where  they  can  make  payments  than  do  the  banks  (17 000 as 
against  4 000),  which  explains  why  this  Treasury  item  is  assuming  growing 
importance in the  overall money supply:  the  proportion grew  from  5.3%  in 1946 
to  11% in 1960.  Cash deposited with  the  Treasury represents  more  than  a  fifth 
of all sight deposits.  111 112 
15.  The  Treasury  also  takes  part  in  the  creation  of  "near-money"  by  tap 
issues of bills,  designed  to  absorb the  short-term  savings  of firms  and private 
persons.  They  are  of  two  types.  Fixed term  bills  are  for  one  year,  two  years, 
and - since June  1961 - five years, with the option of redemption at the end of 
the  third  year.  Progressive  interest  bills  are  for  a  maximum  period  of three 
years, but are repayable on demand three months  after subscription; despite the 
fact  that  these  bills  are  therefore  almost  immediately  convertible  into  cash, 
their total remains in practice very stable. 
16.  The Treasury also participates in economic activity as a  short and medium-
term lender to industry and to private persons. 
It  makes  equipment  loans  to  firms  in  various  sectors  of  the  economy 
(energy,  agriculture,  industry,  transport,  trade  and  tourism).  These  loans  are 
distributed, under appropriations included each year in the  Finance Law,  to the 
" Fonds de  developpement  economique  et social"  (FDES)  eith~r directly  by  the 
Treasury  or  through  certain specialized credit institutions  ("Credit national", 
"Caisse nationale de credit agricole ", co-operative credit institutions). 
It encourages  housebuilding  by  making  loans  at low  rates  of  interest to 
institutions  concerned  with  low-cost housing  (H.L.M.),  and it takes  part in  the 
funding of special housing loans by granting advances  to  the "Credit fonder". 
The  scale  of  medium  and  long-term Treasury  lending  emerges  from  the 
following  tabl~,  which  shows  the  breakdown  by  financing  institutions  of  all 
non-mobilizable  medium  and  Ion g-term  loans  extended  in  Metropolitan  France. 
It will be seen that the Treasury finances about 70% of the total: 
1.  Treasury loans 
a) Loans by the FDES 
b) Loans to institutions concerned ~ith 
low-cost housing (H.L.M.) 
c) Advance,s  to  the  "Credit Fonder" 
for  funding  of special housing loans 
Total of Treasury loans 
2.  Loans  by the  specialized institutions 
Total  non-mobilizable  medium  and long-
term  loans ( 1 + 2) 
Totals at the end of the year in NF '000 million 
1958  1959  1960 
13.25  15.84  18.38 
7.23  9.26  11.24 
0.68  2.33  3.63 
-- --
21.16  27.43  33.25 
8.03  10.16  13.75 
-- --
29.19  37.59  47.00 CHAPTER  2 
THE  CONCEPT  OF  LIQUIDITY 
17.  The  concept of liquidity  can  be  considered from  two  points  of view.  In 
its broad sense it covers the notion of liquidity of the  economy and corresponds 
to  the  volume  of  the  money  supply in  its  widest  sense.  As  bank  liquidity, 
however,  it refers  only  to  bank  holdings  of notes  and  coin  and  deposits  at 
the  Central  Bank  (cash  liquidity),  and  the  banks~  possibility  of  recourse  to 
credit from  the Central Bank (potential liquidity). 
a) The  liquidity of the economy 
18.  As  in other countries,  the  expression "liquidity of the  economy"  has no 
precise and  generally accepted definition.  In  the narrow  sense, it corresponds 
to  what is  known in  French  terminology as  either "disponibilites monetaires" 
or "masse monetaire", i.e.  all means of payment formed  by coin,  banknotes of 
the  Banque  de  France  and  sight deposits  (in  all,  "money  supply").  To these 
money resources  thus  defined in the  narrow  sense ("primary  liquidity") may  be 
added  time  deposits  at  banks  and easily realizable savings, i.e.  the whole of 
what is sometimes called the "secondary liquidity" of the public. 
19.  Trends in the liquidity of the  economy as defined above  can be followed 
in  quarterly  tables  published  by  the  Conseil  national du credit.  They  show 
fluctuations  in  notes  and  coin  in  circulation  plus  sight  deposits  and  their 
contra.;items (see Table 1), and fluctuations  in "liquid and short-term savings" 
(see  Table  2). 
It  will  be  noted  that  "disponibilites  monetaires"  in  the  narrow  sense 
includes within the item "sight deposits", not only deposits with the banks and 
with the Banque de France, but also those of private persons and industry with 
the  Treasury,  either  deposited  directly  at its  agencies  ("fonds  particuliers") 
o~ deposited in the French postal cheque system. 
The  total of the  items in  the  table entitled "supply of money  and  near-
money, contra-items "represents the " primary  liquidity  of  the  economy". 1  The 
Banque de France adds under the heading "time deposits" and "s  pedal accounts" 
1 It includes, however,  only  the  bank deposits  of private persons  and industry, deposits with the 
French  postal cheque service and with  the agencies  of the Treasury.  It includes neither those  of 
local authorities nor  those  of the  "correspondents  of  the  Treasury".  Nor do the  figures  published 
give  any  breakdown  as between residents and non-residents.  113 (comptes  speciaux)  the  time  accounts  accepted  by  the  banks,  the  "boos  de 
caisse"  with  a  fixed  date issued by the banks,  and  the  savings accounts with 
deposit  books,  taking  the  view  that  although  these  are  "secondary liquidity" 
not  immediately  usable,  they  constitute  additional  resources, helpi,ng  to  bring 
total liabilities into equilibrium with total assets. In addition, fairly substantial 
transfers may  take place between demand accounts and time accounts, with the 
result that the fluctuations  within one or other of the categories lose all signif-
icance outside the general development of bank deposits. 
20.  The  table  concerning  liquid  and  short-term  savings  (Table  2)  covers: 
a) Time deposits at banks, and "bons de caisse" issued by the banks,  and  the 
"comptes d'epargne" (special accounts), 
b) Treasury bills issued to the public - private persons and industry. This cate-
gory. must  be distinguished  from  bills  ("boos  en comptes  courants") issued on 
the money market and held mainly by the banking system, 
c) Deposits in savings banks (with no limit on withdrawals), 
d)  Lastly, the proportion of the three and five-year bonds and debentures of the 
"Caisse nationale de credit agricole II  subscribed by the public. 
21.  On the basis of this information it is possible to draw up tables showing 
the  trends  of  primary  and  secondary  liquidity  outside  the  banking  system, 
comparable  with  those  used  by  the  Nederlandsche  Bank,  or  a  consolidated 
balance·•sheet of the entire banking system of the kind published by the Bundes-
bank. The research department of the Ministry of Finance goes so far as to make 
a  detailed study of the  financial operations  affecting each of the  sectors dealt 
with in the national accounts.  It is  not possible, however, for  the results  to  be 
published soon enough or often enough for  them to be used in analysing current 
trends. 
22.  The  contra-items  of the  supply  of money  and near-money  comprise  three 
elements  which  are  headings  in the  table  drawn  up by  the  Conseil national du 
credit. Gold and foreign exchange, claims on the Treasury, credit  by  the  banking 
system to the economy. 
The first heading traces the movement of the balance of those items which, 
in the Banque de France's return, reflect the trend in exchange reserves. It does 
not include the banks' foreign currency holdings and commitments, which are not 
evident from  their balance sheets. 
Claims  on  the Treasury are held  respective~y by  the  banking system and 
by  private  persons  and  industry.  Those  of  the  banking  system  correspond: 
a) for  the  Banque  de  France :  to its  loans  and advances to the  Government, to 
its holdings in the postal cheque system; to coin it has received from  the State 
114  and  has  not  yet  put  into  circulation,  to  tax  and  duty  certificates  known  as "obligations  cautionnees",  and  other  Government  paper  (Treasury  bills  and, 
until 1955, paper concerning public expenditure which the Banque has discounted 
or  bought "en pension"  (i.e. under an agreement to resell to its former  owner); 
b)  for  the banks :  to the Treasury bills subscribed or discounted by  the banks. 
The  claims  of private  persons  and industry  on  the  Treasury  - this  time 
on  the  assets  aide  - are divided into three  categories of assets already men-
tioned in the breakdown of the money supply; credit balances of private persons 
and  industry  in  the  postal  cheque  system;  their  credit  balances  with  direct 
agencies of the Treasury ("Fonds particuliers des comptables"), and lastly the 
total of 'till money. 
The  third  contra-item  to  the  money  supply  corresponds  to  credit  to  the 
economy 1  from  the  banks  and the  Banque  de  France  in the  form  of short-term 
credits and mobilizable  medium-term advances. It can be  broken down  by  cate-
gories  of credit institution (Table  3), according to  the  financing  of credits and 
the form they take (Table 5), and, lastly, according to the nature of the resources 
(Table 4). 
From  this  last  point  of view, the  operations of specialized institutions, 
which,  particularly in the case of medium-term credit, work alongside the  banks 
by appropriating for  the financing of such credit part of the savings they receive, 
explain  the  discrepancy  between  the  volume  of  lending  to  the  economy  as 
indicated  in  the  table  of  contra-items  and  that  shown  in  the  two above-men-
tioned tables. 
b) Bank liquidity 
23.  The liquidity of the banks in France consists less in practice in "liquidite 
de  tresorerie" proper,  i.e.  in  notes  and  coin,  deposits  with  the  postal cheque 
system  or  with  the  Banque  de  France,  than  in  the  possibility  for  recourse  to 
credit from that bank in accordance with its rules. 
In  the absence  of a  genuine system of compulsory reserves blocked with 
the Central Bank, the banks tend to keep to a  minimum their cash liquidity (coin, 
notes,  balances  with  the  post  office) and  their  balances  with  the  Banque  de 
France  - all unproductive - so that they only maintain in this form  the "float" 
needed  for  their daily  operations.  For  many  years  the  "cash  liquidity"  of the 
banking system has been a  bare 2.5%  of the assets of banks as a  wpole. 
24.  The  real  bank  reserves,  or  "potential liquidity",  lie  in  the  recourse  the 
banks  may  have  to  the  Banque  de  France,  which  assists  them  either  (a)  by 
1 i.e.  business  concerns  and  individuals.  Except where  otherwise  indicated;  the  expression has 
the  same definition  throughout this study,  115 discounting  or  by  its  money-market  transactions  - purchasing outright  or  "en 
pension"  short-term  private  or  Government paper and long-term  paper  or  (b) by 
means of 30-day advances against the deposit of Government paper (see Table 6). 
The potential liquidity of the banks does not include short-term claims on 
foreign  countries.  The  banks, if they  are authorized  intermediaries  (" interme-
diaires agrees"), do no more than effect the exchange transactions requested by 
their  customers,  on  behalf  of  the  Exchange  Stabilization  Fund.  Thus  they  do 
not,  strictly  speaking,  maintain  foreign  exchange  portfolios.  Nor  are  they 
authorized to convert into francs the currency they borrow from their own foreign 
correspondents. 
25  The  fluctuations  of bank  liquidity  can  be  followed  in  the  light of those 
of the  money  market,  which  is  defined  in  France  as  the  market  for  liquidity 
in the  form  of  Central  Bank  balances.  It is  a  market  formed  by  holders  of 
current  accounts  with  the  Banque  de  France  (i.e.  mainly  the  banks,  finance 
institutions  and  the  Treasury),  who  daily  balance  out  their  temporary  cash 
surpluses and requirements. Private persons and businesses do not have access 
to this market. The equation of the supply of and demand for  funds is facilitated 
by  specialized  intermediaries:  brokers,  who  are  simply  the  point  of contact, 
and rediscount houses, which act as contracting parties, both for  borrowers and 
for  lenders. 
The  market  is  strongly  influenced  by  the  operations  of  the  Banque  de 
France, which ultimately balances the market by supplying liquidity where it is 
lacking or by resorbing surpluses at the end of the day. 
26.  The main factors in bank liquidity are those which determine the expansion 
or  the  contraction  of  the  banks'  liquid  assets  on  the  money  market  and  the 
fluctuations  in  their  scope  for  recourse  to  the  Banque  de  France:  gold  and 
foreign exchange movements, notes in circulation, Treasury operations. 
These  factors,  which it is possible  to study in  the  balance -sheet of the 
Banque  de  France (see diagram in Anriex), reflect the play of independent forces 
which directly affect the banks. 
The  public's needs  in notes and coin and the external payments  balance 
are the result of current economic trends and psychological factors.  The mone-
tary authorities themselves  can only influence these factors  in  the longer term, 
acting by an appropriate credit policy on the business situation which determines 
them. 
The  volume  of  the  banks'  liquid  deposits  at  the  Central  Bank  varies 
according to whether their business leads them to require the Bank to supply or 
accept banknotes or  foreign currency. The total volume of this liquidity remains 
unchanged and the money market tends to balance automatically, if  the movements 
of  foreign  exchange  and  banknotes  cancel each  other  out,  for  example  if the 
116  balance of payments shows a  surplus equal to the increase in the note circulation. In fact, the movements of foreign currency and of notes in circulation have 
for  long periods in the past tended to produce a  chronic drain on liquidity in the 
French  money  market.  An  expansion in the note circulation larger than that of 
most other countries has  often been coupled with a  deficit, sometimes  a  heavy 
one, on the  balance of payments. The resulting net liquidity r,equire,ments  have 
obliged the Treasury and the banks to resort to the  bank of issue, and this aid 
now  constitutes  the  greater part  of  that bank's assets.  For this  reason short-
lived liquidity surpluses are normally used for  the partial amortization of loans 
previously  granted  by  the  Bank.  This  is  why  trends  on  the  money, market are 
reflected  in  the  movement  of bank  indebtedness  to  the  Central  Bank  far  more 
than  in  the  fluctuations  in  the  banks'  credit balances  with  the  Central Bank, 
which are regularly levelled out. 
Treasury  operations  (the  Treasury  does  not  maintain  deposit  accounts 
with  the  banks) constitute  a  third  factor  which  affects  liquidity  and  which is 
beyond  the  control of  the  banks: all transfers  of funds  between the  banks and 
the Treasury are immediately reflected in their current accounts with the Central 
Bank. The fluctuating cash position of the  Treasury has an effect of expanding 
or contracting bank liquidity which is additional to that of movements of foreign 
currency and  of the  note  circulation,  so that it becomes an important factor in 
the  money  market,  outside  the  control  of the  banks  and in relation  with  which 
the Central Bank must plan its interventions. 
An  explanation  of  the  various  phases  in  the  development  of  the  money 
market from  1956 to 1960 will be found in Annex II. 
27.  It  was  only  in  the  post-war  period  that  French  monetary  policy  turned 
towards  influencing  bank  liquidity,  with  the  aim  of  exercising  quantitative 
control over the distribution of credit. 
The main instrument of monetary policy has continued to be Bank rate, or 
more  precisely Bank rate  policy,  by  which  the Central Bank can either exert a 
general  effect  by  varying  the  cost  or  the  volume  of  rediscounting  or  can act 
selectively by varying the rates for different classes of credit. 
Central Bank intervention  in  the  open market is of secondary importance 
in policy designed to control overall bank liquidity. It is intended only to level 
out spasmodic  fluctuations  on  the  money market,  not to bring about substantial 
or lasting variations in the volume of this liquidity. 
Control over the  volume  of bank liquidity was  strengthened in  1948 when 
minimum holdings of government paper ("planchers") were introduced at the same 
time as rediscount ceilings.  Additional machinery was  created in  1960  in  the 
shape  of  a  special  system  of  minimum  reserves  ("coefficient  de  trc~sorerie"  ). 
Lastly, it is impossible  to und·erstand  the  Central Bank's  influence over 
bank liquidity without taking account of the special part played by the Treasury 
in the French monetary system.  117 CHAPTER  3 
DISCOUNT  POLICY 
28.  Combining  as  it does  opportunities  for  both  quantitative  and  selective 
control,  discount  policy  is  still  today  one  of  the  key  instruments  of  French 
monetary policy. However, its use as a  general instrument for  influencing bank 
liquidity is a  relatively recent innovation which has emerged with the develop-
ment of post-war disinflationary policies. 
The Central Bank's discount policy is bound to be of great importance in 
a  country in which about 80%  of the banks' credit to the economy takes the form 
of the discounting of commercial bills. 
As  in other  Common  Market  countries,  the  Central Bank's  influence  on 
the  banks  with respect to rediscounting is  traditionally made  easier in France 
by the commercial banks' dependence on the Banque de France, due to the high 
proportion of paper money in the total money supply. Despite a  long-term tendency 
for  sight deposits  to expand,  banknotes  in  circulation still represented at the 
end  of  1960  almost  40%  of  the  total  money  supply,  time  deposits,  "bons  de 
caisse" and special accounts. 
For this reason, when any bank expands its lending it finds itself obliged 
to cope with a  proportionate demand for banknotes and other things being equal, 
this compels it to seek the  aid of the  Central Bank and so brings  it under that 
Bank's  control. 
a) Bank rate policy 
29.  Manipulation of Bank rate was for  a  long time the only way of controlling 
the  supply of credit in France.  Because the  banks  in the post-war period have 
~een almost constantly "in the Bank"  - which itself holds- more  than a  fifth of 
the  short-term  paper held by  the  banking system - any  variation in  Bank rate 
makes itself felt in the banks and,  through  them,  in the cost of bank advances 
to the  economy.  This makes  Bank rate an important weapon in monetary policy 
and  explains  why  the  authorities  have  altered it  seventeen  times since 1945. 
The  close connection in  France between  short-term rates  of interest and 
118  the Central Bank's discount rate is brought out in two different ways: 30.  1. From  the point of view  of finance  for  the  banks, the  rediscounting of 
bills by the Central Bank is of essential importance for making available to them 
liquid  funds.  It  thus  sets  a  guiding  rate  for  the  money  market,  where  liquid 
resources change hands. The size of the commitments of money market operations 
to  the  Central  Bank  explains  why  the  rates  at  which  transac.tions  take  place 
depend closely on the rates charged by the bank of issue for refinance. 
At times  when  liquidity in the money market is plentiful,· the banks have 
substantial  margins  for  rediscounting  and  avoid  borrowing  on  the  market  !it  a 
higher  rate  than  that  charged  them  by  the  Banque  de  Frar:_1ce;  the  call money 
rate  therefore  tends  to fall in line  with  Bank rate.  When,  on .the  other hand,  a 
tight cash  position  forces  the  banks  to  exhaust  their  rediscount  margins,  the 
market rates rise above the official discount rate. 
31.  2. With  respect to the  cost and volume  of bank credit from  the standpoint 
of the  borrowers - individuals and business - the influence of Bank rate stems 
mainly  from  the  close  link  between  the  official discount rate  and the  rates  of 
interest  charged  by  the  banks.  Interest rates  charged  to  borrowers  have  been 
gradually  linked  with  Bank  rate,  though  it  should  be  noted  that  this  remark 
concerns minimum rates, and the actual rates are based on the bank's estimates 
of the risk involved in each operation. The  minimum official rates, fixed by the 
Conseil  national du  credit,  comprised  two  parts:  a  basic  component equal  to 
Bank rate, and various commissions. Variations in Bank rate were thus reflected 
fully in the minimum rates applicable to the ordinary banks'advances. 
In  December  1959  the  monetary  authorities,  in  an attempt to make  Bank 
rate  more  effective  as  a  policy  instrument,  established  a  new definition of 
the basic rate,  which then became di,stinct from  the Central Bank's  rate,  where 
the  latter was  below  3.5%  or above  4.5%.  Whenever in future  Bank rate passes 
beyond these limits, the basic rate used to settle minimum  terms  for  customers 
will only be altered by half the difference between Bank rate and 4.5%  or 3.5%, 
as  the  case  may  be.  The  result is  that when  money  is  dear and  Bank rate is 
above  4.5%,  the  banks  will,  in  principle,  be  encouraged  to  scale  down  their 
commitments to the Central Bank, and consequently the volume of their advances, 
more drastically than in the past, when they were able to pass on any Bank rate 
increases to their customers in full.  Conversely, when money is cheap, the cost 
of  bank  advances  will fall more  slowly  than  the  official discount rate  and the 
banks will be  encouraged to increase their aid to the economy, since re-discount 
operations will leave them a  wider profit margin than under the previous system. 
These  new  arrangements  should  normally  cushion  the  impact  on  industry  of 
adjustments  in  Bank rate intended to influence  the  banks' willingness  to make 
new advances and the scale on which they may do so. 
32.  By charging selective rates, discount policy can encourage certain forms 
of credit or certain sectors of the economy and can be linked up with the require-
ments of foreign trade, re-equipment and reconstruction.  119 For  example,  the  Banque  de  France  decided in  1947  to  reserve ordinary 
discount  rate  for  commercial  bills  and  government  paper.  Other  paper  repre-
senting debt not connected with a  commercial operation was to be discounted at 
a half per cent more. 
In  September  1948,  however,  the  Banque de  France  returned  to  the  prin-
ciple of uniform rates.  But there· has been one exception to this principle since 
April 1957 and it concerns  export credits : export drafts have been rediscounted 
since  then  at  a  stable  rate  below  ordinary  Bank  rate.  This  special rate  has 
remained at 3%  whereas  the discount rate  charged on  other advances  has  been 
changed several times and was 5%  from  the middle of 1957 to the autumn of 1958. 
b) Rediscount "ceilings" 
33.  But Bank rate policy is designed above all to exercice quantitative  control 
of credit by acting on bank liquidity: manipulation of Bank rate is not effective 
enough to curb the demand for bank credit in times of rising prices, or to restrain 
the supply of credit if bank liquidity is plentiful. 
The  regulations  concerning  rediscount  ceilings  brought  into  force  in 
September 1948  constitute the  main instrument for  influencing bank liquidity in 
this way. 
Even before  this  date most of the  banks had been assigned a  rediscount 
ceiling by the Banque de  France. The purpose of the measure had, however, been 
solely  that of preventing each  institution considered separately  from  resorting 
to accommodation to  an extent not warranted by its size or in particular by its 
own  resources.  The  very  large  banks, which  could have  extensive recourse  to 
the  money  market  and,  broadly speaking, made  very little use  of Central Bank 
rediscount facilities, were not affected by this rule. 
34.  From the moment that it seemed necessary to keep the rediscount portfolio 
of the  Banque de France below a  certain limit, the monetary authorities decided 
to fix a  rediscount maximum for all institutions and to suit the aggregate of the 
ceilings to changes in the business trend. The ceilings were fixed for each  bank 
by  the  Banque  de  France  on  the  basis  of its  information  on  the  requirements 
of each. 
From  1951  to  1957,  their  total  rose  gradually  from  NF  1850 million  to 
NF  6 200 million.  In June  1957,  the  Banque de  France decided to  lower these 
ceilings by 20%, in two steps of 10%  each with effect from 10 July and 10 August 
of  the  same  year,  to  offset  the  inflationary  effects  that  might result  from  ad-
vances it was being obliged to make to the Treasury at the same time. A further 
reduction decided on  in November brought the  ceiling down  to 65%  of the total 
prior to 10 July.  The  Banque de  France has granted since then, in 1960 and in 
120  the  firts  quarter of 1961, a  number  of increases  to allow  for  developments  in the  structure  of certain  banks,  and  the  rediscount ceilings  now  total approxi-
mately NF 6 000 million. 
Originally, the ceilings imposed separately on each institution represented 
the maximum  permitted recourse as at the  end of. each month.  Between any two 
of  these  reference  dates,  the  banks  could  therefore  obtain  funds  above  their 
credit  ceiling  which  they  would  have  to  repay  by  the  end  of the  month.  This 
loophole had the effect of making end-of-month settlements increasingly difficult, 
and  of obliging the  Ba.nque  de  France  to increase its assistance to the  money 
market. 
Thus,  from  1951, the Central Bank declined  to continue  supplying banks 
which  had  reached  their  ceiling with  the  additional  liquid  funds  they needed, 
save  by taking  their bills "en pension" at rates  higher  than normal  Bank rate. 
As  applied to discounts granted beyond the ceilings within a  margin of 10%  of 
these  ceilings  or for  accommodation  exceeding  this  limit,  these  penalty rates 
are known respectively as "taux d'enfer" and "taux de super-enfer". 
This  innovation  has  the  effect  of  imposing  on  banks  exceeding  their 
ceilings a  penalty they have to pay without being able to pass it on automatically 
to  their customers.  By altering  the rates  on several occasions,  the  Banque de 
France  has  varied  the  severity  of  this  penalty  according  to  the  situation. 
35.  The  fixing of rediscount ceilings would have  lost its point if the banks, 
disposing as they did at the end of the war of a  large portfolio of Treasury bills, 
had been left free to rediscount them with the Central Bank or not to renew them 
on their maturity. The banks were therefore called on at the same time to retain 
a  minimum  portfolio of Treasury bills. The imposition of "floors" (" planchers") 
for  government paper, which will be described in Chapter  5  below, is an auto-
matic  restraint on  the  volume  of  loans  the  banks  can make  to their customers. 
36.  The banks  have nevertheless several "safety valves''  which enable  them 
to  mitigate  the  effects  of  the  measures  mention~d above  on  their  liquidity. 
To obtain liquid funds,  they can, firstly,  apply to the  Banque de France 
for discount of Treasury bills they hold exceeding the obligatory minimum, when 
these  bills  are  within  thtee  months  of maturity :  the  Bank discounts  them  at a 
fixed rate.  In  practice, however, their opportunities are, for two reasons, some-
what  limited.  In  the  first  place  the  play  of  short-term  rates  has  induced  the 
'hanks in recent years to keep only the smallest possible volume  of "free" bills 
above  the obligatory minimum  - their total holding of "free"  bills was more  in 
the  nature  of  an  irreducible  "strategic  reserve"  (masse  de  manreuvre)  than  a 
genuine liquidity reserve.  In addition,  the Banque de France, which since 1958 
has  no longer been required to discount automatically the  "bankable" Treasury 
bills  of the  banks, decided  on  16 December  1960 to  make discounting of  this 
paper subject to prior agreement: this discounting of Treasury bills maturing in 
less than three  months  was until then theoretically part of open market policy,  121 122 
but the fact that is was automatic deprived it in reality of any effectiveness. In 
making it subject to prior agreement,  the  Banque de  France has reassumed the 
initiative  in  this  field  and  can  thus  influence  the  liquidity  of  the  market. 
But  the  real  safety  valve  lies  in  the  facilities  for  mobilization  "hors 
plafond"  (exempted  from  the  ceiling)  of  certain  paper  carried  by  the  banks. 
The banks are free, first of all, to rediscount without any limitation their 
portfolio  of export drafts  of  a  currency  of  less  than  two  years,  and  this  also 
applies  to  their  portfolio  of  bills  guaranteed  by  the  "Office  national  inter-
professionnel des cereales". Bills of this second category, drawn by,  the storage 
agencies, are endorsed with an "aval" by the "Office des cereales" and presented 
for  rediscounting to the  Banque de France, either by the "Caisse  nationale  de 
credit agricole" for bills drawn by the official co-operatives, or by the banks for 
bills drawn by the independent co-operatives. 
In particular, the banks are free to mobilize without any limit their medium-
term  paper. They can do this  through  the  "Credit national"  or  the  "Caisse des 
depots",  since  both  these  institutions  are  in  their  turn  entitled  to rediscount 
this paper with the Banque de France. 
From  the  point of view of control of bank liquidity, the freedom  to redis-
count  medium-term  paper  without  restriction  gives  the  banks  back  part of the 
room  for  manceuvre  they  lost  when  the  machinery  of  rediscount  ceilings  was 
instituted. In  periods when  their liquidity is contracting, the banks will tend to 
mobilize  medium-term  paper  automatically  without  holding  it  themselves ;  the 
"safety valve"  then  becomes  fully  effective  to an  extent corresponding  to  the 
pace at which  this  kind of credit is  crea~ed. 
When, on the other hand, the banks' cash situation is favourable, the banks 
will tend to keep medium-term paper in their portfolios  - its mobilization gener-
ally costs them more  than does that of ordinary paper - rather than to take back 
this ordinary short-term paper from  the Central Bank. 
As  will be  seen below  in  Chapter 5,  the  efficacy of these safety valves 
was  curtailed at  the  end of  1960 by  the  institution of the  "coefficient de  tre-
sorerie" (a special system of minimum reserves). CHAPTER  4 
OPEN  -MARKET  OPERATIONS 
37.  The use of the open-market technique as a  means of influencing the money 
market presupposes certain conditions which do not obtain in France, in contrast 
to certain other Community  countries.  The Central Bank's interventions  gener-
ally have more modest objectives and play only a  secondary part in the control 
of  bank  liquidity.. 
a) Legal and technical bases 
38.  Intervention  by  the  Banque  de  France  on  the  free  market  was  permitted 
only relatively recently:  On  17  June  1938 a  Decree-Law empowered the  Banque 
de France, "for the purpose of influencing the volume of credit and regularizing 
the money market", to purchase on the open market,  within the limits and under 
the  conditions  fixed  by the  General Council of the  Bank, short-dated negotiable 
Government  securities  and  discountable  private  bills  and  to  resell  the  same 
without endorsement. 
The  operations  of  the  Central  Bank on  the  open  market  cannot therefore 
concern long-term securities. They concern solely: 
1. Treasury bills ; 
2. certain  short-term  bills  (S.N.C.F.  bills,  bank acceptances,  bills  guaranteed 
unconditionally  by  the  "Caisse  nationale  des  marches  de  l'Etat",  and  export 
paper backed by a  bank "aval"); 
3. Short-term export drafts. 
As  the  regulations  forbid  the  deposit  banks  to  accept  from  the  public 
deposits for  a  term  exceeding  two  years,  the  banks,  following  a  cautious and 
traditional  policy,  do  not  invest  in  long-term  securities  as  a  counterpart  to 
their deposits and therefore do not deal on  the market in long-term paper either 
among themselves or with the Central Bank. 
This long-standing abstention of the French banks from  operations in long-
term securities tends to keep the money market separate from  the capital market, 
and limits the opportunities for adjusting the capital needs of the two  categories 
of  market:  the  French  money  and  capital  markets  are  for  this  reason  less 
closely interdependent than is the case in other countries.  123 b) The effectiveness of open-market operations 
39.  The scope for  intervention by  the  Banque de France on the money market 
in  order  to  influence  the  liquidity  of  the  banking  system  is  not,  then,  very 
extensive. 
The paper held by the Central Bank as a  result of its intervention on the 
money market is shown in its balance·sheet under the heading "negotiable paper 
purchased in France". The  total value of the portfolio of negotiable paper held 
by  the  Bank has  for  some  years  been  within  the range of NF  2 000 million  to 
NF 3 000 million, this last figure being rarely exceeded. These relatively small 
figures  bear witness  to the secondary role played by open-market operations in 
France. 
The  limited. nature  of  the  operations  is  borne  out  in  particular  by  the 
volume of the Bank's purchases of Treasury bills: in the ten years from  1948 to 
1958 the  volume  of short-term government paper held by the  Banque de  France 
remained virtually unchanged, whilst the portfolio of these securities held by the 
banks increased during the same period by nearly NF 5 000 million. 
Moreover,  open-market  operations  were  used  in  France  mainly  in  one 
direction, since this was a  period in which the market suffered almost constantly 
from  a  shortage  of  liquidity.  Purchases  of  Treasury  and  other  paper  by  the 
Banque  de  France  were  merely  slowed  down  or  speeded  up  according to  the 
needs of the moment. 
40.  The  purchases  of  the  Banque  de  France are  made  either outright or "en 
pension".  Their purpose varies according to the section of the money market -
government paper (Treasury bills) or private paper - they affect. 
On the Treasury bill market, the Banque de France intervenes mainly with 
outright purchases. It generally charges a  fixed rate for  discounting "bankable" 
Treasury bills - purchases of which ceased to be compulsory in 1958 - and the 
market  rate  when its  operations  concern  bills  with  currencies  exceeding three 
months. Its operations  thus  tend to facilitate  the  rotation of the  banks'  portfo-
lios and the adjustment of maturities within these portfolios. 
On  the  other  hand,  on  the  private  bill  market  - which  has  for  several 
years  been the real call money  market  - the  Bank's  intervention  solely takes 
the  form  of very  short-term  "pensions"  (usually  one  day),  at a  fixed  rate,  in 
fact at Bank rate. The purpose of these operations is to ensure equilibrium on 
the  very  short-term  money  market  without  influencing  the  underlying  trend. 
Broadly speaking, they swell very rapidly at the end of the month, only to subside 
just as quickly immediately afterwards. 
The practice of taking private paper in pawn ("en pension") was gradually 
124  introduced from  1948  to  1951  to give  more  flexibility  to  the  policy of limiting rediscount-; in October 1951, it was  feared  that these  new  opportumues  might 
aid  circumvention  of  the  regulations  in  force  and  "limits"  were  fixed  for  each 
institution on dealings in private paper on the open market. 
However,  the  Banque  de  France  purchases  outside  the  "limits",  and  on 
terms  near  to  discount  rate,  the  bank  acceptances  or  "avals"  covering export 
drafts,  where  these have  a  currency of  less  than  two  years.  These purchases, 
which  are  made  at  the  preferential  rate  of  3%,  have  assumed ,considerable 
importance in recent years. 
The  Banque  de  France's  operations  on  the  open  market  are  thus  essen-
tially  technical and marginal in character. Their effect is no more,  than  that of 
supplementing on the money market the main operations carried out by the Central 
Bank to influence the volume of bank liquidity by  what is the traditional channel 
in France, that of the rediscounting of commercial bills. 
125 CHAPTER  5 
DIRECT  ACTION  TO  INFLUENCE  BANK  LENDINGS  AND  INVESTMENTS: 
"FLOORS"  FOR  TREASURY  BILLS,  AND  THE  SPECIAL  SYSTEM 
OF  MINIMUM  RESERVES 
41.  The  nature  of  the  monetary  and  banking  structure  in  France  and  the 
effectiveness of discount policy have obviated the need for a  system of minimum 
reserves such as that in force  in the United States and, of more  recent date, in 
Federal Germany and in the Netherlands. 
As  organized  in  these  countries,  the  machinery  of  m1mmum  reserves 
consists in obliging the  banks  to make deposits with  the Central Bank up to a 
minimum total calculated as a  percentage of their current liabilities. 
The  need for  a  system of reserves  in its strict form  has  not been felt in 
France  because of the  close dependence  of the  banks  on  the  Central Bank.  In 
addition  a  system  of  "floors"  ("planchers")  for  government  paper  has  been 
organized  since  1948,  which,  supplemented  In  1960  by  the  regulations  intro-
ducing  a  special  system  of  minimum  reserves  ("coefficient  de  tresorerie ") 
exerts on bank liquidity an effect similar to that exerted by  minimum  reserves. 
42.  The  obligation  for  the  deposit banks  to  comply  with  a  "liquidity ratio" 
("coefficient  de  liquidite")  serves  requirements  other  than  those  of monetary 
policy.  According  to  this  rule,  the  deposit  banks'  liquid  holdings  - i.e.  till 
money, balances with the Treasury, with the postal cheque system and with the 
Central Bank,  Treasury bills, paper mobilizable at the  Central Bank and nego-
tiable  securities  - must  represent  at  least  60%  of  the  sight  and  short-term 
(up to three months) liabilities of the institution concerned. This provision was 
devised simply as  a  safety rule  to ensure that depositors will be able to with-
draw their money at any time. It has none the less helped the Banque de France 
in its control over the banks' credit policy, since the Banking Control Commis-
sion, which has the task of seeing that these decisions are complied with, allows 
finance  bills (as opposed to commercial bills) to be included in the calculation 
of  this  ratio  only if they are  eligible  for  rediscount at the  Banque  de  France. 
43.  Under  the  rule  concerning  minimum  holdings  of  government  paper estab-
lished in 1948  to  ensure effective working of the machinery of rediscount "ceil-
ings", the banks are compelled to retain the portfolio of Treasury bills they held 
on 30 September 1948,  and 20%  of any increase in deposit liabilities since that 
126  date has to be invested in Treasury paper. At that time  this  obligation on4' confirmed the actual situation, because 
of the  large portfolio of Treasury bills held by  the  banking system. At the end 
of 1948  the  "reserve" thus  blocked in government paper represented in practice 
an average of 28%  of bank deposits. Later this proportion  declined  a  little and 
it was officially fixed at 25%  when the methods of calculating the "floors" were 
revised in 1956. Thereafter, a  quarter of any increase in deposits in the banks 
was automatically placed in Treasury bills, with allowance for a  time lag while 
the  banks adjusted their holdings. 
The  "floors"  device  in  the  form  it was  given  strengthened the  means  of 
action open to the monetary authorities, whilst shielding the Treasury from  any 
sudden  unloading  of  the  short-term  public  debt  held  by  the  banking  system. 
44.  The technique of "floors"  for  government paper and rediscount "ceilings" 
seemed an adequate means  of controlling the volume  of credit in the  ten years 
from  1948  to  1958,  when  bank  liquidity  was  under  almost  continuous  strain 
except in 1954 and 1955. 
But thanks to very heavy inflows of foreign exchange following a  recovery 
in the balance of payments,  the  banks accumulated heavy reserves of liquidity 
in medium-term bills in the course of 1959 and 1960, i.e. in bills rediscountable 
with  the  Banque  de  France  outside  the  ceilings.  At  the  beginning  of  1960, 
the portfolios of medium-term paper held by the banks totalled about NF 4 000 mil-
lion.  The scale of this  potential run  on  the  Banque  de  France meant that the 
monetary authorities might not be able to defend themselves if there were  to be 
an excessive expansion of demand for credit. 
45.  They  therefore  felt  impelled  to  supplement the  arrangements  to  block a 
proportion  of bank holdings. 
On  6  October 1960, the  Conseil national  du  credit decided to institute a 
special system of minimum reserves ("coefficient de tresorerie" ). It was designed 
to oblige the  banks to finance for  themselves, from  their own current resources, 
part  of  the  advances  which,  under  the  regulations  in  force  until  then,  were 
exempt from  the system of rediscount ceilings. 
Technically,  the  "coefficient de  tresorerie"  compels  the  banks  to main-
tain  a  minimum  relationship  between  certain  components  of  their  liquid  or 
mobilizable  assets  and  certain  components- of  their  sight  or  time  liabilities. 
The  denominator  of the  coefficient comprises  the  same  components  from 
the  liabilities  side as ·those  selected for  the  calculation of government paper 
"floors"  - i.e.  broadly  speaking,  the  banks'  current  liabilities  - whilst its 
numerator comprises the folowing components of the assets side: 
a. Liquid  holdings  (till  money,  balances  with  the Banque  de  France  and  the 
postal cheque system) ;  127 128 
b. Treasury  bills  (including  those  held  under  the  regulations  concerning 
"floors"); 
c. Paper  mobilizable  with  the  Banque  de  France  above  the  "ceiJ.ings",  i.e. 
medium-term paper, bills backed by the "a  val"  of the "Office des cereales", and 
short-term  export  drafts. 
By  making  the  "floors"  system  one  of  general  application,  this  n~w 
machinery  gives  the  monetary  authorities  the  possibility  of  influencing  bank 
liquidity  without  unduly  straining the profit  and  loss  accounts  of· the  banks, 
since  the  latter continue  to  earn  income  on  the  asset components  included in 
the  "coefficient". 
46.  The  Banque  de  France  fixes  the  rate  of  the  "coefficient de  tresorerie" 
within  the  limits  settled  by  the  Comite  des  depots  du  conseil  national  du 
credit -i.e. at present between 35%  and 15%. 
The  "coefficient de  tresorerie"  was  brought into  force  as  from  21  Janu-
ary  1961  and was  fixed at 30%  by  order of the  Banque de  France. It was raised 
to  32%  as  from  28  February  1962.  As  a  result of a  decision of the Ministry of 
Finance,  the  ratio  of  Treasury  bills  to  liabilities  was  lowered,  within  the 
coefficient,  from  25%  to 20%.  Easy conditions at the  Treasury led to a  further 
reduction in  the rate of the  "floors"  for  Treasury bills :  it was  brought down to 
17 ~ 2% on  30 June  1961  and to 15%  from  31  March 1962. 
The  reductions  in  the  rate  of  the  "floors"  within  the  "coefficient  de 
tresorerie" has the automatic effect of blocking an equivalent additional amount 
of medium-term paper in the  banks'  holdings. 
The  entry  into force  of the  "coefficient de  tresorerie"  did not lead to an 
immediate reduction in the liquidity of the banks, since the percentage had been 
deliberately fixed at a  level which "froze" the current situation. But in the future 
manipulation of this  rate may  give  the  monetary authorities  an  effective instru-
ment  for  preventing  any  heavy  increase  in  bank  liquidity  from  engendering an 
excessive rise in lending to the economy, just as, conversely, it might be used 
to  avoid  too  steep a  decline  in  the  volume  of  this  lending  as  a  result  of a 
tightening of the cash position of the  banks. CHAPTER  6 
DIRECT CONTROL OF BANK LENDING TO THE ECONOMY 
47.  The  direct  control  of  lending  to the  economy  seemed,  just. after the war, 
a  natural  concomitant  of  the  policy  of  Government  in~ervention  in  economic 
life.  It  was  used  first  of  all  to  keep  the  distribution  of  financial  resources 
between the different sectors reasonably in line with the real resources available, 
and it was  used later to facilitate the execution of the reconstruction and mod-
ernization programme  undertaken under the Monnet Plan. Its importance declined 
gradually  after  1948  as  facilities  for  direct  action  to  influence  bank liquidity 
were  introduced.  It  nevertheless  still plays  a  decisive  part  in  certain classes 
of financial operations (medium- term  and  hire  purchase finance). 
48.  Such  direct intervention  has  only  been  made  possible  thanks  to  the  de-
tailed  information  network  provided  for  the  Conseil  national  du  credit  by  the 
11  Service  central  des  risques 
11
,  This  service  was  set  up  in  March  1946  and 
reorganized in  1948.  It is managed by the  Banque de  France  and  has  a  twc:>fold 
aim:  that  of giving  the  monetary  authorities  information  on  the  distribution of 
credit among about a  hundred branches of activity and that of advising the banks 
as  to  the  total credit granted to  any given firm.  The  banks  are required to pro-
vide  monthly  returns detailing  th-e  credits  opened in  favour  of these  firms,  and 
the  amounts  actually  drawn,  whenever  the  credits  opened  exceed  NF  100 000 
for  discounts  of commercial bills  proper and short-term paper guaranteed by  the 
"Caisse  nationale  des  marches  de  l'Etat ",  and  NF  50 000  for  credits  of any 
other  kind.  The  proportion  of  credit  thus  brought  under  census  in  comparison 
with all bank credit has  grown from  45% in 1946 to about 85% today. The "Ser-
vice  central  des  risques"  and  its  local  offices  advise  the  banks  each month 
automatically  of the  credits  opened  and  taken  up,  by  category,  in  the  name  of 
each of the  customers for  whom  a  declaration has  been  made.  It is forbidden  to 
divulge  any of this  specific information to third parties.  By the  same  procedure 
a  half-yearly  statistical  breakdown  makes it possible  to  evaluate  certain cate-
gories  of  credit  (indirect  discounts,  export  credits)  which  are  not  segregated 
in  the  monthly  declaration. 
49.  This  instrument  has  enabled  the  authorities  to  influence  directly  the 
volume  of  credit  in  any  given  sector  of  business  or  commercial  activity.  For 
example, the banks have on several occasions been called on to cut their lending 
for  the  stocking of wines (1948  to  1950 and 1957 to 1958), to the leather indus-
tries  (1948) or on  the  other hand to grant more  liberal advances  to  the livestock 
industry  (1949),  or  for  exports.  These  measures  were  taken  in  different  ways 
ranging  from  a mere  recommendation to  a  ban on all lending.  129 A  different  and  much  more  generalized  form  of  intervention  has  been 
practised when banks had been asked to take  into consideration, before granting 
advances,  not  only  their  customers'  solvency  but  also  the  usefulness  of  the 
loan  to the  economic  life  of the  country as  a  whole,  and the  question whether 
the  money  asked  for  is  essential.  The  effect  of  these  instructions  has  been 
strengthened by  the obligation imposed on  the  banks  to  request from  their cus-
tomers  a  detailed "dossier", and to obtain prior authorization from  the  Central 
Bank for  operations exceeding  a  certain figure. 
50.  By  a  decision  of  January  1947,  the  banks  were  asked  to  require from 
business  concerns  before  any  examination  of  an  application  for  credit (other 
than  in  the  form  of guarantees. endorsement  of  bills  of  exchange,  discount of 
government  paper  or  commercial  bills}  the  presentation  of  a  "dossier"  which 
the Banque de  France may ask to see and which must include: 
a) the balance-sheets of the firm  for  the last three years; 
b) a  provisional  up-to-date  estimate  of the  approximate  value  of stocks  of raw 
materials  and  finished  goods,  together  with  details  of  sundry  debtors  and  of 
the investment portfolio; 
c) a  statement  disclosing  bank  accomodation  already  obtained,  and  the  plans 
for  expenditure  and  repayment of the  credit applied for,  together with evidence 
showing  that no  alternative  means  of raising  the  required liquid funds,  e.g. by 
speeding up sales, was available. 
51.  Since the  same  date,  applications  for  credit (defined as in the  preceding 
paragraph)  which bring or  are  likely to bring the  total credit opened by  one or 
several banks to the  same firm  beyond a  given figure  cannot be  granted without 
prior assent from  the  Banque de France. This procedure, known as " prior author-
ization",  was  originally applicable  to  advances  of NF  300 000  and above.  The 
limit was gradually raised. It was increased to NF  500 000 in February 1948, to 
NF 1 million in April 1950, to NF 5 million in October 1951, and to NF 10 million 
in July 1959.  The  Banque de  France demands  at the  time  of application all the 
information  specified  (balance-sheet,  profit  and  loss  account,  turnover,  etc.) 
and  endeavours  as  far  as  possible  to  reserve  credit  facilities  for  firms  whose 
activities  are  important  to  the  economic  life  of the  country.  It should be men-
tioned  that as  from  1951  commercial  bills  are  also  taken  into  account  in the 
prior authorization procedure. 
The  scope  for  Central  Bank  intervention  is  further  strengthened  by  the 
fact  that  by  tradition  non-commercial  paper is  only  re-discountable  after prior 
agreement. 
52.  A  similar procedure  is  applied  to  mobilizable  medium-term  loans granted 
for- a  period of from  two to five  years, which can be rediscounted at a  specialized 
institution (see  sec.  11)  by  the  handing  over of renewable  three-month notes. 
130  Provided the  Central  Bank authorized the issue of this paper, it can be further rediscounted  at  the  Banque  de  France,  without  reference  to  the  rediscount 
ceilings.  According  to  case,  the  intervention of the  Central  Bank  takes  three 
distinct  forms:  sometimes it is  represented  on  the  Committee  which is to give 
a  decision  on  loan  applications  presented  to  the  rediscount  institution  con-
cerned; sometimes the Central Bank fixes for  the rediscount institution a  general 
limit  on  the rediscounting of a  given  category of credits ;  sometimes  it obtains 
from  this  institution  or  from  the  public  authorities  agreement  to  limit  certain 
operations. 
Control  of  the  first  kind  is  exercised  over  ordinary  medium-term  credit 
for the equipment of industrial and com:mercial  concerns and for  the financing of 
exports.  The  equipment  of  agricultural  undertakings  is,  on  the  other  hand, 
subject to a  general rediscount limit of the  Banque de  France.  Lastly,  it  was 
laid down ,in  July 1957 that the nationalized undertakings  could finance through 
bank credit only one-fifth of their investment programmes and,  in January 1959, 
that  they  would  have the  option of recourse to such lending only within  a  limit 
set, approximately, by the scale of their repayments of previous loans. 
As  for  medium-term  credit  to  building  and  construction,  granted  in  the 
form  of special  five-year  loans  under  the  Act  of  21  July  1950,  the  Ministry of 
Finance  and  the  Banque de  France  have  taken  care since  1958  to  ensure that 
the  new credit granted during the business year should be  kept at a  level close 
to  that of loans reaching maturity in the same period. On maturing, these credits 
are  funded for  fifteen  additional years by the  " Credit fonder", mainly with the 
use of public  funds  received from  the  Treasury through  the "Caisse de consoli-
dation  et de  mobilisation  des  CreditS  a moyen  terme II  and  Of  long-term  loanS 
which the 
11  Credit fonder 
11  floats  on the  capital market. 
53.  Consumer  lending  was  brought  under  specific  control  in  the  relatively 
recent  past  when  hire  purchase  sales  began  to  assume  some  importance  in 
France. 
The  adoption  by the  Conseil  national  du  credit of measures  designed to 
control  the  development  of  hire  purchase  sales  dates  from  28  July  1954.  The 
regulations  in  force  limit the  period  for  which  loans  may_  be  granted and  fix a 
minimum  down  payment.  When  the  operation  is  financed  by a  bank or a  finance 
house,  there  is  another  limitation:  the  total  of  credit of  this  kind  granted is 
limited to a  given multiple of the establishment's own capital and reserves. 
The  rules  are  relaxed  or  tightened  according  to  the  general  business 
situation and to trends on the markets for the various goods sold on hire purchase. 
For example, the down payment has been lower since July 1950, and the maximum 
period  of  credit  longer,. for  household  appliances.P and  for  radio  and  television 
sets  than  for  motor  cars.  The fluctuations  in total  consumer credit figures  bear 
witness  to  the  effectiveness  of the  restrictive  measures  applied,  in particular, 
in  1956  and  1957,  and  of the  relaxation in  1958  and  1959.  But  the  volume  of 
hire purchase business has  so far  been too small in France for it to be possible  131 132 
to isolate the impact of  the measures applied from  that of other factors influencing 
the general state of business. 
54.  Lastly, the  authorities limited for  a  time  the total volume  of bank lending 
of all kinds  - both  short and  medium-term  - to a  figure  corresponding for each 
of  the  banks  to  the  average  figure  for  the  last quarter  of  1957,  an  additional 
margin  of 3%  being allowed for  new  credits  for  exports.  These  decisions were 
taken on 7  February 1958 and were rescinded on 5 February 1959. CHAPTER  7 
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TREASURY AND  THE BANKING SYSTEM 
55.  As  has  already been observed (see  sec.  27)  Treasury operations  are one 
of  the  factors  in the money market affecting the  cash position of the  banks. We 
have  now  to  examine  how  the  transactions  of  the  Treasury  exert an influence 
on bank liquidity. 
a)  The various functions of the Treasury 
56.  The  Treasury  holds  an  important  place  in  the  French  monetary  system. 
Unlike  that  of  other  countries,  the  French  Treasury  not  only acts  - directly 
through its own network of public agencies - as government cashier and cashier 
for  a  certain  number  of  institutions  and  local  authorities  which  are  called 
" correspondents" ; it also has monetary and banking functions. 
The  activity  of  the  Treasury  is  similar  to  that  of  a  bank  to  the  extent 
that it takes part in several ways in the  creation of money.  The role of deposit 
bank played by the Treasury is not moreover confined to the  two kinds of funds 
mentioned above in  sec. 16 and classified in the  tables of the Conseil national 
du  credit among  the components  of the  money  supply (accounts  with  the postal 
cheque system and " fonds particuliers"  of the agencies). 
The  Treasury  receives deposits  of  many  kinds  of resources,  which vary 
in the  extent to which they belong to the public domain. It acts as cashier not 
only  for  the  Government  but  also  for  the  special budgets  and  the  local author-
ities, and it collects the funds  of a  large number  of other public or semi-public 
" correspondants ",  some  of  which  are  specialized  credit  institutions  (" Caisse 
des  depots",  "Credit  agticole ",  "Credit national"  etc.),  others  industrial  or 
commercial  institutions  (National  energy undertakings,  French  State  Railways, 
"Office des cereales II'  II Office de 1' Azote"' " Potasses d' Alsace "' etc.). 
The situation of the  Treasury depends, therefore, not only on  the Govern-
ment's  strictly  budgetary  operations  but  also  on  a  large  number  of operations 
carried  out  at  the  instance  or  on  behalf  of the  Treasury's  " correspondants 
11
• 
Neither  of  these  two  kinds  of operation  affects  the  liquidity  of  the  Treasury 
uniess  they  involve  settlements  with  the  banking  system,  and  these  can only 
be  carried out  through  the  Central  Bank,  since the  Treasury does  not maintain 
accounts with the ordinary banks.  133 57.  Amont  the  " banking"  functions  of  the  Treasury,  there  is  one  which 
deserves  separate  examination,  since  it  concerns  monetary  relations  between 
the  various  countries  of the  franc area.  The  Treasury acts as a  clearing house 
within this area by playing the  part of a  central bank for  the overseas banks of 
issue,  creating  and neutralizing liquidity on the  occasion of transfers between 
France and the rest of the franc area. 
Transfers between the  franc area and other monetary areas are handled by 
the Exchange Stabilization Fund (" Fonds de stabilisation des changes"), which 
is managed by the  Banque de  France and, since its reform in 1959, is no longer 
in direct contact with the Treasury. Previously a  surplus or deficit in the balance 
of  payments  led,  through  the  working  of  machinery  for  advancing  francs  from 
the Treasury to the Fund, to an outflow or inflow of cash for the Treasury. Since 
1949, the francs  created or withdrawn on  the occasion of foreign  currency move-
ments have been supplied or received directly by the Banque de France. 
For money transfers between the  countries of the  franc  area the  exchange 
of means of payment between France and the overseas banks of issue is carried 
out  through  the  Treasury.  The  Treasury has  committed  itself to  supplying  the 
banks  of  issue  of the overseas  countries  and  territories  of the  franc  area with 
the metropolitan francs  which  they need,  on  the  condition that they place local 
currency  at the Treasury's  disposal for  the  transfers  to  overseas  countries and 
territories.  Thus,  settlements between France and the rest of the  franc  area are 
not included  under the same heading of the  "contra-items  of the  money supply" 
as  are  settlements  between  France  and  foreign  countries.  They  do  not affect 
the  "gold  and  foreign  exchange"  holding  of  the  Banque  de  France,  but  the 
monetary system's  ~!aims on  the Treasury1 . 
The  machinery in  operation  leads  to  a  distinction  being  made,  from  the 
angle  of  their  impact  on  the  home  monetary  situation,  between  private  money 
transfers  and  public operations. 
Only  private  transfers  between  France  and  the  overseas  countries  of the 
franc  area  can  have  the  effect  of altering  the  internal  money  supply  and  the 
extent  of  the  Treasury's  indebtedness  to  the  banking  system.  When  funds  be-
longing  to  individuals  or  firms  are  transferred  from  France  overseas,  they are 
added  to  the  franc  balances  deposited  with  the  Treasury  by  the  appropriate 
overseas  banl<:s  of issue  and enable  the  Treasury to  repay  by  the  same  amount 
advances from  the Banque de France. 
By  contrast,  when  the  Treasury  makes  payments  to  overseas  countries, 
it credits the funds  directly to the accounts in its own books held by the banks 
1 Since  1959  the  Central  Banks  of  Tunisia  and  of  Morocco  have  been  "  correspondants •  of the 
Banque  de  France,  and no  longer those of the  Treasury.  Settlements  between  these  two  countries 
and the  rest of the  franc  area  therefore no  longer affect the  Treasury  and must be treated as set-
134  dements with foreign  countries. of issue  concerned,  and this operation does not  have  the  effect of altering the 
internal money supply or the total of its "contra-items". 
Iri  fact,  the overseas countries' accounts with France have in recent years 
shown  a  relatively marked degree  of equilibrium  between  these  two  categories 
of  transfer:  the  net "public"  transfers  from  France  to  the  overseas  countries 
of  the  franc  area tends  to  offset,  and  even to exceed slightly,  the  net private 
and  commercial  settlements  in  the  opposite  direction.  Thus,  the  balance  of 
private  transfers  from  overseas  to  France  normally  works  in  the  direction  of 
internal monetary expansion and reflects  the  return to France through 
11  private". 
channels of capital remitted overseas through "public" channels  . 
. It will  be noticed that this  machinery is not  such as  to  yield exact sta-
tistical  data.  Admitted!  y  it is possible  to  subtract  from  the  monetary system's 
claims  on  the  Treasury  the  contra-item  of  the  variations  in  the  money supply 
stemming  from  private  transfers  between the  mother  country and  the rest of the 
franc  area.  But  this  process  has  a  certain  arbitrary  element;  apart  from  the 
fact  that  ~rivate  transfers  cannot  always  be  easily  distinguished  from  public 
operations, it is contrary to the principle of the unity of public finance. 
b)  Treasury liquidity 
58.  The  Treasury's  act1v1t1es  affect  the  banking  system  in  two  ways.  As  a 
bank,  the  Treasury has  the  means  of stepping  up  or  scaling  down  the money 
supply.  In  its  capacity as  an  instrument  for  implementing  the  finance  law and 
carrying  out operations  of the  " correspondants du  Tresor 
11  and  of the overseas 
banks of issue, it must at all times be able to·make transfers from its own sector 
to  the  banking  system,  by  maintaining at  the  Banque  de  France  the  balances 
such  payments  require,  by  recourse  to  the  banks  (including  the  specialized 
institutions) or, where necessary, by recourse to the Central Bank itself. 
Of course, the  distinction  between these  two  roles, which in practice are 
often  completely  merged,  must  not  be  exaggerated.  If no  distinction  is  made, 
however,  there  is,  the  risk  of  confusing  the  Government  budget  deficit with 
fluctuations  at the  Treasury,  whereas  there  is  no absolute  correlation between 
these  two  matters,  both because  of  the  expenditure  the  Government engages in 
abroad and the  way in which  the  Treasury finances its commitments in metropol-
itan  francs. 
59.  There  being  practically no income  to  offset  Government  budgetary outlay 
in  the  overseas  countries  of the  franc  area,  this  outlay  is  broadly speaking 
identical with  the  deficit recorded there.  In  1956,  of the  overall budget deficit 
of NF 10 040  million nearly three fifths  (NF  5 900 million) concerned operations 
overseas.  In recent years the growth of the  burden borne in these countries and 
the  reduction  in  the  overall  budget deficit  has  had  the  effect of concentrating 
overseas  the  entire  deficit;  in  1960  the  effective  deficit  of  NF  4150 million  135 comprises a  surplus of NF 2 530 million for operations in France and outside the 
franc  area and  a  deficit of NF  6 680  million for  operations  in the  overseas ter-
ritories. 
The  deficit  on  the  budgets  has  therefore  only  a  slight  direct impact on 
the  internal  monetary  system  and  Treasury  liquidity.  The  commitments  to  be 
financed  overseas  are in fact  c:overed by cash resources  in local currency rep-
resenting  mainly  the  equivalent  value  in  that  currency  of  private  funds  trans-
ferred to France. 
But  the  private  transfers  from  overseas  themselves  exert  an  indirect 
influence  on the  French  monetary system and impose a  strain on liquidity in the 
mother country in the  long run equal to  or even higher than the overseas deficit. 
For example,  in  1960, an overseas deficit of NF  6 680 million (i.e. virtually the 
whole  of  public  expenditure  in  these  countries)  was  recorded as  against a  net 
balance  of private transfers  to  France  of  NF  7 340 million.  (In  1956,  the  corre-
spon~ing figures were NF 5 900 million and NF 5 490 million). 
60.  The  large scale of the deficit or of the  commitments  stemming  from  over-
seas money transfers does not necessarily mean that the Treasury has difficulties 
as regards its cash position. 
It is true .that its power to  create money is limited by the degree of confi-
dence the currency inspires in those who use it and by the fact that the Treasury 
cannot  itself arbitrarily increase the share of the  money  supply held by private 
persons  and firms  with the  postal  cheque system,  since  they are entitled to ask 
for  their  balances  to  be  exchanged  for  banknotes,  foreign  currency  (subject  to 
the exchange regulations) or bank deposits. 
But the general trend of the  Treasury's  account at the  Ban  que de France 
depends mainly on  the one hand on the timing of public receipts and expenditure, 
and,  on  the  other  on  the  aid  the  Treasury  can  obtain  from  the  banks  and  the 
specialized institutions. 
61.  The Treasury must be able at any moment to carry out operations pursuant 
to the Finance Law or those requested by the "correspondants du Tr esor" (and, 
in  particular,  by  the  post  office  acting  on  behalf of  holders  of  accounts  with 
the  cheque  system)  or  by  the  overseas  banks  of  issue.  Such  operations  raise 
no problems  for it as long as they do not go beyond a  mere book transfer between 
two  of the  three  categories (a transfer between depositors in the  same category 
is an even simpler matter).  The transfers take place within the Treasury's own 
payments sphere and therefore affect its relations neither with  the bank of issue 
nor with the ordinary banks. 
The position is quite different if one or other of these categories of operator 
applies  for  payment in banknotes,  or  foreign  currency  or  for  transfer  to a  sight 
136  deposit  ~at a  bank. In all three cases the Treasury can only execute such orders by  debiting  its  account  with  the  Banque  de  France.  Each  of  them  therefore 
leads  to  a  fall  in  its  balance  with  the  bank  of issue  and  this  will affect its 
liquidity situation unless it can at the same time  through any one of these three 
channels attract a  corresponding  volume  of  fresh  funds  in  the  form  of deposits 
or  subscriptions  to  government  paper.  In  other  words,  the  question  whether it 
can close its own "circuit" or not determines whether it must resort to aid from 
the Ban  que de Erance. 
The  Treasury's  means  of influencing  the  volume  of  these  transfers  are 
very  limited:  Rates  of interest on  government paper  are  traditionally  stable in 
France,  for  reasons  which  will  be  given  below,  and  these movements  can only 
vary  with  the  greater  or lesser liquidity of the  banks  and of the  economy as a 
whole,  and in particular with  the impact on them  of fluctuations  in the balance 
of payments.  As  the  situation now stands, the Treasury is very much dependent 
on general factors  affecting the economy. 
c) Interest rate policy with respect to  short-term debt 
62.  The  system  of  short-term  Treasury  paper  issues  is  a  reflection  of the 
high degree of specialization and the relative segregation of short-term financing 
machinery in France. 
Strictly speaking, there is no true  money market in France, as there is in 
certain  other  countries,  on  which  the  supply  of demand  for  short-term  capital 
can be matched and balanced through the free play of interest rates. 
- Firms  and  individuals  obtain  short-term  capital  directly  through  the  banks. 
The  terms  for  bank credit are in accordance  with  scales fixed  for the whole of 
the banking system in relation to Bank rate (see sec. 31); 
- The  Treasury draws  either  on  the  liquid savings of firms  and  individuals  by 
the  issue  of paper (bons  sur for.mules)  or  on  the  liquidity of the  banks  by the 
assignment of bills held in the form  of entry in current account (bons  en comptes 
courants).  . 
The issues of bills in paper form  constitute, alongside deposits in savings 
banks and time deposits in banks, one of the three forms  of investment available 
for  the publiC's liquid savings. They appeal mainly to savers who  are not inter-
ested in investments  on  the  stock exchange  and who  are not greatly influenced 
by fluctuations in interest rates. 
Bills held in the  form  of current account entries are in practice  reserved 
for  the  banks,  for  which  they  represent  the  compulsory  use  of a  proportion of 
deposits  under  the  regulations  establishing "floors".  Up  to  the  amount  fixed 
by these "floors", the banks cannot decline to take up these bills, nor can they 
discuss terms.  137 63.  The  above  explains  why  the  French  Treasury  does  not  alter  the  volume 
of  and  the  rates  for  its  short-term  issues  as  frequently  as  happens  in other 
countries. 
Were  it  to  interrupt  its  issues  of  Treasury  bills  in  paper  form  (or if it 
varied the  terms  too often) it would run the risk of impairing the  smooth working 
of savings machinery which is particularly effective and which enjoys the  confi-
dence  of the  general  public;  the  funds  thus  diverted  from  their  traditional use 
would largely be devoted to  more  liquid investments (particularly in view of the 
limits  set to  savings  bank deposits)  or  would  be  spent on  the  consumer goods 
market. 
For bills held in the form  of current account entries, an interruption of the 
issues  would raise  very  qui~kly the  problem  of the  bank's compliance  with the 
rule  concerning  minimum  holdings  of  government  paper ;  experience  in recent 
years has  shown that they have  bought very little in the way of bills beyond the 
compulsory minimum. 
Moreover,  t~e  French  Treasury  has  available,  through  the  operation  of 
Banque  de  France advances  to  the  Government,  a  mechanism for  the automatic 
adjustment of its resources and commitments.  Where,  for  example, it finds itself 
with a  temporary surplus of short-term resources as compared with requirements, 
it makes it a  rule to use this surplus, as  in 1959 and 1960,  to repay the Central 
Bank's (advances  and  thus  "neutralize"  from  the  monetary  point  of  view  the 
possible consequences of an expansion of internal liquidity. 
64.  The  fixing  of the rates  for  Treasury bills is, in the last analysis, not so 
much  a  consequence  of  the  Treasury's  need  to  adapt itself to  the  fluctuating 
trends  on  a 
11  market 
11  as  a  response  to  the  need  to  establish  a  satisfactory 
equilibrium  between  the  yield  of  the  various  kinds  of  investment  open  to  the 
public. 
Thus the rates for bills in paper form  are fixed as much in the light of the 
rates ruling for deposits in savings banks, time deposits in banks and compulsory 
holdings as by reference to Bank rate. 
As  for  the rates on  bills held in the form  of current account entries, they 
are  no doubt fairly  closely  linked  to  Bank  rate,  given  the  scale of the  French 
banks'  indebtedness  to  the  Central  Bank,  but  the  link  cannot  be  a  hard and 
fast  one.  Admittedly the  Treasury is careful not to fix  the  rate  for  bills above 
Bank  rate,  a·s  this would  offer the  banks  an  incentive  to  buy bills with the aid 
of  money  borrowed  from  the  Central  Bank.  On  the  other  hand,  when  Bank rate 
is  raised,  the  Treasury is not obliged to raise proportionately the  rate  on bills 
which  the  banks  are  compelled to  purchase  under  the  "floor" regulations. The 
Treasury  may  wish  to  avoid an  unnecessary increase in  the  cost of servicing 
the national debt. It may also wish to make  use of the disparity created between 
the cost of the banks' debt to the Central Bank and the yield on  their compulsory 
138  holdings of bills to support a  general policy of credit restraint. 65.  The  easing  of  the  internal monetary  situation thanks  to  the  recovery in 
the  balance  of  payments  from  the  beginning  of 1959  led  the  French monetary 
authorities  to  cut interest rates.  The Treasury has  not  since  then  made issues 
oil the capital market and this is part of the policy of lowering long-term interest 
rates. 
As  for  investment outlets  for  short-term  savings,  interest rates  were cut 
from  1  July  1960 on Treasury bills and as  from  1  January  1961  on  deposits in 
savings  banks.  In  addition,  the  range  of  Treasury bills  issued  to  the general 
public  was  supplemented  in  June  1961  by  a  new  device  - bills  maturing in 
three  or  five  years  - intended to  help in funding,  to  some  extent,  the floating 
national  debt.  At  the  same  time  the  rates  on  progressive  interest rate  bills  -
repayable on demand at the request of the  bearer three months  after purchase -
were once again lowered. 
A  cut in Bank rate made possible the  parallel easing of bank credit terms 
as a  whole ..  However, at least up  to the end of 1960, there was no accompanying 
reduction in the rates on bills held in the  form  of current account entries, since 
these  has  been deliberately maintained at  a  relatively low  level having regard 
to the 1957  increase in Bank rate. Subsequent  cuts in 1958 and after, therefore, 
had  the  effect of bringing the situation nearer to normal.  In October 1960 Bank 
rate  and  the  rate  for  bills  held as  entries  in  current  account  were once again 
at  parity.  Not  until  then  was  it decided  to  lower  slightly  the  rates  for these 
bills. 
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BALANCE·SHEET OF THE BANQUE DE FRANCE :  CONSTITUENT ITEMS 
1.  Notes in circulation 
2.  Gold and foreign  exchange 
Assets  :a) Goldl 
b) Advances to the Exchange Stabilization Fund 
c) Balances available on  demand abroad 
Liabilities:  Credit balances 
a) of foreign central banks and international organizations 
b) of the Exchange Stabilization Fund 
3.  Funds for  the "Public Sector" 
Assets  a) Loans and advances to the State 
b) Till money 
c) Current accounts with postal cheque system 
d) Discounted tax or customs duty certificates  ("obligations cau-
tionnee~ ") 
e) Rediscounted mediu!D-term "housing" paper 
Liabilities:  Current credit balances 
a) of the Treasury 
b) under economic co-operation agreements 
c) of the French finance institutions 
4.  Funds  for  the "Banks " and other sectors 
Assets  a) Discounted  bills  (apart  from  "obligations  cautionnees"  and 
medium-term "housing" paper) 
b) Negotiable securities 
c) 30-day advances 
d) Advances on long-dated securities 
e) Items in course of collection 
Liabilities:  Current deposits of the  French banks. 
Under·  this  fourth  heading  are  also  usually  included  the  balance  of mis-
cellaneous  assets  and  liabilities  and  current  credit  balances  of individuals. 
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DEVELOPMENT OF MONEY  -MARKET LIQUIDITY FROM 1956 TO 19601 
Two  major phases are distinguishable  in the  history of events  from  1956 
to 1960, the turning point being May 1958. 
1.  From the  beginning of 1956  to May  1958, the liquidity of the money market 
was  subject to  continuous  strain under  the  combined effects  of  an  increase in 
notes  and coin in circulation and the outflow of foreign  exchange. This outflow 
was very heavy at the beginning of the period but tended to ease off from  August 
1957  (20%  surcharge).  As  for  the  expansion  in  the  note  circulation,  this had 
already  been  damped  down  a  little  between  September  and  October  1956,  with 
the  issue  of the  1956  5%  loan,  and  it slowed down  further  at the  end of 1957, 
owing,  it  ~ould seem,  to  rumours  concerning  a  possible  withdrawal  from  circu-
lation  of  10 000  franc  notes.  The  inflow  of  notes  at  this  time  made  conditions 
rather easier on the market, which was therefore able to cope with the December 
maturity more  easily than in 1955. 
This continued tightening of liquidity on  the  market,  although it was less 
marked at the end of the period under review, meant that considerable assistance 
had  to  be  provided  by  the  Central  Bank.  However,  the  indebtedness  of the 
" public sector" and that of the banks did not follow the same trend. 
For  the  full  year  1956,  the  indebtedness  of the  public sector grew much 
less than did that of the banks. Several factors account for  this phenomenon: the 
reserves  of  liquidity  accumulated  by  the  banks  (notably  in  medium-term  bank 
paper) during the years in which conditions on the market had been easy -1954 
and  1955  - were  heavier  than  those  of  the  Treasury,  which  also  had  to  cope 
with the amortization of the Central Bank's special advances of 1953. In addition, 
the July increase in the  "ceili~gs" for bills, and the national loan of September-
October caused heavy transfers of liquidity from the banks to the Treasury. 
Early in  1957,  since the  reserves  of  the  various  operators  on  the  market 
were  very limited, the  continuing pressure on liquidity was  to call into question 
the "ceilings" fixed by the Banque de France on  its various forms  of assistance. 
The  monetary  authorities  were  therefore  faced  with  a  choice  and the following 
couttse  was  adopted:  agreements  between  the  Bank and _the  Government in May 
'  - ..  ·'J 
1 The  figures  used  in  this  Annex  and  in  the  graph  to  which  it refers  are based on  the weekly 
returns of the Banque de France;  for  this reason slight discrepancies will be found  between them 
and those given in the tables, which are based on monthly returns.  141 and June, and later in November, provided for  an overall  increase of NF  550000 
million  in  the  "ceiling 
11  on  advances  to  the  Government;  alongside  this,  the 
rediscount 
11  ceilings 
11  of  the  banks  were,  in  July  and  August,  and  later in 
December, lowered by a total of more than NF 200 000 million. 
It  therefore  fell  to  the  Treasury  to  cover  the  money-market  deficit in 
1957.  For  the  full  year,  the  indebtedness  of  the  publi'c  sector  swelled by 
NF  566 000 million, nearly as much as the total net outflow of notes and foreign 
exchange  (NF  585 000  million).  The  indebtedness  of  the  banks,  however,  after 
reaching  a  peak  in April 1957,  fell  towards  the  end of the  year to a  level near 
to  that of 1956, since  presentation of  medium-term paper had offset the lowering 
of the " ceilings ". 
2.  The  floating  of the  3 ~%  loan  in  1958  marks  a  shift in  the  trend  on  the 
money market which was  to be  confirmed early in 1959. 
Purchases  of  gold  by  the  Banque  de  France at the  time  of the  loan and 
in  subsequent months  neutralized in the  second half of 1958  the  effects  on  the 
money market of  outflows of notes, which  in  any case slowed down towards the 
end  of  the  year  as  a  result  of  the  nervousness  of a  section  of  the  population 
over the change from  the old franc to the new. Overall indebtedness to the Banque 
de France therefore became stable. 
In  1959  an  exceptional  inflow  of  foreign  exchange  (NF  7 600  million) 
coincided with the lowest annual increase in notes and coin in circulation since 
1948  (NF  700 million).  The  money market thus received fresh  liquidity totalling 
nearly  NF  7 000  million.  Although  noticeably  less  rapid,  this  flow  of  fresh 
liquidity  continued during  the  first  half of  1960  ( + NF  500  million),  since the 
inflow of foreign currency continued to exceed the outflow of notes. 
The  main  feature  of  these  last  three  half  years  was  therefore  that  the 
money market became  unusually independent of the  Banque de  France.  Both the 
Treasury  and  the  banks  shared in  this, though  the  extent to  which  they did so 
varied at different times. 
Until the end of August 1959, i.e. during  the  period of the heaviest inflow 
for  the  money  market  taken  as  a  whole, it was  the  cash  situation of the  banks 
which  benefited  most  from  the  influx  of  foreign  exchange.  They  were  able  to 
cut their recourse  to  the  Central  Bank, notably in respect of medium-term paper, 
by  almost  NF  5 000  million,  or  about  three  times  more  than  could  the  public 
sector. 
On  the  other hand,  from  September  on,  the  tendency for  the  public sector 
to  reduce  its  indebtedness  gathered  momentum  and  this  continued  until  the 
middle  of 1960  (NF  4 590  m.illion  between  the  end of August  1959 and  the end 
142  of June  1960). At the  same time,  conversely, the  banks  were  once again obliged to put themselves in debt, which they did to an appreciable extent: NF 2 500 mil-
lion between the end of  August 1959 and the  end of June  1960. By drawing from 
the  money market more  liquidity than the  Banque de  France was  pumping into it 
through  movements  of  notes  and  foreign  exchange,  the  Treasury  forced  the 
banks  "into the  Bank".  The maintenance  of approximate  balance  in  the execu-
tion  of the  budgets, and of a  high  rate  of public  subscription to Treasury bills, 
coupled  with  an  increase  in  bills  subscribed  by  the  banks  under  the  "floors" 
regU;lations  because  of  the  large  growth  of bank  deposits  in  1959  - all these 
factors  combined in this period to induce the Treasury to contract bank liquidity 
and  thus  to  neutralize  the  tendencies towards internal monetary expansion which 
were emerging in the French economy. 
143 Table  1 
SUPPLY  OF  MONEY  AND  NEAR-MONEY,  AWD  CONTRA-ITEMS 
in NF '000 million 
31.12.  31.12  31.12.  31.12.  31.12.  31.12. 
1956 1  1957 1  1958 1  1959  1960  1961 
Supply  of money  and near-money 
a) Notes in circulation  31.14  32.68  34.69  34.95  39.32  44.35 
b) Coin in circulation  0.67  0.75  0.78  0.76  1.13  1.28 
c) Sight deposits  34.04  37.94  40.26  48.21  55.34  65.16 
of which : i) At the banks  (26.69)  (29.52)  {30.80)  (37.57)  (42.67)  (50. 54) 
ii) With  the  postal 
cheque system,the 
Treasury  and  the  (  7.35)  (  8.42)  (  9.46)  (10.64)  (12.67)  (14.62) 
Banque de France 
Total money supply  65.85  71.37  75.73  83.92  95.79  110.79 
a) Special accounts  - 0.15  0.38  0.85  1.43  2.04 
b) Time deposits  2.32  3.83  4.13  5.43  7.58  9.61 
Total  supply of money and near-
money  68.17  75.35  80.24  90.20  104.80  122.44 
Contra-items 
a) Gold and foreign exchange (net)  3.73  -0.31  -0.07  7.16  10.48  15.29 
b) Claims on the Treasury  24.14  30.13  31.10  31.31  33.33  34.61 
c) Credit extended to the economy 
by  the  banks  and  the  Banque 
de France  40.24  45.77  48.68  53.81  62.04  73.45 
Total  68.11  75.59  79.71  92.28  105.85  123.34 
Miscellaneous  + 0.06  -0.24  +0.53  -2.08  - 1.05  - 0.90 
Total of contra-items  68.17  75.35  80.24  90.20  104.80  122.44 
1 Including the Saar. 
144  Source: Conseil national du  credit. Table  2 
LIQUID  AND  SHORT-TERM  SAVINGS 
in N F  '000 million 
31.12.  31.12.  31.12.  31.12.  31.12.  31.12. 
1956  1957  1958  1959  1960  1961 
Time  deposits  with  banks, and 
cash  certificates  ("bons  de 
caisse ") 1  2.32  3.83  4·.13  5.43  7.58  9.61 
Special accounts  - 0.15  0.38  0.85  1.43  2.04 
Deposits in savings banks 
(including capitalized 
interest)  17.48  19.24  22.28  26.16  29.51  33.20 
a) National Savings Bank  (7.55)  (8.23)  (9.42)  (10.91)  (12.05)  (13.29) 
b) Ordinary savings banks  (9.93)  (11.01)  (12.86)  (15.22)  (17 .38)  (19.78) 
c) Savings - credit  - - - (0.03)  (0.08)  (0.13) 
Treasury bills 
(subscriptions less 
repayments)  9.87  10.97  12.16  15.85  19.41  23.30 
a) Bills in paper form  (9.32~  (10.39  (11.54)  (14.  77)  (18.15)  (21.87) 
b) Bills held by firms in form of 
current account entry  (0.55)  (0.58)  (0.62)  (1.08)  (1.26  (1.43) 
3- and 5-year certificates of the 
"Caisse  nation  ale  de  credit 
agricole"  (held  by  the  public)  0.50  0.66  0.87  1.27  1.93  2.76 
Total  30.17  34.85  39.82  49.56  59.86  70.91 
1 Including the Saar for 1956,  1957 and 1958. 
Source: Conseil national du  credit.  145 Table  3 
SHORT-TERM  CREDIT  AND  MOBILIZABLE  MEDIUM-TERM  CREDIT 
Classified by  types of credit Institutions 
(totals and  changes) 
in NF '000 million 
December  Changes 
December 
1960  1961 
I.  Credit granted by the banks 
A.  Overdrafts  8.81  2,59  11.40 
B.  Commercial bills 
a) Short-term 
i) Held by the banks  27.36  +  5.22  32.58 
ii) Discounted by the Ban~e  de France  7.92  +  0.80  8.72 
iii) Held by the specialized institutions  0.09  +  0.04  0.13 
Total  35.37  +  6.06  41.43 
b) Medium-term 
i) Held by the hanks  2.80  +  2.20  5.00 
ii) With .the Banque de France  6.07  - 1.36  4.71 
iii) Held by the specialized institutions  Total  0.58  - 0.15  0.43 
Total  9.45  +  0.69  10.14 
Total I  53.63  +  9.34  62.97 1 
II.  Credit granted by the finance institutions 
Commercial bills 
a) Short-term (finance of hire purchase business) 
i) Held by the finance institutions  0.44  +  0.01  0.45 
ii) Held by the hanks  2.05  +  0.77  2.82 
iii) Discounted by the Banque de France  0.10  - 0.10 
Total  2.59  +  0.78  3.37 
b)  Medium-term 
i) Held by the finance institutions  0.06  +  0.22  0.28 
ii) Held by the specialized institutions  0.14  - 0.02  0.12 
iii) Discounted by the Banque de France  0.13  - 0.11  0.02 
Total  0.33  +  0.09  0.42 
Total II  2.92  +  0.87  3.79 
III. Medium-term credit granted by the "Sous-Comptoir des 
entrepreneurs "  and  the  "Credit  foncier  de  France " 
i) Bills held by the specialized institutions  3.58  - 0.24  3.34 
ii) Bills discounted by the Banque de France .  5.71  +  0.66  6.37 
-
Total  9.29  +  0.42  9.71 
IV.  Medium-term  credit granted by the 
agricole" 
"Caisses de credit 
i) Bills held by the "Caisses de credit agricole"  0.15  +  0.16  0.31 
ii) Bills discounted by the Banque de France  0.94  - 0.01  0.93 
Total  1.09  +  0.15  1.24 
v.  Credits granted by the Banque de France 
A.  Bills discounted directly for customers  0.08  +  0.01  0.09 
B.  Advances against. security  0.07  - 0.07 
Total  0.15  +  0.01  0.16 
Grand Total  67.08  + 10.79  77.87 1 
1 Excluding  non-mobilizahle  medium-term  commercial  hills  held by  the  banks  (NF 650 million  on 
31.12.1961). 
146  Source: Conseil national du  credit. Table  4 
SHORT-TERM  CREDIT  AND  MOBILIZABLE  MEDIUM-TERM  CREDIT 
Breakdown according to the nature of resources 
{totals and changes) 
in NF '000 million 




Credits  financed  from  monetary resources 
A.  Short-term 
i) Overdrafts 
(Items lA plus VB  of Table 3)  8.88  +  2.59  11.47 
ii) Bills held by the banks and the 
Banque de France  37.51  +  6.80  44.31 
Total  46.39  +  9.39  55.78 
B.  Medium-term  bills  held  by  the  banks 
and the Banque de France  15.65  +  1.38  17.03 
Total (A+ B)  62.04  +  10.77  72.81  1 
Credits financed /rom  savings 
a) Short-term bills held by the  spe~ialized 
institutions  and the finance institutions  0.53  +  0.05  0.58 
b) Medium-term bills held by the specialized 
institutions and the finance institutions  4.51  - 0.03  4.48 
Total  5.04  +  0.02  5.06 
Grand Total  67.08  +  10.79  77.87  1 
1 Excluding  non-mobilizable  medium-term  comme~cial bills  held by  the  banks  (NF 650 million  on 
31.12.1961). 
Source:  Cons~il national du  credit.  147 148 
Table  5 
SHORT-TERM  CREDIT  AND  MOBILIZABLE  MEDIUM-TERM  CREDIT 
Breakdown according to financing and form  of credit (totals) 
in NF '000 million 
financed by 
special·  the "Caisse 
Total  ized 1 and  the Banque  de conso-
banks  finance  de France  lidation 
institutions  et demo-
bilisation " 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
I. 31  December 1960 
1.  Short-term 
- Overdrafts  8.88  8.81  - 0.07 
- Bills  38.04  29.41  0.53  8.10 
Total  46.92  38.22  0.53  8.17 
2.  Medium-term 
Credits  granted by agree· 
ment with: 
- the  "Credit fonder" or 
the  "Sous·Comptoir des 
entrepreneurs" 
- Loans to building : 
special loans  8.5'5  - 2.29  5.69  0.57 
other credit  1.56  0.35  0.96  0.25 
- Equipment credit: 
private sector  ().58  0.34  0.03  0.21 
- the "Credit national" or 
the "Caisse des depots " 
- Equipment credit  3.03  1.68  0.11  1.24 
- Export credit  1.16  0.04  - 1.12 
-the  "Caisse  nationale 
des  marches de l'Etat" 
- Equipment credit : 
pr.i.vate sector (Art.S)  0.70  0.23  - 0.47 
nationalized under-
takings  3.49  0.16  0.25  2.93  0.15 
-the  "Caisse  nation  ale 
de credit agricole " 
-Credit  to  agriculture  1.09  - 0.15  0.94  -
Total  20.16  2.80  3.79  12.85  0.72 
Grand Total  67.08  41.02  4.32  21.02  0.72 
Credits borne by the banking 
system (2) + (4)  62.04 Table  5 (continued) 
financed by 
special- the "Caisse 
Total  ized 1 and  the Banque  de conso-
banks  finance  de France  lidation 
institutions  et demo-
bilisation" 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
~' 
II. 31  December 1961 
1.  Short-term 
- Overdrafts  11.47  11.40  - 0.07 
- Bills  44.89  35.40  0.58  8.91 
Total  56.36  46.80  0.58  8.98 
2.  Medium-term 
Credits  granted by agree-
ment with: 
- the "Credit foncier" or 
the "Sous·Comptoir des 
entrepreneurs" 
- Loans to building: 
special loans  8.88  - 2.36  6.33  0.19 
other credit  1.97  0.63  1.18  0.16 
- Equipment credit : 
private sector  0.72  0.62  0.07  0.03 
- the "Credit national" or 
the "Caisse des depots " 
- Equipment credit  2.72  2.54  0.04  0.14 
- Export credit  1.59  0.09  - 1.50 
-the  "Caisse  nation  ale 
des marches de l'Etat" 
- Equipment credit : 
private sector (Art.8)  0.88 
nationalized under~  1.12  0.17  2.94  0.16 
takings  3.51 
-the  "Caisse  nationale 
de Credit agricole II 
- Credit to  agriculture  1.24  - 0.31  0.93 
Total  21.51  5.00  4.13  12.03  0.35 
Grand Total  77.87 2  51.80 2  4.71  21.01  0.35 
Credits borne by the banking 
system (2) + (4).  72.81 2 
1 Other  than  the "Caisse de  consolidation et de mobilisation des credits a moyen terme" (Fund for 
the consolidation and discounting of medium-term credits). 
2 Excluding non-mobilizable  medium-term  commercial  bills  held by  the  banks  (NF 650 million on 
31.12.1961). 
Source: Conseil national du  credit.  149 ...... 
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Table  6 
POSSIBLE  RECOURSE  TO  THE  BANQUE  DE  FRANCE  (end-of-month  figures) 
19581  1959  !  1960 
I.  Possible  direct  recourse  by  banks  to  the  Dec.  Dec.  March  June  l  Sept.  Dec.  March 
Banque de France 
1. By rediscount 
(available margin under "ceilings") 
"ceilings"  4.47  4.59  4.73  4.89  5.08  5.39  5.45 
used  3.87  3;86  3.90  4.18  4.05  4.72  4.50 
Margin  0,60  0.73  0.83  0.71  1.03  0.67  0.95 
of which "Grands ensembles" 
2. On -the money market 
(0.19  (0.22  (0.22)  (0.20  (0.33  (0.23  (0.30) 
(available margin up to limits) 
limits  0.63  0.65  0.65  0.65  0.65  0.65  0.65 
u~ed  0.59  0.50  0.49  0.64  0.64  0.68  0.46 
Margin  0.04  0.15  0.16  0.01  0,01  - 0.19 
3. In Treasury paper  0.22  0.34  0.26  0.26  0.33  0.66  0.81 
(surplus of holdings above "floors") 
II. Possible  recourse  to  mobilization  of 
medium-term paper 
1. By  the  banks  with  the  "Credit national"  or 
with the "Caisse des depots et consignations"  0.83  4.15  4.08  3.24  3.87  2.80  4.62 
Total  of rediscountable items in bank portfolios  1.69  5.37  5.33  4.22  5.24  4.13  6.57 
2. Of "Credit national" and "Caisse des  depots 
et consignations" with Banque de France  0.57  1.10  2,08  2.51  2.17  2.61  3.08 
3. Of the "Sous-Comptoir des entrepreneurs", the 
"Credit  fonder  de  France"  and  the  finance 
institutions  0.79  1.01  0.96  1,01  1.08  1.03  1.15 
4.  Of the "Caisse nation  ale de credit  agricole" 
with the Banque de France  0.12  0.16  0.18  0.21  '0.25  0.15  0.19 
m. The  Treasury's  £ossibilities  of recourse 
Rediscountable "Ob igations cautionnees"  0.02  2.09  1.93  2.13  2.10  2.16  2.30 
TOTAL  3.19  9.73  10.48  10.03  10.84  10.08  13.29 
Pro memoria 
Banks' use of "pension" facilities  0.46  - 0.01  0.17  - - -
--
1 Excluding the Saar. 
Source: Conseil national du  credit. 
in NF '000 million 
1961 
June  Sept.  Dec. 
6.01  16.02  6.14 
5.22  5.15  5.69 
0.79  0.87  0.45 
(0.30  (0.28  (0.16) 
0.65  0.66  0.66 
0,59  0,65  0.73 
0.06  0.01  -
0.45  0.73  0.66 
4.26  5.15  5.04 
5.56  6.76i  6.15 
3.43  3.83  2.54 
1.21 8  1.22  1.28 
0.23  0.30  0.30 
2.25  2.39  2.31 
12.68  14.50  12.58 
- - 0.01 Table 7 
TRENDS  IN  BANQUE  DE  FRANCE  AND  MONEY-MARKET INTEREST RATES 
Banque de  France 
Ul!a 
Call money rate on  private 
paper (opening rates) 
~  ... 
~8-s  -s  -s 
c::,... 
::s  ... 
~ .. 
Ul  c::  a 
c::  o.oeg 
ui  ~ 6  C'l 
~  ........  Ul  0  s  .eo  u  0  ~ ..  e  e  <  1:1:1 
8~  ~ t  =  e Ul  ~ 
~  •N  e.~ 
:  ..  ~ >-
0.0  .s  .s  =~~  ~  ~ 
~=  ~=  liS 
.  g  ...  c::  ...  c::  :-o:a  ~  ~ .2 ·;:::  0  .. 
~  :ge~  liS  liS  0  ~.Sl  ~~5~ 
~  ~ 
~  ..  ......  II>  Ul~ c.  II> 
~  f  e ~ ...  c.  d 
...  Ul  ...  Ul  ~~a~ 
liS  ...  ..  c::  c::  c::  c::  a  ...  c:'O  ~  ...  w  'Oa-9  '0  8  8&  8 &  ~·liS ....  8.  ~  .s  ::I  >-
Ul  fll 
-s  ~  ~  ... ;g  t 
~  u  U:  Uo:  "?]~~ -~  0  u  ~  .;,  Ul  .~ 0 
Ul  ..  .~ Qj  ~ ~  =  ~~c.  c::  Q  o.s  o::s:= ....  0  0  li!  w  o ....  ff'l  Clo..Q  0  >o..clll  ..  ~  ~  ue! 
1958 Dec.  4.50  7.00  10  3  3.84  6.07  4.500  10.500  5.05 
1959 March  4.25  6.00  8  3  3.84  4.36  3.000  5.250  4.80 
June  4.00  5.50  7  3  3.84  3.67  3.000  4.750  4.55 
Sept.  4.00  5.00  6  3  3.84  4.05  3.875  4.750  4.55 
Dec.  4.00  5.00  6  3  3.84  4.07  3.875  4.750  4.55 
1960 Jan.  4.00  5.00  6  3  3.84  3.90  3.500  4.250  4.45 
Feb.  4.00  5.00  6  3  3.84  4.11  3.750  4.500  4.45 
March  4.00  5.00  6  3  3.84  4.17  3.750  5.000  4.45 
April  4.00  5.00  6  3  3.84  4.22  3.875  5.250  4.45 
May  4.00  5.00  6  3  3.84  4.25  3.500  5.750  4.45 
June  4.00  5.00  6  3  3.84  4.15  3.750  6.000  4.45 
July  4.00  5.00  6  3  3.84  4.53  4.000  5.250  4.45 
Aug.  4.00  5.00  6  3  3.84  4.05  3.500  4.375  4.45 
Sept.  4.00  5.00  6  3  3.84  4.15  4.000  4.750  4.45 
Oct.  3.50  4.50.  6  3  3.84  3.99  3.500  5.250  3.95 
Nov.  3.50  4.50  6  3  3.84  3.76  3.500  4.500  3.95 
Dec.  3.50  4.50  6  3  3.62  3.70  3.500  4.250  3.95 
1961 Jan.  3.50  4.50  6  3  3.62  3.65  3.000  4.500  3.95 
Feb.·  3.50  4.50  6  3  3.62  3.59  3.375  4.125  3.95 
March  3.50  4.50  6  3  3.62  3.70  3.500  4.125  3.95 
April  3.50  4.50  6  3  3.62  3.70  3.500  3.875  3.95 
May  3.50  4.50  6  3  3.62  3.91  3.375  4.500  3.95 
June  3.50  4.50  6  3  3.62  3.76  3.500  4.250  3.95 
July  3.50  4.50  6  3  3.62  3.65  3.500  4.000  3.95 
Aug.  3.50  4.50  6  3  3.62  3.52  3.375  3.750  3.95 
Sept.  3.50  4.50  6  3  3.62  3.57  3.375  3.875  3.95 
Oct.  3.50  4.50  6  3  3.62  3.60  3.500  4.000  3.95 
Nov.  3.50  4.50  6  3  3.62  3.52  3.250  3.625  3.95 
Dec.  3.50  4.50  6  3  3.62  3.58  3.500  3.875  3.95 
1 Of less than 3 months'  currency. 
2 These are bills mobilizing export drafts. 




PRINCIPAL  FACTORS  IN  THE  MONEX  MARKET 
(from Balance-sheet of the Banque de France) 
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156 INTRODUCTORY  REMARKS 
1.  Liquidity  policy,  in  the  sense  of  the  influencing  of  bank  liquidity  and 
indirectly of liquidity of the economy as a  whole is of minor importance in Italy 
in  comparison  with some other  countries.  Italy's  economic  development  since 
the stabilization of the lira in 1947 has proceeded without excessive fluctuations 
and no critical problems have arisen with regard to the supplying ·or drawing off 
of  liquidity.  Consequently,  the  Banca  d'Italia  has  not  pursued  a  systematic 
open•market policy but merely operated occasionally on the market when medium-
term  Government  bonds  were  being  issued.  The  minimum  reserve  ratio  was 
changed in January  1962  for  the first  time  since the  regulation was introduced 
in  1947.  Manipulation  of Bank rate has also been very  limited  - the discount 
rate  of  the  Banca d'ltalia has  been changed only  four  times  since  the  end of 
the  war. 
Influence  on  the  liquidity  of  the  banking  system  is  chiefly  exerted by 
changes  in  the  availability of credit from  the  Central Bank and by Government 
policy is issuing Treasury bills and bonds. Certain groups of credit institutions 
are obliged to observe rules on liquidity and credit and this also restricts their 
freedom  of  action.  In  addition the  credit institutions  are  boq.nd  by  the  Banca 
d'ltalia'  s  regulations  on  quantitative  credit controls.  This  is  particularly  true 
of the banks dealing in short-term credit. 
a) The  liquidity  of the  economy  as  a whole 
2.  For  some  years  th~  Ranca d'ltalia has  included in its Annual Reports  a 
table  giving the  breakdown  of liquid of the  economy as  a  whole (disponibilita 
liquide).  This  table,  which  is  reproduced  as  Table  1  (page  158),  shows  the 
short-term claims of the non-banking sector (other than the Treasury) on certain 
groups of credit institutions 1  and the Treasury. It distinguishes between primary 
and  secondary  liquidity.  Primary  liquidity  (total  money  supply),  as  in all the 
other Community countries, is made up of Banca d'Italia and Treasury notes in 
circulation, coin, and the sight deposits of the non-banking sector with the bank-
ing  system  and  the  Postal Cheque  Offices,  excluding  the  deposits  of  public 
bodies with the Banca d'Italia and the Postal Cheque Offices. 
The Banca d'Italia includes in the money supply the outstanding cheques 
issued by certain banks against payment which are  payable at any branch of the 
1 Banca  d'Italia,  short-term  deposit  and  credit  banks,  People's  Banks,  savings  banks,  pawn-
brokers of the first category, and Postal Cheque Offices.  157 Table  1 
LIQUIDITY OF  THE  ECONOMY 
'000 million 'tire 
Position at end of year 
1958  1959  1960 
1.  Domestic money supply (primary liquidity) 
a) Notes and coins  2109  2298  2 501 
b) Sight deposits, including bank drafts in circulation 1  3 592  4208  4874 
Total primary liquidity  5701  6 506  7 375 
2. Secondary liquidiry 
a) Savings deposits  4326  5 034  5767 
b) Treasury bills held by companies, individuals and 
special credit institutions  182  152  150 
c) Balances of insurance companies and social insurance 
funds at the Treasury  43  68  77 
d) Foreign currency balances of residents with banks  13  38  54 
Total secondary liquidity  4 564  5 292  6048 
3. Total liquidity  10265  11798  13423 
1 See text below. 
Source: Annual Reports of Banca d'ltalia. 
issuing  bank  but can in  practice  be  cashed at virtually any  credit institution. 
These  bank drafts  (assegni in circolazione) are an  instrument peculiar to Italy 
and at present 52  banks  are authorized to issue them.  They are  a  widely-used 
means  of' payment and are  consequently included  in the  money  supply as sight 
liabilities  of the  banks.  The  two former banks of issue  - Banco di Napoli and 
Banco di Sicilia - and the Banca d'Italia also issue a  similar traditional instru-
ment  of payment,  the  "vaglia  cambiario"  which  performs  the  same  function as 
the bank draft. 
3.  The secondary liquid resources include the following claims on the banking 
158  system and the Treasury: Jt 
i)  Savings deposits with the Banks (including savings banks  and pawnbrokers) 
and  with the Post Office Savings Bank 
ii)  Treasury bills (with currency of 1  - 12 months  - Buoni del tesoro ordinari) 
held by companies, individuals and special credit institutions. 
iii) Balances of insurance companies and social insurance funds at the Treasury. 
iv)  Foreign currency balances of residents with banks. 
4.  The Annual Reports of the Banca d
1ltalia also include a  table (Formazioni 
ed  impiego  delle  disponibilita  monetarie  e  finanziarie),  which  analyses  the 
operations on the  money and capital markets  by  categories and  thro~s light on 
the  factors  affecting liquidity in the  economy as  a  whole.  This  survey, which 
is reproduced in Table 2  (page •160),  does more  than simply examining the fac-
tors  determining  the  changes  in liquidity as  shown in Table  1.  Besides  those 
factors  it  includes  long-term  claims  an:d  commitments  in  the  capital  market. 
Direct comparison of the  two tables is therefore impossible. 
b) The Liquidity of the banking system 
5.  In  Italy  bank  liquidity consists  of  the  banks 
1  cash  balances,  their  free 
balances and unused credit lines with the  Banca d
1ltalia and their holdings  of 
free  Treasury bills.  In addition  to these assets  shown  in the  Banca d
1Italia
1s 
liquidity table  the  banks 
1  holdings  of Storage Agency Bills and freely convert-
ible foreign currencies can also be included in bank liquidity. 
Table  3  classifies  the  components  of  bank  liquidity  according  to  cash 
liquidity and potential liquidity.  Cash  liquidity is made  up of holdings  of coin 
and  notes,  free  balances  with  the  Banca  d
1ltalia  and  balances  at  the  Post 
Office  Savings  Bank,  the  Postal Cheque  Office and  the  Treasury.  The  •free" 
balances  at the  Banca  d
11talia are  those  balances  which  are  not earmarked as 
minimum reserve obligations. 
The  banks  may hold their free  balances with the Central Bank on current 
account or on fixed deposit. Under Article 42  of its Statutes the Banca d
1ltalia, 
may  accept  time  deposits  as  well as  sight deposits;  these  time  deposits  are 
for  periods  of  8  or  15  days;  up  to  1952  it even  accepted  deposits  for  4 or 
6  months.  Interest is paid at  0.5%  on  sight deposits,  1.5%  on  8-day deposits 
and 2%  on 15-day deposits. 
6.  The  potential liquidity  of the  banks  includes  their credit margins  at the 
Banca  d
1Italia,  free  holdings  of  Treasury  bills,  balances  and  money  market 
investments  abroad  in  convertible  currency,  and  holdings  of  Storage  Agency 
Bills.  "Credit  margins"  are  unused  facilities  for  advances  against  security 
(bonds  issued or guaranteed by the State, Treasury bills and bonds of the spe-
cial· credit institutions).  159 Table  2 
BORROWING  AND  MONETARY  ASSET  FORMATION 
BY  NON-FINANCIAL  SECTORS 
in '000 million lire 
1958  1959  1960 
I.  Borrowing and changes in holdings of gold and foreign 
currency 
1.  Borrowing(+) by the Treasury: 
a) From the Central Bank and "money-creating" 
institutions (short-term credits)  304  17  - 20 
b) From enterprises and individuals 1"  - 9  27  3 
c) By issue of Government bonds  - 2  326  160 
Total  293  370  143 
2.  Borrowing by the private sector: 
a) From the Central Bank and other "money-creating" 
institutions 
aa) short-term credits  203  678  1186 
bb) medium and long-term credits  580  691  880 
b) By issue of securities  440  372  758 
Total  1223  1741  2824 
3.  Total domestic borrowing (1  + 2)  1 516  2111  2967 
4.  Net purchases ( +) of gold and foreign currency by 
"money-creating" institUtions 
a) Banca d'Italia and the Italian Exchange Office (UIC)  546  572  65 
b) Banks  - 87  -54  208 
Total  - 459  518  273 
5.  Total (1 to 4)  1975  2629  3240 
II. Monetary asset formation 
1.  Liquidity of the Economy 
a) Internal money supply (primary liquidity)  543  805  869 
b) Secondary liquidity  690  728  756 
c) Total liquidity of the Economy  1233  1533  1625 
2. Other resources 2  211  431  522 
3.  Securities  531  665  1093 
Total (1  to 3)  1975  2629  3240 
1 This item represents deposits by insurance companies and social insurance funds at the Treasury, 
various  deposits  with  the  Postal Cheque Office, Treasury bills held by  enterprises and individuals 
and Treasury notes and coin in circulation. 
2 The  other resources  consist of: various bank funds,  time deposits with the special credit institu-
tions, savings certificates of the Post Office Savings Bank with a  currency of one year or longer and 
claims  of individuals  in  respect  of contributions  and premiums paid to social insurance funds and 
insurance companies (actuarial reserves). 
160  Source: Annual Report of--the Banca d'ltalia 1960, Tables Q 1-5. Table  3 
LIQUIDITY  OF  THE  BANKING  SYSTEM 
in '000 million lire 
At end of year 
1958  1959  1960 
I.  Cash liquidity 
1. Cash in hand  105  110  116 
2.  Balances (free) at the Banca d'Italia  77  so  58 
3. Balances at the Treasuri, the "Cassa defositi e 
prestiti 1, and the Posta  administration  r7  11  32 
Total cash liquidity (1 to 3)  199  171  206 
II. Potential liquidity 
l. Credit margins at the Banca d'Italia  249  237  250 
2.  Free holdings of Treasury Bills  371  580  221 
3. Balances and money market investments abroad 
in convertible currencies  - - -
4. Storage Agency Bills  90  110  102 
Total potential liquidity ( 1 to 4)  704  927  573 
Total liquidity (I + II)  904  1098  768 
1 See sec. 32. 
2 Includes the Post Offices Savings Bank and the Postal Cheque Office. 
Source: Annual Report of the Banca d'Italia 1960,  Table Q 5. 
Treasury bills that the  banks have not deposited with  the  Banca d'Italia 
in  compliance  with  minimum  reserve  obligations  or  as  security  for  advances 
constitute the banks'  free holdings of Treasury bills. These Treasury bills can 
be  converted  into  cash  liquidity  with  the  Banca  d'Italia  under  the  minimum 
reserve regulation  (see sec. 23). 
Holdings  of  Storage  Agency  Bills  only,  not  the  total  commercial  bill 
portfolio, are  included  in  the  banks'  liquid  assets.  The  banks  rarely  present 
ordinary  commercial  bills  to  the  Central  Bank  for  rediscounting.  If they are 
short  of ·liquid  funds  they  prefer  to  have  Storage  Agency  Bills  rediscounted. 
7.  The Annual Report of the Banca d'Italia for  1960 gives for  the first time 
a  table  (Operazioni  e  liquidita  del  sistema  bancario)  showing  the  factors  161 162 
determining  the  trend  of  bank  liquidity.  This  provides  the  basis  for  Table  4 
("Trend  of  bank  liquidity  and  recourse  by  the  banks  to Central Bank  credit" 
(page  163). Unlike the account of bank liquidity given on page 159, sec. 5, the 
figures  in this  table relate only to the banks' balances with the Banca d'Italia, 
making a  distinction between free balances and minimum reserves. 
The  principal factors  determining the  trend of bank liquidity are defined 
in this table as : 
a) changes in the note and coin circulation, 
b) net transactions  by  the  Treasury  with the  Banca d'Italia (including finance 
for stocks of agricultural products), 
c) advances by  the Banca d'Italia to the Exchange Office - Ufficio Italiano dei 
Camhi  - (changes  are  due  to  purchases  and  sales  of  foreign  currency) and 
changes in the Banca d'Italia's gold and foreign exchanges reserves, 
d) transactions by the  Central Bank with enterprises and individuals (including 
the special credit institutions). Table  4 
TREND  OF  BANK  LIQUIDITY 1  AND  RECOURSE  BY  THE  BANKS 
(AZIENDE  Dl  CREDITO)  TO  CENTRAL  BANK  CREDIT 
(changes in '000 million lire) 
1960  1959  1958 
A.  Flow of funds to(+) and from(-) the banks as a  result of 
changes in the following items: 
I.  Note and coin circulation  - 187  - 176  - 147 
II. Net position of domestic non-banking sector vis·a·vis 
the Banca d'Italia  - 94  -485  - 72 
of which: 1) Treasury  (- 99)  c- 522)  (-52) 
2) Others (enterprises and individuals, 
special credit institutions, etc.)  (+  5)  (+ 37)  (- 20) 
III.  Advances by the Banca d'Italia to the Exchange Office 
- Ufficio italiano dei cambi -(changes are due to pur· 
chases  and sales  of foreign  currency) and changes in 
the Banca d'ltalia' s  gold and foreign exchange reserves  +  154  +  571  + 608 
IV.  Other factors  - 9  - 16  - 22 
Total effect of factors I  to IV  - 136  - 106  +  367 
B. Change in Central Bank credit to banks:  +  33  +  21  - 49 
of which: rediscounts  (+  7)  (+  7)  (+  1) 
advances against securities  (+  18)  (+  14)  (- 45) 
deferred clearing payments (pagamenti prorogati)  (+  8)  (  - )  (- 5) 
Total effect A  +  B  - 103  - 85  +  318 
C. Increase(+) or decrease(-) in Central Bank 
balances:  - 103  - 85  +  318 
ot  which: 1) Minimum reserve balances (including 
11  M 
11 
accounts)  -100  - 57  +  288 
2) Free balances  - 3  - 28  +  30 
1 In  contrast to  the description of bank liquidity given in sec. 5,  page 159,  the figures in this table 
only relate to the banks' balances with the Banca d'Italia. 
Source: Annual Report of the Banca d'ltalia 1960 , Table Q 5.  163 164 
CHAPTER  1 
REFINANCING  POLICY 
8.  Rediscount credit from  the Central Bank is of little importanae in Italy, 
if the rediscounting of Storage Agency Bills for agricultural products (portafoglio 
ammassi) is left out of account 1•  The banks prefer advances against securities ; 
the  nominal rates  of interest for discounts and for  advances against securities 
are usually the same (at present3.5%) and the latter, unlike rediscounted bills, 
can be repaid at any time, if the liquidity position permits. 
9.  _At  the  end of 1960, when the  Banca d'Italia held bills for  442 000 million 
lire, 437 000 million lire was accounted for by Storage Agency Bills (see Table 5, 
page 165), so that ordinary trade bills in the Central Bank's portfolio amounted 
to about 5 000 million lire. By contrast, the Bank's advances against securities 
at the same date totalled 64 000 million lire, of which 61 000 million lire repre-
sented  loans  to  banks  and  3 000  million  lire  loans  to  the  non-banking sector. 
However, the importance of trade bills as credit instruments in Italy cannot be 
judged by  the Central Bank's portfolio,  but only  by  the holdings  of the banks. 
The  combined  balance-sheet  for  all  the  banks  (aziende  di  credito) recorded 
2 316 000  million  lire  of  ordinary  trade  bills  held  at  the  end  of  1960.  These 
banks  held Storage Agency Bills for  only  103 000 million lire.  The majority of 
these bills are held by the Central Bank. 
a) Terms  for  refinance credit 
10.  The  Banca  d'ltalia  grants  the  credit institutions  short-term  credit  for  a 
maximum  duration of 4  months  by  rediscounting trade and Treasury bills  or by 
making  advances  against  securities.  It  may  discount  trade  bills  only  for  the 
credit institutions.  On  the  other hand advances against securities may also be 
made  to  business  enterprises  and  individuals,  though,  as  has  already  been 
pointed out, this occurs only on a  small scale. 
Under  the  law  establishing  the  Banca  d'Italia,  bills presented for dis-
count must bear at least two signatures of persons known to be solvent and the 
bills  themselves  must  be  payable at a  centre where  the  Banca d'ltalia  or  its 
correspondents have a  branch or other office. For advances against security the 
rule is  that the advance must not exceed 85%  of the value  of the securities or 
goods  pledged. 
1 These bills are issued by  the Storage Agencies; if they are not used to finance transactions in 
goods  but  only  to  offset losses incurred in that class of business which are finally  borne by the 















Table  5 
REDISCOUNT  CREDITS  AND  ADVANCES  AGAINST  SECURITY  BY  THE  BANCA  D'ITALIA 
TO  CREDIT  INSTITUTIONS,  BUSINESS  ENTERPRISES  AND  INDIVIDUALS 
Rediscounts by Banca d'ltalia in favour of banks 
Advances against securities by the Banca d'ltalia to:  (including special credit institutions) 
Ordinary 
Storage 
Treasury  Total 
Special  Enterprises 
Total 
in '000 million lire 
Total 
(4 + 8)  Agency  Banks  credit  and  trade bills  Bills  bills  (1 to 3)  institutions  individuals  (5 to 7) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
~ 
27.2  152.3  1.6  181.1  71.8  0.4  17.2  89.4  270.5 
16.6  151.6  0.1  168.3  73.2  0.7  18.9  92.8  261.1 
12.5  180.9  2.5  195.9  104.9  0.5  16.9  122.3  318.2 
12.2  237.8  0.1  250.1  95.3  0.8  16.3  112.4  362.5 
24.0  290.3  0.1  314.4  77.1  0.4  14.3  91.8  406.2 
7.2  318.4  0.1  325.7  70.9  0.3  11.6  82.8  408.5 
25.4  396.5  0.1  422.0  97.9  0.3  9.0  107.2  529.2 
20.5  379.7  - 400.2  73.9  0.4  7.2  81.5  481.7 
3.5  382.6  0.1  386.2  28.7  0.4  4.8  33.9  420.1 
2.9  427.3  0.1  430.3  42.8  0.2  3.2  46.2  476.5 
4.9  437.4  0.2  442.5  61.1  0.3  2.8  64.2  506.7 
Source: Bollettino of the Banca d'Italia  • 
..... 
0"\ 
'"" 11.  No limit is set to the  Banca d'Italia's refinancing. Contrary to practice in 
other countries, the Central Bank has not set every bank a  ceiling, up to which 
it can draw discount credit or obtain advances. But this does not mean that the 
banks can automatically obtain unlimited credit from  the Central Bank. Generally 
the Banca d'Italia makes the  granting of credit to a  bank dependent on its main-
taining a  certain ratio between the volume of its rediscounts and  advances  from 
the Central Bank on  the  one hand and its  deposit liabilities on  the  other. The 
Central Bank also takes into account the general trend of bank liquidity. 
b) Efficacy of refinancing policy 
12.  The discount rate of the  Banca d'Italia has been changed only four times 
since  1947, whereas  during the same period the  dis.count rate of the  Banque de 
France was changed 17 times  and that of the Deutsche Bundesbank as many as 
24  times.  It  is  particularly  noteworthy  that  the  Italian  bank  rate  remained 
unchanged  for  a  period  of  eight years  (1950  to  1958).  Since  1951  the  interest 
rate on advances against security has coincided with the Central Bank's discount 
rate.  Previously the rate for advances  sometimes differed from  Bank rate  by as 
much as 1%. 
13.  There is a  relationship between the Banca d'Italia's discount rate and the 
minimum interest rates  for  bank advances, which are stipulated for  the different 
types  of  credit  in  an  inter-bank agreement.  Since  the  banks  generally  exceed 
these  minimum  rates,  and as  they  have  little  recourse  to  central  bank credit, 
changes in bank rate do not necessarily affect the actual lending rates~ i.e.  the 
cost of credit to the final borrower. 
As  a  rule  the raising or lowering of Bank rate  - which is nearly always 
followed by a  corresponding change in interest rates on advances Treasury bills, 
and on the compulsory reserves - does •not so much exert a  direct  influence  on 
the  lending rates  of  banks  as  modify  their general attitude.  They  regard such 
measures  as  an official indication  of changed  conditions  on  the  money  market 
and seek to adapt their business policy - in particular the extending of credit -
accordingly. 
An indirect effect of changes in Bank rate  on the rates charged by banks 
to borrowers  in  some cases results  from  changes  in interest rates  on deposits. 
Although  the  latter rates, which are also laid down  - in this case as maximum 
rates - in an inter-bank agreement, are not tied to Bank rate, they are renewed 
and sometimes altered following a  change in Bank rate. Such changes are usually 
made when the raising or lowering of Bank rate is coupled with a  corresponding 
change  in  interest  rates  on  short  and  medium-term  Treasury  paper  and  when 
otherwise  the relationship between deposit rates and Treasury bill rates would 
be  disturbed.  The  effect of the  change  in deposit rates  on  bank earnings  will 
then  have  repercussions,  to  some  extent,  on  the  rates  charged  by  banks  to 
166  borrowers. CHAPTER  2 
OPEN  -MARKET  POLICY 
14.  Although  under  its  statute  the  Banca  d'Italia  is  empowered  to  buy and 
sell Treasury  bills  and  government  and  government-guaranteed  bonds,  it does 
not  systematically  use  this  right  to  conduct an  effective  open-market  policy  .. 
It has in its  portfolio scarcely any suitable securities, such as Treasury bills, 
for  such operations. Moreover, in Italy there is no money· market similar to that 
of  other  countries  on  which  the  banks'  supply  of  and  demand  for  short-term 
credit can  be  balanced.  The  Italian money  market  is  almost entirely an inter-
bank market and its interest rates seldom change. 
15.  The  Treasury  whose  issues  on  the  money and capital markets  influence 
the liquidity of banks and of the economy as a  whole, only occasionally carries 
out operations for purposes of open-market policy, as for example when it issued 
medium-term  Treasury  bonds  (Buoni  del  tesoro  poliennali,  with  a  life  of  7  or 
9 years) in 1959. On  that occasion the Treasury drew some 300 000 million lire, 
which was chiefly the result of foreign exchange surpluses in that year, from the 
market and immobilized this liquidity in accounts at the Central Bank. 
In general, however, the  Treasury's  intervention on the money and capital 
markets cannot be considered as  open-market operations comparable with those 
of other countries. This is a  result of the special situation of the Italian credit 
system  and  of  the  Treasury's  debt  policy.  Thus  for  example  Treasury  bills 
(Buoni del tesoro ordinari - with currency periods  1  to 12 months) are usually 
issued on tap;  in the past the  interest rates  for  these bills have always, with 
one exception, been changed at the same time as the Banca  d'Italia's  discount 
rate. Since May  1952 the nominal rate for  12-month Treasury bills has coincided 
with  the  discount  rate;  since  the  rate  on  Treasury  bills  is  a  discount,  the 
effective  yield is higher  - 3.63%  as  compared with  a  nominal rate  of 3.5% at 
present on 12-month Treasury bills. The Treasury bills in circulation (end-1960 
1 769 000  million lire) are held mainly  by  the  banks  (1 592 000 million lire) but 
the  majority  (1350 000  million  lire)  are  held  in  conformity  with  compulsory 
reserve  obligations (1213 000 million lire) and other commitments  (137 000 mil-
lion  lire).  At  present the  Banca d'Italia  purchases  no Treasury  bills  from  the 
banks,  while  dealings  in  Treasury  bills  between  the  batiks are insignificant. 
16.  Swap transactions  (foreign exchange  against lire) between  the  Exchange 
Office  (Ufficio Italiano dei  Camhi)  and  the  banks  form  a  kind  of open-market 
operation.  The  banks  buy  spot currency  from  the  Exchange  Office and  sell it 
back  to  the  Office  forward.  They  use  the  spot  proceeds  for  foreign  currency  167 168 
credits to residents and non-residents, to increase their own holdings of foreign 
exchange  and  investments  on  foreign  money  markets  or  to  repay  advances 
obtained earlier from  foreign correspondents. 
Bank  liquidity  is  partly  frozen  by  the  purchase  of  foreign  exchange.  In 
the period from the autumn of 1959 to the end of January 1961 the banks purchased 
about  $491  million  of foreign  exchange  in  this  way  from  the' Exch'ange Office. 
The  effect was  to reduce  bank liquidity by  306 600 million  lire.  The  policy of 
swap  transactions  by  the  Exchange  Office  is  explained  by  the  efforts  of the 
Italian monetary authorities to induce the banks to reduce their net indebtedness 
abroad.  In  November  1959  this  amounted  to  $488  million,  but  by  the  end  of 
January  1961  the position had changed to a  net claim of $19 million. The large 
net indebtedness of the banks was due to the fact that they had been borrowing 
abroad  at  low  interest  rates  and  lending  the  foreign  currency  so obtained to 
residents at higher interest rates (especially to finance imports). CHAPTER  3 
MINIMUM  RESERVE  POLICY 
a) General 
17.  As long ago as 1926 a  regulation anticipating the present minimum reserve 
system was  introduced to protect the interests  of .savers and depositors.Under 
this  regulation the  banks  were  obliged; when customers'  deposits rose  to over 
twenty times the amount of their own capital and reserves, to place a  sum equal 
to the  excess  on interest-bearing deposit with  the  Central Bank. Alternatively 
they could invest this sum wholly or partly in fixed-interest government securities 
to be deposited with the Central Bank. 
In 1947 this arrangement was changed. Whereas previously the main object 
had  been  to  protect depositors,  the  new regulation  placed in  the  hands  of the 
Banca d'ltalia an instrument of monetary policy by which it could influence bank 
liquidity. This change was introduced by agreement with the banks. 
b) Credit institutions subject to minimum reserve obligations 
18.  The  minimum  reserve  regulation applies  to all credit institutions  except 
some  of  the  specialized  institutions.  It  first  applied  only  to  the  public  law 
credit institutions (Istituti di credito di diritto pubblico),  the  banks of national 
interest  (Banche  d' interesse  nazionale),  the  ordinary  credit  banks  (Banche  di 
credito ordinario) and  the  people's  banks  (Banche  popolari  cooperative). Since 
1  September  1958  it also applies  to  savings  banks  and  pawnbrokers  of  the 
first category (Casse di Risparmio e  Monti di I categoria  1), since for some years 
these  institutions have  dealt to an increasing extent in short-term credit.  The 
postal  Cheque  Offices,  on  the  other  hand,  are  not  subject  to  the  obligation 
because  their funds  are  in any case deposited with  the  Treasury.  The agricul-
tural credit institutions come  under a  special regulation. 
c) Calculation of minimum reserves 
19.  The calculation of minimum  reserve  is  based on  sight,  time and savings 
deposits. The minimum t:eserve ratio is the same for all classes of deposit and 
for  all banking centres. Inter-bank deposits are not subject to minimum reserve 
obligations.  There  is  a  special  ruling  for  the  lira  balances  of non-residents 
(see under f). 
1 See also footnote 1  on  page  157.  169 The  compulsory  minimum  reserve for  the  banks is calculated as follows: 
i)  20%  of deposits which on  30 September 1947 exceeded ten times the capital 
and reserves  of the  bank at that date,  but with  an  upper  limit  of 15%  of total 
deposits; 
ii)- 40%  of  the  increase  in  customers'  deposits  since  30  September  1947; if 
capital  and  reserves  have  increased,  a  sum  is  deducted  corresponding  to ten 
times the increase ; 
iii) under  the regulation valid until the end of 1961, the total minimum reserves 
were not to exceed 25%  of deposits (from 31  January 1962  22  ~%  see  sec.  27). 
Since, on the foregoing calculation, the maximum figure was soon reached, 
itmay be said that up to the end of 1961  the banks had to hold minimum reserves 
of  about  25%  of  customers'  deposits  and  from  January  1962  22 ~%.  For  the 
purposes of calculating the minimum reserve obligations, the capital and reserves 
of the banks mean their paid-up share or endowment capital together with ordinary 
and extraordinary reserves not earmarked for specific purposes. 
20.  The  minimum  reserve  ratio  for  savings  banks  and  first  category pawn-
brokers  is  only  20%  of  the  increase  in  customers'  deposits. The  reserves can 
be  deposited  with  the- Banca  d'Italia  or  the  central  credit institution  of  the 
Italian  savings  banks  (Istituto  di  credito  delle  Casse  di  Risparmio);  in  the 
latter  case  the  central  credit institution  mus~ deposit  half  the  reserves  with 
the Banca d'Italia and comply with certain provisions regarding the employment 
of the other half. 
Under legislation adopted in 1932  the agricultural banks (casse rurali ed 
artigiane) were required to invest a  minimum  of 10%  of their customers' deposits 
in Government  bonds  or  bonds  of the  special credit institutions and to deposit 
them with the Banca d'Italia or other authorized institutions. By a  1955 act the 
compulsory minimum  ratio for  agricu~tural banks  in the  form  of limited liability 
co-operative  societies  was  raised  from  10%  to  20%  of  customers'  deposits. 
21.  The minimum reserves to be held by the banks are calculated in the first 
half of each month on the basis of the deposits subject to the minimum reserve 
obligation held at the end of the previous month. As a  rule the banks bring their 
reserve  commitments  up to date during the  month  following  the  reference date. 
In the event of delay, the Banca d'Italia does not charge penalty rates of interest 
but defaulting  banks receive a  strongly-worded reminder.  The  banks  can place 
surplus  reserves  on  ordinary  accounts  with  the  bank  of  issue  at an interest 
rate of between 0.5% and 2%  (see page  159). 
d) Minimum reserve deposits ·and interest 
22.  The banks can discharge the minimum reserve obligation either by holding 
170  balances  on  an  account  or by  depositing  Treasury  bills  at the  Banca d'Italia. Although Treasury bills - the interest on which is paid by discount -yield more 
than  minimum  reserve  deposits  bearing interest at the  same rate (now  3.75%), 
but  credited at a later date, up to the beginning of 1960 about half the reserves 
took the form  of balances at the Central Bank. Subsequently the banks' holdings 
of  Treasury  bills  under  the  minimum  reserve  system  tended  to increase faster 
than their balances with the Central Bank (see Table 6). The interest on minimum 
reserve balances is also borne by the Treasury. 
23.  A  bank's  preference  for  one  type  of reserve  rather  than  another depends 
on its own situation and particularly on the size of its cash balances and hold-
ings of Treasury bills. Since the reserves can only be  drawn on in proportion to 
a  fall  in  deposits  and  Treasury  bills  must  reach  maturity before  they  can be 
encashed (because they cannot be rediscounted by the Central Bank), it is in the 
banks  interest to keep part of the  reserves  in balances at the  Banca d'Italia; 
they  can  when  necessary  draw  on  them  to  meet  commitments  and replace  the 
drawings by Treasury bills. They can also use this method ifthey needadditional 
cash but do not wish to have recourse to Central Bank credit, or if they wish to 
invest  surpluses.  The  depositing  of  Treasury  bills  and  reduction  of  Central 
Bank  balances  is  equivalent  to  mobilization  of  (free)  Treasury  bills  before 
maturity'· while  the  reverse  procedure enables  the  banks· to earn interest (now 
3. 75%) on their reserves without being tied to maturity dates. 
24.  Under  this  minimum  reserve  system the  Banca d'Italia can  buy  Treasury 
bills up to the extent of the minimum reserve balances held with it by the banks ; 
these  purchases are  made with due regard for  the Treasury's cash requirements 
and are  recorded under  "impieghi in titoli per con  to del tesoro"  on  the assets 
side  of the  balance-sheet  of  the  Banca d'Italia, the  corresponding item on the 
liabilities  side  being  the  minimum  reserve  balances  of  the  banks.  Whereas 
minimum  reserve  balances  stood at 508100, million lire at the  end of 1955 and 
676 500 million  lire at the. end  of 1960,  this  item on  the assets side showed a 
fall from  355 000 million lire at the end of 1955  to 20 000 million lire at the end 
of1960. 
e) Reserve obligation  for  bank drafts  in  circulation 
25.  A  similar rule  to that for  minimum  reserves  applies  to  outstanding bank 
drafts  (assegni  circolari).  Against  drafts  of  this  type  issued  the  banks  are 
required to deposit at the  Central Bank as security part of the funds  received, 
i.e. 40%  of the amount of the drafts in circulation. If, however, this exceeds the 
bank's capital and reserves, the full amount of the excess must be deposited at 
the Central Bank. In  1947 the obligatory cover for  bank drafts issued in excess 
of capital and reserves was reduced to 60%,  but in 1953 it was  again raised to 
100%. Since then the cover must be held in the form  of Treasury bills deposited 
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Source: Bollettino of the Banca d'Italia. 
Table  6 
MINIMUM  RESE RYES 
Balances at Central Bank 
Counterpart 
covered by  Others  Total 
investment in 
Treasury bills 
2  3  4 =  2 + 3 
345  155.5  500.5 
350  178.3  528.3 
350  186.3  536.3 
347  200.8  547.8 
345  200.2  545.2 
340  362.2  702.2 
330  382.5  712.5 
330  503.9  833.9 
325  445.0  770.0 
290  574.1  864.1 
234  676.0  910.0 
154  713.3  867.3 
128  635.0  763.0 
98  718.6  816.6 
74  636.2  710.2 
40  762.7  802.7 
20  656.5  676.5 
in '000 million lire 
As % of minimum reserves 
Total  Counterpart 
Minimum  Treasury  covered by  bills held  Others  reserves 
by banks  investment in 
Treasury bills 
5 =  1 +4  6 = 1:5  7 = 2:5  8 = 3:5 
1056.3  52.6  32.7  14.7 
1087.2  51.4  32.0  16.6 
1102.1  51.3  31.8  16.9 
1120.6  51.1  31.0  17.9 
1163.9  53.2  29.6  17.2 
1213.3  42.1  28.0  29.9 
1267.1  43.8  26.0  30.2 
1302.2  36.0  25.3  38.7 
1387.8  44.5  23.4  32.1 
1468.1  41.1  19.8  39.1 
1539.7  40.9  15.2  43.9 
1554.8  44.2  9.9  45.9 
1657.7  54.0  7.7  38.3 
1709.5  52.2  5.7  42.1 
1772.1  59.9  4.2  35.9 
1854.6  56.7  2.2  41.1 
1961.5  65.5  1.0  33.5 f)  Reserves for  non-residents' balances 
26.  In respect of the lire balances of non-residents  the  banks must keep 50% 
on deposit with the Banca d'ltalia on so-called "M"  accounts, earning 0,5% interest. 
g) Efficacy of the minimum reserve policy 
27.  The  Comitato interministeriale  per  i1  credito  e  per  i1  risparmio  (inter-
ministerial committee  for  credit and S!iVings) has  power to change the  minimum 
reserve. ratio.  But the first time it did this since the agreement was introduced 
in  1947  was  in January  1962,  when  the  ratio was  lowered  from  25%  to 22.5%. 
Before this reduction the actual ratio of minimum reserve balances and Treasury 
bills to customers' deposits at the banks 1  was about 23  - 24%. 
Assuming the  minimum  reserves ratios remain unchanged as was  the case 
from  1947 to end of 1961 bank liquidity is froze_n  only, when customers' deposits 
rise,  and  correspondingly  bank liquidity is released, when deposits fall.  Since 
1947  customers'  deposits  with  the  banks  have  steadily  increased.  Bank 1  de-
posits  subject  to  minimum  reserve  obligations  went  up  from  4 511900 million 
lire at the  end of 1956  to 8156 000 million lire at the end of 1960, while mini-
mum  reserve balances and Treasury bills held under the minimum reserve system 
rose from  1 056 300 million lire to 1883 500 million lire. 
28.  The  minimum  reserve  ratio  is  relatively  high  in  comparison  with  other 
countries (the Netherlands  6%  - 10%,  Germany 7%  - 20%),  particularly when it is 
remembered that this ratio is applied indiscriminately to sight, time and savings 
deposits. However, this high ratio does not seriously impair the  earning  capacity 
of  the  banks,  since  minimum  reserve  balances  and  Treasury  bills  at present 
earn  interest at  3.75%,  which  is  still  0.25%  higher  than  the  Banca d'Italia's 
discount rate and rate for advances against security. 
29.  The  effect  of  the  Italian  minimum  reserve  regulations  on  bank  liquidity 
cannot be measured only by the total size of the compulsory reserves. It depends 
much  more  on  the extent to which  the. banks  decide  to use  their Central Bank 
balances  or  their Treasury  bill holdings  to  bring  their reserves  into line with 
the minimum  reserve obligation whenever their customers' deposits rise or fall. 
The effect will also be determined by changes made by the banks, independently 
of changes in their customers'  deposits, in the  ratio between the  two  forms  of 
reserves {see sec. 23). 
This ratio lies  outside  the influence of  th~ Banca d'ltalia for  each bank 
can  itself determine  what  proportion  of  its  minimum  reserve  is  to  be  kept in 
what  form.  Furthermore,  it  should  be  remembered  that  purchases  of Treasury 
bills by the (:entral Bank in connection with the banks' minimum reserve balances 
1 Excluding savings banks and pawnbrokers.  173 174 
can swell bank liquidity, on  the assumption that the Treasury uses the proceeds 
from  the sale of these bills to the Central Bank for payments within the country. 
In  January  1962  the  minimum  reserve  ratio for  banks  (aziende di credito) 
was  changed for  the  first  time  since  1947.  It was  reduced  from  25%  to  22.5%. 
This measure released about 200 000 million lire of the banks' minimum reserves, 
so  that  bank  liquidity  (free  balances  and  free  Treasury  bills)  rose  by  that 
amount. CHAPTER  4 
CASH  MANAGEMENT  AND  BORROWING  OF  PUBLIC  AUTHORITIES 
AND  THEIR  EFFECTS  ON  LIQUIDITY 
30.  The  Banca  d'Italia is  the  fiscal agent of the  Treasury and  manages its 
accounts. The  most  recent  law of December 1960 entrusts these responsibilities 
to it until 31  December 1970, after which the authority must be renewed. 
The  Banca d'Italia  collects  all revenue  due  to  the  Treasury  and  makes 
payments on its behalf. Consequently the difference between the flow of income 
and that of expenditure influences bank liquidity. Income is particularly high on 
the  recurrent  tax  payment  dates.  Some  idea  of  the  magnitude  of  the  money 
movements on these dates can be formed from  the fact that, of the annual budget 
revenues  totalling  about  3 400 000  million  lire,  more  than  500 000  million  lire 
is  accounted  for  by  direct taxes  which  fall due  in  the  even-numbered months. 
During  these  months  and  particularly  at  the  middle  of  each  month  liquidity 
consequently falls by  about a  sixth of the above-mentioned sum (about 85 000 mil-
lion  lire).  Apart from  unimportant exceptions, other taxes are  collected contin-
uously throughout the year. 
31.  The local and regional authorities  generally keep their accounts with the 
banks ;  the  cash transactions  of individual budgetary authorities,  therefore,  do 
not  significantly affect the  liquidity of the  banking system as  a  whole.  These 
authorities  at the moment have an annual income  of the  order of 1100 000 mil-
lion  lire  and  expenditure  of  1 500 000  million  lire,  while  their  indebtedness 
stands  at about  1 500 000  million  lire.  The  State  contributes  to  their  finances 
. either  by  allotting  them  a  percentage  of  the  taxes  collected under  the  central 
government budget, on conditions which vary according to the type of authority, 
or by a  grant from  budget funds. 
Other public institutions (i.e. bodies  other than  the central,  regional and 
local authorities) which for  financial or administrative reasons have close ties 
with the government, keep their liquid funds at the Treasury (about 400 000 mil-
lion lire), while others (including the above-mentioned local and regional author-
ities)  which  have  less close  ties  with  the  State,  deposit their funds  with  the 
banks (about 700 000- 800 000 million lire). 
32.  The  Postal  Cheque  Offices  and  the  Post Office Savings  Banks  transfer 
their liquid funds  to the "Cassa depositi e  prestiti", an independent department 
of  the  Treasury,  which  lends  them on a  long-term basis to public institutions,  175 particularly local and regional authorities and co-operatives, and invests them 
in government or government-guaranteed securities; the remainder is kept at the 
Treasury  on  current  account.  The  Treasury , Postal  authorities  and  "Cassa 
depositi e  prestiti" are very closely linked administratively and financially and 
the  two last-named carry out their cash ttansactions through the  Central Bank. 
Consequently  the  effects  of  transactions  by  the  Postal  Authorities  and  the 
"Cassa  depositi  e  prestiti"  on  bank  liquidity are  about  the  same  as  those of 
transactions by the Treasury. 
At  the  end  of  December  1960  the  funds  held  by  the  Postal Authorities 
amounted  to  2 461 000  million  lire  (342 QOO  million  lire  savings'  deposits, 
i 723 000 million lire Postal Savings bonds (buoni fruttiferi) and 396 000  million 
lire  Postal  Cheque  deposits,  of  which  228 000  million  lire  were  from  public 
institutions). The deposits of the "Cassa depositi e  prestiti" with the Treasury 
stood at 1202 000 million lire. 
33.  Since the end of the  war the central government budget in Italy has con-
stantly  shown  a  deficit,  which  the  Treasury  has  financed  by  recourse  to  the 
.Central Bank and by issues of securities. 
The  Banca  d'ltalia  is  one  of  the  Treasury's  most  important  sources  of 
credit. Under Statutory Order No.  544 of 7  May  1947 the Central Bank may allow 
the  Treasury  cash  credit  up  to  15%  of  budget  expenditure  other  than  capital 
expenditure.  On  the  basis  of  current  expenditure  in  1960  of  3 185 000  million 
lire a  maximum  cash credit of about 475 000 million lire is at present available 
to the Treasury. If the debit balance on  the cash advance account exceeds the 
maximum,  the  Central  Bank must  inform  the  Minister  of the  Treasury.  Twenty 
days  after this  has  been done,  the  Banca d'Italia will make  no more  payments 
for  account of the Treasury until the debit balance on the account brought back 
within the 15%  limit. 
34.  As  will be seen from  Table 7,  the Treasury has  never yet taken up cash 
credits  up  to  the  ceiling  authorized  under  the  above-mentioned  order.  On  the 
contrary, in 1959, thanks to the particularly favourable  financial situation of the 
Treasury in that year, the cash credits wer~ even paid off. The Treasury has in 
any  case  other  means  of  recourse  to  the  Central  Bank  than  cash  credits, as 
Table  7  shows : 
Storage  Agency bills: The  financing of stocks is carried out through the 
rediscounting  of  bills  issued  by  the  Storage  Agencies  and  discounted  by  the 
credit institutions. At the beginning of every harvest season, the Storage  Agen-
cies finance  the harvest is  this  way.  The  balance  of the  debt is  borne  by the 
Treasury  and has its counterpart either in stocks  or  in the difference  between 
the proceeds of the sales and the higher prime costs. 
Foreign  currency  credits:  The  item  "Financing  of  the  Treasury  by  the 
Exchange Office"  shows  the  sales of foreign  currency  by  the  Exchange Office 
176  to the Treasury for  the financing of imports on Government account; this account Table  7 
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---
Debtor accounts 
>'l1  t:rl>·i 'l1  Ill  C)  ........  ...,  n  OQ  .....  H.,,....  B  0  ~.~  Ill  B::l  n  B  ::1  2 <  Ill 
::~Ill  :;rill  Ill  e.111 
n=  I»  Ill  ::1  a· a  a  rn  ::r 
'<c.  ~~  5·  c  =  n 
tl:l=  ;·g  a~  ~ 
...  OQ  B  OQ  Ill  ::1  e:  oe-o  ..  tl:l  =o  ...  B  ...  ur  Ill'""  ::::a  ....  Ill  ...  B  ...  fJl  ..... c  ;.  ..  Ill 
§  ~~B  <  B 
I»  e.  OQ 
B 
1  2  3  4  5 
1955  318  285  129  355  187 
1956  396  283  133  345  148 
1957  380  267  150  345  202 
1958  383  270  143  325  155 
1959  427  244  165  128  -
1960  437  202  175  20  -
-- -- -'----------





Ill  trl  1110  ...,  Q 
lllr:Jl  ..., 
e:l-H  g;.  0  n  c::  0  <  ...  E. 
::;  n  =  E. 
Ill  ..  0  B  Oe:l-
::1  I»  = ..  B 
§~  n  o  :a  ::1  Q..  ........  G  ~- e:  urg.  ..... 
ur~  I  I» 
::1  n  +  8  ,:j  '0  I»  n  0  ..... 
~  ..  8 
=· 
8  ::1  ... 
6  7  8  9  10  11 
567  6  1847  - 52  52 
567  8  '1879  - 35  35 
567  5  1916  - 43  43 
567  16  1859  - 35  35 
567  18  1549  162  44  206 
549  5  1388  159  38  197 
-·--·--- ---- ------ --
L__  ____ 
in '000 million lire 
For information 
z  .....  tl:l  Ill  tl:l 
~  ;~~  ::rill 
B  ::1 
n~~  B  n 
5'  ...  I»  t1l  <  Ill 
Q..  a~  a  8e:l- B 
c"  ..  .....  ...  . 
I»  ........  ::1  1»- ;  .-e_  ... Q.. ... 
tl:IBa  Q..  ;·  ::1  1»'8=  B  =rna  Ill  c" 
Ill  w::;·  Ill 
Ill  Iii" 




12  13  14 
1795  508  2471 
1844  500  2636 
1873  545  2841 
1824  769  3298 
1343  763  3 557 
1191  677  3652 is debited with the equivalent in lire of the sales of exchange, which is credited 
to the current account of the Exchange Office at the Central Bank. The balance 
on this special account represents a  liability of the Treasury. 
Government securities: The item "Government securities" partly consists 
of securities transferred from  the Treasury to the Exchange Office and from  the 
latter to the Central Bank to cover liabilities from  transactions similar to those 
mentioned above (Article 41  of the Statutes of the Banca d·'Italia). 
Treasury  bills  (minimum  reserves):  The  Central  Bank  buys  Treasury 
bills  on  the basis  of  the  minimum  reserve  balances held by  the  banks.  As al-
ready explained in section 24,  the Central Bank can purchase Treasury Bills up 
to  the  level  of  the  banks'  minimum  reserve  balances,  which  amounted  to 
677 000  million  lire  at the  end of  1960.  Independently  of  the  minimum  reserve 
rule  the  Banca  d'Italia  may,  under  Article  41  of its  statutes,  make unlimited 
purchases  of Treasury bills. 
Extraordinary  advances: The  extraordinary advances  owe  their  ortgtn to 
financing  carried  out during the  war  and  post-war  period  and  partly  represent 
the counterpart of the bank notes put into circulation by the Allied authorities dur-
ing the occupation. 
35.  A  further  important source of funds  for  the Treasury is the issue of short 
and  medium-term securities.  Fir~t place here goes to the Treasury bills held by 
the banks chiefly in conformity with the minimum reserve regulation. At the end 
of  1960  the  banks  held  a  total  of  1552 000  million  lire  in  Treasury  bills ; 
1285 000 million lire of this  consisted of Treasury bills earmarked as minimum 
reserves. 
The Treasury also finances  much  of  its requirements  by  issuing medium 
and  long-term loans  on the  capital market.  Here  the  most important issues are 
7  and  9-year  Treasury  bonds  (Buoni  del  tesoro  poliennali),  the  outstanding 
amount  of  which  amounted  at  the  end  of  1960  to  some  2 000 000  million lire. 
These  are bought mainly by  business  enterprises and individuals  (end of 1960 
about  1200 000  million  lire),  but  the  banks  also hold  a  considerable  amount 
(end-1960 about 540 000 million lire). 
In  general the Treasury issued its securtttes on the capital market in the 
light of its financial requirements. Before an issue is made the Treasury and the 
Banca  d'Italia discuss  the  size, timing and terms  of the  issue with particular 
reference  to  the  aspects  affecting  liquidity  policy.  In  exceptional  cases  the 
Trea~ury has also made issues for  purposes of open-market policy. For example, 
as  mentioned in section 15,  the Treasury issued a  loan of 300 000 million lire 
in 1959 for the sole purpose of withdrawing liquidity from  the market. 
36.  The  total effect of the Treasury's financial operations  on the liquidityof 
the  banks  and  of  the  economic  system in general  can  be  seen  from  the  debit 
and  credit  accounts  of  the  Treasury  with  the  Central  Bank.  It  has  already 
178  been pointed out that the Treasury's operations are almost exclusively designed to  meet  the  Government's  financial  requirements  and  are  only  seldom  carried 
out  for  purposes  of  monetary  policy.  There  has  been  hardly  any  need  for  the 
Treasury to intervene in monetary policy, since Italy's general economic devel-
opment  has  not  been  disturbed  by  violent  fluctuations  of  the  business  trend 
since  the  stabilization  of  the  lira  in  1947  and  no  monetary  tension  has  been 
felt. 
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CHAPTER  5 
DIRECTIVES  ON  CREDIT  AND  LIQUIDITY 
37.  The  legislation  and  directives  on  banking  practice  impose  certain  re-
strictions  on  lending,  which  are  embodied  in  the  statutes  of  the  institutions 
concerned.  This  applies  particularly  to  the  savings  banks,  the  first  category 
pawnbrokers and the agricultural and craft credit institutions. 
The banking law also empowers the Interministerial Committee for savings 
and credit to lay down regulations on: 
i)  the  ratio  between  the  banks'  various  forms  of  lending  and  investment, 
either from  considerations of liquidity or from  the angle of the  business sectors 
to which the advances are made; 
ii)  the ratio between capital and reserves and commitments, and the investments 
by which  customers'  deposits  in excess of the amount determined by this ratio 
should be  covered ; 
iii) guarantees which must be furnished to avoid an accumulation of risks arising 
from the expansion of credit; 
iv)  the  obligation  to  obtain  the  Banca d'ltalia's  permission for  certain lending 
and  investment  transactions ; 
v)  the issue of bank drafts ("assegni circoJari"). 
38.  The  law  also provides  that the  Banca d'Italia can issue regulations on: 
i)  the  ratio  between  authorized  capital  and  investments  in  fixed  assets  and 
securities, 
ii)  Credit ceilings. 
The legislation and directives  further  provide that deposit banks  may not 
grant credits in excess of a  fifth of their capital and reserves without first ob-
taining the authorization of the Banca d'Italia and that shares may be purchased 
for  account  of  customers  only.  Investments  in  bonds,  on  the  other  hand,  are 
permissible. Part five 
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184 INTRODUCTORY  REMARKS 
1.  In their monetary policy the Belgian authorities  make use mainly of discount 
policy; open-market policy has so far been of less significance. Since the begin-
ning  of  this  year  the  mof!_etary  authorities  have  also  had  at  their  disposal a 
m1mmum  reserve  system.  It is  a  feature  of  Belgian  monetary  policy  that  two 
institutions  - the  Fonds  des  rentes  (Securities  Stabilization  Fund)  for  open-
market operations and the Institut de  reescompte et de  garantie (Rediscount and 
Guarantee  Institute)  for  part  of  the  discount  business  - to  some  extent take 
precedence of the Central Bank. 
Belgian  monetary  policy  and  the  way  in  which  it  is  conducted  by  the 
appropriate  authorities  will  be  better  understood  if the  following  factors  are 
borne in mind: foreign  payments transactions are of relatively greaterimportance 
than  in some  other EEC Member  States; the  note  and coin circulation is high ; 
the  national  budget has  been in deficit for  ~any years;  ther~ is a  multiplicity 
of  authorities  competent  for  monetary  policy  (Treasury,  Banque  nationale  de 
Belgique,  Commission  bancaire  and  the  Fonds  des  rentes,  managed, however, 
by  the Treasury and the Central Bank) 
a) Liquidity of the economy 
2.  In  its  analyses  the  Banque  nationale  de  Belgique  sets  out  not  only the 
total  notes  and  coin in circulation  and  sight deposits,  but also,  as  is done  in 
the  Netherlands,  certain  other  claims  on  money-creating  institutionsl  and  on 
savings banks; these are referred to as near-money(liquidites quasi-monetaires). 
Apart  from  cash and sight  deposits  of firms  and  individuals with  money-
creating  institutions,  the  domestic  money  supply  includes  the  public  sector's 
sight deposits  (Treasury balances  with  the  Postal Cheque  Office  and holdings 
of local authorities, mainly with the "Credit communal"). 
"Near-money" includes  savings  accounts,  time  deposits  and  foreign  ex-
change  balances  of residents at banks, savings deposits and balances with the 
Caisse generale d'epargne et de  retraite (General Savings  and  Pensions Fund), 
and savings deposits for a  term of less than  two years with the  private savings 
banks. 
1  These include:  Ban  que nationale de Belgique,  Fonds momhaire beige (which issues  coin only), 
the  commercial  banks (banques  de  depots),  Credit  communal,  Caisse nationale de  credit profes-
sionnel and the  Postal Cheque Office.  185 3.  In  its  monthly  "Bulletin"  the  Banque  nationale de  Belgique  publishesra, 
table  on  the  composition  and  distribution  of  the  money  supply  (see  Table 1). 
In its annual  report  the  Bank  further  shows  the  composition  of  the near-money 
held  at the  banks  and savings  banks  (see  Table  2).  It will be  seen from  this 
table that savings deposits with the  savings banks constitute by far the greater 
part of this near-money (70% in September 1961). Since the  Treasury's short-term 
securities are held almost exclusively by the  banks and certain other financial 
institutions, they are not included in the calculation of overall liquidity. 
On  the  basis  of the  quarterly  consolidated  balance-sheet of· the  money-
creating  institutions  the  Banque  nationale  de  Belgique  publishes  a  quarterly 
table  on  the  factors  determining  changes  in  domestic  liquidity  (that is  to say 
including near-money but  excluding deposits  kept with  the  General Savings and 
Pension  Fund  and  the  private  savings  banks).  This  survey  is  reproduced as 
Table 3. 
Th'e  following  are  the  main  factors  quoted  as  determining  domestic  liq-
uidity:  the  granting  of  credit  to  firms  and  individuals,  advances  to  public 
authorities,  transactions  with  foreign  countries  (excluding  the  capital  trans-
actions of the public sector) and the creation of liquidity through the realization 
of  public  securities.  The  public  sector's  capital  transactions  with  foreign 
countries  and  credits  granted by  the  banks  are  shown in this survey under the 
heading " monetary financing  of the  public authorities '. 
b)  Bank liquidity 
4.  In  contrast to  the  Nederlandsche  Bank and the  Deutsche  Bundesbank the 
Banque  nationale  de  Belgique  does  not,  in  its  analyses,  publish  tables  on 
changes in bank  liquidity and  on  the  factors  determining  it. Nevertheless it is 
possible,  with  the  help  of  the  balance-sheets  of  the  Banque  nationale  and the 
commercial  banks  and  of  the  annual  Report  of  the  Banking  Commission  to 
picture  the  trend of bank  liquidity and  the  relative  significance  of the  various 
determinant  factors. 
Liquid cash  holdings,  which  consist of cash in hand,  money at call and 
deposits  with  the  Banque  nationale de  Belgique, the  Postal Cheque  Office and 
the  Caisse  nationale de  credit professionnel,  are  relatively low.  Between the 
end of 1957 and the end of 1960 the holdings of the banks averaged 4~%  of the 
balance-sheets total.  The cash ratio system (coefficient de tresorerie, see page 
32)  required  the  banks .to  maintain  a  certain cash liquidity in relation to their 
liabilities. 
5.  The  "potential liquidity"  of the  Belgian  banks  consists  largely of com-
mercial  bills  and  bank  acceptances  rediscountable  with  the  Central  Bank  or 
186  the  Rediscount and  Guarantee  Institute.  For years  the  banks'  holdings  abroad Table 1 
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End of year  1  2  3  4  5 
1957  5,4  112.7  115.5  6.4  0.9 
1958  5.5  117.4  120.3  7.2  0.5 
1959  5.6.  118.3  121.3  7.6  0.5 
1960  5.8  124.1  126.8  7.3  0.7 
1961  6.0  129.1  132.2  10.0  0.6 
1  Less holdings of money-creating credit institutions. 
2 Including semi-public administrations and balances of Congo residents. 
3 Mainly with the Credit communal. 
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8  9  = 4+8  10 = 3 + 9  11=3:10 
76.1  82.5  198.0  58.3 
82.0  89.2  209.5  57.4 
87.4  95.0  216.3  56.1 
86.3  93.6  220.4  57.5 
95.2  105.2  237.4  55.7 
4  This includes commercial banks (banques de depots) and two special credit institutions: Credit communal and Caisse nationale de credit professionnel. 
Source: Bulletin d'information et de documentation de Ia Banque  nationale  de  Belgique (Table XIII- 4)  • 
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Table  2 
NEAR-MONEY 
(secondary liquidity) 
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5  6  7 = 1·6 
66.8  17.6  111.2 
75.2  20.1  125.9 
82.2  23.5  142.0 
85.8  25.8  153.7 
69.9  19.2  119.1 
77.3  22.3  134.2 
81.9  25.0  148.9 
86.7 5  28.2  164.4 5 
1 Balances of Belgian, Luxembourg and Congo residents. 
2  Balances  of institutional  investors  (soci«hes  financieres)  with  banks  are  only  included  from 
1958 onwards. 
3 Savings and current account. 
4 Savings and deposit accounts. 
5  Provisional figure. 
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realisable  at  short notice  have  been  smalL  As  a  rule,  the  banks  are  even in 
net  debt  on  their  short-term  transactions  with  foreign  countries;  from  1953  to 
1960 their net debtor position fluctuated from  about Bfrs  2 500  million to nearly 
7 000  million.  Apart  from  commercial  bills  and bank acceptances much  of "po-
tential  liquidity"  consists  of Treasury and Fonds des  rentes paper.  These are 
mobilizable at the  Central  Bank, but the system of banking ratios (coefficients 
bancaires)  - which  has  been  in  existence  since  1946  but  was  considerably 
modified in 1962 (see page 209) - means  that a  relatively large  part of them is 
frozen,  so that,  from  the  point of view of the  banks  as  a  whole,  they can only 
to a  limited extent be regarded as "potential liquidity". 
The  following  are  the  principal  factors  determining  changes  in  bank 
liquidity: 
i)  'changes .in the note and coin circulation 
ii)  net changes in the foreign assets of the Central Bank 
iii) net transactions of the Government with the Central Bank 
iv) net transactions of the Fonds des rentes with the  Central Bank. 
6.  In  the  past,  the  Banque  nationale de  Belgique has  made  much  less use, 
in  its  credit  policy,  of  measures  exerting  a  quantitative  and  direct influence 
on  bank  liquidity  than  has  been  the  case in  the  Federal Republic  of Germany 
or  the Netherlands. Until the end of 1961  there  was  no minimum  reserve system 
of  the  classic  type,  nor  could it very  well have  existed alongside  th~ system 
of banking ratios.  In the course of a  reform,  the  salient points  of which will be 
described  below,  such  a  system  has  now  been introduced.  Open-market policy 
is, in tum, not  conducted by  the Central Bank itself but by  a  special fund,  the 
Fonds  des  rentes,  on  whose  business  policy  the  Central  Bank  however exerts 
some  influence.  The  Central Bank's  powers  for  influencing the  credit business 
of  the  banks  have  therefore  largely  depended  on  its  refinancing  and discount 
terms.  The  provisions  on  banking  ratios  - which,  it is  true,  have  meanwhile 
been  changed  - play  an  important  part,  certainly  so  far  as  the  lending and 
investment operations of the banks are concerned. 
The following chapters deal first with the rediscount policy of the Banque 
nationale  de  Belgique  and  then  with  the  open-market  policy  conducted  by the 
Fonds  des  rentes in conjunction with  the  Central  Bank.  Part of this  chapter is 
devoted  to  the  structure  of and operations  on  the  money market.  Then follows 
a  chapter  on  the  system  of banking ratios  as it has  been in force  so far, with 
a  supplementary  explanation  of the  newly introduced minimum  reserve  system. 
The  concluding chapter will  be  on  the effects on  liquidity of relations between 
the  public authorities and the Central Bank. CHAPTER  1 
REFINANCING  POLICY 
7.  The banks call upon the credit of the  Ban  que nationale de Belgique either 
directly by rediscounting  commercial bills  or,  to  a  lesser degree,  by obtaining 
current account advances  against public securities, or by  applying to a  special 
institution,  the  Institut  de  reescompte  et de  garantie  (IRG)  for  rediscounts, 
especially of bank acceptances; this institution can in turn obtain finance from 
the  Central  Bank.  As  a  rule,  the  banks  have  been  compelled to obtain finance 
by rediscounting because of the relatively high ratio of note and coin circulation 
to  the  money  supply  (56%  at  the  end  of  1961) and  of  the  system  of banking 
ratios; in their credit business  they therefore attach considerable importance to 
rediscountable  credits based on  the drawing of a  bill of exchange.  At any rate, 
commercial bills and bank acceptances play an important part in Belgian credit 
business.  There is a  limit on  the  rediscounting of Treasury paper because,  as 
has  been  mentioned  above,  the  greater part of  the  banks' holdings  of Treasury 
paper is frozen - in practice, if not in theory - by the system of banking ratios. 
If necessary the banks can, however,  obtain advances against public securities 
from  the  Banque  nationale  de  Belgique,  generally  up  to  95 % of  the  nominal 
value of the securities pledged, but in some instances only up to 80 %. 
a)  Conditions  for  discount credit 
8.  The acceptance  of bills for  discount is subject to qualitative conditions, 
some  of which are contained in the  ~tatute of the  Banque nationale de  Belgique 
and  some  of  which  it  has  itself  laid  down.  Moreover,  there  are  quantitative 
limitations implied in the system of rediscount ceilings. 
aa) Qualitative conditions 
Under  Article  17 of the statutes of  the  Banque  nationale  de  Belgique the 
Bank  may  discount  bills  or  other  paper  which  serve  to  finance  trade.  Under 
Article  19  such  commercial  papers  must  be  within  120  days  of  maturity and 
bear three signatures known to be sound ; however, one signature may be replaced 
by  a  pledge  (of securities or goods).  Under Article 19(2) of the statutes certain 
bills  may  be  accepted  for  rediscount  bearing  only  two  signatures.  The Bank 
itself  lays  down  other  rediscount  conditions  concerning  the  type  and quality 
of  the  bills  offered  to  it. To  promote  foreign  trade  it has  since  February 1945  191 applied  a  special procedure  for  rediscounting  export  and  import  bills  and has 
frequently changed its conditions. 
Also,  it  is  the  aim  of  the  interest  policy  of  the  Banque  nationale  de 
Belgique, by applying differential rates for discount and advances on securities, 
to  exert  a  selective  effect on the  transactions  it is  prepared  to refinance. The 
following  table shows the rates applied since 18 January 1962; it may be noted 
that a  differentiation between rates of discount for  import and export transactions 
was introduced for the first time since 1951 on 10 November 1960. 
RATES  FOR  DISCOUNT  AND  ADVANCES  ON  SECURITIES 
APPLIED  BY  THE  BANQUE  NATIONALE  DE  BELGIQUE 
Percentages 
on  from  from 
31.12.1960  24.8.1961  28.12.1961 
Discount credits 
Acceptances domiciled with banks, ware-
house receipts  5.00  4.75  4.50 
Bank acceptances previously certified by 
the Banque nationale de Belgique : 
Imports  5.00  4.75  4.50 
Exports  4.00  3.75  3.50 
Acceptances without domicile visa  5.50  5.25  5.00 
Non-accepted bills with domicile visa  5.75  5.50  5.25 
Non-accepted bills  without domicile visa  6.25  6.00  5.75 









Treasury certificates  and certificates of  rate of certificates + 5/16% 
the Fonds des rentes of up  to  366  days 
(limit 95 'to)  minimum rate 2 1/4  % 
Other public securities 1  (limit 80 %)  6.25  6.00  5.75  5.50 
1  Only public securities  and  bills (bearer securities) expressed  in Belgian francs are accepted as 
192  cover. 9.  The  policy  pursued· by  the  Banque  nation  ale  de  Belgique  in  financing 
internal trade  can be described as a  policy of "admissible maturity dates".  The 
statutes of the Central Bank authorize it to accept bills for discount which have 
no  more  than  120 days to  run,  which does  not necessarily exclude bills drawn 
initially for  longer  periods.  For many yeat's, however, the  Bank has  discounted 
no  bills  of  longer than  120 days'  tenor.  Until recently it even fixed maximum 
periods according to the type of goods the sale of which the bil'l was 'to finance. 
At present the bank is a 'little less rigid in this respect but continues to refuse 
bills drawn between companies whose interests are too closely linked. 
Nor  will  the  Banque  nationale de  Belgique  rediscount  any 'promissory 
notes  for  banks  which  serve to  mobilize cash credits  or, since  1939,  any bills 
drawn to finance hire purchase. 
In  the hands of the  Central Bank the  fixing of qualitative conditions is an 
instrument which can be easily adapted to  cir:cumstances and enables the Bank 
to exert a direct influence on  the supply of credit. 
bb)  Rediscount  ceilings 
10.  Apart  from  setting  qualitative  rediscount  conditions  it  is  open  to the 
Banque  nationale de  Belgique  to influence  bank  guidance credit by  fixing  re-
discount  ceilings.  It has  laid  down  for  its  own  use  a  rediscount  ceiling for 
each  bank.  These  ceilings  are  not  officially  made  known  to  the  banks  and 
they  have  never  been  of any practical  significance,  as  for  instance  in France 
or the Federal Republic of Germany. 
If the  Banque  nationale  de  Belgique  feels  that  the  banks  have  too large 
a  bill portfolio, it prefers the method of "moral suasion".  In Belgium rediscount 
ceilings  are  of greater  importance  as  an influence  on  bank  management rather 
than  as  an  instrument  of  credit  policy.  In  practice,  the  Bank  has  never  yet 
refused  to  rediscount bills  which  met its qualitative  conditions.  Moreover,  the 
ceilings fixed have so far been reached only in exceptional cases. 
11.  The  following  procedure  has  been  laid down  for  the  fixing  of rediscount 
ceilings:  in the  case  of bills which  serve to finance  business in  Belgium, the 
banks  are  authorized  to  call upon  the  Banque  nationale  de  Belgique  up  to an 
amount  not  exceeding double  their  own  capital and reserves.  Another maximum 
rate  (two and a  half times  the  bank's own capital and reserves) has  been fixed 
for  bills  - especially those to finance  foreign  trade  - which  the  Central Bank 
merely certifies (see sec.12). 
Purely  Belgian  bills  may  be  discounted  direct  by  the  banks  with  the 
Banque nationale de  Belgique, whereas bank acceptances which serve to finance 
foreign  trade  are  handled  via  the  Institut  de  reescompte  et de  garantie which 
only  endorses  these bills and  passes them  on  to  the  Central  Bank if it cannot  193 find  sufficient  day-to-day money.  These  bank  acceptances  are  included  in the 
maximum  amount  allocated  to  each  bank  in  respect  of  bills  for  foreign  trade 
transactions. 
b)  The role of the lnstitut de  reescompte et de  garantie (IRG) 
12.  This  institution was  founded  in  1935  for  the  purpose  of mobilizing  bank 
. credits up to a  term of two  years. It was to work as a  sort of sluice-gate between 
the Central Bank and the  commercial banks and to support the latter in financing 
transactions  for  which  rediscounting  with  the  Central  Bank  is  not  possible 
because  of their long term. The  Institute  in turn obtains its finance  by taking 
up  short-term  credits  in  the  money  market  (see  page  195)  and  by obtaining 
rediscount  from  the  Banque  nationale  de  Belgique  for  bills  with  a  residual 
period to maturity of up  to  120 days.  The  Bfrs.  600 million  capital of the Insti-
tute  was  subscribed by  the  major  Belgian  commercial banks.  The Belgian State 
has guaranteed the  Institute's  liabilities up to Bfrs. 12 000 million. 
The  importance  of  this  Institute  has  grown  since  the  Banque  nationale 
de  Belgique began, in 1945, to give an assurance of rediscount for  bank accept-
ances  and  commercial  bills  relating  to  foreign  transactions  up  to  a  certain 
ceiling, which it fixes for each bank. In order to obtain an assurance of rediscount 
from  the  Central Bank, exporters and importers must submit to it for  examination 
the  bills  they have drawn  - mainly on  Belgian  commercial banks  and accepted 
by the latter. This enables the Banque nationale de Belgique to determine which 
export  and  import  transac dons  it  is  prepared  to  finance  and  what  period to 
maturity individual acceptance credits can have.  If the conditions  for privileged 
financing  of a  foreign  trade  transaction are fulfilled, the  Central Bank endorses 
the  bank acceptance with its visa, thus creating a 
11  certified bank acceptance 
11
• 
13.  Such a  visa confers  two advantages.  In  the  first  place it makes  the  bank 
acceptance  rediscountable  with  the  Banque  nationale  de  Belgique,  albeit only 
when its residual period to maturity  do~s not exceed  120 days.  More  important, 
howeve.r,  is  the  further  advantage  conferred  by  the  visa  that  the  bill  can be 
rediscounted  with  the  Institut  de  reescompte  et  de  garantie  at  an  especially 
favourable  rate,  which  for  short-term acceptances, lies below the  discount rate 
of the Central Bank. 
Since, as a  rule, bank acceptances have lengthy maturities which may run 
to  two years, the advantage conferred by the visa is considerable. As  a  result, 
a  special  market  has  grown  up  in  these  bank  acceptances,  in  which  the IRG 
plays  an  important. part.  Since  its  own  funds  are  not  sufficient  to  finance  the 
purchase  of acceptances,  the  Institute  <;>btains  finance  by  taking  up short-term 
credits on  the  money market,  thereby effecting a  capital conversion because its 
investments in certified bank acceptances have a  longer period to maturity. One 
of  the  principal  suppliers  of  money  for  this  purpose  is  the  Caisse  generale 
194  d'epargne  et  de  retraite,  which  in  1960  provided  about  Bfrs.  1000  million in day-to-day  money.  Table  4  below  shows  how  the  bill portfolio of the Institute 
is financed. 
Table  4 
VOLUME  AND  FINANCING  OF  THE  BILL  PORTFO,LIO 
OF  THE  INSTITUT  DE  REESCOMPTE  ET  DE  GARANTIE 1 
(Bfrs. million) 
Call money credits 
Rediscount with the 
Banque nationale  Bill portfolio  Year  taken up  de Belgique 
1  2  3 
1953  2842  755  2 566 
1954  2733  1414  2 513 
1955  2540  1589  2344 
1956  2602  615  2261 
1957  2 514  2579  1891 
1958  2504  195  2 583 
1959  2981  560  2 521 
1960  3001  380  3173 
1961  3014  357  3316 
1  The figures  in  columns  1  and  2  are not comparable with those in column 3. The fotmer represent 
averages calculated on data available for each working day. The third contains an average calculated 
from  end-of-month figures.  The amounts in that column are lower because some of the bill holdings of 
the IRG have usually been rediscounted at the end of the month. 
Source: Banque nationale de Belgique. 
This  table shows that the Institute's ability to call on the  money market 
has fluctuated greatly so that it has be.en compelled to draw more or less heavily 
on  the  Central  Bank  according  to  the  liquidity  situation  in the  money market. 
Since  the  reform  of  the  money  market  in  November  1957  the  Institut de 
reescompte et de  garantie  markedly  fewer calls on  the  Central Bank for credit. 
This may be  partly due. to the  fact that the  Fonds des rentes has ceased taking 
up call money as a  regular practice but has even  been supplying large sums of 
call money since its financing has been assured by placing its certificates with 
the  banks  - until the  end of 1961  in part-coverage of their sight deposits (see 
page  202).  For this reason the Institute was  able in 1959 and 1960, to take up 
more call money. 
The  main reason is, however,  to be found  in  the  high degree of liquidity 
in the  Belgian  economy and of the  banks  during  the recession  of 1958  and the 
subsequent years.  195 14.  Apart  from  the  business  it  transacts  on  its  own  behalf the  Institut de 
reescompte et de garantie is also, and to an increasing degree, becoming an agent 
for  the  placing of  certified bank  acceptances.  Belgian and ·Luxembourg banks 
and  some  credit institutions  under  public  law  as well as  the  Caisse generale 
d'epargne  et de retraite,  to  which reference has  just been made,  take  these up 
when  they  seek  an  interest-bearing  investment  for  their  liquid  funds.  This 
agency business has greatly expanded over the past years. In 1953 the Institute 
arranged for  the purchase of bank acceptances to an amount of Bfrs. 300 million; 
in 1959 the figure was Bfrs. 7 200 million and in 1960 8 700 million. · 
The  distribution  of  bank  acceptances  (including  Bfrs.  9 700  million  cer-
tified)  amongst  the  various  groups  of  institutions  at  the  end' of  1961  was  as 
follows: 
Bfrs. 2 400 million with the Ban  que nationale de Belgique 
Bfrs. 3 000 million with the Institut de reescompte et de garantie 
Bfrs. 2 700 million with the commercial banks 
Bfrs. 6 200 million with institutions which are not in the true sense banks. 
c) Efficacy of refinancing policy 
15.  The  direct  influence  exerted  by  the  Banque  nationale  de  Belgique upon 
the  credit  business  of  the  commercial  banks  tbrough  its  discount  policy  is 
limited  in.  scope.  The  qualitative  discount  policy  of  the  Banque  nationale  de 
Belgique has so far had little if any effect on bank liquidity, and the rediscount 
quotas  have  never  really  been  operative,  so  that the  effect of discount policy 
has  largely been confined to influencing  the business trend through  changes in 
interest rates.  Until the end of 1961 some leading interest rates were in varying 
degree  tied to  the  discount  rate  of the  Banque  nationale  de  Belgique.  So long 
as  the  scope  for  open -market operations  was  slight and  there was  no minimum 
reserve  system,  this link  was of some ,importance  for  the  effectiveness of dis-
count policy. The various  reforms  of the  Fonds des rentes, which are de·scribed 
in the following chapter, and the introduction of a  minimum  re·serve  system made 
it possible and  even necessary to  loosen  this  tie,  in particular in the  case of 
rates  for  money  market ·securities,  and  to  make  intere·st  rates  more  dependent 
on market conditions as determined by supply and demand.  This is in particular 
true of the rate of interest for  ' B '  Treasury Certificates (see Table 7, page 206) 
·and  for  certificate·s  of  the  Fonds  des  rentes,  w~ch have  a  currency  of  four 
months and are issued by tender.  Furthermore, the  rate for  time  deposits, which 
had  hitherto  been  bound  to  bank  rate  by a  fixed  scale,  will  in  future  be laid 
down  by agreement between the  Banque  nationale de  Belgique  and  the  commer-
cial banks, in the light of the money market situation, movements in the balance 
of payments and the general economic situation. 
16.  There  are  other interest rates  which  are  not strictly linked to  Bank rate 
196  but  follow its movements more or less closely. Since  the  Institut de reescompte et de  garanti.e  may at any  time  need to 
call on the Central Bank for rediscount it must adapt its own rates to the move-
ments  of Bank rate. It is interesting to note that the Institute'·s rediscount rate 
for  bills with a  remaining period to maturity of up to 120 days is always  below 
the  discount  rate  of  the  Banque  nationale  de  Belgique,  so  that  the  Institute 
incurs  a  loss  of interest when  it take·s  up  bills  at these  lower rates  and re-
discounts them with the Central Bank.  This loss is, however, made good in the 
overall transaction by the Institute's having to pay only very low rates of inter-
est when taking up short-term credits in the money market. As will be seen from 
the diagram on page 198, the  call money rate is considerably below the discount 
rate. It must, however, be  pointed out that no comparison is possible between the 
movements  of the  call money rate before and after the  reform  of the  call money 
market in the autumn of 1959. 
On the basis of the position at 31  December 1961 the Institut de reescompte 
et de  garantie has  charged the following  bring  rate·s  for  certified bank a~cept­
ances,  Bank  rate  being  4~% with  a  preferential rate of 3 ~%  for  export bills : 
DEBTOR  INTEREST  RATES  CHARGED  BY  THE  IRG 
(for bills bearing the first signature ofa Belgian bank} 
Period to maturity 
120 days max. 
121 to 240 days 
241 to 365 days 
366  to 545 days 
546 to 730 days 
1 3 7/8% for accepted commercial bills. 
2 2 7/8% for accepted commercial bills. 
Import bills 




,5  1/2 
Export bills 






Until  the  end of  1957 the Institut de  reescompte  et de  garantie adjusted 
its  rates  of interest  to  the  prevailing  balance-of-payments  situation  and even 
applied differential rates  for bills according to the  currency areas to which the 
underlying  transactions  related.  The  object  was  to  favour  exports  or imports, 
as the case might be, or to encourage a  given trend in foreign  trade in relation 
to certain currency areas. The latter differentiation was abandoned on 6  Decem-
ber 1957. As can be seen from  the foregoing table on the debtor rates of interest 
charged  by  the  Institut  de  reescompte  et  de  garantie,  a  dis tinction  was still 
maintained  between  import  _and  export  business .  (except  for  a  temporary inter-
ruption from  6 December 1957 to 4  February 1958). 
17  ·  The  interest rates  charged  by  the  banks  on  advances  to  firms  or indi-
viduals are  frequently fixed in relation to Bank rate.  197 Diagram 
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Source: Bulletins d'information et de documentation de la Ban  que nationale de Belgique. 
Finally,  the  rate  for  Treasury  Certificates with period to  maturity of up 
to 4  months is  fixed  by  the Banque nationale de  Belgique, which has responsi-
bility for placing this paper. The interest for this short-term Treasury paper may 
not exceed Bank rate. 
18.  The effectiveness  of discount policy depends  on  the  extent to which  the 
198  banks and business regard a  change in Bank rate as a  pointer to a  change in the liquidity  situation  as  a  whole,  that is  to  say, it depends  on whether,  and to 
what  extent,  the  aims  of the  Central Bank'·s  discount  policy can be translated 
into practice in the  money market and perhaps also in the  capital market. The 
direct influence  of changes in discount rate  on  the decisions  of the  banks and 
their customers also plays a  part, although probably not a  very large one. 'The·se 
points are discussed in the following chapter on open-market policy. 
199 CHAPTER  2 
OPEN  -MARKET  POLICY 
19.  In  Belgium,  open-market  operations  are  carried  out  by  the  Fonds  des 
rentes  which,  following  the  latest reforms,  is  empowered  to  intervene  in  the 
money as well as the capital market. It is true that under the Law on the Activ-
ities  and Organization of the  Banque  nationale  de  Belgique  of  24  August 1939 
(in the version of 28  July 1948) the Bank is authorized  to  carry  out open-market 
transactions.  Article  11(3)  of  this  law  authmizes  the  Bank  to  purchase  and 
sell  short  and medium-term  securities  issued  or  guaranteed  by  the  Belgian 
State,  by Luxembourg,  or by institutions  which  enjoy a  State guarantee. Under 
Article 11(9) the  Bank can also purchase and sell long-term public bonds quoted 
on  the  Stock Exchange.  Since  the  war the  Central  Bank has,  however, ceased 
operations of this nature which it has left entirely to the  Fonds des rentes. On 
the other hand, the business of the Fund is managed by the Central Ban,k  and the 
Treasury,  acting as equal partners ·so that the Central Bank can indirectly bring 
its  influence  to  bear  on  those  operations  of  the  Institut  de  reescompte  et de 
garantie which are of monetary importance . 
a)  The role of the  Fonds des rentes 
20.  When  the  Fonds  des  rentes  was  established  in  May  1945,  it was  given 
the  function  of  regulating  the  market  for  public  bonds.  To  this  end  the  Fund 
may  buy  and sell  medium  or  long-term  securities  issued  or  guaranteed  by the 
State and it may also buy or sell securities issued by  the Regie des telephones 
et  telegraphes,  the Societe des  chemins  de  fer  belges, the  Credit communal de 
Belgique, the local government authorities. 
The  Fonds  des  rentes  accordingly  supervised and influenced  the  market 
for  fixed interest securities issued by the  above-mentioned  public  authorities. 
It absorbed  any  excess  of securities  offered  or  satisfied excess  demand,  and 
thereby determined prices. Table 5  on  the  transactions of the  Fonds des rentes 
on  the  capital  market,  in  the  column  headed  '"Operations of the Fund" quotes 
figures  showing net purchases and sales of securities in  the years from  1946 to 
1960 inclusive. 
When  the  Fonds  des  rentes  was established, its sponsors had in mind as 
its  most important  function  the  maintenance  of  normal  conditions  on  the  long-
200  ~erm capital  market  by  operations  of  a  regulatory nature.  The decisions  of the Table  5 
THE  MARKET  FOR  PUBLIC  LOANS,  ISSUES  AND  REDEMPTIONS, 
AND  OPERATIONS  OF  THE  FONDS  DES  RENTES  1 
(Bfrs.  '000 million) 
Operations of the 
Fonds des rentes,  Net 
recourse 
Issues  R~dem:.r- Net  to  tlons  issues  capital  Net trans- Sales  Buying in  actions  market 
, 
1  2  3  = 1-2  4  5  6  = 4-5  7  = 3 +6 
1946  4.1  2.7  1.4  - 2.2  - 0.8 
1947  9.9  3.5  6.4  - 0.9  5.5 
1948  8.1  3.2  4.9  -0.1  4.8 
1949  15.7  - 15.7  0.8  16.5 
1950  9.5  0.5  9.0  - 1.3  7.7 
1951  11.8  4.4  7.4  1.2  0.9  + 0.3  7.7 
1952  25.7  7.4  18.3  1.4  0.6  + 0.8  19.1 
1953  20.9  3.8  17.1  1.8  1.1  + 0.7  17.8 
1954  38.2  12.7  25.5  1.5  3.0  - 1.5  24.0 
1955  14.8  0.6  14.2  2.1  1.6  + 0.5  14.7 
1956  24.2  4.3  19.9  0.7  2.1  - 1.4  18.5 
1957  19.0  2.1  16.9  2.5  0.7  + 1.8  18.7 
1958  26.6  5.4  21.2  2.4  1.6  + 0.8  22.0 
1959  30.3  2.4  27.9  0.5  1.8  - 1.3  26.6 
1960  36.1  13.1  23.0  - 2.1  - 2.1  20.9 
1~ This table includes loans by the State, local authorities and semi-public institutions, but not direct 
sales to institutional investors or rehabilitation loans. 
2 Redemptions by buying in on the Stock Exchange or by drawings are shown in column 5. 
Source: Reports of the Fonds des rentes.  201 Fund  to  raise  or  to lower  the  prices  of government securtttes  certainly played 
an important role in Belgian interest rate policy in the  post-war years. Since the 
Fonds  des rentes conducted its policy by agreement with the Central  Bank, its 
operations resulted in long-term interest rates largely keeping in  step with Bank 
rate. 
21.  Apart from  this the Fund has been able to exert a  direct monetary influence 
by  creating  or  absorbing  bank  liquidity.  Up  to  1957  it financed  its  stock of 
public  securities  by  taking  up  very  short-term  loans  in  the  money  market or, 
if  this  was  not  sufficient,  by  calling upon  the  Central  Bank.  The  very short-
term  funds  taken up  by the  Fund until 1957  did  not  come  from  the  banks, but 
from  institutional investors such as savings funds, pension funds, etc. 
Whenever  the  Fonds  des  rentes  wished  to  promote  an  expansive  policy 
it could increase its purchases of  public ·bonds and in this way bring long-term 
interest rates down; it could also call upon  the  Central  Bank which,  on  the·se 
occasions,  widened  the  credit  basis.  The  aid of  the  Central  Bank  sometimes 
took  the  form  of advances,  but  for  the  greater part it consisted in discounting 
the  cash certificates of the  Fund, which. were set against the State credit line, 
fixed  at Bfrs.  10 000  million. Without this provision the  Fonds  des rentes could 
have made  such. heavy support purchases of State securities financed by Central 
Bank credits that arbitrage  transactions would have been possible, which would 
have favoured the issue of new Treasury loans. 
22.  In  November  1957,  with  the  reform  of ihe  money  market,  the  Fonds  des 
rentes  was  entrusted with  a  further  responsibility in  connection  with monetary 
policy; it was  allowed to place its own certificate·s with the banks. The banks 
could count the certificates of the Fund amongst those assets which were taken 
into account in calculating the partial cover to be held in Government securities 
for  Belgian  franc  liabilities  of  up  to  a  month's  term  (sight  deposits; see 
page 209). 
To the extent that the  Fund sterilized the  proceeds of placing its certifi-
cates' with  the  banks  by keeping  them  in accounts  with  the  Central  Bank, the 
effect  wa~ the  same as  that  of increasing  the  banks'  cover ratio,  the intere·st 
burden falling upon the Fund itself. 
If deposits increased, the Fund did not need to issue certificates ; in that 
event  the  banks  had  to increase  the  balances  on  their  Central  Bank accounts 
in  order  to  ensure  the  partial  cover  of  sight  deposits  to  which  reference has 
been  made  above.  In ·such  case the  cost of sterilizing the  funds  was  borne by 
the b,anks. 
23.  After  the  reform  of November  1957  the  Fonds  des  rentes was  required to 
contribute to the stabilization ofthe government securities market. When deposits 
with  the  banks  fell  off and  the  banks  were  consequently able  to  cash 'B' or 
202  even  'A' Treasury certificates,  the  Fund  was  obliged  in  turn  to  purchase  a corresponding  amount  of Treasury Certificates  in order to protect the Treasury 
from liquidity fluctuation·s. 
Although  under  the  amended  banking  ratio system, ' B '  Treasury Certifi-
cate·s are now sold by tender, the Fonds des rentes must ensure that the amount 
outstanding  doe·s  not  fall  below  Bfts.  9100  million  (see  Table  7,  page  206). 
The  reform  of November  1957  has  not  deprived the  Fonds  des  rentes of 
all  possibilities  of recourse  to  the  Banque  nationale  de  Belgique.  When  the 
Fund must buy back its own certificates or subscribe 'B' Treasury Certificates, 
it can draw on  a  current account credit with the Central Bank if its other means 
are  not  sufficient.  This  current  account  is  not  included  in  the  10 000  million 
credit line. 
24.  The  law  of 19  June  1959  has  further  extended  the  Fonds  des  rentes' 
ability to  operate in the State securities market,· it has been explicitly authorized 
to operate in the market for  short-term  securities.  To provide the  Fund with the 
means  to  carry out  this  new  task, additional  sources of finance  have been put 
at  its  disposal,  apart  from  the  proceeds  from  the  issue  of  certificates. It has 
received from  the Government the  Bfrs.  2 800 million proceeds resulting from  the 
Banque nationale de  Belgique's having taken over the  Belgian gold subscription 
to  the  International  Monetary  Fund.  It also  has  a  current  account credit line 
with the Central Bank, at present fixed at Bfrs. 2 000 million. The Central Bank 
can,  acting on  its  own  responsibility and at its  own  discretion,  increase this 
credit to meet  the  requirements  of the  economy;  the  credit may not be  used to 
provide  funds  for  the  Treasury,  systematically to  support  prices  in  favour  of 
the Treasury,  or to  supply liquidity to the money market if conditions are tight 
owing to an outflow of capital to foreign countries. 
To these new resources of the .Fund must be added the proceeds from  the 
issue of its own certificates, which on 30 June 1959 amounted to Bfrs. 5 700 mil-
lion and on 31  December 1960 to Bfrs. 5 800 million. 
25.  When  the  call-money  market  and  the  market  for  very  short-term  money 
were  reformed on  17  November  1959,  the  Fund was  given yet a  third task',·  the 
market  was  unified,  the  liaison  between lenders  and borrowers  as well  as  the 
formation  of money market  rates  became  more  flexible.  The  operations  of the 
Fund were thereby facilitated and since then it has to regulate the money market. 
However,  it does  so exclusively by granting  credits in the  call money market. 
When  operating in this way, the  Fonds des rentes draws on its balance with the 
Central Bank - in other words it repays to the· commercial banks, either directly 
or  through  the  Institut  de  reescompte  et de  garantie,  part of the  liquid funds 
which it has drawn from  them by the issue of its own certificates. 
26.  In  judging  the  effectiveness of the  transactions  of the  Fonds  des  rentes 
a5 an in5trument of credit policy, two factors must be borne in mind :  203 I.  The long-term interest rate policy of the  Fund in the  bond  market;  the level 
of interest applied lowers or raises prices ; 
2.  Movements  in  the  account  which  the  Fund has  with  the  Central Bank;  these 
may result from  drawing liquid funds away from  the  banks by issuing certificates 
and from  the  partial return of these funds to circulation in the economy when the 
Fund  employs  them  in  the  market  for  long  or  short-term  go~ernme"nt securities 
or  in  the  money market. In  1960 the  Fund exerted an  expansionary influence on 
bank  liquidity for  a  fairly  long period (see Table 6,  page 205) by  allowing  more 
liquidity to reach the  banks  by its  credit business than it withdrew from  them  by 
issuing  its  certificates  or  taking  up  money  market  credits ;  of  ~ourse  it can 
pursue  such  an  expansionary  policy  in  the  long  run  only  by  drawing  on  the 
Bfrs. 2 800 million credited to its account when the Banque nationa.l,.e  de Belgique 
took over the gold subscription to the International Monetary Fund~or by drawing 
on its line of credit with the Central Bank. 
The  movements  in  the  account of  the  Fo.nds- des  rentes  with  the  Central 
Bank  reflect  the  overall  effect  of  the  transactions  of the  Fund  on  the  volume 
of liquidity (see Table 6). 
b)  The structure of the money market 
27.  In  the  Belgian  money  market  Treasury  Certificates  and  certificates  of 
the  Fonds des rentes, call money and commercial bills are used as credit instru-
ments. 
So  far  as  public  securttles  are  concerned,  there  has  not,  so  far,  been a 
market in the real sense of the word. This is in part due to the banks' obligation, 
referred to above, to purchase these securities under the cover ratio system, and 
partly  also  to  the  fact  that  tax  regulations  favour  the  retention  of govemmen  t 
securities in the  portfolio.  Also,  some leading rates of interest were tied to the 
discount rate of the Banque nationale de Belgique (see page 196). 
The  above-mentioned  reform  of  the  banking ratio  system  and  the  more 
flexible  interest rates in  the  money market have  now made  it possible  for  these 
securities  to  be  dealt in  on  a  larger scale.  Whereas  until  recently there  was a 
market  rate  of  interest  only  for  short-term  certificat(;!s  (6,  9  and  12  months) 
issued  on  the  basis  of tenders,  this  now  applies  to 
1  B 
1  Treasury Certificates 
and to the certificates of the  Fonds des rentes as well. 
As  will  be  seen from  the  table  on  the  terms  and  conditions  of issue for 
the  various  types  of  certificate  (see  Table  7,  page  206),  both  the short-term 
c.ertificates and  the 
1 B 
1  Treasury Certificates as·  well as  the certificates of the 
Fonds  des rentes  are  now issued by public tender; this is  done  monthly for the 
204  former and weekly for the latter. Table  6 
PRINCIPAL  ASSETS  AND  LIABILITIES  OF  THE  FONDS  DES  RENTES 
(Bfrs, million) 
Assets  Liabilities 
Security holdings  Credits taken up 
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1951  4936  - - - - - 2698  250  - 1562 
1952  4112  - - - - - 2350  1000  - 344 
1953  3532  - - - - - 1999  1000  - 120 
1954  5023  - - - - - 2248  1000  - 1327 
1955  4533  - - - - - 2039  1000  - 920 
1956  5930  - - - - - 2631  800  - 1998 
1957  4112  1242  - - - 486  2457  585  1237  200 
1958  3311  1370  - - - 4059  274  - - 45 
1959 Jan.  4298  90  - - - 3 893  107  - - 45 
Feb.  3985  20  - - "T'  3 651  68  - - -
March  4152  - - 427  - 4300  - - - -
April  4339  420  - 1098  - 5 512  - - - -
May  4715  40  - 1351  - 5757  - - - -
June  5107  204  - 729  - 5706  - - - -
July  4044  160  - 1072  - 4949  - - - -
Aug.  4228  50  - 4883  - 6021  - - - -
Sept.  4784  453  - 3479  - 5 514  - - - -
Oct.  4292  187  300  5 056  - 6663  - - - -
Nov.  4368  184  1000  3 342  1510  7 211  - - - -
Dec.  4572  623  2700.  1  - 4608  72  - - -
1960 Jan.  4908  5  1200  719  1922  5 421  .:..  - - -
Feb.  5030  37  100  1476  2 413  5760  - - - -
March  4767  85  - 2683  1910  6147  - - - -
April  4992  64  1200  3925  1239  8099  - - - -
May  5105  228  - 3 545  2640  8163  - - - -
June  5085  201  100  2862  2644  7 508  - - - -
July  5995  70  - 1188  2 237  5933  - - - -
Aug.  5936  6  450  3  1211  4242  - - - -
Sept.  6075  89  1000  - 103  3896  - - - -
Oct.  6097  11  600  75  1332  4773  - - - -
Nov.  6366  - 400  1312  1583  6165  - - - -
Dec.  6661  1403  1200  6  15  5812  - - - -
1 Including securities  sold  to  semi-public institutions which the Fonds des rentes is entitled tore-
purchase. 
2  Including  cash  certificates  discounted  with  institutions  other  than  the  Banque  nationale  de 
Belgique.  . 





Method of issue 
Dealings 
Volume in circulation 
Repurchase by 
Central Bank 
Fonds des rentes 
1 See page 000. 
Table  7 
TERMS  OF  ISSUE  OF  TREASURY  CERTIFICATES  AND  FOR  DEALINGS  THEREIN 
Treasury Certificates  'B'  Treasury  Certifi-
'A'  Treasury  Certifi- cates 1 
cates 1  Fonds des rentes 
Very short-tenn  Short-term  Certificates 
1, 2, 3 months  6, 9, 12 months  1 year  4 months 
Fixed by Central Bank  According  to  monthly  1 15/16%  According  to  weekly 
according  to  market  tenders 3.8 - 4%  tenders 3. 99% 
conditions  3.1 - 3.6%  (Feb. 1962)  (Jan. 1962) 
(Jan. 1962) 
Subscribed  by  Banque  By monthly tenders  No  new  issues;  only  By  tender;  for  'B' 
nationale  de  Belgique  renewal  of  maturities  Certificates  only  re-
which  places  them  on  newal of maturities 
the market 2  ' 
Among all operators on money market  Among banks 
Fluctuating  Fixed by Banque natio- Bfrs. 19 800 m.  'B' Certificates 
nale  de  Belgique  and  Bfrs. 9100 m. 
Treasury  Fonds des rentes 
Certificates not limited 
No;  but  Fonds  des  rentes  does  operate on this  No  Purchase by Fonds des 




Agreed between  Treas-
ury and purchaser 
By  agreement between 
purchasers  and  Treas-





2 The holdings of very short-term certificates by the Banque nationale de Belgique are set against the Treasury credit ceiling of Bfrs. 10 000 m. 
Source: Banque nationale de Belgique. The very important part played by the Institut de reescompte et de garantie 
in the  market  for  commercial bills  (mainly  bank acceptances) has  already been 
discussed in the previous chapter on refinancing policy. 
The  money  market  in  Belgium  is  the  call-money  market.  This  was  re-
organized in November  1959.  Before  that date money transactions were  for  one, 
five  or ten days; since then only one-day transactions have  been the  rule. The 
final  settlement  of the  call-money dealings  on  the  market is made at a  uniform 
rate through a  central clearing office. 
28.  Both  Belgian  and  foreign  agencies  can  deal  on  this  market.  In  practice 
their n.umber is limited because - with  the exception of the  public authorities, 
whose liabilities are guaranteed by the State - dealers on the call-money market 
must  deposit  with  the  Banque  nationale  de  Belgique  security  in  the  form  of 
government  paper  or  bills  rediscountable  by  the  Central  Bank.  The  Belgian 
banks  can also use for  this purpose the public debt certificates which they have 
deposited  with  the  Central  Bank  as  security  for  advances,  in  which  case  the 
credit line involved will be  reduced accordingly. 
The  Belgian  banks,  the  Caisse  generale  d'epargne  et  de  retraite,  some 
credit  institutions  under  public  law,  foreign  agencies  which  have  an  account 
with  the  Banque  nationale de  Belgique, and the  Fonds  des rentes  figure  among 
those  who  offer call money.  On  the  demand  side we  mainly find  the Institut de 
reescompte  et de  garantie,  secondly  the  Belgian  banks  and  finally  the  Office 
national  du  Ducroire  (export  credit  insurance), other credit institutions under 
public  law,  and  the  Fonds  des  rentes.  Among  the  "other  credit institutions 
under  public  law "  there  are  the  Caisse  nationale  de  credit  professionnel,  the 
Societe nationale de  credit a l'industrie and the  Credit communal de  Belgique. 
These  institutions  issue  short-term  cash . certificates  (bons  de  caisse)  and 
medium-term  loans;  they  also  purchase  short-term  Treasury  Certificates  and 
other  money-market  securities.  Moreover,  they  give  call-money credits  or  take 
them up if required. 
Among the creditinstitutions under public law the Caisse generale d'epargne 
et  de  retraite  and  the  lnstitut  de  reescompte  et  de  garantie  hold  a  special 
position.  At  the  end  of  1960,  for  example,  the  former  institution  invested its 
surpluses  from  deposits  on  savings  accounts  and  from  insurance  business  in 
very short-term and short-term Treasury Certificates to an amount of Bfrs.  2 000 
million  and  in  bank acceptances  to  an  amount  of 2 400  million.  It also granted 
call-money credits up to Bfrs.  800 million.  The  importance of the IRG has been 
discussed in the preceding chapter. 
29.  The Banque nationale de  Belgique plays no pa-::  in the call-money market, 
that is  to  say it does  not lend or  borrow  at  call,  although it does  organize the 
market.  Its  function  is  merely  that  of  an  agent  placing  short-term  Treasury 
Certificates in the  money market.  207 208 
It should be  pointed out that the  holdings of Treasury Certificates shown 
in  the  balance -sheet  of  the  Banque  nationale  de  Belgique,  which  rose  from 
Bfrs.  4200 million to 9800 million between 22  February 1960 and 11  April1960, 
are  not  connected  with  money-market  operations.  These  figures  merely reflect 
credits granted to the State up to the fixed ceiling. 
c) Efficacy of  open-market policy 
30.  As  explained  above,  systematic  open-market  operations  have  only  been 
possible  since  the  fundamental  reform  of  the  Fonds  des  rentes,  so  that  not 
much experience has yet been gained with the new system. 
The position of the  Belgian  Treasury  makes a  flexible  open-market policy 
in  the  money  market  difficult.  The  operations  of  the  Fonds  des  rentes  in the 
long-term  securities market  are  expected to  some  extent to  bring interest rates 
into  harmony  with  the  Central  Bank's  discount  policy.  The  operations  of  the 
Fund  in  the  short-term  public  bond  market  have  served  to  cushion  the  effects 
on  the  Treasury of fluctuations  in  bank  liquidity.  This  was  particularly  true at 
the  time  of  the  Congo crisis. 




Short-term Treasury Certificates 
Call-money credits 






(Bfrs. '000 million) 
Liabilities 
Certificates issued by the Fund 
Drawings on the sums made avail-
able to the Fund as a result of the 
Ban  que  nationale  de  Belgique's 
having taken over participation in 
the  International  Monetary  Fund 
6.2 
2.8 CHAPTER  3 
THE SYSTEM OF BANKING RATIOS AND MINIMUM  RESERVES 
31.  Between  1946 and  the  end of  1961  the  banks  were  subject to the  provi-
sions  of  a  Royal  Decree  concerning  the  observance  of  certain  ratios  between 
some  assets  - mainly  claims  on  the  Treasury  - and  the  Belgian  franc  liabil-
ities  of  the  banks  (banking  ratios - coefficients  bancaires).  This  system was 
introduced at  the  time  in  order  to  prevent  the  Treasury securities  placed with 
the 'banks during the war from  being turned into money.  At the  end of 1961  there 
were three ratios which applied to the major banks (banques de grande circulation) 
as follows: 
Cash  ratio (coefficient de tresorerie) 
COMPOSITION 
Cash in hand 
Deposits  with  the  Banque  nationale  de  Belgique, 
the , Postal  Cheque  Office,  and  the  Caisse  natio-
nale de credit professionnel, less 
- unsecured call-money loans taken up 
- advances from  banks 
secured call-money loans granted, or loans to public 
credit institutions  for  which  the  State  has  given a 
general guarantee  (not exceeding 2% of liabilities) 
Solvency ratio (coefficient de solvabilite) 
Own capital and reserves 
Cover ratio (coefficient de couverture) 
A.  Liabilities  expressed  in  Bfrs.  (at  up  to  one month) 
a)  Partial cover 
Balances  with  the  Banque  nationale  de 
Belgique  not  already  included  in  the  cash 
ratio 
'A' and 'B' Treasury Certificates 
Certificates of the  Fonds des rentes 
4%  of  liabilities 
at  one  month's 
term  or  longer 
Minimum  rate  5 % 
of liabilities 
Minimum  rate  50% 
209 b)  Diversified cover 
in  addition.  to  the  items  listed  under  a): 
Ca~h reserves (including call money): 
All  government  or  government-guaranteed 
securities  in  Bfrs.  (maximum  3  years) 
Very  short-term  Treasury  Certificates  (maxi-
mum  4  months) 
Treasury  Certificates  issued  by  tender  (6  to 
12 months) 
B.  Liabilities (at 1 month to 2 years) 
All items .listed under A  and all undated govern-
ment  or  government-guaranteed  bonds  in  Bfrs. 
Minimum  rate  15 % 
Minimum  rate  65% 
Whereas  the  major  banks  had  to  meet  cover  obligations  of up  to  65% of 
their deposits,  these  obligations  amounted  to  50%  for  the  regional  banks  and 
the special banks, and to 60% for the medium-sized banks. 
32.  In the course of the years the Commission bancaire,  which is the competent 
authority, has  frequently changed the  general provisions  governing these ratios. 
The reform  which  took place towards  the  end of 1957  was particularly important 
as  it ended the  automatic link betrpeen  movements in  deposits and the Treasury 
bill holdings of the  banks.  Since that time  the banks have no longer been allowed 
to  hold Treasury paper as  a  partial cover for additional deposits but have been 
obliged to acquire  Fonds des rentes certificates for  this purpose. The Fund has 
thereby  more  facility  for  engaging  in  open-market  or  other  money-market  op-
erations. 
The Treasury paper issues held by the banks before  this reform (to a  total 
of  Bfrs.  28 900 million) were  replaced  by  special  Treasury  Certificates  of  the 
'A' and 'B' series. It was  arranged that of these Bfrs.  28 900 million the 'A' 
Treasury Certificates, amounting to  Bfrs.  20 000  million,  would remain  with  the 
banks;  should deposits  fall  below  the level as  at the  end of October 1957,  the 
banks  would be able, to  the  extent of their reduced obligations,  to  redeem 'B' 
Treasury  Certificates,  and in  such  ~n event the  Fonds  des  rentes  was  to take 
up a  corresponding amount of Treasury Certificates. 
33.  Although  this  system  of banking ratios  may  in  theory  be  regarded  as  a 
kind  of minimum  reserve  system,  practice  showed  that it lacked  the  necessary 
flexibility  to  be  used as  an  effective  instrument of monetary policy.  The  basic 
ratios  were  never  changed,  probably  because  for  one  thing  the  procedure  for 
fixing  a  banking  ratio  was  very  cumoersome.  The  Commission  bancaire  could 
change  the  ratios  only by  agreement  with  the  Ministry of  Finance  and the Min-
210  is  try of Economics. At the  end of 1961  the  Belgian Government introduced a  mtmmum reserve 
system  which  enabled  the  monetary  authorities  to  exert  a  direct  influence  on 
banking  liquidity  by  changing  the  minimum  reserve  ratios  as has been done for 
some  time  in the  Federal Republic  of Germany and in  the  Netherlands.  By this 
new  arrangement  the  previous  provisions  on  the  "coefficient  de  tresorerie " 
(cash ratio)  and  the  "coefficient  de  couverture"  (cover  ratio)  were  rescinded 
and replaced by transitional  provisions. 
Minimum  reserves 
Under the new regulation minimum reserves are held in the form  of special 
accounts  with  the  Banque  nationale  de  Belgique.  But,  acting  on  a  considered 
proposal  by the  Banque nationale, the Commission bancaire may direct that part 
of  the  banks'  reserve  obligations  can  be  met  by  balances  with  the  Fonds des 
rentes or by the deposit of certain public securities with the Central Bank. 
Liabilities subject to  minimum reserves 
These  include  all  bank  liabilities  expressed  in  Belgian  francs  with  a 
term of up to two years. There are three categories of such liabilities 
1. Liabilities at sight or up to one month ; 
2.  Liabilities  with an agreed term  of more  than  one  month  and up to two  years; 
3. Liabilities in respect of which deposit books have been issued. 
Banks whose minimum reserve obligation does not exceed Bfrs.  20 million 
need not keep  such minimum  reserves.  The  Commission  bancaire  can increase 
this  exemption  limit  where  one  of  the  minimum  reserve  ratios  for  the  various 
categories of bank liabilities exceeds two-fifths of the maximum ratios mentioned 
in the following paragraph. 
Minimum  reserve ratios 
The minimum  reserve  ratios  are fixed  by the  Commission bancaire on the 
proposal  of  the  Banque  nationale  de  Belgique  justified  by  considerations  of 
credit policy. 
The  highest ratio  for  sight deposits  or deposits  with  a  term  of up to one 
month  is  20%,  that  for  liabilities  at  a  term  of more  than  one  month  and up to 
two  years  is  7 %.  If  within  any  30-day  period  the  minimum  reserve  ratios  are 
increased by more  than three points, the approval of the Minister of Finance and 
of the Minister of Economics is required.  211 212 
Basis  for  calculation 
The  new  minimum  reserve  prov1s1ons  explicitly provide  that  the  m1mmum 
reserve  ratios  may  be  applied  either  to  the  total  of deposits  or merely  to the 
increase in deposits, or to a  combinati<m of both. The calculation of the minimum 
reserve  obligation  is  based  on  the  liabilities  subject  to  minimum  reserve  as 
they  stand on  the  last business  day of  the  month.  The  obligation must be ful-
filled in the course of 30 days beginning on the 15th day ofthe succeeding_month. 
So far  the  new  minimum  reserve regulation has  only  created a  framework, 
the  details  of  which  have  not  yet  been  filled  in  by  the  monetary authorities. 
As  banks  are  still  required  to  keep  large  portfolios  of  public  securities, the 
margin  for  measures  of  minimum  reserve  policy  would  still  seem  to  be  very 
limited.  The  transitional  arrangements  mentioned  above  provide  that the  banks 
must  for  the  time  being  continue  to  meet  their  previous  obligations  under the 
system  of  cover  ratios.  However,  deposit  increases  are  no  longer  subject  to 
this  obligation,  which  need only  be  met on the  basis  of  average deposits over 
the  period  from  31  January  1961  to  31  October  1961.  Moreover,  in observing 
these continuing cover obligations, the  banks are free  to  choose from  among the 
various  acceptable forms  of assets, except  that  they  must maintain their hold-
ings of 
1 A 
1  Treasury  Certificates at the level at which they stood when the new 
regulation was ls  sued. CHAPTER  4 
CASH MANAGEMENT AND  BORROWING OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES 
AND  THEIR EFFECTS ON  LIQUIDITY 
34.  Under  Article  32  of  its  statutes  the  Banque  nationale  de  Belgique  is 
entrusted  with  the  management of  the  Government's  cash amounts.  Most of the 
time  the  Government's  current account shows  a  relatively small  balance; apart 
from  the  current  account  there  is  a  special  account  of  the  Treasury which  re-
ceives  the  proceeds  of  the 
11  business  cycle  tax 
11 
(" taxe  de  conjoncture ") 
introduced in 1959. 
The  Treasury  makes  most  of  its  payments  through  the  Postal  Cheque 
0 //ice,  which ·transfers its surplus receipts to the Treasury. The Postal Cheque 
Office,  which  is not  looked upon  - as in the  Federal  Republic. of Germany and 
in  the  Netherlands  - as  part  of the  banking  system,  plays  a  considerable part 
in  payments  generally.  Over  the  past  few  years  the  balances of firms  and indi-
viduals  with  the  Postal  Cheque  Office  amounted  on  the  average  to  about 10% 
of  the  volume  of  money.  Transfers  from  private  accounts  to  public  accounts 
with  the  Postal Cheque Office  have no  effect  on  the  liquidity of the  banks. In 
January  and  July,  however,  when  the  main  taxes  fall  due,  there  are  large  out-
goings  from  the  banks  to  public  authorities,  with  a  consequent  strain  on bank 
liquidity.  To relieve  this  the  Fonds  des rentes carries  out corresponding open-
market operations. 
The budget policy of the  Belgian State has a  direct influence on the volume 
and distribution of liquid funds  in the economy. The amount of the  budget deficit 
and  the  method  of  financing  it play a  decisive  part.  The  budget deficit can be 
covered  by  calling  on  the  Central  Bank  or  on  the  money  market,  by  issuing 
medium  or  long-term  loans,  by  taking  up  credits  abroad  or,  finally,  by  falling 
back on reserves. 
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218 INTRODUCTORY  REMARKS 
1.  Apart  from  changes  in  Bank rate,  the  main  instruments  employed  by the 
Nederlandsche  Bank in its monetary and credit policy are  those  that affect the 
liquidity  of  the  banking  system and  hence  influence  that  of  the  economy  and 
the total effective demand. Direcf credit controls in the sense of a selective credit 
policy play no part. In the eady post-war years they were in fact applied to a  con-
siderable extent, but as conditions returned to normal  this method became more and 
more  unsatisfactory  1  The  provisions  that  gave  the  Central  Bank  extensive 
control over advances  by the commercial· banks were  therefore rescinded at the 
end of 1950 and were temporarily replaced by overall quantitative credit controls 
(in force until the end of March 1952). 
2.  The concept of "liquidity policy"  in the  Netherlands generally means an 
influence  exerted  on  the  liquidity  of  the  economy  by  measures  taken  by  the 
Central Bank and,  be it 1'\0ted  at the outset,  the  Treasury, but not so much an 
influence on  bank liquidity itself, though this is the starting point for  action by 
the  Central  Bank.  To  this  extent,  the  terminology  here  is  different  from  that 
used in the Federal Fepublic of Germany. 
a) The  liquidity of the  economy 
3.  Since  1951  the  Central Bank, in its periodic  surveys, has·  been  applying 
a  concept  of  liquidity  that. is  partly  at  variance  with  that  of  the  other  EEC 
countries.  By  liquidity  of  the  economy  the  Bank  understands  not  only  primary 
liquidity  - ready  money  (cash  and  sight  deposits)  held  by  the  non-banking 
sector (though excluding Government balances) - but also certain other claims 
of the  non-banking sector on  public authorities  and money-creating institutions 
in so far as they can be  fully  realized  within  a  very short period and at negli-
gible expense or loss, or can be used at their face value .to pay taxes (secondary 
liquidity). 
1  Addressing the Radcliffe Committee in November 1958, Dr.  Holtrop, the President of the Central 
Bank, explained ,that a  selective credit policy might be feasible when the aims of general economic 
policy had been plainly and unequivocally defined -as in wartime  or a  period of reconstruction -
and the public were therefore prepared· to accept ~ontrols of this nature.  But as the targets became 
less definite and the  gamut of possible choices widened, it became very difficult to  say what the 
aim  of economic  policy was  and  to  judge which  of several was  the  higher  good.  The criterion of 
the  "general national well-being"  was  no more. adequate  than  the  distinction between "essential" 
and  "non-essential".  This  distinction  was  dangerous  in  so  far  as  it  stimulated  protectionist 
tendencies,  for  "essential" could easily be de.fined as  anything that replaced imports or promoted 
exports,  while  all  other  goods  could  he  called  "non-essential".  Any  other  distinction  between 
"essential" and "non-essential" had no basis in a free  economy.  219 For the  purposes  of this analysis,  the components of secondary liquidity 
are the following: 
1) short-term claims of the non-banking sector on the Treasury, generally in the 
form  of Treasury bills; this includes balances held at the Treasury, mainly by 
institutional investors, though at the moJV,ent  these are only small; 
2) short-term  claims  of  the  non-banking  sector  on  local  authorities  such  as 
provincial and  local governments  and  the  Bank for  Netherlands  Municipalities 
(Bank  voor  Nederlandsche  Gemeenten),  mainly  in  the  form  of  non-negotiable 
securities  but  at  times  also  in  the  form  of call money  and  credits  in  current 
account; 
3) short-term claims of the  non-banking sector on money-creating institutions in 
the  form  of time  and savings deposits,  foreign  exchange  balances and the call 
money  that  these  institutions  mainly  take  up  from  the  non-banking  sector. 
4.  The money-creating institutions include, apart from  the Central Bank and 
commercial banks, the postal cheque office, Amsterdam's municipal giro transfer 
service,  the  agricultural  credit  institution  with  their  short-term  deposit  and 
credit  business,  the  security  credit  institutions  (effectenkredietinstellingen) 
and  the  Treasury.  As  there  is  in  the  Netherlands  a  rather  sharp distinction 
between  the  short-term  business  of  the  commercial  banks  and  the  long-term 
business  of  the savings banks,  the  latter  are  not  counted  among  the  money-
creating institutions.  Nor  are  savings  deposits  held  at savings banks included 
as secondary liquidity in the analysis ; the relatively small but growing savings 
deposits at commercial banks, however, are included. 
Table  1,  "Total Domestic  Liquid Assets", which is  taken  from  the  1961 
Annual  Feport  of  the  Netherlandsche  Bank,  gives  the  composition  of primary 
and  secondary  liquidity as  these  concepts  are  understood  in  the Netherlands, 
and  the  distribution  of  primary,  secondary  and  total  liquidity  over  the  most 
important sectors. 
The  sources  of  primary  and  secondary  liquidity,  as  shown  in  Table  2, 
are essentially  advances  by  the  Central  Bank and  other  money-creating insti-
tutions  to  the  Government  (including  changes  in  its  balances  at the  Central 
Bank)  and  to  other public  bodies  and  the  private  sector, net  foreign  exchange 
purchases by the money-creating institutions, purchases of securities  by  these 
institutions  and  the  placing of short-term securities  by  public  authorities out-
side the money-creating institutions. 
b) Bank liquidity 
5.  Besides  the  cash  liquidity  of  the  banks,  i.e.  their  holdings  of Central 
Bank  money,  the  liquidity  of  the  banking  system .includes  their  liquid assets 
that  can if necessary be  transferred  to  the  Central  Bank  or  placed with  it as 
220  security for  advances ("potential liquidity"). Table  1 
TOTAL  DOMESTIC  LIQUID  ASSETS 
(Amounts at end of year, to nearest 10 million guilders) 
Composition 1 
1958  1959 
1.  Domestic money supply (total primacy liquid assets) 
a) Notes and coin  4580  4680 
b) Sight deposits  5 560  5910 
Total  10140  10 590 
2.  Total secondaty liquid assets 
a) Claims on the Government  1320  1420 
b)  Claims on Jhe local authorities  1300  890 
c) Claims on money-creating institutions  2790  3 560 
1) Time deposits and day-to-day loans  2 230  2770 
2) Foreign currency balances of residents  240  290 
3) Balances on savings accounts  320  500 
Total  5 410  5870 
3. Total domestic liquid assets (3 = 1  + 2)  15 550  16460 
Holders 2 of: 
1.  Primary liquid assets 
a) Personal and business sector  9840  10 320 
b) Pension  funds,  insurance. companies  and  other 
funds  150  130 
c) Savings institutions  60  70 
d) Local authorities  90  70 
Total  10140  10 590 
2. Secondaty liquid assets 
a) Personal and business sector  3810  4080 
b) Pension  funds,  insurance  companies  and  other 
funds  690  720 
c) Savings institutions  720  840 
d) Local authorities  190  230 
Total  5410  5870 
3. Total domestic liquid assets (3  = 1  + 2) 
a) Personal and business sector  13650  14400 
b) Pension  funds,  insurance  companies  and  other 
funds  840  850 
c) Savings institutions  780  910 
d) Local authorities  280  300 
Total  15 550  16460 
Not included above: 
Sight deposits of non-residents at banks  200  210 
Savings  balances  at savings  institutions,  interest 
included  7680  8800 
Private sector's balances and money market invest· 
ments abroad  150  390 
1960  19613 
5090  5470 
6 220  6710 
11310  12180 
1390  1440 
540  420 
4380  4 540 
3 220  3090 
240  220 
920  1230 
6 310  6400 
17620  18 580 
10930  11790 
140  150 
100  120 
140  120 
11310  12180 
4560  4430 
640  680 
840  880 
270  410 
6 310  6400 
15490  16220 
780  830 
940  1000 
410  530 
17620  18 580 
250  230 
9930  11190 
200  180 
1 The  domestic  money supply includes notes and coin in the hands of non-residents; also  the  vety 
small sight deposits of non-residents at giro transfer institutions. 
2 The funds that could not be included under "Pension funds, insurance companies and other funds" 
are  comprised in· "Pension  and business sector", where the figures were obtained by  subtraction. 
Savings institutions also include the savings departments of agricultural credit banks. 
3  Provisional figures. 
Source: Annual Report of the Nederlandsche Bank 1961.  221 Table  2 
CAUSES  OF  CHANGES  IN  TOTAL  DOMESTIC  LIQUID  ASSETS 
(in millions of guilders) 
1959  1960  19616 
1. Creation of  liquidity for account of the Government 
a) Money ere  ation 
1) Net recourse ( +) to the N ederlandsche Bankl  537  -998  235 
(of which as the result of open market tran·sactions)  (44) (- 174)  (178) 
2)  Net recourse ( +) to the other money-creating institutions  -953  103  114 
3) Special transactions mentioned in 6.  a) 1)  - 421  107  -664 
Total 1) to 3)  -837  -788  -315 
b) Placing ( +) of floating debt having the character of 
secondary liquidity  103  - 30  53 
To.tal a) and b)  - 734  -.818  -262 
2.  Creation of liquidity for account of the local authorities 
a) Lending ( +) by: 
1) Nederlandsche Bank  .29  - 46  -
2) other money-creating institutions  32  - 67  -119 
Total 1) and 2)  61  - 113  -119 
b) Placing ( +) of floating debt having the character of 
secondary liquidity  - 410  -349  -125 
Total a) and b)  - 349  -462  -244 
3. Creation of money for account of the private sector 
Lending ( +) by : 
1) Nederlandsche Bank  - 2  2  9 
2) commercial banks  483  614  720 
3)  agriCultural c..redit institutions  .  97  45  68 
4) other money~creating institutions  24  15  37 
Total 1) to 4)  602  676  834 
(of which at medium term)  ( .  )  (28)  (203) 
4. Miscellaneous causes of money creation 
a) Net transactions of money·creating.institutions on the 
capital market (purchases +) 
1)  public market  65  103  215 
2) private market  2  40  126  242 
b) Increase(-) in capital 3  and reserves of money-creating 
institutions, and sundry items  - 93  - 174  -103 
Total a) and b)  12  55  354 
(of which money creation by giro transfer institutions)  (74)  (195)  (102) 
5. Domestic creation of liquidity (total of items 1 to 4)  -.469  -549  682 
Z22 Table  2  {continued) 
6. Net purchase of foreign exchange by the money creating insti· 
tutions from the private sector and public authorities· used for: 
a) Special transactions of 
1) the Govetnment : 
- Transactions with the I.M. F. 
- Increase  .( +)  of net  consolidated  claimS  arising  from 
payment  agreements,  so  far  as taken  over from  the 
Nederlandsche Bank 
- Accelerated repayment of external Government debt 
Total 
2) the banking  system:  purchase 4  of Netherlands  Govem· 
ment bonds from  the I.B.R.D. 
b) Increase ( +) of gold and foreign exchange holding 
1) Nederlandsche Bank 
2) authorized banks 
c) Lending(+) by authorized banks to non-residents 
d) Increase ( +) of other net claims on non-residents 5 
Total a) to d) 
7. Changes in: total domestic liquid assets (total of 5 and 6) 
a) Domestic money supply 
b) Total secondary liquid assets 
1) Claims on money-creating institutions 
(of which balances on savings account) 
2) Claims on the public authorities 
Total a) and b) 
1  Includ~s drawing down of credit balances. 
2 This is deemed to include granting of private loans to local authorities. 
3 Other than by i$sue of own shares and be>nds.  . 
4 Cf. paragraph 34 on page 239. 
















66  442 
- 173  39  ...  183 
- 107  664 
- -
1514  ...:.199 
- 400  -611 
664  483 
38  - 63 
1709  274 
717  867 
822  161 
(421)  (314) 
- 379  - 72 
1160  956 
5 Including  consolidated  claims  arising from  payments  agreements  which have not been taken over 
by the State, foreign bonds denominated in foreign currency and statistical errors. 
6 Provisional figures. 
Source: Annual Report of the Nederlandsche Bank 1961. 
The  cash  liquidity  of  the  banks  is,  as  with the  banks  of  the  Federal 
Republic,  almost  completely controlled by  the  required minimum  reserve ratio. 
At all events, apart from  a  few  exceptions, there are hardly any excess reserves 
worth  mentioning,  since  the  banks  can use  their  minimum  reserves as  working 
balan~es.  223 Potential  liquidity,  which  is  the  real  measure  of  the  liquid  position  of 
the banking system, mainly includes: 
a) short-term securities, 
b) call-money credits to brokers, (see sec. 21) 
c) balances and other money-market investments abroad, 
d) commercial bills that can be rediscounted at the  Central Bank,  though these 
are of minor importance. 
In the graphs published by the Central Bank in its Annual Reports,however, 
the  liquid  assets  include  only  Treasury  bills  with  currency  periods  of  one 
year  or  less  and  short-term  claims  in  foreign  currency ;  commercial  bills  are 
not regarded as forming part of the liquidity of the banks. 
6.  If the special measures  of liquidity policy taken by the Central Bank are 
disregarded,  the  cash  liquidity  of  the  banks  is  essentially determined  by  the 
following  factors : 
a) changes in notes and coin in circulation; 
b) net  foreign  exchange  transactions  between  banks  and  the  Central  Bank; 
c) net  transactions  of  the  Treasury  with  the  Central  Bank  affecting domestic 
liquidity; 
d) changes  in  the  minimum  reserve  requirements  as  a  result  of  changes  in 
deposits; 
e) Central  Bank  advances  to  local  authorities,· these  credits  are  of  minor im-
portance, except in periods of light conditions on the money market. 
The net transactions  of the Central Bank with business firms  and private 
customers are also of little importance. The Act governing the Central Bank does 
not prohibit such transactions; .  the  Bank  could certainly lend to business con-
cerns  and  private  individuals.  But its  policy is  to  leave  the  financing  of the 
· private sector to the commercial banks. 
To  illustrate  the  factors  detertnining  bank  liquidity,  the  Central  Bank 
publishes  in  its  Annual  Report  a  table  headed  "easing  and  tightening  of the 
money market", which consists of broadly the same elements - though in a  rather 
different  order  - as  the  corresponding  tables  published  by  the  Bundesbank. 
The  Netherlands  Rank's  table  is  reproduced  on  a  later  page  (see  Table  3). 
7.  The credit policy of the Central Bank influences the cash liquidity of the 
banks almost entirely by means of open-market transactions and changes in the 
minimum  reserve  ratio  of  the  commercial  banks.  But  these  operations  of  the 
Central  Rank  are  closely  bound  up  with  its  discount  policy.  They  serve  the 
purpose  of so  influencing  the  state  of the  money  market  that market  rates a-
dapt  themselves  to  the  discount  rate  of  the  Central  Bank.  On  the  following 
pages  the  refinancing  policy  of  the  Central  Bank  is  first  examined,  then its 
open-market  policy  and  its  minimum  reserve  policy.  Finally,  the  occasional 
dealings  of  the  Central  Bank  in  the  forward  foreign  exchange  market,  the 
Bank's  relations  with  the  public  sector,  particularly  the  Treasury,  and  its 
224  powers of supervision over the banking system are discussed. Table  3 
EASING  AND  TIGHTENING  OF  THE  MONEY  MARKET 
Causes of change in the average 1 ease or tightness of 
the money market 
Easing(+) I  tightening(-) 
(rounded off ro  the nearest 10  million guilders) 
1. Autonomous factors 
a) Transactions of the Government, other than placing and 
repayment  of  Treasury paper (excess  of  expenditure 
(+)/excess of receipts(-) 
b) Contraction(+)/  expansi~n  (-)of the bank note circulation 
c) Fall (+)I  rise  (-) in obligatory cash reserves  because 
of fall/rise in deposits 
d) Sundry causes 
Total 
2. Purchase (+)/sale (-) of gold  and foreign  exchange  by 
the Nederlandsche Bank 
3.  Net result of the  autonomous factors and of net purchase 
of gold  and foreign  exchange by the Nederlandsche Bank 
4. Credits  sranted by ( +) I repaid  to (-)  the  N ederlandsche 
Bank to I by local authorities 
5. Net repayment (+)/placing(-) of Treasury paper by the 
Government to I on the market 
6.  Open~market operations and reserve-ratio changes 
a) 1) Fall  (+)/rise  (-)  in  obligatory  cash  reserves 
because  of lowering I raising of the required reserve 
ratios 
2) Blocked by purchase 
of bonds from I.B.R.D. 2 
b) Open·market operations 
Total 
7. Easing ( +) /  tightening (-) of the money market (::  1 to 6) 
reflected in : 
a) Increase  ( +) of the  banks'  average  free cash reserves 
b) Decrease  ( +) in  the  average  extent of recourse to the 
Nederlandsche Bank by : 
1) Banks 
2) Billbrokers 
8. Average level of ~he surplus (+)/deficit(-) on the money 
market reflected in: 
a) The banks' average free cash reserves 




1 The averages are daily averages for the reserve-ratio period. 
2 See page 239. 
Source: Annual  Reports of the Nederlandsche Bank, 
Comparison between reserve-ratio periods 
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- 225 CHAPTER  1 
REFINANCING  POLICY 
8.  When  banks and brokers wish to finance  their requirements by recourse to 
the  Central  Bank  (see  sec.  21),  they  generally  do  so by  taking  up  credits  in 
current  account  against  pledges  of  Treasury  bills  or  - to  a  lesser extent -· 
other securities.  They can also discount short-term  securities (Treasury paper, 
commercial  bills  and  bank  acceptances)  at the  Central  Bank  as  long  as  they 
have no more  than 105 days to run to maturity. 
a) Terms  for  refinance  credits 
9.  In  the  Netherlands,  as  opposed  to  Germany,  France  and  Belgium,  the 
discounting of commercial bills and bank acceptances is only of minor importance. 
Under an agreement concluded between the  Central Bank and a  number of other 
banks  in  1922,  h<>wever,  certain  bills  used  to  finance  foreign  trade  are  auto-
matically  discountable  if  they  satisfy  certain  conditions  (no  more  than  four 
months'  tenor; amount of discount credit no more than one million guilders) and 
are notified to the Central Bank. At the request of a  bank, bills drawn to finance 
other  types  of  transaction  may  by  special  arrangement  also  be  declared dis-
countable. Discountability enables banks to negotiate these bills on the money 
market, but little use is made of this facility. 
There  are  no  fixed  limits  to  the  eligibility  as  collateral  and  discount-
ability of Treasury paper issued by the  Government.  J-lowever,  within the frame-
work of its credit policy in relation to the Treasury the Central Rank is free  to 
decide whether or not to discount such paper or to accept it as  security for an 
advance (see also page  247). 
Short-term  securities  issued  by  local  authorities  can  also  be  declared 
discountable  or  eligible  as  collateral  by  the  Central  Rank,  but  only  up  to  a 
given  ceiling  fixed  by  the  Bank  - in general  15% of the current revenue shown 
in the last budget of these authorities. As a  result of a  sharp rise in the floating 
debt  of  these  authorities  in  1957  (a  development  that  was  unwelcome  to  the 
C~ntral Bank),  these facilities  have  since been subject to certain conditions; 
the Nederlandsche Bank established the principle that it would grant rediscount 
facilities  up to  the  promised ceiling only if the  local authorities  observed the 
standard limits on floating debt recommended by the Government (25%  of current 
226  revenues);  but  in  order  to prevent hardship,  the  Bank laid down  the  following rules:  the normal rate  of  15%  of current revenue  would continue  to be granted 
only to those  public authorities whose net floating debt did not exceed 25%  of 
current  revenue.  Half of  this  rate  would  be  granted  to  authorities  whose  net 
floating  debt was  between  25%  and  50%  of current revenue.  Public authorities 
whose  floating  debt  exceeded  50%  of  current  revenue  would  be  denied  the 
facility  altogether.  The  appreciable "fall  in  the  local authorifies'  9et floating 
debt  caused  the  Bank  in  the  middle  of  1961  to  bring  its  refinance facilities 
into line with the above-mentioned directives of the Government. Since then only 
local authorities whose net floating debt does not exceed 25%  of their revenues 
can make use of the Bank's credit facilities. 
10.  The  banks  generally  endeavour  to  manage  their  cash  liquidity  in  such 
a  way that they need have no recourse to the Central Bank. This policy is partly 
based on the Central Bank's conception that banks should be able to count only 
temporarily  on  the  assistance  of  the  Central  Bank.  The  Nederlandsche  Bank 
regards access to its refinance facilities as a  privilege and not a  right.  Banks 
are not expected to be permanently indebted to it. 
11.  The rate charged to banks for credits in current ace  oun  t  against pledging 
of  securities  or other paper is  one-half per  cent above  Bank rate.  But as the 
banks as a  rule only call on  the Central Bank for  very short periods, advances 
against security are asked for more often than rediscount credits. 
Moreover,  in  September  1957,  when  credit  expansion  was  particularly 
strong,  the Central Bank introduced for  a  time  a  penalty interest rate; this had 
to be paid by all banks having recourse to the Central Bank which, in its view, 
were  not  exercising  sufficient  restraint  in  granting  credit.  This  rate  was  1% 
above the official discount rate. 
b) The efficacy of refinancing policy 
12.  Any  change  in  the  discount  rate  of  the  Central  Bank  generally affects 
the  debtor and  creditor  interest rates  fixed  by  the  banks;  although  the  banks 
have  a  free  hand  in  fixing  their interest rates  (the  Act  on  Supervision  of  the 
Credit System is  silent on  this  matter),  the  rates  they  charge  to borrowers  are 
often linked to the  official discount rate.  The banks, however, will not usually 
lend at less than 5%,  so that, as a  gap of 2%  between Bank rate and the lending 
rate  of  the  banks  is  normal,  changes  in  Bank  rate  below  the  3%  level have 
little if any effect on the cost of credit. 
Changes  in  Bank  rate,  as  the  President  of  the  Nederlandsche  Bank 
informed the Fadcliffe Committee, affect the demand for credit in varying degree 
according to circumstances,  though  the general view is  that their influence on 
demand is only slight.  The real efficacy of discount policy, however, lies more 
in the fact that business and banking circles regard a  change in Bank rate as a 
pointer  to the  tigthening or easing of credit, and  take  steps accordingly.  As  a  227 Table  4 
RECOURSE  OF  CREDIT  INSTITUTIONS 1  TO  THE  CENTRAL  BANK 
(in millions of guilders) 
Monthly average  Total credits  Advances in current account 
1958  First quarter  5  3 
second quarter  13  10 
third quarter  9  3 
fourth quarter  6  4 
1959  First quarter  '3  3 
second quarter  3  3 
third quarter  2  2 
fourth quarter  18  16· 
1960  F i~st quluter  3  2 
second quarter  7  7 
third quarter  3  3 
fourth quarter  2  2 
1!961  First quarter  3  ...  3 
second quarter  3  3 
third quarter  10  10 
fourth quarter  50  23 
l·Commercial  banks, central  institUtions of the agricultural credit banks and security credit institu-
ti.ons (" effectenkredietins  tellingen "). 
Source: Annual Reports of the Nederlandsche Bank. 
rule,  a  change  in  Bank rate  is not an isolated event; it is made in relation to 
the  aims  of  the  Central  Bank's  money-market  policy.  In  the  normal  course  of 
monetary  and  credit  policy  in  the  Netherlands  the  Central  Bank  takes  simul-
taneous  measures  directly  affecting  bank  liquidity  even if money-market  rates 
are expected to be in line with  Bank rate, since, as  stated above, it is  on~y in 
.exceptional cases  that Dutch banks  - in contrast to those in  France, Belgium 
and  Germany  - are  indebted  to  the  Central  Bank  through ·rediscounting.  (see 
Table 4). 
13.  In the  early post-war years,  the Central Bank did not yet have the neces-
sary instruments  of money-market  policy at its  disposal,  so  that money-market 
rates were well below Bank rate for  several years, although the latter was only 
2~  %.  When  a  large increase in bank credit took place during the Korean crisis, 
restrictive  measures  were.  called for  and  the  Central  Bank raised its discount 
rate first· to  3%  and  then to 4%.  In  order  to  make  these rates effective in spite 
of  the  high  le~el of bank liquidity,  the  Central Bank used certain powers  that 
had  been  conferred  upon  it during  the  currency  reform  of  1945  .....  powers  that 
228  authorized it to direct the commercial banks  not to allow their liquid reserves, Diagram 
BANK  RATE  AND  INTEREST  RATES  ON  THE  MONEY  AND  CAPITAL  MARKETS 
% 
FMAMJ J  ASONDJ FMAMJ J  ASONDJ FMAMJJ ASONDJ  FMAMJ J  ASOND 
1957  1958  1959  1960 
a. average yield of 9  Government loans at 3%,  3~%  and 3~% 
b.  Bank rate 
c.  market discount rate for three-month Treasury bills 
d. call-money rate 
Source: Annual Reports of the Nederlandsche Bank. 
including  Treasury bills,  to fall below  a  certain  limit or,  alternatively,  not to 
extend  their  !endings  beyond  a  certain  limit  without  having  recourse  to  the 
Central Bank.  Consequently, although  the  banking system remained very liquid, 
it was forced "in the Bank"  and Bank rate was thus made effective. 
The experiences gained in that period led in 1952 to an agreement between 
the  Treasury and  the  Central Bank,  enabling the  latter to effect its own  open-
market  transactions.  The  Bank  took  a  further  step  towards  an  active  money-
market  policy  in  1954  by  concluding  a  gentlem~n'  s  agreement  with  the  most 
important  commercial  banks  and  th.e  central  institutions  of  the  agricultural 
credit banks which  enabled the  Bank to institute a  system of minimum reserves.  229 CHAPTER  2 
OPEN-MARKET  POLICY 
14.  For  the  purposes  of its  open-market_ transactions  'the Central Bank uses 
only short and medium-term Treasury bills. The Bank Act of 1948 does authorize 
the  purchase  and  sale  of  Governm~nt or  Government -guaranteed  bonds  quoted 
on  the  Stock Exchange,  but the Central Bank has no stock of such securities. 
a) Legal  foundations 
15.  The  right  of  the  Central  Bank  to  conduct  open-market  business  is  laid 
down  by the Bank Act of  23  April 1948, in which  the  bank is authorized to buy 
and sell the following securities: 
a) Bills  accepted  by  banks  and  bankers  established  in  the  Netherlands  and 
drawn at a  tenor which conforms with customary usances ; 
b) Treasury bills ; 
c) Government bonds, or bonds  for  which the  Dutch  Government has guaranteed 
payment  of interest and  amortization,  provided  that  such  bonds  are  officially 
quoted on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. 
16.  Although  the  Central  Bank has  been  empowered  to  conduct open-market 
transactions since 1937 (on the basis of the earlier Bank Act), it has only been 
able to apply this policy itself since 1952.  Previously it was  the Treasury that 
operated on the money market through its own agent, even when its cash balances 
were  sufficient  to  cover  current  financial  needs ;  to  that  extent it  was  the 
Treasury's task rather than the Central Bank's to mop up surplus bank liquidity. 
In the 1952 agreement between the Treasury and the Central Bank, respon-
sibility for  open-market poli.cy  was  transferred to the  Central Bank. Since then 
Treasury  policy has  been to limit the issue of Treasury paper basically to re-
newals of paper falling due.lt does happeq, of course, that the Treasury supplies 
to  the  market  a  greater  or  lesser quantity  of  short-term  paper  than falls  due. 
In such cases there is close co-operation between the Treasury and the Central 
Bank. 
17.  At  the  time  when  the  agreement  was  concluded,  the  Central  Bank  had 
claims totalling 2 100 million guilders on the Treasury, arising from  the transfer 
230  of its  old Reichsmark balances· to the  Treasury, 800 million  guilders  of which was  in  the  form  of  Treasury  bills,  while  the  rest was  a  book  claim.  In  the 
course of its first open-market operations, the Central Bank had already sold a 
large  part  of  its  stock  of  Treasury  bills;  it was  able  to  continue  its  open• 
market operations thanks to the Government's readiness to convert the remaining 
book debt into Treasury bills as and when the  Bank needed them.  But in 1956 
the  Treasury  discharged  the  rest  of  its  debt  to  the  Central  Bank  by  using 
counterpart funds  from  Marshall Aid.  The strategic reserve of the Central Bank 
was later supplemented by the transfer of its claims on  the EPU and Argentina 
to the State. 
These repayments  left the  Central Bank in some  doubt as  to whether its 
portfolio  of  open-market  paper  would  still suffice  to  control the  money  market 
effectively, particularly in view of  the  increasing liquidity arising from  foreign 
exchange  surpluses.  It  was  mainly  these  considerations  that  prompted  the 
·agreement  with  the  banks  on  the  introduction  of  a  minimum  reserve  system. 
b) Structure of the money market 
18.  Dealings  on the money market in the Netherlands are mainly in short and 
medium-term  securities  issued  by  public  authorities.  However,  only  Treasury 
bills and bonds are of any importance to the Central Bank's open-market policy. 
Treasury  bills  (promessen) are  registered securities with  a  currency of up to a 
year; Treasury bonds  (biljetten) on  the other hand are bearer securities with a 
period  of  over  a  year  and  up  to  five  years.  Half-yearly  interest  coupons  are 
attached  to  these  bonds. 
From  Table  5  (page  232)  - "Short  and medium-·term  Treasury  paper in 
circulationu  - it  will  be  seen  that  the  greater  part  of  money- market  paper 
consists of Treasury bonds  with original currency periods  of one to five years. 
This proportion of longer-term Treasury paper has become even larger in recent 
years as a  result of the Treasury's general funding policy. 
19.  Table 5 also throws light on the structure of the money market and shows 
that  - in contrast to the  situation in Germany  - it is not only the banks that 
buy  Treasury  paper.  In  1953  the  commercial  banks'  share  of  the  short  and 
medium-term  Treasury  paper  in  circulation  was  as  much  as  68%,  but  it had 
dropped  to  41%  by  the  end of  1956 and has  changed only  slightly since then. 
The proportion held by the agricultural credit banks on the other hand, increased 
considerably  - from  8%  at the  end  of 1953  to  21%  at the  end of 1961. Other 
investors are official and semi-official bodies,  institutional investors  - mainly 
savings  institutions  - as well as  brokers,  business  concerns  and private  in-
dividuals. 
20.  Through its own agent the Treasury is the most important issuer of Trea~­
ury  paper  on  the  money  market.  Whereas  the  Treasury  used  to  sell Treasury 
bills  at rates  fixed  before-hand,  since 1956  issues have  been made  by public  231 Table  5 
SHORT  AND  MEDIUM-TERM  TREASURY  PAPER 
IN  CIRCULATION 
(in millions of guilders) 
Treasury bills  ( schatkistpro· 
messen - dated one year) 
Treasury bonds ( schatkistbil· 




Agricultural  credit banks and 
their central institutions 
Central  Bank,  under  "repur· 
chase agreements" 2 
Banks 
Public and semi-public bodies 
Institutional investors 
Others 
Treasury certificates  (dated 
more than 5 years) 3 
Held by: 
Commercial banks 
Agricultural  cr~dit banks and 
their central institutions 
1  Generally 2, 3 and 5 years. 






3099  68% 
395  8% 
- -
3494  76% 
307  7% 
239  5% 
543  12% 
4583  100% 
End 1956  End 1960  End 1961 
114  228  434 
2679  2666  2 439 
-- -- --
2793  2894  2873 
1140  41%  1228  42%  1169  41% 
257  9%  585  20%  621  21% 
- - 64  2%  - -
1397  50%  1877  64%  1790  62% 
347  13%  285  10% 
309  11%  307  11%  1083  38% 
740  26%  425  15% 
2793  100%  2894  100%  2873  100% 
1200  1'200  1,200 
1127  94%  1125  94%  1125  94% 
73  6%  75  6%  75  6% 
3 Subscribed by the banks under the gentlemen's agreement of 1954; dated 8, 10 or 12  years. 
232  Source: Nederlandsche Bank. tender  only.  The  Treasury's  agent offers  the  market Treasury bills  with  fixed 
periods to maturity ; dealers on the market announce the rates at which they are 
prepared  to  take  up  given  amounts;  the  Treasury  determines  the  rate  in the 
light  of  the  tenders  received.  All  applicants  who  tendered  at  a  lower  rate 
receive a  full allocation; those who tendered at the rate agreed by the Treasury 
have theirapplications allottedin full or in part, as the case may be. For issues 
of  Treasury  bonds,  on  the  other  hand,  the  agent  fixes  as  formerly,  without 
holding tenders, the interest rate at which applicants can buy. 
21.  Treasury  bills  and  call and  short-term  money  are  dealt  in  only  by  tele-
phone  through  independent  brokers  (wisselmakelaars),  who  give  quotations  for 
the  various  periods  to  maturity.  The  function  of  th_es.e  brokers  can  best be 
understood  from  historical developments.  Before  1926  they  functioned  only as 
inter.mediaries in money  market and exchange business. They were  brokers who 
held no stocks  of money-market paper for  their own account. In ·1926, however, 
the  Central Bank recognized them as discount brokers  and also accorded them 
special  facilities  for  borrowing  against  security.  Since  then  the  brokers  have 
held  their own  stocks of bills  and Treasury paper.  They finance  these stocks, 
which  since  1945  have  consisted  mainly  of  Treasury  bills  by  taking  up  call 
money  at the  banks. If liquidity difficulties  oblige  the  lenders  to  call in their 
loans, the brokers can· obtain cash from  the Central Bank by selling it Treasury 
bills  or  bonds  or  by  borrowing  on  security.  The  Central  Bank  has  given· the 
brokers the special facility of discounting a  given proportion of their bill holdings 
at the old rate on the day of any change in Bank rate. 
The brokers act as a  buffer between the banks and the Central Bank. But 
they  have  nothing  like  the  importance  of  the  discount  houses  in  England, 
which alone have access to rediscount credit at the Bank of England. 
c) The efficacy of open-market policy 
22.  The Central Bank's open-market transactions over longer periods influenced 
the  situation  on  the  money  market  only  in  a  passive  ~ense  since  the  Bank 
limited itself to buying or selling money-market paper at market rates according 
to  the  needs  of the market.  From  1952  to  1955  and in  1958,  for  instance,  the 
Bank  mopped  up  the  surplus. liquidity  resulting  from  its  purchases  of foreign 
exchange.  This  policy  was  applied  flexibly.  Such  temporary  shortages  on  the 
money  market as  arose  during long periods  of abundant liquidity  were  elimina-
ted by the Central Bank's purchase of short-term securities. 
In order to allevia  ~e short-term liquidity difficulties on the money market-
resulting, for  instance, from  seasonal fluctuations  in tax revenue and payments 
falling  due  at the  end  of  the  accounting  year  - the. Bank ,Pas  also  taken  up 
m~ney-market  securities  in  accordance  with  "repurchase  agreements",  under 
which  the  banks  undertake  to  buy  back  after  a  stipulated  period  securities 
sold to the Central Bank.  233 234 
23.  The Central Bank's money-market policy, however, has also at times had 
an  active  influence  on  the  situation  of  the  money  market  and  on  the  money-
market  rate.  At  the  beginning  of  1956  the  Bank  caused a  rise in  the money-
market rate .by  selling five-year Treasury bonds at increasing rates. From 1956 
to 1957 the  Bank took no securities from  the market, despite the contraction of 
the  money  market  resulting  from  a  deficit  on  the  balance  of  payments,  and 
consequently it did not arrest the considerable rise of money-market rates (see 
diagram  on  page  229 and Table 6  on  page  235). Only by redU'cing  the minimum 
reserve ratio - and that with  some hesitation - did the Central Bank ease the 
market. Table  6 
MOVEMENTS  OF  OPEN  MARKET  PORTFOLIO  OF 
CENTRAL  BANK 1 
(in millions of guilders) 
Treasury bills and bonds 
Bought  Redeemed  Bought on  Sold on 
fro.!Jl  by  open  open 
Treasury 2  Treasury (-)  market  market 
1  2  3  4 
1952  - - 700  - - 649 
1953  +  600  - - - 235 
1954  - - +  98  - 255 
1955  - - +  141  - 179 
1956  +  275  - - - 135 
1957  +  68  - - -
1958  +  156  - 52  +  3483  - 799 
1959  +  402  - 290  +  296  - 234 
1960  +  146  - 246  +  55  - 126 
1961  +  451  - 343  +  425  - 161. 
1 Excluding movements under repurchase agreements (see page  233). 




Total  bonds 
changes  at end 
of year 
5  6 
- 1349  151 
+  366  517 
- 157  360 
- 38  322 
+  138  460 
+  68  528 
- 347  181 
+  174  355 
- 171  184 
+  3361  5204 
a) In  persuance  of  the  agreement  as  to  the  taking-over  by  the  Government  of  the consolidated 
claim  on  Argentina:  1957:  fl.  68  million,  1958:  fl.  56  million,  1959:  fl.  40  million  1960: 
fl.  2 0  million ; 
b) The exchange of State ledger debt for  Treasury bills in accordance with agreement of 26 Febru-
ary l947: 1958: fl. 100 million; 
c) The taking-over of consolidated net claims on  EPU countries in  accordance with an agreement: 
1959:  fl.  362  million,  1960:  fl.  126  million;  1961:  fl.161million;  the  1960  and  1961 figures 
refer  to  paper  redeepted  on  maturity  by  the  Treasury,  which  the  Central  Bank had  sold  on  the 
open market  from  its own  portfolio. 
d) Partly representing funds  for IMF-drawing of Great Britain in guilders. 
3  Including fl.  100 million bought abroad. 
4 Taking  into account fl.  36  million  representing Treasury  paper bought by  foreign Central banks 
for investment of guilder balances held with the Nederlandsche Bank. 
Source: Annual Reports of the Nederlandsche Bank.  235 CHAPTER  3 
MINIMUM  RESERVE  POLICY 
24.  A  minimum  reserve  system  was  introduced  into  the  Netherlands  for  the 
first time in 1954. The Central Bank concluded a  gentlemen's agreement in that 
year with  the  most important commercial banks and the  two central institutions 
of the agricultural credit banks,  according to which  the'se  banks declared their 
readiness  to  maintain  minimum  balances  at  the  Central  Bank at a  level to be 
determined  by  the  Central  Bank  within  certain  limits.  The  explanatory  memo-
randum  stated  that the  banks  were  thus  participating in  financing  the  Central 
Bank's gold and foreign exchange reserves. 
The conclusion of this agreement must be viewed against  the  background 
of  the  liquidity  situation in  1952  and  1953.  In  1952  1. 700 million and in  1953 
another  800  million  guilders  in  cash had accrued to  the  banks  as  a  result of 
sales  of foreign  exchange  to  the  Central  Bank.  The Treasury and  the  Central 
Bank did, it is true, skim off this surplus liquidity by selling Treasury bills and 
bonds.  But the  rates  for  twelve-month  Treasury bills  dropped to  0.4%  in 1953. 
The  Central  Bank was  thus  faced  with  the  question how  it could  continue  to 
control  the  money  market  without  losing  its  holdings  of  Treasury  paper  too 
quickly. 
25.  The  banks  were  all  the  more  ready  to  accept  certain  minimum  reserve 
requirements since they were allowed to convert some of their short and medium-
term  Treasury  bills  into  higher-yielding  Government  bonds.  The  banks  that 
were party to the agreement could take 8, 10 or  12-year certificates (schatkist-
certificaten) yielding interest  at  2  5/8%,  2 3/4%  or  2 7/8%  in  return  for  their 
almost  interest-free  Treasury  paper.  They had  to  undertake,  of course,  not to 
sell or  pledge these Government bonds  other than to the Central Bank or banks 
participating  in  the  agreement.  The  restriction  on  the sale or  pledging  these 
papers ceases once the Nederlandsche Bank has acquired them. 
The Central Bank also declared its readiness to grant advances, if  needed, 
to  the  parties  to the agreement against pledges  of these  Treasury certificates 
hnder certain circumstances and up to certain limits.  When  the  loans taken up 
in  this  way  run  wi:thout  interruption  for  more  than a  year,  the  borrowing bank 
236  can sell the paper to the Central Bank. a) The legal basis of the  minimum reserve system 
26.  Article 10, paragraph 5a of the Act of 18 J  anuar)' 1952 on the supervision 
~f the credit system - passed to implement Article 9 of the Bank Act of 23 April 
1948  - gives  the  Central  Bank  the  right  to  ask  the  banks  registered with 'it 
to  hold balances  on  current account at the  Central Bank in a  given proportion 
to the deposits accepted by them. 
On  this  basis the  Central  Bank  could  have  issued  a  regulation  to  the 
desired effect, but it preferred to conclude with the banks a  gentlemen's agree-
ment on· the  holding of minimum reserves, because the  1952 Act stipulates that 
such measures shall be valid only for ·a  year, with the possibility of extension 
for at most another year, and the Act itself was due to expire on 1  January 1955. 
In point of fact, it has always  been extended and is still valid today; the most 
recent  tex~ is of 21  June  1956 (where  the relevant passage is Article 10, para-
graph  7a). 
· b) Credit institutions subject to the minimum reserve obligation 
27.  The  agreement  on the  maintenance  of-·minimum  reserves  was  concluded 
with  thirty-nine  commercial banks  and  the  two central institutions  of the  agri-
cultural  credit  banks.  Deposits  at these  thirty-nine  banks  at the  end  of 1954 
accounted  for  97% . of  all deposits  held  at  commercial  banks,  while  the  other 
·eighty or so commercial banks shared the remaining 3%. 
Since July 1957 the postal cheque and giro transfer service has also been 
obliged to hold minimum reserves at the Central Bank. Its minimum reserve ratio 
was originally decided by the  Ministers of Finance and of Transport and Water-
ways  some  little  time  after  changes  were  made  in  the  reserve  ratios  for  the 
. banks  participating  in  the  gentlemen's  agreement.  With  effect  from  1  Jan-
uary  1959  the  general regulation  applies  also to  the  postal  cheque  and  giro 
transfer  service,  but  with  the  restriction  that changes  in  the  minimum  reserve 
ratio do not come into force for this institution until one month  later. 
The  so-called  security  credit  institutions  (effectenkredietinstellingen), 
which  also accept deposits,  were  not included in  the  minimum  reserve  system 
because  of  their  relatively  low  total  deposits.  As  they  only  accept  savings 
deposits,  the  savings  banks  are  not subject  to  minimum  reserve requirements. 
The  agricultural  credit  banks  affiliated  to  the  two  central  institutions  partic-
ipating in the  agreement are indirectly subject to minimum  reserve obligations. 
c) Calculation of the  mi17;imum  reserves 
28.  The basis for  the calculation of the required minimum reserves (verplichte 
kasreserve)  consists  in  certain  deposits  and  other  liabilities (toevertrouwde  237 gelden)  accepted  by  the  commercial  banks  and  the  two  central  institutions 
mentioned above.  These are the  following items  on  the liabilities side of bank 
balance  sheets : 
a) Customers' sight and time deposits; 
b) Sight and  time deposits  of credit institutions  not participating in  the agree-
ment and  savings  banks; 
c) Other short-term liabilities in the nature of deposits. 
Foreign  currency  liabilities  and  savings deposits  do  not  come  under the 
minimum reserve obligation. 
In  calculating  the  minimum  reserves  of  the  two  central  institutions  of 
the  agricultural  credit  banks,  the  balances  held  with  them  by  their  member 
associations are reduced by an amount corresponding to the proportion of savings 
deposits in  the total deposits held by those associations. The savings deposits 
of  the  agricultural  credit  banks  are  thus  excluded  from  all  minimum  reserve 
obligations, direct  or indirect. 
29.  In  the  case  of  institutions  with  relatively low  total  deposits  the  first 
fl.  10  million  of liabilities  subject to  the  minimum  reserve  obligation  are  ex-
empted and a  further fl.  50 million are only subject to half  the  current minimum 
reserve ratio. 
For  the  commercial  banks  the  average  minimum  reserve  to  be  held  is 
computed  on  the basis  of  the  volume  of the  above-mentioned deposits  and lia-
bilities  at the  end of  each  month.  The  minimum  reserve  commitment  thus  cal-
culated must  be  discharged as an average over a  period beginning on  the first 
business day after the 21st of the month and ending on the 21st of the following 
month.  (If,  for  instance,  the  volume  of  deposits  subject  to  minimum  reserve 
obligation  is  determined  at  the  end  of  March  1961,  average  minimum  reserve 
balances calculated on this basis must be held at the Central Bank from  22  March 
to  21  April  1961).  The  minimum  reserves  of  the  agricultural credit banks are 
calculated on the basis of the calendar month. 
The obligation to hold minimum reserves only on  monthly average enables 
the banks - just as in Germany - to compensate for falling short of the  minimum 
reserve  requirements  on  some days  by exceeding them on others.  The minimum 
reserve balances are thus  to some extent comparable with Central Bank bal~nces 
that can be withdrawn on demand. 
d) The minimum rese-rve ratio 
30.  The minimum reserve ratios apply without distinction to all banks deposits 
and  liabilities  subject  to  the  minimum  reserve  obligation.  The  February  1954 
238  agreement  fixed  a  ceiling of  15%,  but the  Central  Bank has announced  that it ·~ 
will not raise the minimum reserves above 10%  of the relevant liabilities without 
first selling a  considerable part of its open-market holdings and consulting the 
banks. The need for this has never yet arisen, however. 
e) Interest and penalty interest rates 
31.  The balances held as minimum reserves on current account at the Central 
Bank  bear  no  interest. On  the  other hand,  there  is no  provision  in the  Dutch 
m1mmum  reserve  regulations  for  a  penalty  interest  rate  for  failing  to  meet 
minimum  reserve  obligations. 
f)  The  efficacy of minimum reserve  policy 
32.  Under  the  terms  of  the  agreement  between  the  Central  Bank  and  the 
banks  subject  to  minimum  reserve  regulations  the  Central  Bank  fixes  the  per-
centage  of  minimum  reserves  in the  light of the movement  of gold and foreign 
exchange  reserves  and the  reasons  for  that  movement.  The  President  of  the 
Central  Bank told the  Radcliffe  Committee  that this  could mean,  for  instance, 
that a  drop in gold and foreign  exchange reserves  would  justify a  reduction in 
the  minimum  reserve  ratio if it were  accompanied  by  a  fall  in  customers'  de-
posits,  but  that  a  loss  of foreign  exchange  accompanied  by  credit expansion 
would be no incentive to reduce minimum reserves. 
33.  Certain  structural  factors  in  th~  Dutch  economy  give  rise  to  sharp dif-
ferences  between the minimum  reserve  system - and open-market operations  -
in  the  Netherlands  and  the  corresponding measures  of Central  Bank policy in 
larger countries such as the United States. In his  memorandum presented  to the 
Radcliffe  Committee  the  President  of  the  Netherlands  Bank  stated  that  in 
larger countries foreign trade had slight influence on bank liquidity, whereas in 
the Netherlands  - where foreign trade played a  very important part in the econ-
omy  - any excessive credit expansibn resulted immediately in a  deficit on  the 
balance of payments, since about one third of national expenditure went abroad. 
Any  credit expansion  therefore had  a  powerful direct effect on  the  liquidity of 
the  banks,  whose  deposits increased much  less  than  their !endings  and which 
therefore  very  soon  got  into  liquidity  difficulties.  Nevertheless,  the  minimum 
reserve system performed a  useful service even in a  small country like Holland. 
But  the  differences  between Holland  and  a  country  such  as  the  United States 
had to be  borne in mind.  It woulEl  otherwise be difficult to understand why  the 
Netherlands  had  kept its  minimum  reserve  ratio high  even  when  the  business 
trend was quiet but reduced it in periods of excessive expansion and increased 
it  again  during  a  recession,  whereas  the  United  States  rightly  pursued  the 
c;>pposite  policy. 
34.  Table  7  on  page  241  shows ·that the  Central  Bank;  during  the period of 
stable or only slightly rising foreign exchange reserves in 1954  and 1955, kept  239 '240 
the  mlntmum  reserve  ratio  unchanged  at  10%  almost  until  March  1956,  after 
having increased it gradually during the  early months after the  agreement came 
into  force.  From  April  1956,  when  both  foreign  exchange  reserves  and  bank 
deposits were dwindling, the reserve ratio was gradually reduced until it touched 
bottom  at  4%  in  October  1957.  From  February  1958  it was  again increased by 
stages, reaching 10%  in August 1958. When  in April 1959 the banks party to the 
agreement took over from  the World  Bank the outstanding bonds (fl. 207  million) 
of  a  World  Bank  loan  granted  to  the  Dutch  Government  in  1947,  the  Central 
Bank  supported  the  transaction  by  lowering  the  reserve  ratio  to  7%.  The  net 
effect of these operations was to leave the, liquidity of the money market undis-
turbed.  A  further  reduction  to  6%  was  made  in  July 1959,  but _only  for  one 
monthly_ accounting  period,  in  view  of  the  issue  of ·a  Government  loan.  From 
July 1960 the ratio was  put up three times (July 1960, January and April 1961), 
finally reaching 10%, to absorb the bank liquidity resulting from foreign exchange 
surpluses. In August 1961, however, the Central Bank again cut the ·ratio to 8% 
to  facilitate  the  placing  of  a  Government  loan,  among  other  reasons;  in Oc-
tober 1961, in view of the tightening of the money market, resulting from  heavy 
tax payments, the ratio was brought down as low as 6%. 
As  can  be  seen  from  Table  7,  the  Central  Bank in  every case  but one 
increased the minimum reserve ratio by 1%  only of the liabilities subject to the 
minimum  reserve obligation, but often reduced it by larger percentages.  As the 
minimum  reserve ratio for  technical reasons  can only  be altered once a  month, 
this device is not suitable for  cushioning short-term fluctuations, but it can be 
used to skim off or inject a  certain amount of liquidity,  beyond which recourse 
is had to the more flexible open-market policy. Table  7 
MINIMUM-RESERVE  RATIO  AND  BALANCES 
(in millions of guilders) 
Deposits  Minimum- Minimum·  Reserve 
balances 
·  End of month 
at  reserve  reserve  as percentage  banks  ratio  balances '  of deposits 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4 =  3: 1) 
February  1954  5 259  - - -
March  5 330  5  222  4.2 
April  5 388  6  270  ,  5.0 
May  5 517  7  319  5.8 
June  5 720  8  373  6~5 
July  5 806  9  439  7,6 
August  5 683  10  493  8,7 
September  5 642  10  481  85 
October  5 688  10  478  8.4 
November  5 761  10  487  8,5 
December  5 641  10  495  8,8 
January  1955  5 651  8  387  6.8 
February  5 612  10  483  8.6 
March  5 677  10  481  8,5 
April  5 659  10  485  8,6 
May  5 689  10  482  8~5 
June  5 845  10  485  8.3 
July  5 975  10  500  8.4 
August  5 885  10  514  8,7 
September  5 931  10  505  8.5 
October  6 079  10  508  8.4 
November  6 186  10.  526  8.5 
December  6 066  10  537  8.9 
January  1956  5 975  10  525  8.8 
February  5 975  10  516  8.6 
March  6 014  110  516  8,6 
April  5 914  8  415  7,0 
May  6 066  9  459  7.6 
June  5 947  9  460  7.7 
July  5 951  9  461  7.7 
August  5 935  9  457  7,7 
September  5 783  9  446  7.7 
October  5 652  7  338  6.0 
November  5 622  7  334  5.9 
December  5 664  7  338  6.0 
January  1957  5 650  7  337  6.0 
February  5 671  7  339  6.0 
March  5 707  6  294  5.2 
April  5 712  6  292  5.1 
May  5 785  6  297  5.1 
June  5 777  6  295  5.1 
July  5 860  6  300  5.1 
August  5 543  6  282  5,1 
September  5 296  6  270  5.1 
October  5 168  4  174  3.4 
November  5213  4  176  3.4 
De<:ember  5 303  4  c'  180  3.4  241 Table  7  (continued) 
Deposits  Minimum·  Minimum·  Reserve 
balances 
End of month  at  reserve  reserve 
banks  ratio  balances  as percentage 
of deposits 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4 = 3: 1) 
January  1958  5 487  4  187  3.4 
February  5 744  5  247  4.3 
March  5 832  6  302  5.2 
April  5 797  6  301  5.2 
May  5 892  7  353  6~0 
June  5 837  8  402  6.9 
July  6 040  9  467  7.7 
August  6  143  10  534  8.7 
September  6 030  10  522  8.7 
October  5 880  10  506  8.6 
November  6 200  10  537  8.7 
December  6 303  10  547  8.7 
January  1959  6 683  10  586  8.8 
February  6 739  10  594  8.8 
March  6 890  10  607  8.8 
April  6 989  7  433  6.2 
May  6 983  7  432  6,2 
June  6 845  6  360  5.3 
July  6 998  7  429  6.1 
August  7 087  7  435  6,1 
September  6 930  7  426  . 6,1 
October  6 788  7  416  6.1 
November  7 042  7  430  6.1 
December  7  106  7  435  6.1 
January  1960  7 332  7  451  6,2 
February  7 290  7  450  6.2 
March  7 455  7  463  6.2 
April  7 482  7  464  6.2 
May  7 460  7  458  6.1 
June  7 506  7  463  6.2 
July  7 686  8  543  7.0 
August  7 920  8  561  7.1 
September  7 790  8  550  7.1 
October  7 680  8  543  7.1 
November  7 759  8  549  7.1 
December  7 630  8  540  7.1 
January  1961  8  111  9  650  8.0 
February  8  246  9  660  8.0 
March  8 284  9  664  8.0 
April  8  259  10  736  8,9 
May  8  193  10  727  8,9 
June  8268  10  733  8.9 
July  8  282  10  736  8.9 
August  8 421  8  601  7.1 
September  8 209  8  583  7.1 
October  7 640  6  405  5.3 
November  7 731  6  413  5.3 
Dcccember  7 718  6  410  5.3 
242  Source: Annual Reports of the Nederlandsche Bank. CHAPTER  4 
OTHER  INSTRUMENTS  OF  MONETARY  POLICY 
35.  Apart  from  those  described  in  previous  sections,  the  Central  Bank has 
several other means of influencing bank liquidity and lending. 
These are based on  gentlemen's agreements concluded with  the  banks in 
pursuance of the Act on the supervision of the credit system passed in 1952 and 
extensively  amended  in  1956.  Under  this  Act  the  Central  Bank  can  in  fact: 
a) issue  regulations  on  minimum  liquidity,  i.e.  on  the  ratio  of  liquid assets 
to deposits ; 
b) issue regulations on maximum credits and/ or investments; 
c) prohibit or restrict certain forms  of credit. 
This legislation assumes, however, that the Central Bank will first attempt 
to conclude gentlemen's agreements with the banks on any measures to be taken. 
Only  if agreement  is  not  reached  can  the  Bank  issue  the  general directives 
mentioned above,  and they must have  the approval of the  Finance Minister and 
be  presented for ratification by Parliament within  three  months.  Their validity 
is limited to a  year, and they may be extended once only. 
36.  In  1954,  then,  after the  lapse of the  authorization  mentioned at the  be-
ginning of this  report (see  page  219) for  the imposition of overall quantitative 
restrictions,  the  Central  Bank  concluded  two  agreements  with  the  banks  con-
cerned.  One  of  them  related  to  th~ maintenance  of a  certain ratio between the 
liquid  assets  of  a  bank  and  its  customers'  deposits;  the  other  enabled  the 
Central Bank, if circumstances so required, to ask the banks not to lend above 
a  certain ceiling to be fixed later. 
These directives were not to be hard and fast, but if the  banks fell short 
of  the  minimum  ratio or  went above  the  credit ceiling they  would  have had to 
cover the difference by recourse to the Central Bank. 
37.  In  the event,  the directives  were never applied.  In  May  1960 the Central 
Ban'k signed a  ne:w  agreement with the banks and agricultural credit institutions 
under  which  they  could  be  required  to  hold  supplementary  balances  at  the 
Central Bank.  Whereas  minimum reserves are normally ca'lculated on customers' 
deposits  and  other liabilities,  this  agreement  introduces  a  broader regulation 
under  which  a  further  reserve  can  be  required  in  relation  to  credits  granted.  243 In short, the system now adopted provides the power to control banks, whenever: 
they  lend above a  certain fixed ceiling, to maintain a  given percentage of  this 
excess as a  non-interest-bearing deposit at the Central Ban~ 
The  arrangement is as  follows :  the  Central ·Bank  can  advise  the  com; 
mercia!  banks  and  the  agricultural credit institutions  not to allow their short• 
term advances to business concerns and private individuals to rise by more than 
a  given  percentage  (x  %)  per  annum.  A  bank will remain  within  this  norm,  if 
the  average  of its  short-term !endings,  calculated  from  the  last three  monthly 
balance sheets submitted to the Central Bank, 
a) has  not  risen  by  more  than  x  % per  annum  over  the  average  fpr  the  corre-
sponding months of a  reference year to be decided; 
b) or  has  not  risen  by  more  than x/  12%  per  month  over  the  average  for  three 
months of a  reference quarter to be decided. 
If the  banks that are parties to this agreement do not as a  whole keep to 
these  norms,  the  Central Bank can require  those of them which have failed to 
observe  either  norm  to  hold  a  non-interest-bearing  balance  with  the  Central 
Bank  in  addition  to  the  normal  minimum  reserve.  The  amount of  this  balance 
will  be  fixed  as  a  percentage  (not  more  than  100) of  the  smallest amount by 
which one of the norms has been exceeded. 
However,  the  first  fl.  100 000  of  the  excess  is  to  be  exempt  from  the 
obligation ;  one quarter of the  full percentage rate will be applied to a  further 
fl.  400 000  in  excess,  and  half  the  percentage  to  the  next  f1. 500 000.  The 
amount  of  the  balance  to  be  kept at the  Central  Bank  will be  adjusted each 
month to the amount by which the norms are overstepped. 
Should  special  circumstances  make  the  basis  for  the  credit  expansion 
rate  of  a  bank  particularly  low,  the  Central  Bank  may  change  the  reference 
period.  In  addition,  when  lending  increases  by  more  than  the  average  as  a 
result of exceptional factors  but can be expected to revert to normal in a  short 
time,  the Central Bank can, at the request of the bank concerned, postpone the 
obligation  to pay  the whole or  part of a  deposit.  In  the  agreement the Central 
Bank undertook to discuss  with  the  banks the possibility of waiving its appli-
cation if total  lending  within  a  period  of three  months  did  not exceed a  norm 
previously fixed. 
38.  In July 1961 in view of the rise in bank credit, this agreement was applied 
by arrangement - as stipulated-· between the Central Bank and the other banks. 
Having  regard  to  the  expected  growth  rate  of  the  gross  national  product,  the 
banks  were  required not to increase their  total !endings in  1961  by  more  than 
15%  in relation  to the fourth  quarter of 1960, or in any given month in relation 
244  tp the. corresponding month of the previous year. CHAPTER  5 
BANKS'  MONEY  -MARKET  INVESTMENTS  ABROAD 
AND  TRANSACTIONS  OF  THE  NEDERLANDSCHE  BANK 
ONTHE  FORWARD  FOREIGN  EXCHANGE  MARKET 
39.  Whereas  the  banks  that under  the  1954  gentlemen's  agreement had been 
authorized  to  invest  abroad  largely  confined  themselves  until  about  1957  to 
holding  working  balances  to  finance  foreign  trade,  they  later  - especially 
after th.e  return to convertibility and in view of the increasing foreign exchange 
reserves  at  home  and  rising  money  rates  abroad,  particularly  in  the  United 
States  - began to increase their foreign  money-market investments for  reasons 
of  interest  arbitrage.  Table  8  below  shows  that  the  commercial  banks  had 
already  increased  their  investments  on  foreign  money  markets  from  about 
fl.  600 million  to  fl. 700 million in  1958 and up to fl.  1 800 million by the end 
of 1959. 
Table  8 
FOREIGN  EXCHANGE  BALANCES  AND  OTHER  FOREIGN  INVESTMENTS 
OF  COMMERCIAL  BANKS 
(in millions of guilders) 
End of yea~  Total  Foreign exchange  Investments in 
balances  money markets 
1956  551  376  175 
1957  639  466  173 
1958  731  564  167 
1959  1845  1090  755 
1960.  1823  1448  375 
1%1  1444  1243  201 
Source: Annual Reports of the N ederlandsche Bank. 
The  interest rate  policy  of the  Central  Bank in recent years  has aimed 
at  making  the  investment  of  funds  abroad  attractive  to  the  banks ;  special 
incentives for the export of money by offering banks swap facilities thus became 
unnecessary.  However,  the  Central  Bank  intervened  once  in  recent  years  on 
the  forward  foreign  exchange  market in  order  to  exert an indirect influence on 
the  liquidity  of  the  banking  system  and  on  conditions  on  the  money  market. 
This  was  in  September 1957,  when  there  was  h~avy speculative  buying  of  245 246 
forward exchange by bank customers and the banks were buying spot currencies 
to cover their own· forward commitments, and these two factors led to a  reduction 
in central foreign currency reserves and to sharp strains  on  the  money market. 
At  this  time  the  Central  Bank  agreed  to  conclude  forward  foreign  exchange 
transactions  with  the  banks  as  cover  for  their  forward  sales.  In  August and 
September  1957  the  Bank  sold  the  equivalent  of  fl.  390  million,  including 
$78.5 million and DM  103 million, to the banks. This intervention by the Central 
Bank  was  an  exceptional measure  taken in  view  of the  special circumstances 
obtaining at that time. CHAPTER  6 
CASH  MANAGEMENT  AND  BORROWING  OF  PUBLIC  AUTHORITIES 
AND  THEIR  EFFECTS  ON  LIQUIDITY 
40.  The  1948  Bank Act makes  the Central  Bank  the  Treasury's fiscal agent 
and  keeper of its accounts.  The balances  of local authorities  are kept almost 
entirely at other banks. 
The centralization of the  Treasury's  cash resources at the  Central Bank 
is  an  important  factor  in  determining  the  short-term  movement  of liquidity on 
the  money  market,  particularly as  the  Treasury is  by  far  the  biggest receiver 
of tax proceeds. Apart from  small local taxes, the Finance Ministry is the only 
collector of taxes. At the dates when most payments fall due (mainly in the months 
of August to December) the banks part with considerable amounts of cash because 
of  payments  by  their  customers  to  the  Treasury.  The  Central  Bank  takes 
account of the resultant influences on  the money  market by  pursuing a  flexible 
open-market policy. 
The Treasury's quarterly payments  to municipalities, moreover, alleviate 
the consequences of these tax payments on bank liquidity. 
41.  The cash credits that the Central Bank makes available to public author-
ities to finance deficits are of importance from  the liquidity policy aspect. The 
1948  Bank  Law,  as  amended  in 1955  ,  aliows  the  Treasury  credit  from  the 
Central  Bank up to fl.  150  million.  Below  this  limit the  Treasury can at any 
time  take  up  interest-free  advances,  which  must  be  covered  by  deposits  or 
pledges  of Treasury paper.  Above the  limit the  Bank can decide freely  and is 
not  obliged  to  make  cash advances  to the  Treasury  or  to  take  over Treasury 
paper  direct  from  the  Treasury.  The  same  also  applies  to  the  taking  up  of 
Government paper as part of the Bank's open-market policy. 
Between  the  Central  Bank  and  the  Treasury  there  is  a  general  under-
standing  that  the  Treasury  will  refrain  from  inflationary  financing  and  that 
credit should therefore not be granted for  current budget expenditure. However, 
if  the  Treasury's  needs  were  the  result  of difficulties  in  renewing  its  short-
term  debt  on  the  money  market,  the  Central  Bank,  as  its  President  told  the 
Ra,dcliffe  Committee,  would  have  to  regard  the  wishes  of  the  Treasury  in a 
different  light.  In  19?1, for  instance,  when  the  renewal  of Treasury  bills  met 
with difficulties  (and it was  experience at that time  that led to the concept of 
secondary liquidity being developed), the Central Bank gave extensive assistance 
to the·treasury.  247 248 
42.  In  recent years  Treasury  borrowing  has  also had  a  strong  influence on 
bank  liquidity;  it has  often  floated  long-term  loans  beyond  its  current need 
for  funds  anc:l  has  either  applied  the  proceeds  to  repaying  foreign  debts  or 
deposited them with the Central Bank. CHAPTER  7 
DIRECTIVES  ON  SOLVENCY  AND  LIQUIDITY 
43.  To  protect  the  depositor  the  Central  Bank  may  issue certain directives 
on solvency and liquidity. These are: 
a) regulations on the minimum of liquid resources in relation to deposits accepted 
or to particular categories of deposits ; 
b) regulations on the maximum volume  of credit granted or investments made in 
relation to own  capital and reserves; 
c) bans  or  restrictions  on  the  grant  of  certain  types  or  forms  of credit or  of 
credit or of credit above a  given figure; 
d) bans or restrictions on certain types or forms  of investment or on investment 
above a  given figure. 
Coefficient of s'olvency:  Certain advances  and investments involving a  consid-
erable risk element may not exceed five  times the banks'  capital and reserves; 
others  carrying  less  risk  may  not  exceed  ten  times  the  capital  and reserves. 
Coefficient of liquidity:  Liquid resources  must cover 10%  of time deposits and 
equivalent  liabilities  and  30%  of  other  liabilities  - mainly  sight  deposits. 
For time deposits with a  term of- 3 to 10 years the ratio is 5%. 
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253 INTRODUCTORY  REMARKS 
1.  In  1922,  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxembourg  concluded  a  fifty-year  treaty 
of  economic  union  with  Belgium.  Under  thj,s  treaty  trade  and  servi~es between 
these  two  countries  are  - with  a  few  exceptions  - freed  from  customs duties, 
charges  and  quantitative  restrictions  on  imports  or  exports.  Belgium  assumes 
responsibility  for  external  trade  policy  (with  Luxembourg  co-operation)  and 
concludes  trade  and  payments  agreements  on  behalf of the  Economic Union.  In 
1944,  a  jointly  administered  institution  - (Institut  belgo-luxem bourgeois  du 
change) - was set up  to deal with payments transactions with foreign  countries. 
2.  The  treaty  on  the  Belgo-Luxembourg  Economic  Union,  and  subsequent 
Protocols,  contain  regulations  on  the  issue  of bank  notes  by the  Luxembourg 
authorities.  These  form  the  basis  of  a  currency  association  between  Belgium 
and  Luxembourg.  As  Luxembourg has no  Central  Bank,  it is  not in a  position 
to pursue its own  monetary policy in the strict sense of the term. 
Since  the  Luxembourg  banks  regularly  invest  their  liquid -surpluses  in 
call  money  and  short-term  paper  in  the  Belgian  money  market,  it  follows  that 
the  money  and  credit  policy  of  the  Banque  nationale  de  Belgique  has  some, 
though evidently not a  very large, influence on  credit conditions in Luxembourg. 
3.  There  are  several  factors  which  favour  the  participation  of  Luxembourg 
banks in the  Belgian money market.  In 1935, for  instance, the Banque nadonale 
de  Belgique  set up  a  branch  office  and  a  discount office  in  Luxembourg.  The 
branch  office  can  carry  out  all  credit  and  deposit  transactions  in  accordance 
with  the  law  establishing the  Banque  nationale  de  Belgique;  in  fact,  however, 
its  activity is  limited  to  supplying  Luxembourg  with  Belgian  notes  and  coin. 
Occasionally  Luxembourg  banks  have  transfers  to  Belgium  made  through  this 
branch office. 
It is  the  function  of the  discount office  to  guarantee  bills  to  make  them 
negotiable at the branch office of the  Banque nationale de Belgique. In practice, 
however,  the  activities  of  the  discount  office  are  without  much  significance 
since it does  not guarantee  bills payable in  the  Grand Duchy,  whether they are 
made out in Luxembourg or Belgian francs or in any. other currency. 
The  Luxembourg  banking  system  has  its  own  clearing  arrangements  for 
settling  inter-bank  claims.  These  settlements  are  cleared  through  the  Caisse 
d'epargne de l'Etat (State Savings  Bank), with whom  the Luxembourg banks keep 
accourtts; the branch office of the  Banque nationale de  Belgique in Luxembourg  255 takes  no part in  this.  For this reason,  transfers  from  Luxembourg private banks 
to  Belgium are  made  through  the Caisse d' epargne  de l'Etat within the clearing 
system;  the  Caisse  d 'epargne  de  1  'Etat effects  these  transfers  to  the  debit of 
the  accounts  with  its  Belgian  correspondents  and  the  Belgian  Postal Cheque 
Office  or,  when  necessary,  via  the  branch  office  of  the  Banque  nationale  de 
Belgique in Luxembourg. 
4.  The  Luxembourg  banking  system  proper  comprises  the  Caisse  d'epargne 
de  l'Etat (a public corporation),  two  large  banks  and a  number of less important 
credit  institutions.  The  Caisse  d'epargne  de  l'Etat,  which  carries  out  the  fi-
nancial  transactions  of the  State as  well as all other  normal  banking business 
exerts a  certain influence on  the  other credit institutions  because  its volume of 
business  is. as large as that of all the other banks put together. Since  the State 
Savings  Bank has no capital,  it has no interest charge  to meet under this head, 
but it has  to make  considerable appropriations  to  general and special reserves. 
It tends  to set the  pace for  competition  between  banks,  especially with regard 
to ere  di  t  terms . 
The  two large  bant<s  are  the  Banque internationale and the  Banque gene-
rale  du  Luxembourg.  The  capital  of  both  is  linked  to  that  of  Belgian  banks, 
especially  that  of  the  Banque  generale  du  Luxembourg  which  was  formerly  a 
branch  and is now a  subsidiary of the Societe generale de  Belgique. These two 
large  banks  account  for  some  35%  of  the  total  deposits  held  by  Luxembourg 
banks ;  the State Savings  Bank holds  some  50%  of total deposits, so that these 
three  major credit institutions account for  about 85%  of all the  money deposited 
with Luxembourg banks (these figures  refer to the  situation at the end of 1960). 
No  great  importance  attaches  to  the  other  Luxembourg  banks  6r  to  the 
branches  of  foreign  banks in  Luxembourg;  they  account for  some  15%  of total 
deposits. 
a) Liquidity in the economy as a whole 
5.  In  Luxembourg,  as  indeed  in  the  other  Community  countries,  deposits 
with the banks withdrawable within a  month or  less and deposits with the Postal 
Cheque  Office  are  reckoned,  together  with  the note  and  coin in circulation, as 
money  supply  (domestic  liquidity)  or  the  primary  liquidity  of  businesses  and 
private individuals. The money circulating in Luxembourg as legal tender consists 
of Luxembourg  a~d Belgian Treasury notes and coin, as well as Luxembourg and 
Belgian  bank  notes.  Under  an  agreement  of  15  April  1952  (so  far  ratified by 
neither  the  Luxembourg nor the  Belgian  Parliament) the  Luxembourg authorities 
may issue Treasury notes and coin only up to a  certain limit, which is at present 
308.6  million  franc:s.  Luxembourg's  entitlement  to  issue  at  any  given  time  is 
calculated on  the  basis of the  Belgium-Luxembourg population  ratio (at present 
256  29  :  1)  and on  the  approved maximum  amount for  the  issue of Belgian Treasury notes  anq coin (that is, excluding bank notes),  which is at present Bfrs. 7 500 
million,  plus' an absolute  figure  of 50 million  francs.  In the ,past two  years the 
actual  circulation  of  Luxembourg  notes  and  coin  has  been  about  200  million 
francs. 
Luxembourg  notes  and  coin are  issued by  the  Caisse generale  de  l'Etat 
and  the  Banque  internationale de  Luxembourg.  This bank is authorized to issue 
its  own  notes  up to a  value of 20 million francs.  In an agreement with  Bel~ium 
concluded in 1935 it is laid down that Luxembourg notes must not be of a  denom-
ination higher than 100 francs. 
6.  Most  of  the  money  in  circulation  in  Luxembourg  consists  of  Belgian 
notes  and coin, which are legal tender and equivalent to Luxembourg notes and 
coin, whereas Luxembourg currency is not legal tender in Belgium. 
The  total amount  of Belgian notes  and  coin  circulating in Luxembourg is 
not  known.  A  rough  calculation based on  the  population ratio between Belgium 
and Luxembourg gives the following result: on 31  December 1960 Belgian notes 
and  coin  circulating  in  the  Belgo-Luxembourg  Economic  Union  totalled 
126 800 million francs and Luxembourg money circulating in Luxembourg amounted 
to  200 million  francs,  so that  the  total  money  in circulation  was  127 000 mil-
lion  francs.  At  that  time  the  population  of  Belgium  was  9 178 000  and  that of 
Luxembourg  323 000,  making  a  total  of  9 501 000.  Dividing  the  total  note and 
coin  circulation  by  this  total,  we  arrive  at  a  figure  of  13 367  francs  per head. 
On. this  basis  the  total money in circulation in Belgium at the  end of 1960 was 
Bfis.  122 700 million and in Luxembourg 4 300 million (4100 million in Belgian 
and 200 million in Luxembourg notes and coin). 
At the end of 1960, sight deposits with Luxembourg banks, in Luxembourg 
francs  and  to  a  small extent in Belg.Jan  francs,  amounted to about 5 000  million 
and  balances  with  the  Postal  Cheque  Office  which,  like  those  of  the  Caisse 
d'epargne  de  l'Etat,  are  expressed  only  in  Luxembourg  francs,  amounted  to 
about 1000 million francs. Thus the total deposits reckoned in the money supply 
amounted to about 6 000 million francs (see Table 1  - Domestic Liquidity). 
The  notion 
11  near-money 
11  is  also  known  in  Luxembourg.  In  Dutch  termi-
nology,  these  could be  described as  secondary  liquidity.  They include deposits 
for  periods  longer  than 30 days,  ~mounting to  3 400  million at the  end of 1960, 
savings deposits at 6 700 million, and to some extent the liabilities of Luxembourg 
banks  in  respect of sight and  time  deposits  in  foreign  currency,  amounting to 
about 1 800 million  1. 
1 rhis includes  deposits of non-residents,  which  ought  to  be  excluded,  but their amount is prob-
ably not· very large. It is not possible to  isol-ate them  because no distinction  can  be made between 
the resident holders of foreign currency deposits and  the non-resident holders.  257 Table  1 
DOMESTIC  LIQUIDITY 
in million frs. 
31.12.1958  31.12.1959  31.12.1960 
I.  Domestic money supply 
(Primary liquidity) 
Money in circulation : 
Luxembourg notes and coin  191  198  234 
Belgian notes and coin 1  3912  3952  4084 
Cash less holdings at Luxembourg 
-251  -240  -258  banks 
Total  3852  3 910  4060 
Sight deposits 2  4975 
Postal Cheque Accounts  987 
Total  9 270  9 543  10 022 
II. Secondary liquidity 
Time deposits  2744  2983  3 395 
Savings deposits  5794  6 337  6 736 
Short and medium-term Government paper  132  114  101 
Sight and time deposits in foreign 
566  977  1815  currencies with Luxembourg banks 2 
Total  12047 
I  + II - Total domestic liquidity  18 506  19 954  22069 
1 Estimate. 
2 Including  deposits of Belgians  and  other non-residents, which ought to be excluded, but it is ,not 
possible to segregate them. 
Source: Statistical Yearbook  of the Office de la statistique generale, and commissariat au  controle 
des  banques. 
The  secondary liquidity of  the  economy also includes  short and medium-
term government securities such as" Bons du Tresor 
11  or "Bons de la reconstruc-
tion 
11  held  by  business  firms  or  private  individuals  (101  million  francs  at the 
end of 1960). 
8.  In  its  Year-book  the  Statistical  Office  of  Luxembourg  publishes  a  table 
on  the  supply of money.  This does not,  however, include  the  Belgian notes and 
coin  circulating  in  Luxembourg.  A  further  table  shows  customers'  deposits  on 
time  and  savings  accounts.  Further  information  must  be  sought  from  internal 
sources. 
No  analysis is published of the factors affecting the liquidity of the econ-
omy  as  a  whole,  but  some  factors  such as  the  granting  of  credit  and external 
258  transactions can be determined. Table  2 
LIQUIDITY  OF  THE  BANKING  SYSTEM 
in million frs. 
31.12.1958  31.12.1959  31.12.1960 
I.  Cash liquidity 
Notes and coin  251,1  240,0  258,0 
Balances with the Banque nationale 
de Belgique 1  431,6  408,6  297,2 
Total  682,7  648,6  555,2 
II. Potential liquidity 
Balances with foreign banks  1048,1  2 280,5  2389,9\2 
1782,0 J 
Commercial bills (rediscoun  table)  2902,2  2 509,7  3 055,8 
Treasury bills and other 
mobilizable paper  327,3  432,4  560,6 
Total  4 277,6  5 222,6  7 788,3 
I +II  4960,3  5 871,2  8 343,5 
1 The  figures  for  1958  and  1959  include  balances  with  the  Postal Cheque Office and the  Caisse 
d'epargne  de  l'Etat,  which  should not be  incorporated since  they  represent inter-bank liabilities. 
2 In 1960, for the first time, broken down into sight and time deposits abroad, including Belgium; the 
figures  for  1958 and 1959 include only foreign currency holdings other than Belgian francs (in 1960: 
3 27 5 million francs). 
Source: Commissariat au controle des banques, Luxembourg. 
b)  Liquidity of the  banking system 
9.  Usually  the  cash liquidity of  the  banking  system is understood to denote 
the  banks'  holdings  of Central Bank money (notes and coin and balances at  the 
Central  Bank),  and  potential  liquidity means  those  assets of the  banks  which 
can  be  changed into  money  by  recourse  to  the  bank  of issue.  As  Luxembourg 
has  no  Central  Bank,  its  conception of liquidity of  the banking  system differs 
from  that of other countries. 
10.  The banking system's cash liquidity comprises holdings of notes and coin 
and  balances  at the  Banque  nationale de  Belgique.  Moreover,  Luxembourg sta-
tistics also include among liquid resources  the commercial banks' deposits with 
the Postal Cheque Office and the Caisse d'epargne de l'Etat. 
11,  Potential  liquidity  includes  balances  at  foreign  banks  plus  call  money 
credits  granted  and  commercial  and  Treasury  bills  which  can  be  encashed by 
discounting  at  Belgian  banks.  The  Luxembourg  banks  invest  a  large  part of 
their liquid funds in Belgian commercial bills which are certified by the  Banque 
nationale  de  Belgique  and  can  be  discounted  at  any  time  by  the  Institut de  259 260 
reescompte  et  de  garantie  (Rediscount and  Guarantee  Institute)!.  The holdings 
of  Belgian  Treasury bills  are  included in  the  calculation of potential liquidity 
because they can be sold on the Belgian money market. 
Luxembourg Treasury bills can be included in potential liquidity inasmuch 
as,  with  the  approval  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance,  they  can  be  cashed at the 
Luxembourg  Treasury  before  maturity;  Luxembourg  commercial  bills  cannot, 
however,  be  included,  as  the  Banque  nationale  de  Belgique  does  not discount 
either  them  or  Luxembourg  Treasury  bills.  The  Banque  nationale  de  Belgique 
refuses  to  discount  Luxembourg  commercial  or  Treasury  bills  on  the  grounds 
that,  in  view  of  Luxembourg's  right  independently to  alter its  currency parity, 
it is not prepared to accept the exchange risk involved. 
12..  Although  Luxembourg  has  no  Central  Bank  and  the  Luxembourg  money 
and  credit  market  is  to  some  extent  influenced  by  the  policy  of  the  Banque 
nationale  de  Belgique, the  Luxembourg authorities  nevertheless have  powers to 
determine  the  business  policy  of  the  banks.  This  is  done  largely  through the 
interest  rate  policy  of  the  Caisse  d'epargne  de  l'Etat and  the  liquidity ratio, 
which  is  always  a  convenient  instrument.  The  following  chapters  deal  with 
interest  rate  policy,  the  money  market,  Government  handling  of  public  funds 
and borrowing, and the cash and liquidity ratios. 
1 See Instruments of Monetary Policy  in Belgium, page 194. CHAPTER  1 
INTEREST RATE POLICY,  THE MONEY AND CAPITAL MARKETS 
13.  Though  Luxembourg has  no real Central Bank it can be  said, in a  limited 
sense, that the  policy of the  Caisse d'epargne de l'Etat on interest rates has a 
certain  effect  on  the  business  policy  of  the  other  banks.  It is  true  that the 
commercial  banks  can  rediscount  bills  with  the  Caisse  d'epargne  de  l'Etat or 
take  up  loans  against  security  from  it;  but  they  hardly  avail  themselves  of 
the·se  facilities because  the  high surplus  of  foreign  currency keeps  them  suffi-
ciently liquid and they have no need to obtain funds in this way. 
It  is  rather  by  its  volume of business,  which  is  approximately  as  large 
as that of all the other Luxembourg banks put together, that the Caisse d'epargne 
de l'Etat exerts its influence over the other banks ; it has a  commanding position 
on the credit market, that is to say in the fixing of the interest rates charged to 
borrowers. Similarly the deJ>2sit business and borrowing of the Caisse d'epargne 
de  l'Etat have  an effect on  the  other banks.  The interest rates  charged by the 
Caisse  d'epargne  de  l'Etat  can,  therefore  be  considered as  representative  of 
all Luxembourg credit institutions. 
14.  Foreign  influence,  especially  that  of  the  Banque  nationale  de  Belgique, 
must  be  taken  into consideration  in  connection  with  the  interest policy of the 
Caisse  d'epargne  de  l'Etat.  This  bank  has  a  current account overdraft facility 
at the  Banque  nationale de  Belgique  of up to 100  million francs  (at an interest 
rate  equal  to  the  prevailing  Bank  rate)  but it has  never  yet  availed  itself of 
this facility. 
15.  The discount policy of the  B.anque  nationale de  Belgique has therefore no 
direct influence  on  the interest policy of the  Caisse  d'epargne  de l'Etat or, in 
consequence,  on  that of any  other Luxembourg  bank.  The diagram on page  262 
shows that in fixing its lending rate the State Savings Bank is quite independent 
of  the  discount rate  of  the  Banque  nationale  de  Belgique.  No  firm  comparison 
is however possible  between the  two  rates  of interest because  the  Luxembourg 
lending  rate  corresponds  to that charged by the  Belgian banks  which,  though it 
is  not  publicized,  is  thought  to  be  some  1 ~%  higher  than  the  Central Bank's 
discount rate. 
In  view· of the  close  economic  ties  between  Luxembourg  and  Belgium it 
might  be  expected that Belgian  borrowers  would  raise  money in Luxembourg at 
a  rate  of interest which is  sometimes  much  lower thab  in  Belgium.  In general,  261 Diagram  1 
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a) Interest rate of the Caisse d'epargne de 1'Etat (Luxembourg) for short-term advances. 
b) Discount rate of the Banque nationale de Belgique. 
c) Call money rate in Belgium. 
however,  the  Caisse  d'epargne  de  l'Etat  and  other  Luxembourg  banks  grant 
credits  to  residents  only.  For  the  Caisse d'epargne  de  l'Etat this  is  a  matter 
of  principle,  the  object  being  to  keep  interest rates  low  in  Luxembourg.  The 
other  banks  which  are  large  enough  to  contemplate  lending  to  non-residents 
follow  the  s'ame  line,  probably because they are  under  the influence  of Belgian 
banks,  which presunably have  no inclination to provide  Belgian  borrowers  with 
cheaper credit through their Luxembourg subsidiaries. 
16.  The  Luxembourg  banks  keep  most  of  their  liquid  reserves  abroad espe-
cially in Belgium in. the  form  of sight and time  deposits with banks, call money 
credits  and money-market securities.  Only a  very  small proportion is kept with 
262  the branch of the  Banque nationale de Belgique in Luxembourg,  the Luxembourg Postal Cheque Office, the Caisse d'epargne de l'Etat and in cash. Balances at 
other  banks  are  unusually high,  at 4 582  million  francs,  as  will  be  seen from 
Table 3 deposits with banks. This figure includes the call-money credits granted. 
Of the  items  mentioned above  more  than  two-thirds  are  expressed in currencies 
other  than  those  of  Belgium  or Luxembourg,  which indicates that they are kept 
to a  large extent with foreign (not Belgian) banks or as money-market investments 
in  foreign  countries  other than  Belgium. If this  item  is broken  down into. sight 
and  time  deposits  and  for  the  various  banks  we  a:re  led  to  conclude  that the 
Banque  generale  du  Luxembourg. and the Kredietbank in Luxembourg, place most 
of their liquid surpluses in sight deposits with their parent companies in Brussels, 
whereas  the  Banque  iiiternationale de  Luxembourg,  in which apart from  Belgian 
there  is  also  French  capital,  places  some  of  its  liquid  resources  in  foreign 
countries.  The  Caisse: d'epargne  de  l'Etat has  only  comparatively small sight 
deposits with other banks. 
Of  the  total of  3 223  million  francs  worth  of  commercial  bills  at the  end 
of  1960,  Belgian  commercial  bills  accounted  for  3 056  million.  They represent 
the  remainder  of the  Luxembourg banks'  money-market investments in Brussels, 
largely  in  certified bank  acceptances  rediscountable  with  the  Institut  de rees-
compte  et de  garantie  (IRG  - Rediscount and Guarantee Institute) in Brussels. 
Of  the  total  of  3 798  million  commercial  and  other  bills,  the  Caisse d'  epargne 
de l'Etat has  2 473 million, chiefly bank acceptances rediscountable in Belgium. 
Evidently  the  Caisse  d'epargne  de  l'Etat places  most  of its  liquid reserves in 
these  bank acceptances  (19% of its assets at the end of  1960). The  other large 
banks  have a  relatively small holding of bills in  comparison with their deposits 
with banks. 
17.  Through  the  investments  of  Luxembourg  banks,  especially  the  Caisse 
d'epargne de l'Etat, on foreign money markets, the terms  and conditions prevailing 
on these markets to some extent affect the Luxembourg money and credit market. 
The certified bank acceptances rediscountable with the IRG - to which reference 
has  been  made  above  - are  of particular importance  in this  connection;  with a 
life of  120 days,  their yield is  ~%  lower  than the discount rate  of  the  Banque 
nation  ale de  Belgique. It may therefore  be said that developments  on  the  money 
market in  Belgium - or in other words indirectly the  credit policy of the  Banque 
nationale de  Belgique - partly determine the earnings of the Caisse d'epargne de 
l'Etat.  However,  this  Bank  is  not  much  guided  by  interest  rate  movements in 
other  countries,  in  particular  Belgium;  it can  always  keep  its  rate  of interest 
below  the  level  obtaining  in  Belgium.  One  explanation  for  this  independence 
is  that  Luxembourg  depositors  - even  in  the  frontier  areas  - do  not deposit 
·their  money  with  Belgian  banks  even  if this  means  a  higher  rate  of interest, 
but prefer Luxembourg franc deposit accounts with Luxembourg banks, especially 
the  Caisse  d'epargne  de  l'Etat,  the  more  so  as  deposits  with  the  latter are 
guaranteed by the Luxembourg State. 
18.  .There  is  between  the  capital  market  rates in  Luxembourg  and  Belgium a 
difference  similar  to  that  between  the  rates  of interest  for  short-term  credit.  263 N 
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c) Balances at Banque nationale de Belgique 
Sight deposits with banks (up to 30 days) 
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Bills 
a) Commercial 
b) Treasury and other securities 
Securities 
a) Luxembourg public securities 
b) Foreign public securities 
c) Other fixed interest securities 
d) Equities 
Liabilities: 
Liabilities towards other banks 
Deposits and current accounts 
a) Sight deposits 
b) Time deposits (at more than 1 month) 
Savings deposits 
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a) Belgian Government Debt Certificates (5 - 20 years). 
b) Luxembourg Government Loans (40 years). 
Since  the  end  of  the  war  the  Luxembourg  State and local authorities have paid 
4% interest on all loans on  the Luxembourg capital market - with the exception 
of one loan floated in US  dollars and £  sterling. These loans are taken up by the 
Luxembourg  social  insurance  institution,  private  insurance  companies,  the 
Luxembourg  banks  and,  to  a  smaller extent,  private  individuals.  In  so  far  as 
they are dealt in at all on the Luxembourg stock market,  their quotations remain 
close  to  par,  so  that  during the past fourteen years the yield has nearly always 
been close  to  4%.  The nominal rate of interest on loans floated by  the Belgian 
State or  other  public authorities since  the  end of the  war has on the  other hand 
been between 5 and 6%. Stock exchange quotations have often fluctuated widely, 
as  will be  seen from  the diagram on page  265  showing  the  yield of Government 
debt certificates with a  life of from  5 to 20 years. 
l 
19.  The lower rate  of interest for  Luxembourg  securities  seems  to be largely 
due to  the  fact that most of these are taken up by  the Luxembourg social insur-
ance institution which is prepared to accept a  rate below that offered on Belgian 
securities.  265 266 
CHAPTER  2 
CASH MANAGEMENT AND  BORROWING OF THE STATE 
AND  THEIR EFFECTS ON  LIQUIDITY 
20.  The  Luxembourg  Government  keeps  its  balances at the  Caisse d'epargne 
de  1' Etat which  acts  as  agent of the  Caisse generale  de  1' Etat and therefore 
carries  out  all  the  State's  financial  transactions.  The  Caisse  d'epargne  de 
l'Etat also lends money to the Luxembourg Government. 
Another  source  from  which  the  Luxembourg Government  can  borrow is the 
Banque  nationale  de  Belgique ;  under  an· agreement  of  1952  it can draw credit 
up  to  333  million Bfrs. This borrowing facility,  which has in fact never yet been 
used,  was  fixed  in  the  light  of the  population  ratio  between  the  two  countries 
and  the  volume  of  credit  the  Belgian  Government  can  obtain  from  the Banque 
nationale de  Belgique. 
21.  In  addition,  the  Luxembourg  State  has at its disposal other normal means 
of  financing  such as the issue of Treasury bills  and bonds.  Although  the banks 
are  not  obliged  to  purchase  these  they  nevertheless  hold  considerable  port-
folios  of  them.  At  the  end  of  1960  their  holdings  of  Government securities 
amounted to 1200 million Luxembourg francs  or  about  5%  of their total assets. 
(The outstanding total of these securities is about 5 200 million, but as has been 
pointed out above, the  bulk of them is held by the social insurance institution). 
This  is  the  more  remarkable  as  it is  difficult  to  mobilize  these  securities in 
practice. CHAPTER  3 
CASH  AND  LIQUIDITY RATIOS 
22.  The Luxembourg credit institutions and savings banks- with the exception 
of  the  Caisse  d'epargne  de  l'Etat  - must  observe  certain  cash  and liquidity 
ratios  laid  down  by  the  Commissariat  au  controle  des  banques  (Bank  Control 
Commission}.  The  cash ratio is  the  ratio  between  the  sight and  time  deposits 
of  a  bank  and  its  primary  liquidity,  which  consists  of cash and balances with 
the Postal Cheque Office, the Caisse d'epargne de l'Etat and the  Banque natio-
nale de Belgique. In accordance with a recommendation made by the Bank Control 
Commission  the cash ratio should not be allowed to fall below 6% of the above 
mentioned liabilities. On  31  December 1960 it was 11.5 %. 
23.  The liquidity ratio, likewise recommended by the Bank Control Commission, 
is  the  ratio  between  liabilities  in  respect  of sight,  time  and  savings deposits 
and  assets  in  the  form  of balances  with  banks  in  the  territory  of  the  Belgo-
Luxembourg  Economic  Union,  short-term  advances  and  credits,  rediscountable 
Belgian  commercial  and  other  bills  and  mobilizable  Luxembourg  and  Belgian 
public  securities.  The  Bank  Control  Commission recommended  a  liquidity ratio 
of 30%; in fact it was 50.6% at the end of 1960. 
267 Table  4 
CREDIT  INSTITUTIONS  IN  LUXEMBOURG 
I. Institutions under Luxembourg law 
a  Public corporation  1  Caisse d'epargne de l'Etat 
Ban  que  internationale a Luxembourg 
Banque generale de Luxembourg 
Kredietbank; Luxembourg 
b  Joint stock companies  8 
Ban  que commerciale, Luxembourg 
Cofhylux, Luxembourg 
La Luxembourgeoise, Luxembourg 
Caisse hypothecaire, Luxembourg 
Banque centrale, Luxembourg 
Caisse centrale des associations 
c  Co-operatives  2  agricoles, Luxembourg 
"Fortuna " , Luxembourg 
d  Unlimited mercantile  1  Banque Mathieu Freres, 
partnership  Luxembourg 
II. Institutions under foreign law 
a  Institute enjoying special  1  Banque nationale de Belgique, 
privileges  Luxembourg 
Credit Lyonnais, Luxembourg 
b  Joint stock companies  2  Credit industriel d' Alsace et de 
Lorraine, Luxembourg 
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